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I, Victor Fitzmauri<je, hereby declare that the thesis which follows is
wholly my own work,
(i)
PREFACE
On the night of 23 April 1977, a production well in the
Norwegian Ekofisk Field blew out. After eight days of frantic
activity, the well was brought under control—but few observers
thought that the disappearance of daily news accounts of events
on Platform Bravo signalled a return to the pre-existing state
of affairs. The abstract issue of pollution control in respect
of North Sea petroleum development had become concrete.
At the time of the Ekofisk blowout, this thesis was typed in
final form. In consequence, it was not possible to investigate
the influence of that incident on the development of North Sea
pollution control law. At the time of this writing, it appears
that such influence will be considerable indeed. The present
law of North Sea pollution control has developed in response to
crises: the Torrey Canyon incident, the Santa Barbara blowout,
the Allegro/Pacific Glory collision. The events of 23 April
1977 and the days following will inspire a similar response.
A second omission occasioned by the need to curtail the
length of this investigation concerns events resulting from the
imminent sixth session of UNCLOS III.
The Ekofisk blowout and UNCLOS III are but two reminders
that the law of the sea is subject to daily influences which
shape its evolution to a greater or lesser extent, but at an
accelerating rate. It is hoped that this thesis will assist
the reader to understand these changes.
V.F.
Edinburgh, 13 May 1977
(ii)
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The ocean both links and divides mankind. It is a highway in
peace and a moat in war. Until recently, oceanic vastness was
incomprehensible: Grotius was undoubtedly reflecting the popular
view of the seventeenth century as well as more recent times when
he described the ocean as a body of such magnitude that it could
be "neither seized nor enclosed; nay, which rather possesses the
earth than is by it possessed."'1" Highway or moat, there was room
for all. This is no longer true. Man's increasing numbers and
advancing technology have provided both motive and means for exploi¬
ting the sea. The hope that mankind will benefit from oceanic
resource development is tempered by doubts that this will be so:
how should the increasing conflicts over ocean use be resolved?
The ocean continues to link and divide mankind.
The North Sea is a microcosm of the global marine environment.
Moreover, petroleum development in the North Sea is a forerunner of
similar activity in areas from Alaska to Vietnam. Analysis of the
control of marine pollution resulting from offshore petroleum devel¬
opment in the North Sea provides some indication of the nature of
problems which will arise at an increasing rate in other oceans.
The primary objective of this thesis is to suggest an effective
legal regime to control marine pollution from the development of
petroleum in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea. The
proposed model legal regime is intended to provide insights into
1. Grotius, H., Mare Liberum (1609). This work was Chapter 12 of
De Jure Praedae, which was not published until 1868.
2
this aspect of offshore petroleum development which will be useful
2
in other marine areas as well. This objective is based on an
investigation of the causes and effects of North Sea marine pollution
and the nature of the present legal regime.
A. Causes and Effects
The causes and effects of marine pollution are considered in
Chapter Two. The analysis is primarily concerned with sea-based
sources of environmental damage; it considers vessels, petroleum
transfer and refining, and offshore petroleum development. The
role of land-based marine pollution sources is discussed in connec¬
tion with the capability of the North Sea to assimilate all mater¬
ials which may enter it as a result of human activity.
This thesis uses the United Nations definition of "marine
pollution":
"The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances or energy into the marine environment resulting
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources,
hazards to health, hindrance to marine activities, in¬
cluding fishing, impairment of quality for use of sea-water
and reduction of amenities.
This broad definition encompasses conflicts with other users of
the North Sea, such as obstructions to navigation caused by installa¬
tion clusters or damage to fishing nets caused by oil-related debris
on the seabed. As the North Sea is intensively used for a number
of marine activities, potential "pollution" in the sense of user
2. A leading industry journal observed that North Sea experience
is likely to be of great value in development of the petroleum
resources in the Gulf of Alaska. Noroil (November 1975), at p.
38.
3. U.N. Doc. 3/5003, 1971, p. 5.
3
conflict is serious indeed. This thesis is concerned with the
control of any pollution resulting from the development and trans¬
portation of North Sea petroleum. Thus, the disposal of drilling
mud from an offshore installation or the consequences of a tanker-
mobile platform collision are both pertinent. It has been necessary,
because of limitations of time and space, to exclude much of the law
of vessel safety. It is also regrettable that it has not been
possible to discuss in detail the subject of personnel qualifica¬
tions and training, for it is well known that many maritime accidents
5
are caused by human error rather than equipment failure. It is
hoped that references cited herin will enable the interested
reader to pursue these issues.
B. The Legal Regime of Marine Pollution Control
This thesis investigates the legal control of marine pollution
6
in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea. It is recog¬
nised that considering less than the total national law relevant
4. The competing uses and interests in the North Sea are described
in detail in Sibthorp, M. (ed.), The North Sea: Challenge and
Opportunity, A Report of a Study Group of the David Davies
Memorial Institute of International Studies, published by
Europa Publications, London (1975), at pp. 67-84.
5. For example, it has been reported that "over 50 per cent, of
the collision or grounding type of tanker casualties can be
attributed to human error." Congress of the United States,
Office of Technology Assessment, Oil Transportation by Tankers:
An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measures, Washington,
D.C. (1975), at p. 57.
6. For the purposes of this thesis, the southern and northern limits
of the North Sea are considered to be 51° 48' 18" N. and 61° 44'
12" N., the present limits of the U.K.-Continent continental
shelf boundary.
4
to North Sea pollution control is artificial because the sea is
itself indivisible. However, it was necessary to limit the scope
of this investigation in order to permit a thorough analysis of
both municipal and international law. It was decided that concen¬
trating on the two principal petroleum producing States in the North
Sea would permit a thorough investigation within a manageable scope.
The U.K. and Norway have many common interests; in addition to
their status as major oil producing nations, they are both
coastal States and each is a substantial merchant shipping nation.
Thus, each Government has an interest in petroleum production,
coastal protection, and freedom of navigation. Despite these shared
interests, the U.K. and Norway have adopted different approaches
to offshore oil and gas development because their needs are different.
The U.K. needs more oil because her larger population consumes
far more petroleum than is the case in Norway and, unlike her
Scandinavian neighbour, her hydroelectric generating capacity
is small. Moreover, the British economy has come to depend upon
massive foreign borrowing to survive. Much of this borrowing
7
is secured by projected revenues from North Sea oil. U.K. policy
therefore emphasises production.
Norway, on the other hand, has one of the world's strongest
8
economies. Norwegian policy tends to concentrate on orderly
7. Neil, A., "North Sea Oil: Make or Break?" Survey, The Economist,
26 July - 1 August, 1975, at p. 1. The Department of Energy in
United Kingdom Offshore Oil and Gas Policy, Cmnd. 5696 (1974),
omits mention of these considerations.
8. Leonard, R., "Norway: The Next Richest Nation," Survey, The
Economist, 15-21 November 1975, p. 3 et seg.
5
development of offshore resources and minimisation of social dis¬
ruptions which could accompany rapid expansion of petroleum produc¬
tion. Furthermore, prevailing meteorological conditions suggest
9
that in the event of a massive oil spill in existing North Sea
oil fields, Norway would be more likely to suffer damage than would
Britain. This possibility is clearly a consideration in Norwegian
oil development policy.
How are these divergent policies manifested in law and how
effective is such law in environmental protection? Answering
this question is a central concern of those chapters which analyse
the constituents of the present regime of North Sea pollution
control. Chapters Three and Four consider the role of international
law in the prevention of pollution and liability for pollution
damage. Industry compensation schemes are briefly discussed in a
chapter placed after the discussion of the international law of
liability. Industry agreements are both international and
governed by rules of law; it is of interest to compare them with
the analogous public international law compensation schemes.
Separate chapters are allocated to the U.K. law of pollution
prevention, the U.K. law of liability for pollution damage, the
Norwegian law of pollution prevention, and the Norwegian law of
civil liability. Municipal law is of great importance in the
North Sea, not only because it implements international conventional
9. But Scotland might become a victim of pollution from a possible
new field only twenty miles off the Scottish coast. See Banal,
R., "Mesa Strike Stimulates Interest in Moray Firth," The
Scotsman, "oil Register," 25 January 1977, p. iii.
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law, but also because many petroleum development activities are
subject to jurisdiction which proceeds from coastal State sovereignty
or sovereign rights.
The suggested model legal regime in Chapter Ten attempts to
coordinate laws and reconcile values to the extent realistically
possible. Coordination of national and international law concen¬
trates on establishing a system of uniform standards and enforce¬
ment for the United Kingdom and Norwegian areas initially, and
then expands these recommendations to include the entire North
Sea. An interdisciplinary approach is employed to weigh carefully
multiple factors—economic, technological, sociological and
political—in order to provide a solid foundation upon which to
base the suggested model legal regime.
CHAPTER TWO
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARINE POLLUTION
"Pollution" as defined in this thesis includes the introduction
of substances into the sea which cause environmental injury and/or
which diminish other users' enjoyment of the sea.^ Pollution contem¬
plates the introduction of harmful agents into the sea and is there¬
fore concerned with the nature of those agents, the pathways they
use to enter the ocean, and the effects thus wrought on the marine
environment. This process is imperfectly understood despite exten-
2
sive research and voluminous writings; the summary contained in
this chapter is included to refresh the reader's memory and to
present some of the more recent findings relevant to the North Sea
3
rather than as a contribution to scientific inquiry.
A. Causes of Marine Pollution
1. Land-based sources of marine pollution
Most marine pollution is caused by agents which are transferred
4
from land to sea by rivers or winds. The imperfect data available
1. See Chapter One, p. 2.
2. See, for example, Moulder, D. and Varley, A., A Bibliography on
Marine and Estuarine Oil Pollution, Supplement 1, Marine Pollution
Information Centre, Marine Biological Association of the United
Kingdom, Plymouth (June, 1975). This bibliography contains 1,200
references and complements an earlier work which contained nearly
1,100—yet it considers only marine oil pollution.
3. It has also been suggested by Viktor Sebek, Secretary of the
Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, that as legal
protection is based upon scientific investigation, lawyers and
legislators would do well to acquire at least a minimal under¬
standing of the scientific problems involved. (Conversation
with the author, June, 1976.)
4. Hardy, M., "Offshore Development and Marine Pollution," 1 Ocean
Development and International Law 239-273 (1973-74), at 242.
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make an accurate estimate of how much land-based sources contribute
to the total problem of marine pollution impossible, but there is
general agreement that the figure must be well above fifty per cent.,
perhaps as much as seventy per cent. There are literally hundreds
of pollutants,^ ranging from ultra-hazardous radioactive wastes to
inert marine dredge spoils; thermal and seismic discharges are in-
eluded among the pollutive activities. The North Sea is character¬
ized by strong flushing action, and, in consequence, its capacity to
assimilate such agents and to accommodate such activities is consid¬
erably enhanced. It is not, however, unlimited, and account must
7
be taken of possible synergistic as well as cumulative effects. It
is clear, therefore, that control of North Sea pollution must con¬
sider harmful inputs from all sources. Thus, although this thesis
5. The Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollu¬
tion (GESAMP) has prepared a list of several hundred substances
in connection with its work on ocean dumping. See Chapter Three,
p. 107.
6. A GESAMP list of major marine pollutants includes: radioactive
materials, oil, sewage, pesticides, inorganic wastes, petrochem¬
icals and organic chemicals, organic wastes, military wastes,
heat, detergents, solid objects, and dredging spoil and inert
wastes. Report of the Second Session, March 1970 (GESAMP 11/11,
June 20, 1970) Annex V: "Review of Harmful Chemical Substances,"
p. 16.
7. The "synergistic effect" by which chemical interactions may cause
substances to become more harmful than the sum of their separate
characteristics may also be manifested indirectly. Barbara Ward
has observed that oil spills in the Arctic are such an example.
Should oil cover the surface of ice floes, sunlight would be
absorbed at an unusual rate, possibly causing increased melting
and a consequent increase in the sea level, to the substantial
detriment of coastal communities. See the Introduction to
Hallman, R., Towards an Environmentally Sound Law of the Sea,
A Report of the International Institute for Environment and
Development, London (1974), at p. 7.
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will not consider the legal control of land-based pollution sources,
it will outline the transfer of harmful agents from the land to the
North Sea insofar as that process is understood,
a) rivers and outfall pipes
Rivers and outfall pipes carry society's wastes into the sea.
Rivers are a particularly significant pathway for agents which may
be washed off the land; it has been estimated that about fifty per
cent, of the pesticides and heavy metals which enter the sea have
Q
drained from agricultural land into watercourses. It is generally
accepted that the Rhine is the single greatest source of pollutants
9
introduced into the North Sea. Rivers are particularly prone to
become overloaded in their capacity to assimilate the substances
dumped into them because they may pass through several countries
and regulation may therefore depend upon inter-governmental agree-
4- 10ment.
8. Kelbie, D. "Law and Pollution in Scotland," 18 Journal of the
Law Society of Scotland 174-179, (1973), at p. 174. It is
estimated that seventy-five per cent, of all DDT ever used is
still on land and waiting to be washed off. Ibid.
9. A significant amount of oil is no doubt also delivered to the
sea in Rhine effluent. One writer has noted that an estimated
10 million tons of oily bilge water per year is discharged
into the Rhine from river craft. Tinker, J., "Europe's Majestic
Sewer," 56 New Scientist 194-199 (1972), at p. 199. See also
The Times, 12 April 1972, p. VII.
10. Control of pollution in the Rhine is fraught with such problems.
In 1963, France, West Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland and
Luxembourg established the International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine. Since that date the most noticeable
change which has occurred is the steady decline in the quality
of Rhine water. A particular problem is the discharge of
sodium chloride from Alsace mines into the river: cessation or
elimination of this practice would entail economic consequences
which the French are unwilling to bear alone, and the apportionment
10
Municipal sewage is frequently discharged from outfall pipes,
and though the quantities of effluent entering the sea may be com¬
paratively small individually, cumulatively they become significant.
Moreover, even as rivers may be described as "open sewers," so out¬
fall pipes might well be termed "closed rivers," for in addition to
human wastes, such channels also convey a considerable volume of
industrial wastes—including oil^—to the sea.
of which is a subject of disagreement among the riparian States.
The Times, 3 May 1976, p. 4.
"On 3.12.1976 France, Germany (F.R.), Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Switzerland and the European Communities signed a Convention
for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution and
an Additional Agreement to the 1963 Agreement concerning the
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine
against Pollution. The latter provides for the EC to take
part in the work of the Commission. At the same time the five
States also signed a convention on the protection of the Rhine
from pollution caused by salt." Bulletin of Legal Developments,
17 December 1976, p. 243, citing Guardian 4 December 1976, p. 3.
Another writer has pointed out that rivers enable (some might
say "require") landlocked States to discharge wastes into the
sea. At UNCLOS III, Iraq "suggested that a more appropriate
rendering of the terms 'marine pollution' and 'marine environ¬
ment' would be 'water pollution' and 'water environment' since
so many pollutants are brought to the sea by rivers." Birnie,
P., "The Basic Obligation to Protect the Marine Environment,"
in Stein, R. (ed.), Critical Environmental Issues on the Law
of the Sea, a Report of the International Institute of Envir¬
onment and Development, London (1975), pp. 1-8, at p. 2.
11. One writer has suggested that "the largest single source of
oil to the ocean may come from such sources as old crank case
oil from automobiles" dumped into municipal sewers. "Although
much of the oil is removed by sewage treatment, that which is
not passes through sewage treatment plants virtually unmod¬
ified. For example, we are reasonably certain that the largest
single source of oil pollution in Narragansett Bay is not
spills from tankers, oil storage facilities, or similar obvious
sources, but our sewage treatment plants." Knauss, J., "Ocean
Pollution: Status and Prognostication," in Gamble, J. and
Pontecorvo, G. (eds.), Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of




Pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and pesticides may be trans¬
ported by winds for great distances before falling to earth or sea.
The atmospheric pathway is particularly efficient for transferring
hydrocarbons from land to sea in the form of gases and particulate
matter resulting from petroleum burning.^ This is one of the
contributors to marine pollution about which we have the most to
learn; it is, therefore, not possible to estimate with confidence
14
hydrocarbons entering the North Sea by atmospheric transfer.
pp. 313-332, at p. 323. Mr. Knauss cites Farrington, J. and
Quinn, J., "Petroleum Hydrocarbons and Fatty Acids in Waste
Water Effluents," 43 Journal of the Water Pollution Control
Federation 704-712 (1973) in connection with the Narragan-
sett Bay findings.
12. Salmon and trout stocks in the rivers and lakes of southern
Norway are being depleted by acid rain caused by air pollution
in Britain, according to a report from the Norwegian Ministry
of Environment. Sweden has issued a similar report. The
Guardian, 13 October 1975, p. 15. See also, Norwegian Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway's National Report to the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972),
p. 40. Ten Northwestern European States under the auspices
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop¬
ment (OECD) are monitoring atmospheric sulphur dioxide.
Sibthorp, M. (ed.), The North Sea: Challenge and Opportunity,
David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies,
Europa Publications, London (1975), p. 39.
13. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences estimates that about two-
thirds of the hydrocarbons entering the atmosphere are from
transportation. Fuel consumption from fixed locations, industry,
and solvent and gasoline evaporation account for the remainder.
National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environ¬
ment, Washington, D.C. (1975), p. 10. See also, National
Academy of Sciences, Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants,
Washington, D.C. (1975), p. 162.
14. A recent Report concluded that "the atmosphere as a pathway
for the entry of metals /"into the North Sea] has been shown to
be of importance for at least the two elements iron and lead,
and, possibly for a third, zinc." Nothing was stated concerning
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c) ocean dumping
Ocean dumping involves the use of vessels or aircraft to trans¬
port wastes from land to a disposal site at sea. This method of
disposal is likely to be selected when it is cheaper than terrestrial
alternatives, or is thought to be less risky. In the former category
is the huge volume of sewage sludge and rubbish produced by coastal
megalopolises;"^ in the second category, the most striking example
hydrocarbons. International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea (ICES), Cooperative Research Report No. 39 (1974), p.
25. Various estimates of atmospheric transfer of hydrocarbons
to global seas have been made; one scientist estimates that
"over 95 per cent, of the petroleum flux into the marine environ¬
ment is airborne." Van Grieken, R., "Ocean-Atmosphere Inter¬
actions and Oil Pollution," in Sierra Club, Ocean Resources and
the Ocean Environment, San Francisco (1974), pp. 9-14.
However, it is submitted that such findings should be treated
with caution, particularly when they are used as a basis for
deducing that the North Sea is representative of the world.
This may be the case: Knauss has observed that because of
atmospheric mixing, airborne marine pollutants are likely to
be uniformly distributed around the world. Knauss, J., op.
cit. in footnote 11, at p. 326. On the other hand, Mr. Hardy
suggests that only certain areas may be affected. Hardy, M.,
op. cit. in footnote 4, at pp. 242-243. The most prudent
course would appear to be acceptance of Knauss's comment
that "our present level of understanding is best characterized
by saying that we believe we have some estimate of the magnitude
of the problem," and to consider this imperfect knowledge in
any assessment of North Sea pollution. Knauss, J., op. cit.
in footnote 11, at p. 318.
15. One authority predicts that "in the year 2000 half of the esti¬
mated 312-million population of the U.S. will live on the 5
per cent, of the land areas in three coastal urban belts: the
megalopolises of the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Great Lakes.
Along with the people will come an intensification of competing
demands for the limited resources of the narrow, fragile coastal
zone." Wenk, E., "The Physical Resources of the Ocean," in
The Ocean, a Scientific American Book (1969). An extensive
review of U.S. ocean dumping has produced the conclusion that
localised damage could result (as in the New York Bight) from
dredge spoil and sewage sludge. National Academy of Sciences,
Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, Washington, D.C. (1975),
pp. 228-290.
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is nuclear material. The volume of material dumped at sea is
increasing at a great rate, as is the variety of substances dis-
17
posed of. Substances disposed of in the North Sea appear to be
The trend to urban conglomerations in general and to coastal
concentrations of population in particular is a global one,
and will increase the volumes of land-based substances enter¬
ing the North Sea as is the case in the U.S. ICES has detailed
information on North Sea sewage inputs compiled in their Report
No. 39 (op. cit. in footnote 14, at p. 15 et seq.), and that
organisation is but one of several groups continuing to investi¬
gate the problem. See, e.g., World Health Organisation,
Regional Office for Europe, "Long-Term Programme in Environ¬
mental Pollution Control in Europe: The Hazards to Health
and Ecological Effects of Pollution of the North Sea," Report
on a Working Group, Bilthoven (1972) .
16. The proliferation of nuclear power stations is causing concern
about a number of aspects of their operation, including waste
disposal. A recent U.K. Report has suggested that present
techniques of radioactive waste storage are inadequate in view
of the fact that such materials remain dangerous for thousands
of years and, because of this and other dangers, it was con¬
cluded that the present U.K. nuclear power programme exposes
the public to unjustifiable risks. Royal Commission on Environ¬
mental Pollution, Nuclear Power and the Environment,
Cmnd. 6618 (1976). This Report coincides with increasing
accounts of leakage from drums of radioactive waste dumped in
the last twenty years. The Times, 22 May 1976, p. 5; International
Herald Tribune, 22-23 May 1976, p. 3. Obsolete military equip¬
ment is another example of dangerous materials disposed of at
sea because the risks of storing them on land are judged to be
greater than ocean dumping. See, e.g., Brown, E.D., "International
Law and Marine Pollution: Radioactive Waste and Other Hazardous
Substances," 11 Natural Resources Journal 221-255 (1971).
Professor Brown includes in an Appendix, "The Ocean Dumping of
Nerve Gas: A Case Study of 'Operation Chase.'"
17. It has been estimated that the volume of industrial waste
reaching the oceans will increase sevenfold in the decade of the
seventies. Wenk, E., op. cit. in footnote 15, at p. 90. A
great increase in ocean dumping will result as pressures mount
for clean rivers, lakes, and land storage. See, e.g., a recent
account in The Times of a U.K. Government Report: "Every year
about 2,700,000 tons of colliery waste is tipped on a six-mile
stretch of coast" in England. It is discharged by outfall pipes
which end on the beach itself, thus staining that area. In
considering alternative methods of waste disposal, a Department
of the Environment Report suggested ocean dumping as the most
14
limited to industrial wastes of comparatively low toxicity, sewage
18
sludge, and dredge spoils. Most of the North Sea littoral States
are now parties to one or more conventions, the terms of which regulate
19
this practice. It should be noted, however, that the available
evidence indicates that the disposal of oil-related debris in the
efficient and economic solution. The Times, 31 October 1975,
p. 2. The increase in the variety of materials dumped may be
even more serious. Although GESAMP are attempting to assess
the effects of materials on the marine environment so that a
basis exists for deciding the conditions under which dumping
may occur, it may well be that new and chemically complex
products are being produced faster than careful assessment
(especially of the long-term effects) can occur. See, e.g.,
Norwegian Ministry of Environment, Parliamentary Report No. 44,
(1975-76), "Pollution Control Measures," para. 1.1; the
description of an "early warning scheme" designed to "prevent
the discharge of waste substances that later turn out to have
undesirable physical, chemical and biological properties,"
The Times, 10 April 1975, p. 2. The National Academy of
Sciences of the U.S. has also concluded that "dumped material
is often poorly characterized chemically," National Academy of
Sciences, Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, Washington,
D.C. (1975), at p. 5.
18. The ICES Report (op. cit. in footnote 14, at p. 25) concluded that
marine dumping activities in the North Sea "were, however, shown
to be of relatively minor importance in terms of total pollutant
inputs and to be confined to minerals such as colliery wastes
or harbour dredging with some dumping of chemical waste, pri¬
marily of waste acid from the production of titanium dioxide.
The only other major waste which is dumped is sewage sludge."
Replies to the ICES questionnaire relating to dumping in the
North Sea indicate that, as of mid 1972, Norway reported no
dumping and the U.K. reported some ocean disposal (op. cit. in
footnote 14, at pp. 23-24 and Table 4, at pp. 86-88). Wastes
licensed by the U.K. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food (excluding licences issued by the Department of Agriculture
and Fisheries for Scotland) are tabulated in Table 7 in a paper
presented by P. Wood at the Conference on Exploitation of the
North Sea: Greenwich Forum, 23-25 April 1975, at p. 34.
19. See the discussions of the Oslo Convention (p. 205), the London
Convention (p. 209), the U.K. Dumping at Sea Act 1974 (p. 382),
and the Norwegian "Regulations on dumping of substances which
may have harmful effects on marine life and human health"
(p. 485). Because of the economics of transportation, it is
unlikely that States not bordering the North Sea would dump there.
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North Sea is a common practice. Although the scale of such dumping
is probably much smaller than that of the commercial ocean dumpers
whom the legislation was intended to regulate, it is still a reminder
that even where the pathway from land to sea is not complex, economic
and convenience factors conspire to render scientific knowledge of
man's impact on the oceans imperfect.
2. Sea-based sources of marine pollution
Installations, submarine pipelines, and vessels are devices for
the production and transportation of hydrocarbons; it is, therefore,
to be expected that they pose some risk of oil pollution to the marine
environment. Vessels carrying hazardous cargoes may also threaten
very serious injury to the sea, but although the potential harm is
21
great, the likelihood of its occurrence is small when compared to
20. See below, pp. 53, 444.
21. For example, see the account of a freighter which sank in the
Adriatic Sea following a collision, carrying with her a cargo
of 900 barrels of poisonous lead derivatives. International
Herald Tribune, 17-18 January 1976, p. 2. Crew training, traf¬
fic separation schemes, and vessel construction standards are
intended to minimise such risks. See below, p. 106. It has
also been suggested that damage to a vessel carrying hazardous
materials such as ammonia, chlorine, or liquefied natural gas
in close proximimity to inhabited areas could have particularly
severe consequences. Bates, C. and Yost, P., "Where Trends the
Flow of Merchant Ships?" in Gamble, J. and Pontecorvo, G,,
Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans, Ballinger
Publishing, Cambridge, Mass. (1973), pp. 249-284, at p. 275.
This view is certainly supported by the events of 16 April
1947 when the French ship Grandcamp caught fire as she was
taking on a cargo of ammonium nitrate at Texas City, near
Galveston. An attempt was made to tow the burning vessel
away from the dock, but before she had been moved very far,
she exploded. This in turn set off a tremendous explosion at
a chemical plant some 1,000 yards away and also ignited oil
refinery installations. At least one-third of the town of
15,000 persons was destroyed and hundreds of people were killed
or injured. The Times, 17 April 1947, p. 4. Cf. the account
16
oil pollution. This situation results from the express nature and
scope of carriage of oil by sea.
Petroleum is the most important potential pollutant of the marine
environment because of the tremendous quantity which is carried by
23
sea. Oil is the principal source of energy in the industrialized
world and, increasingly, it is produced in one part of the world and
consumed in another. A recent study has found that for the year 1973,
global oil consumption was 2.76 billion tons, of which 1.70 billion
tons (62 per cent.) was transported from point of production to place
24
of consumption, nearly all of it by tanker.
of an oil company which plans to build a natural gas liquids
plant at North Collielow, Peterhead, and the testimony of
their witness before an inquiry panel that "out of the esti¬
mated 60,000 plus loadings worldwide by liquid petroleum gas
tankers since the early 1950s there had been fewer than lOO
incidents—and in fewer than 20 of these was there damage to
a ship or to shore property." The Press and Journal (Aberdeen),
9 June 1976, p. 6.
22. There is general agreement that oil is the most important cargo
from the point of view of environmental protection. See, e.g.,
Sandbrook, R. and Yurchyshyn, A., "Marine Pollution from
Vessels," in Stein, R. (ed.), Critical Environmental Issues on
the Law of the Sea, A Report of the International Institute
for Environment and Development, London (1975) , pp. 19-29, at p.
19.
23. The risk of oil transportation in the North Sea is described in
detail in U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on
Environmental Pollution, Accidental Oil Pollution of the Sea,
Pollution Paper No. 8 (1976), H.M.S.O., particularly para¬
graph 1.12 and Appendix C.
24. "Out of a total of more than 50,000 merchant ships afloat,
6,000 ships, with a carrying capacity of 180 million DWT
were used to transport this oil. . . another 250 million tons
of refined petroleum products moved across national borders,
predominantly by ship." National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum
in the Marine Environment, Washington, D.C. (1975) , p. 8; Congress
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The increase in size and variety of vessels used to trans¬
port hydrocarbons by sea has been described by many writers and
of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Oil
Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution
and Safety Measures, Washington, D.C. (1975), at p. 8; citing
British Petroleum, Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry,
1973.
25. During World War II, 16,000 tons deadweight (DWT) was the stand¬
ard size tanker; in 1950, a 25,000 ton DWT tanker was considered
large; by the mid 1950s a few tankers of 40,000-50,000 tons
DWT were operating; following the Suez crisis of 1956 tankers
of over 100,000 tons DWT were constructed; in the 1960s the
most frequently ordered tanker was just over 200,000 tons DWT.
Since that time, tankers of increasing size have been ordered,
including a few of 500,000 tons DWT. Congress of the United
States, op. cit. in footnote 24, at pp. 15-16. This trend has
slowed, if not stopped, primarily because of present excess
tanker capacity. However, "present sizes of tankers will not
diminish on the major long-distance routes" because vast invest¬
ments have already been made in large ships and because it is
probably cheaper to run a large ship on a longer route than
several smaller tankers on a shorter route. U.K. Department
of the Environment, Central Unit on Environmental Pollution,
op. cit. in footnote 23, para. 4.6, p. 33. On the other hand, few
ports can accommodate the largest supertankers presently in
service when they are fully loaded; moreover, many straits
(such as the Strait of Malacca), semi-enclosed seas (such as the
North Sea) and other shallow areas of the ocean may severely
restrict navigation. For this reason, the tankers used in the
North Sea are not likely to exceed 300,000 tons DWT. Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution, Fourth Report, Cmnd.
5780 (1974), at p. 48.
26. New vessel types include liquefied natural gas carriers, con¬
tainer ships capable of great speeds (and with the capability
to carry packaged petroleum products), and a proposed "Arctic
tanker" which could break its own ice where necessary. Bates,
C. and Yost, P., op. cit. in footnote 21, at p. 252. Because
of current tanker overcapacity, few new vessels are likely to
be built in the near future. The tentative orders by Globtik
Tankers Ltd. for three nuclear powered vessels of 600,000 DWT
is seen by many shipping experts as a "gigantic risk." Inter¬
national Herald Tribune, 3 February 1977, p. 7. Nevertheless,
there is reason to believe that the world tanker glut may dis¬
appear by 1980, five years earlier than expected. The growth
in Middle East exports to the U.S. may not only absorb present
tanker capacity, but require the construction of new vessels.
The Economist, 12 February 1977, p. 104.
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therefore will not be discussed in detail here. Suffice to say
that, whatever the effects of the current recession on the market
for tanker transportation in other parts of the world, the demand
28
for these vessels in the North Sea will increase. Until recently,
little tanker traffic traversed the North Sea north of Rotterdam.
(See Figure II-l on the following page.) The North Sea States
were exclusively importers of petroleum. As oil is produced from
beneath the North Sea this pattern will change. (See Figure II-2
on page 20.) Imports of Middle Eastern oil to Northwest Europe
29
will continue, but new tanker movements resulting from locally
produced oil will include:"^0
1. Transportation from some U.K. and Norwegian fields to
the U.K. and Norway.^
27. See, for example, Birnie, P., "Prevention of Pollution from Ships:
Problems and Progress," a paper presented to the British Inter¬
national Studies Association Conference, Birmingham, December
1975. For a popular approach, see Mostert, N., Supership,
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England (1975).
28. North Sea oil production started in July, 1971 when the Norwegian
Ekofisk Field went on stream. Initial transfer of recovered oil
to Norway was by tanker, the gas being flared. Norwegian Min¬
istry of Industry, Report No. 30 to the Norwegian Storting,
(1973-74), pp. 15-16. See also Chapter Eight. The first oil
from the U.K. sector was brought ashore by tanker from the
Argyll Field in June, 1975. U.K. Department of Energy, Oil
from the U.K. Continental Shelf, Fact Sheet 2 (July 1976), p. 2.
29. North Sea oil is in general lighter than that from the Middle
East and is not suitable for all purposes. In consequence, it
will be necessary to import some petroleum, even after the U.K.
and Norway become net exporters of oil.
30. U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Environ¬
mental Pollution, Accidental Oil Pollution of the Sea, Pollution
Paper No. 8, H.M.S.O. (1976), para. 4.10, p. 34.
31. Petroleum produced from U.K. and Norwegian fields must be landed
19
FIGURE II-l
Source: U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Envi¬
ronmental Pollution, Accidental Oil Pollution of the Sea,
Pollution Paper No. 8, H.M.S.O. (1976), Figure 3.
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FIGURE II-2
PREDICTED FLOW OF CRUDE OIL AND
PRODUCTS BY TANKER IN 1981
0 5 20 40 60 200 300
million tonnes crude oil
North Sea crude oil from
UK ports
Other crude oil and products /
Exported
I
Source: U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Envi¬
ronmental Pollution, Accidental Oil Pollution of the Sea,
Pollution Paper No. 8, H.M.S.O. (1976), Figure 4.
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2. Transportation from U.K. pipeline terminals to U.K. refin¬
eries .
3. Transportation from the U.K. and Norway to other countries
(including the landing of Norwegian petroleum in the U.K.).
This increased activity is bound to increase the risk of damage to
the marine environment of the North Sea and its coasts from operation¬
al and accidental discharges of crude oil and derivative products.
The risk of marine pollution from the exploration for and produc¬
tion of petroleum from the North Sea continental shelf is difficult
to assess because there is no history from which to extrapolate prece¬
dents and comparisons with established areas, such as the Gulf of
Mexico, must be viewed with the caution that oceanographic and meteor¬
ological differences require. This task will be undertaken in the
context of an examination of all sources of marine oil pollution.
The data presented in Table II-l provide a basis for assumptions
32
about oil discharges into the North Sea. It was observed above that
in the U.K. and Norway respectively before it can be exported,
unless an exception is granted. Norwegian petroleum piped from
the Ekofisk field to Teesside, England, and thence by tanker to
Norway is such an exception. See the U.K. Petroleum (Production)
Regulations 1976, Schedule 5, Model Clause 28; see also the
Royal Decree of 8th December 1972 relating to Exploration for and
Exploitation of Petroleum in the Seabed and Substrata of the
Norwegian Continental Shelf, S. 34.
32. The estimate presented in Table II-l is but one of many. See, for
example, National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine
Environment, Washington, D.C. (1975), Table 1-6, p. 6, "Com¬
parison of Estimates for Petroleum Hydrocarbons Annually Enter¬
ing the Ocean, circa 1969-1971," which compares MIT, U.S. Coast
Guard and NAS estimates. See also Wardley Smith, J., "Oil
Spills from Tankers," a paper presented to the Marine Ecology
and Oil Pollution Conference, Aviemore, 21-23 April 1975, under
the auspices of the Institute of Petroleum. Table 1 of that
paper compares three additional estimates of sources of oil in
the marine environment. The NAS estimate was selected as a
22
TABLE II-l
ESTIMATED OIL INPUT TO THE WORLD'S OCEANS FROM ALL SOURCES
Source
Input rate


















































Source: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment, Oil Transportation by Tankers, Table III-2, p. 27,
citing National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine
Environment (1975) .
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most marine pollution came from land-based sources and Table II-l
indicates that this is true in the particular case of oil as well.
River runoff is the greatest single pathway of marine oil pollution
and all land-based sources contribute about one-half of the total.
Most of the remainder is accounted for by marine transportation;
coastal refineries contribute a small volume, but at present the oil
input from offshore production is small. These sea-based sources of
oil pollution will be examined in the subsections below,
a) vessels
i) operational discharges
Most vessel-source oil pollution results from normal operations.
Table II-l indicates that non-Load On Top (LOT) tankers, bilge clean¬
ing and bunkering, LOT tankers, and dry docking contribute to marine
oil pollution in that order and rank far ahead of accidents and
terminal operations. The categories "non-LOT tankers" and "LOT
tankers" represent oil discharged as a result of ballasting or
representative example of recent work by a respected institution.
It is recognized that great care must be exercised in the use of
these data, particularly when applying them to the North Sea.
In the first place, offshore oil production is increasing
rapidly: exploration and exploitation is now planned or in
progress in a variety of environments off 65 countries and six
continents. Production of offshore oil now comprises about 18
per cent of the global total, but is estimated by one writer to
increase to 30-40 per cent, of a nearly doubled total by 1980.
Ward, B., op. cit. in footnote 7, in the Introduction, at pp.
2-3; Hallman, R., "Environmental Regulation of Marine-Based
Activities (Non-Vessel) in Areas of National Jurisdiction," in
Stein, R. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 22, pp. 9-18, at p. 10.
Secondly, caution must be used in attributing the character¬
istics of the global marine environment to a particular area.
For example, although natural seeps exist in the North Sea
(National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environ¬
ment, Washington, D.C. (1975), p. 7), this is not a significant
source of North Sea hydrocarbon input. In the Santa Barbara
Channel, this pathway is very important.
24
tank washing operations.
"Ballasting" is the discharge of water carried in cargo tanks of
an otherwise empty tanker to give it stability necessary for safe
33
operation. This is a function of the tanker cargo market: petroleum
is usually carried only from producer to consumer and no cargo is
available for the return voyage. A tanker is likely to take on ballast
as soon as possible on the journey from consumer to producer State,
34
and as all tanks need not be used to achieve the required weight,
the ballast water can be shifted from tank to tank while the empty
35
tanks are washed and the oily effluent discharged. This procedure
allows the tanker to remain in ballast for the maximum time, for
it can retain the clean ballast water until it must be discharged to
make room for cargo without incurring the wrath of producing State
port officials.
33. The following description of ballasting and tank washing is
based on an account given in a U.K. Department of Trade (Marine
Division) brochure, "The battle against oil pollution at sea,"
(March, 1976), pp. 2-3. This publication also contains useful
illustrations of the LOT system.
34. Only about 30 to 40 per cent, of the vessel's DWT tonnage is
required as ballast.
35. About one per cent, of the tank's capacity may be discharged with
the wash water. The exact percentage depends upon the type of
petroleum which was carried; one estimate is that the range is
from O.l per cent, in the case of light refined products to as
much as 1.5 per cent, for residential fuel oils. National Acad¬
emy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environment, Washington,
D.C. (1975), p. 8. The internal surfaces of cargo tanks in some
supertankers may cumulatively be measured in acres; it is not
surprising, therefore, that oil discharged in washings may amount
to thousands of tons. This loss of cargo has an economic cost to
the oil companies, as well as an adverse impact on the sea, and
one company has developed a method to wash tanks using jets of
crude oil which significantly reduces the amount of oil adhering
to the tanks when they are water washed.
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"Load on top" (LOT) is a procedure whereby one tank is designated
to receive the washings from the others rather than discharging oily
water from each into the sea. If the voyage is of sufficient length,
the seas relatively calm, and the petroleum cargo the usual one of
37
crude oil or other heavy products, the oil.will separate from the
water, rising to the top and so permitting the discharge of the rela-
38
tively clean water from below. A new cargo of oil may then be
39
"loaded on top" of the oil thus saved from discharge. As indicated
in Table II-l, non-LOT tankers are responsible for about twice as much
oil entering the marine environment as vessels using
the LOT system. The difference becomes even more significant in the
light of estimates that only about twenty per cent, of the world's
40
tankers do not use LOT.
36. The minimum time necessary for the oil and water to separate
properly is approximately three days.
37. Crude oil represents about 85 per cent, of petroleum carried by
sea. North Sea oil will initially be carried almost entirely as
crude, but as British and Norwegian petrochemical industries
expand, it is likely that a considerable volume of refined
and synthetic products will be carried as well.
38. The potential for about 99 per cent, efficiency is, in practice,
considered to be approximately 90 per cent., because "the per¬
formance of a tanker depends on the concern and proficiency of
tanker crews." National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the
Marine Environment, Washington, D.C. (1975), at p. 9; citing
Victory, G., "The LOT System, Present and Future," Symposium
on Marine Pollution, Royal Institute of Naval Architects, London
(1973), pp. 10-20. It will be seen that crew performance stand¬
ards that are designed to protect the environment and are scrup¬
ulously observed are a sine qua non to the control of marine
pollution from the development of offshore petroleum.
39. Most refineries are able to accept some sea contaminants in oil.
40. Many of these tankers operate under "flags of convenience" which
are, in essence, licences to operate substandard equipment and to
26
It is generally accepted that rough seas and short voyages will
combine to make the LOT system impossible to use for tankers engaged
41
in the carriage of North Sea oil while in that area. The problem
thus posed is a new one, for previously as importers of petroleum
the North Sea States were "exporters" of ballast water to the Middle
East and intermediate points. As oil exporters, however, the U.K.
and Norway must consider how to dispose of ballast water not only at
ports and harbours, but also at single-point mooring buoys (SBMs) and
42
other offshore installations. As there are both clear legal and
43
strong environmental reasons for avoiding the simple expedient of
pumping dirty ballast into the North Sea, it is clear that alternatives
use procedures which are unacceptable from the point of view of
environmental protection or crew safety, sold for the cost-
cutting advantages they confer to "resident" (and frequently one
ship) corporations.
41. Conversation with Mr. Chris Horrocks, General Council of British
Shipping, 15 June 1976.
42. The 1962 Amendments to the 1954 IMCO Convention designate the
North Sea as a "prohibited area" in respect of the discharge
of specified persistent oils. Of course, this does not bind
the ships of States not parties to that instrument (flag of
convenience vessels, in many cases), and the restriction of
lighter ("white") oils will not be subject to international
treaty (although perhaps to voluntary agreement) until the
entry into force of the 1973 IMCO Convention. See below, p.
160. It is interesting to note that, in the case of two
refined products, the National Academy of Sciences cites IMCO
data indicating that of global discharges of benzene and
toluene from chemical tanker cleaning, about half of the esti¬
mated yearly 240 tonnes of benzene is flushed into the North
Sea, but little toluene is involved. National Academy of
Sciences, Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, Washington, D.C.
(1975), Table 4-31, pp. 169-170. These data may change drastically
if a significant period separates the establishment of a U.K. and/
or Norwegian petro-chemical complex and the acceptance of inter¬
national standards or expanded coastal State jurisdiction.
43. See the discussion of "Effects," below at p. 67.
27
to LOT must be considered. Three which have been suggested are the
provision of oil reception facilities at the oil exporting port or off¬
shore installation, the use of segregated ballast tanks, and the
retention of oil cargo onboard as permanent ballast. However, each of
these schemes has an associated cost.
The provision of oil reception facilities of sufficient capacity
to handle tank washings from a large tanker would entail a substantial
investment in plant and equipment. This is particularly true of struc¬
tures which would be needed to contain ballast water from tankers
45
loading offshore. A further consideration is that discharge of
ballast while in port is time consuming and is therefore a cost to
both tanker owner and port authority.
Segregated ballast requires separate and exclusive ballast tanks
so that the water remains uncontaminated by cargo. Although this
solution is being actively considered by IMCO and is particularly
46
favoured by the Americans, adoption of a segregated ballast system
44. U.K. Department of Trade, op. cit. in footnote 33, at p. 2.
45. Some facilities at present provide for the pumping of ballast
water into installation oil storage tanks as displacement water.
U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Environmental
Pollution, The Separation of Oil from Water for North Sea Oil
Operations, Pollution Paper No. 6, H.M.S.O. (1976), para. 6f p. 3,
46. As an interim measure prior to the coming into force of the 1973
Convention which will make segregated ballast systems on new
tankers of 70,000 tons DWT mandatory. See p. 106, below. It is
interesting to note that many tankers that will be used in connec¬
tion with North Sea oil will be under this tonnage limit. King,
N. and Wilkinson, T., "The Sources of Oil Contaminated Discharges
Arising Directly from North Sea Operations," a paper presented at
the Heriot-Watt Symposium on the Separation of Oil from Water for
North Sea Operations, 22-23 June 1976, at p. 7. The tankers used
for movement of Ekofisk oil to Norway were in the 40,000 tons DWT
class. Taylor, A., "Ekofisk Development: Movement of Oil from
28
imposes substantial economic penalties on the shipowner because of
cargo capacity loss.4^
A variation of segregated ballast is retention of some oil
cargo on board permanently. Tankers employing either type of
segregated ballast for North Sea operations are likely to be
dedicated; that is, routed in closed patterns between offshore
installations and certain ports. This was, in fact, the procedure
followed in tanker transportation of petroleum from the Ekofisk
field.48
Bilge pumping is an activity characteristic of all ships.
Although individual discharges are comparatively small, the cumula¬
tive effect is significant. Discharges of oil from bilges can be
reduced to some extent through the use of oily water separation
49
equipment, an approach required by the IMCO Conventions.
Cleaning for drydock can involve the discharge of large amounts
of oil into harbour and inshore waters if adequate reception facili¬
ties are not provided. Drydocking usually occurs about every 18
months. All cargo ships must be both clean and gas-free for work to
commence, so various substances (including oil) may be washed over-
Platform to Shore," in Cole, H. (ed.), Petroleum and the Conti¬
nental Shelf of North-West Europe, Vol. 2, "Environmental Pro¬
tection," Applied Science Publishers Ltd., on behalf of the
Institute of Petroleum, Great Britain (1975), pp. 31-35, at p.
32.
47. Segregated ballast tanks mean a loss of 30 to 40 per cent, of
possible cargo space. U.K. Department of the Environment, op.
cit. in footnote 30, at para. 4.30, p. 39.
48. Taylor, loc. cit. in footnote 46.
49. See below, p. 151.
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board. Most vessels wash at sea; only about 50 per cent, on a
50
global average arrive at the drydock port needing washing.
ii) accidental discharges
Table II-l indicates that oil discharged from vessel accidents
is a relatively small part of the total input from all sources.
However, it does not necessarily follow that maritime casualties
are an insignificant contributor to marine pollution because the
oil input from this source tends to be concentrated in shallow,
congested waters on tanker routes,^ and a great part of the total
52
is the result of a few accidents. Reduction of the few catas¬
trophic spills which occur is therefore a desirable goal, although
an elusive one, perhaps, because of infrequent occurrences.
Table II-2, on pages 30 and 31, tabulates some significant
53
tanker accidents. It is noteworthy that two common character-
50. National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environ¬
ment, Washington, D.C. (1975), p. 9.
51. The effect of petroleum on the marine environment tends to be
more severe in coastal waters because they are rich in marine
life, the opportunity for natural forces to dissipate the spill
is reduced when compared to the open sea, and because environ¬
mental and clean up costs escalate rapidly if oil reaches the
shore. See below, p. 69 et seg. Safety of persons and equip¬
ment in coastal areas is a further and very real consideration.
For example, a collision involving two tankers off the U.S.
coast resulted in a fire that was only kept from a tank farm
nearby by favourable winds. Congress of the United States,
Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit. in footnote 24, at
p. 37.
52. U.S. Coast Guard data indicate that the occasional catastrophic
spill contributes about 2/3 of the oil volume which is acciden¬
tally discharged. Bates, C. and Yost, P., op. cit. in footnote
21, at p. 271; citing U.S. Coast Guard, "Pollution Spills in
U.S. Waters—1970," Internal Report by U.S. Coast Guard, dated
September, 1971 (data covers only 6 months of 1970).
53. Although Tables II-2 and II-3 consider only tankers, they are by
TABLEII-2
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istics of these accidents are 1) they resulted from grounding or
collision, and 2) they occurred in coastal waters. Table II-2 is
included to provide the reader with a ready reference to some of the
more spectacular and better known tanker disasters; Table II-3 on the
following page provides much more comprehensive data on the causes
54
and locations of tankship accidents.
Table II-3 summarizes some of the more significant findings of a
recent study which analysed 3,183 tanker "involvements" for the years
for the greatest actual and potential source of marine hydro¬
carbon pollution. There are approximately nine times as many
other vessels as tankers, but they are much smaller in average
size, and the only oil normally on board in bulk is bunker fuel.
National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environ¬
ment, Washington, D.C. (1975), at p. 9.
54. There is little data on North Sea tankship accidents. The
British "National Maritime Institute" has analysed the circum¬
stances of marine casualties in the Dover Strait area for the
period 1958-1971 finding, inter alia, that 23 per cent, of ships
involved in collisions and 38 per cent, of those stranded were
tankers. In only 10 of the 174 collision cases were there
records of oil spillage; oil pollution of beaches was reported
to have been caused by just one of the stranding incidents. The
Institute is now investigating shipping casualties in the North
Sea, but as yet has published no findings. Letter from Mr. J.A.H.
Paffett, General Manager, National Maritime Institute, to the
writer, 13 October 1976; Brown, I. and Wheatley, J.H.W., National
Physical Laboratory Report Mar Sci R101, October 1972. The
Dover Strait at the southern entrance to the North Sea is an area
of continuing concern. In 1976, up to 500 vessels a day passed
through this area, and as of October of that year there had been
five collisions. A joint British/French "Channel Navigation
Information Service" was formed following a multiple collision
in 1971 and now provides half-hourly bulletins to shipping. The
Times, 9 October 1976, p. 2. In the absence of comprehensive
data on North Sea tankship involvements, this thesis will rely
upon the global data compiled by Card (et al.), which provide a
broader data base and geographic spectrum than the Dover Strait
data. Card, J.C. (et al.), "Tankship Accidents and Resulting Oil
Outflows, 1969-1973," Attachment 1 in Congress of the United
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1969-1973.(An "involvement" is the participation of one vessel in
an "accident" which could involve two or more ships.) A brief analysis
of the data tabulated in Table II-3 may indicate some peculiarities of
tankship involvements which will be of value in a consideration of the
legal regime necessary to minimise such occurrences.^
Collision and grounding were the most frequently occurring
causes, followed by structural failure; however, in terms of quantity
of oil spilled, this order is transposed. It is apparent that the
average amount of oil discharged from the involvements "fire" and
"other" exceeds that of structural failure, but too much importance
should not be placed on this fact because concern is with the excep¬
tion rather than the norm. From this point of view, structural
failure, grounding and collision have the greatest potential for a
calamitous discharge of oil.
Structural failure of a tanker at sea, though relatively
uncommon, could well result in a major loss of cargo. The possibility
of such an occurrence has concerned the U.K. Department of Trade, who
have established a Group comprised of its own senior officials and
representatives from the Ministry of Defence and the shipping industry
55. The Card (et al.) study is based on information compiled from
3,715 worldwide tankship involvements during the period 1969-
1973. For 3,183 involvements of tankers exceeding 3,000 tons
DWT a number of characteristics are analysed. Table II-3 in this
thesis is a synthesis of Tables 4 and 8 of the Card (et al.)
study, and is concerned only with accidents involving oil loss
because it is this type of accident that it is sought to prevent.
56. See Chapter Ten, A Model Legal Regime for the North Sea, below at
p. 515.
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to consider this and other safety-related problems. Preliminary
findings of the U.K. Group indicate that
"while the overextrapolation of data in the early design
and construction of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs)
may have given rise to problems, these were quickly
overcome, the incidence of hull failure is extremely
rare, and the modern supertanker if properly handled is ^
basically as safe as the smaller ships which it replaces."
58
Even if this conclusion is accepted without question, it is not
particularly reassuring, for it says no more than "supertankers are no
less safe than their smaller progenitors, but they are no more safe
either." This being the assertion, it provides no basis for altering
an extrapolation from the historical data of structural failures
worldwide to future incidents of this nature in the North Sea. Much
more work is needed to reduce even the possibility of structural failure
which the U.K. Group appear to think negligible, as well as research
into the causes of the closely-related but distinct problem of tanker
59
explosions. It is also of critical importance that the proviso, "if
properly handled" is always satisfied by the operators of North Sea
tankers; the work of IMCO and the International Labour Organization
60
(ILO) will be of great use in this regard.
57. U.K. Department of Trade, op. cit. in footnote 33, p. 9.
58. For a rejection of this contention, see Mostert, N. op. cit. in
footnote 27.
59. A number of cargo tank explosions resulted in tanker losses a
few years ago. Many tankers are now equipped with inert gas
systems in their cargo tanks to reduce the possibility of
explosion. For an account of tank explosions, see Mostert, N.,
op. cit. in footnote 27. The use of inert gas systems is dis¬
cussed in Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment, op cit. in footnote 24, at pp. 52-54.
60. IMCO is also considering the problem of substandard ships of all
kinds. The present work of IMCO is discussed below, at p. 106.
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Grounding is an increasingly likely source of tanker casualties
because supertankers have grown in cargo capacity by expanding all
61
dimensions, but particularly vessel draft. Although tanker size in
62
the North Sea will be limited, there are still many shallow areas.
Another potential problem is the likelihood that present navigational
charts will be inadequate to prevent the new, deep-draft additions to
North Sea commerce from grounding or striking an uncharted submarine
63
object. It is clear that proper charts are a sine qua non of safe
navigation; cost-cutting at the expense of North Sea hydrography is,
from an environmental point of view at least, false economy indeed.
IMCO and ILO activities intended to increase standards of
64
seamanship are relevant to efforts to reduce vessel groundings. In
61. Fully laden supertankers may draw up to 90 feet of water.
Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment,
op. cit. in footnote 24, at p. 23.
62. In the Strait of Dover, the deepest channel at low tide is about
29 metres. Tankers inbound from the Persian Gulf have been
limited to a maximum draft of just over 20 metres, and the Dover
Strait Pilot "recommends" masters to allow an under-keel clear¬
ance of 5 metres, "a very generous allowance." U.K. Department
of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at para. 4.8, p. 33.
63. This is a serious concern of U.K. officials. See the Report
from the Select Committee on Science and Technology, Offshore
Engineering, Session 1974, H.M.S.O. (1974), particularly para.
119, at p. 38. See also numerous letters to The Times, for
example that of D.C. Cumming of the Royal Geographical Society,
5 March 1975, at p. 15. See also, Advisory Committee on Oil
Pollution of the Sea, Annual Report, 1974 (1975), at p. 9. The
Annual Report of the Hydrographer of the Royal Navy also con¬
tains findings and comments of particular relevance to North Sea
tanker operations, including a warning that tankers risk
grounding through miscalculation when using tables of predicted
tide levels (reported in The Times, 18 May 1974, at p. 3), and
the discovery in one year of 95 previously uncharted wrecks in
the English Channel as well as uncharted shoals in deep water
near the Hebrides and East Anglia (The Times, 3 May 1975, p. 2).
64. See, for example, the account of the grounding of the Deep Sea
37
addition, the former organisation is investigating construction
techniques such as double hulls or double bottoms to reduce the
possibility of oil outflow should a grounding occur. The use of
double hulls or bottoms is of controversial value, the main points
of a voluminous literature on the subject being the amount of cargo
such construction would be likely to save from discharge in a typical
grounding or collision, and, on the other hand, the construction and
65
cargo capacity costs, as well as possible safety considerations.
A collision between two laden supertankers would be the environ¬
mental equivalent of a midair disaster involving two filled wide-
bodied passenger aircraft: fortunately, neither has yet happened,
although there have been near misses and, in the case of tankers,
actual collisions involving smaller vessels.^
Driller north of Bergen in The Scotsman, 3 June 1976, at p. 6.
A commission of inquiry concluded that the grounding was the
direct result of three mistakes made by the captain. It has
been implied, however, that some groundings may well be the
result of attention to economic considerations rather than
inattention to or ignorance of matters of safety: one source
reports that an extra foot of vessel draught means another
£25,000 per year to the oil company. Sibthorp, M. (ed.) op. cit.
in footnote 12, at p. 48.
65. The Office of Technology Assessment Report (op. cit. in footnote
24) contains a discussion of issues involved in assessing the
desirability of employing double hulls or double bottoms, at
pp. 39 et seg. See also, Chapter Three, wherein IMCO activities
in respect of segregated ballast and double hulls are described,
and The Times, 30 March 1976, reporting the first meeting of the
International Maritime Industries Forum, in which segregated
ballast was considered as one possible solution to excess tanker
capacity, at p. 21.
66. See, for example, the account of the Oregon Standard/Arizona
Standard collision in San Francisco Bay, in Office of Technology
Assessment, op. cit. in footnote 24, at pp. 35-36 and Attachment
6, at pp. 242-284. The accident between the two 10,500 gross
ton vessels resulted in the loss of 20,000 barrels of Bunker C
fuel oil, which caused heavy beach pollution. See also, the
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Supertankers are characterized by great mass and inertia and are
therefore difficult tomanoeuvre.^ This problem is exacerbated by
tanker design: a single screw design permits more economical operation
than twin screws, but vessel handling characteristics are much
68
reduced. There is, in consequence, a much diminished margin for
human error. Increased standards of seamanship induced by training
can do much to compensate for poor manoeuvrability, but behavioural
changes must be complemented by applied technology if the seaman is to
69
realise his potential. The standards thus made possible must then
be implemented. While voluntary compliance is certainly possible,
especially in a group with common interests such as the major oil com¬
panies, where the class is larger and the interests more disparate
account of the Allegro/Pacific Glory collision in Chapter Six,
at p. 362.
67. A recent report concluded that a 500,000 deadweight ton vessel
would need approximately four miles to stop from cruising spaed,
one and one-half miles to stop at eight knots, and nearly one-
half mile to stop at four knots. However, supertankers cannot
steer at less than five or six knots! Frye, J., "Oil, Superships,
and the Oceans," Oceans, (Jan. -Feb. 1974) pp. 48-55, at p. 50;
citing "a three-volume report by a special consultant, Arthur D.
Little, Inc., of Cambridge, Massachussets."
68. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 809, cols. 187-88, 13 January 1971. See
also, Dillon, E., "Ship Construction and Operation Standards
for Oil Pollution Abatement," in NATO, Committee on the Challenges
of Modern Society, Coastal Water Pollution of the Sea by Oil
Spills, p. 3.1, Brussels (1970).
69. See, for example, the plea by the accused commander of the
Reward, an oil and fishery protection vessel which sank after
a collision in the Firth of Forth, that uncertain and inflexible
starting of the converted tug's engines caused him to keep them
running, despite thick fog. The Chief Petty Officer in charge
of the Reward's engines described them as "very old fashioned."
The Scotsman, 23 October 1976, p. 5.
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the formality of law may be required. Thus, shipowners,^0 cargo
71
„ « 72
owners, and offshore operators may unite to promote safe and
environmentally sound operating practices; conversely, the flouting
of vessel traffic separation schemes in the Dover Strait by conti-
73
nental fishing boats is notorious.
A recent paper compared the aviation and shipping industries in
respect of safety practices and found the older industry wanting.
Some of the recommendations proposed to increase maritime safety are
74
footnoted.
70. See the description of TOVALOP, below at p. 262.
71. See the description of CRISTAL, below at p. 269.
72. See the description of OPOL, below at p. 251.
73. Following the collision of the Achilles and the Olympic Alliance
in November, 1975, Mr. Clinton Davis, Under-Secretary at the
Department of Trade singled out French trawlers fishing out
of Boulogne as particularly guilty of violating the then
voluntary traffic separation schemes in the English Channel.
The French vessels were said to sail as directly as possible to
the Dogger Bank fishing grounds, ignoring traffic lanes. The
voluntary scheme has been replaced by an Agreement which is to
come into force in July, 1977, and which requires States Par¬
ties thereto to observe traffic rules. The Times, 6 December
1975, p. 4; ibid., 15 July 1976, p. 6.
74. Madsen, S., Nicastro, F., and Schumacher, D., "Aviation/Marine—
A Study of Contrast," Proceedings 17th Annual Tanker Conference,
American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C. (1972); cited in
Bates, C. and Yost, P., op. cit. in footnote 21, at pp. 273-274.
1. Establishment of mandatory traffic separation lanes in
heavily trafficked international waterways of the world
along with an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.
2. Encouragement of governments to establish mandatory sea
lanes in their coastal waters.
3. Establishment of radar monitoring and enforceable traffic
control systems in critical pilotage waters, including
such straits as the English Channel.
4. Requiring vessels to establish and maintain radio contact
with existing harbour radar networks.
5. Establishment of English as the universal maritime language
for communication between pilot and master, pilot and local
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The increased use of the North Sea also magnifies the possibility
of a collision between a vessel and an offshore installation. It is
difficult to estimate the probability of such an occurrence from
North Sea data because offshore activity in that area is comparatively
recent. Likewise, although data exist from the Gulf of Mexico,
production platforms in that area are concentrated where large ships
75
rarely sail, except at well-marked entrances to harbours. It is not
harbour advisory service, and pilots and tugs.
6. Provision of preplanned route information for frequently
travelled trade routes.
7. Provision of coded radar transponders in fixed key
positions as all-weather navigation aids in pilotage
waters.
8. Establishment of international rules requiring that all
marine navigation equipment must meet certain minimum
performance and reliability standards. If the vessel in
question would be operating in an IMCO traffic separation
scheme, then this navigation equipment should include
radar, Loran/Decca, or a similar electronic navigation
device.
9. Encouraging development of more accurate navigational
equipment for use in coastal waters, as well as advanced
collision avoidance systems.
10. Preparing better instructions to ship masters defining
minimum safety navigation conditions considering limitations
of his navigational equipment and the local geography.
11. Stiffening international maritime licensing requirements
for ships' officers so there is included performance testing
under both normal and stress conditions, periodic
proficiency checks to hold the licence, and some restrictions
as to size and class of ship the individual is licensed to
operate.
12. Updating curriculum [sicjofmaritime training academies to
include modern problems in ship-handling, navigation, and
collision avoidance, and cargo handling, including the
handling of liquid cargo, with some stress placed on the
operations of very large vessels that are now becoming
commonplace.
13. Introduction of additional formal training before an
officer can advance in grade; such training might take
the form of working with special simulators for enhancing
navigation and collision avoidance skills.
75. Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment,
Ocean Assessment Program, Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy
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surprising, therefore, that only a few instances of collision have
76
been reported. The possibility of collisions with installations
in the North Sea would appear to be greater than in the Gulf because
the intensity of competitive use is much greater: not only is the
area used for navigation, but it is host to a flotilla of fishing
boats, and in all kinds of weather. See Figure II-3, which depicts
U.K. continental shelf clearways. The severe nature of North Sea
weather is perhaps the most important difference from the Gulf, and
could well contribute to a collision because of decreased visibility
77
or rendering a vessel difficult to control.
Development: Oil and Gas Systems, (summary of an interim
report) (March 16, 1976), at p. 37. The OTA was assessing the
impact of offshore installations on other ocean users which
would be likely when the Baltimore Canyon Trough is developed.
They concluded that development off the U.S. Atlantic coast
would present more user conflicts than had been the case in the
Gulf, but that technology existed to lessen undesired effects.
76. The OTA reports lO major accidents involving ships striking drili
rigs in the Gulf of Mexico in the past 10 years. Ibid., pp.
37-38. A British writer citing U.S. data has stated that "in
the 11 years 1962-73, 30 incidents of collision between vessels
and platforms in the Gulf of Mexico were reported; of these 8
involved vessels of over 1000 gross tons. They were all outside
established shipping fairway and anchorage areas. There are now
some 2000 rigs and platforms in the area. No pollution was
reported." Wardley Smith, J., "Oil Exploration in the Celtic
Sea--A Review of the Pollution Risk," David Davies Memorial
Institute of International Studies (September 1975) , at p. 7;
citing U.S. Department of the Interior, Draft Environmental
Statement Vol. 2 or 4, Proposed 1975 Outer Continental Shelf
Oil and Gas General Lease Offshore Texas, pp. 589-93. One
collision casualty in 1975 was the British tanker Globtik Sun
which burned after ramming an unmanned oil rig in the Gulf.
The Times, 16 August 1975, p. 1.
77. One writer has observed that the risks of collision with a
drilling rig require the same techniques of avoidance that are
used to keep ships off shoals and rocks; but even if this is
conceded, it does not address the argument that an increase in
obstacles will place increased demands on techniques to avoid an
increased level of risk. See, Warbrick, C., "The Regulation of
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FIGURE II-3
U.K. CONTINENTAL SHELF SHIPPING CLEARWAYS
^HamburgAlianlic Ocean
New North Sea Hydrographic
Commission Deep Water Route
To the Eatt of the Greenwich
Meridian the Dover Strait i»
totally within a UK Mandatory
Traffic Separation Scheme
Category A
Those figures indicated alongside the shipping lanes deno!
number of merchant vessels using the clearways per weekCategory
Source: Draft serial atlas of North Sea (MAFF).
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The possibility of a vessel or other installation abandoned, out
of control, or adrift from its moorings has caused considerable con-
78
cern among U.K. officials. This concern may be well placed, for
incidents involving a barge^ and a mooring buoy^° have already occur¬
red. This also raises an interesting legal question: would destruc¬
tion of the threatening object be consistent with international law?
The answer depends upon the particular circumstances; these are dis-
0
cussed in some detail in connection with the Intervention Convention,
b) petroleum transfer and refining
It will be recalled from Table II-l that a small quantity of oil
is discharged into the sea from terminal operations and from coastal
refineries. These inputs are small, but they are significant since
they are repetitive and occur in the same area. Thus, the cumulative
Navigation," in Churchill, R. (et al.), (eds), New Directions in
the Law of the Sea, Vol. 3, British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, London (1973), pp. 137-154, at p. 138;
citing Beattie, "Marketing a New Radar," Journal of the Institute
of Navigation, (1970), p. 212.
78. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at
para. 6.41, p. 58. The Report states that "contingency measures
are now under active discussion."
79. "A 350 ft barge carrying a 3,300-ton steel oil rig structure,
a mass of girders standing 100 ft high, was adrift for nearly
15 hours in the North Sea yesterday after breaking loose from
two tugs in heavy seas." The wayward craft was recaptured
before any damage occurred. The Times, 21 March 1975, p. 2.
Also see U.K. Department of Energy, Report on the Loss of the
Drilling Barge Transocean III, H.M.S.O. (1975).
80. "Tugs were last night battling against gale-force winds in the
North Sea in an attempt to 'recapture' a 480-foot high tanker
loading buoy which had twice broken adrift in two days." The
buoy was captured before collision or grounding. The Scotsman,
8 December 1975, p. 1.
81. See below, p. 138.
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effect of such discharges is great, and, depending upon the ability
of the receiving waters to absorb and disperse pollutants, it may be
necessary to control them.
"Terminal operations" includes the loading and unloading processes
which have traditionally occurred in harbours. In the case of the
North Sea, however, one must also consider the various existing and
82
proposed schemes for offshore loading of tankers. It has been
estimated that, as a global average, an oil spill will occur for
83
between every 50 and 100 loading or unloading operations. These
84
spills are usually less than one barrel, but when the occasional
major discharge does occur it can usually be dealt with quickly as it
is confined to the calm waters of the harbour and clean up equipment
is readily available.
Petroleum transfer in connection with North Sea oil production
requires expansion of capability to deal with oil spills, as well as
82. Another important facet of the changes in terminal operations
wrought by North Sea oil production is the metamorphosis of
existing oil receiving ports into combination import/export
centres, and the consequent problems of dealing with oily
ballast water.
83. Wardley Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 76, at p. 9; citing
Dudley, G., "Incidence and Treatment of Oil Pollution in Oil
Ports," a paper presented to the Conference on Marine Ecology
and Oil Pollution, Aviemore (1975). The most common cause of
spills during oil transfer operations is failure or incorrect
manipulation of one of the many valves in the tanker's plumbing.
A common procedural error is opening the sea valve to discharge
ballast water before the pump is activated at the same time
that oil is being loaded. Ibid., at p. 3. An open valve
caused one of the largest spills in TOVALOP records, that of
2597 tons from the Universe Leader in Bantry Bay, 21 October
1974. Ibid., at p. 9; Note, "Flag of Convenience—No Pollution
Alibi," 64 New Scientist 490 (1974).
84. Wardley Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 76, at p. 9.
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continued research toward reducing discharges from this source and
85
mitigating their effects. New oil terminals will require additional
86
investment in personnel and equipment to deal with possible spills;
the new system of offshore tanker loading may require new techniques
as well. To date, oil spills from SBM's have apparently not been
85. One area of research is the development of automatic monitoring
equipment to stop discharge when the oil/water interface nears
the discharge point. One report suggests that had such
equipment been in use, the Bantry Bay spillage would have been
much reduced. New Scientist, loc. cit. in footnote 83.
Automatic monitoring equipment will be required by the 1973 IMCO
Convention, but objections have been made that reliable monitors
for persistent oil vessels do not currently exist and that new
technology would be required before the monitoring requirement
could be complied with by clean product tankers. See, Oil
Companies International Marine Forum, International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, London (1974),
particularly at p. 9. See also the discussion of the 1973 IMCO
Convention below, p. 160. More mundane improvements have also
been urged: standardized couplings should replace the current
mix, other couplings should be uniform as well, there has been
criticism of using butterfly valves instead of gate valves.
U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30,
at para. 5.22, p. 47.
86. The U.K. Department of Trade has conceded that the emergence of
the Orkney and Shetland Islands as oil terminals will create
the risk of pollution in those waters, and as there is at
present no Marine Survey Office in the Islands, the Department
is considering "the best method of achieving a rapid response
to such an incident." U.K. Department of Trade, op. cit. in
footnote 33, at p. 12. See also U.K. Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, op. cit. in footnote 25, at para. 227,
p. 82. "We note, however, that because of the arrangements
for landing oil from the North Sea, the risk of serious pollution
is likely to be concentrated in the area of the Shetlands where
there is a hazard to wild life, particularly to the very large
numbers of sea birds, and where difficulties of applying clean¬
up measures will be greatest." Milford Haven, the major oil-
receiving port in the U.K., has an enviable record of spillage
prevention and might well serve as a model for the new ports.
However, it has been pointed out that even the Milford Haven
standards may have to be bettered as the volume of oil handled
increases. Ibid., p. 48.
46
87
significant anywhere; the minor spill accompanying the inauguration
88
of Argyll production may represent a typical mishap. Small spills
in the open sea are quickly dispersed by natural forces, and, in the
case of the U.K., a standby pollution protection vessel is nearby
during loading operations.^
90
There is at present no offshore refining of North Sea oil,
although the technology exists to do so should the advantages outweigh
the considerable expense which would be involved. A more likely
possibility is the manufacture of hydrocarbon-based products, such as
ammonia or liquid natural gas on installations near production plat-
91
forms. Proximity to the raw material and availability of tanker
transport are advantages, but what may be particularly attractive is
the relative freedom to pollute by effluent, smoke and noise when
87. Wardley Smith, J. op. cit. in footnote 76, at p. 9.
88. U.K. Department of Energy, Development of the Oil and Gas
Reserves of the United Kingdom (1976), p. 16.
89. Fulleylove, R., "Oil Spills and the Offshore Oil Industry," a
paper delivered to Offshore Europe, a Conference held at
Aberdeen, 19 September 1975, at p. 4. A B.P. spokesman has
assured the writer that no spills of North Sea oil have occurred
during transfer operations in the Firth of Forth. Telephone
conversation with Mr. Ron Findley, B.P. Public Relations,
Grangemouth, 23 February 1977.
90. As this thesis encompasses only marine pollution which may
result from activities at sea, the discharge of effluents into
the sea from refineries on land is not considered.
91. German and French companies are developing a LNG plant to be
located on a floating platform, and which will load directly on
to LNG carriers. Noroil (October, 1975), at p. 86. The U.S. is
considering a different but related use of coastal waters,
that of nuclear powerplant location. The U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment was asked to study the effects of "con¬
struction of a floating nuclear power plant inside a protective
breakwater some three miles off the coast of New Jersey." OTA,
op. cit. in footnote 75, at p. 1.
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compared to land-based sites.
The objection to refineries is that they must separate some water
from the oil they receive, but separation is imperfect and some oil
93
remains in the water discharged. This problem also characterizes
the offshore production of oil, and is discussed under the heading
of "operational discharges," immediately below.
c) offshore petroleum development
The exploration for, and production and transportation of,
petroleum from the North Sea continental shelf has increased the risk
of injury to the environment from discharges of harmful substances.
This assertion rests on the commonsense proposition that risk increases
94
with exposure to harm, and upon the contention that the proliferation
92. Freedom to pollute may be the impetus to the first large-scale
offshore installation to process offshore oil. Exxon, holder of
a large lease on the Outer Continental Shelf (i.e., under federal
rather than California jurisdiction) off Santa Barbara, has
"vowed" to "do its initial processing at sea rather than meet
state requirements for onshore operations." International Herald
Tribune, 10 March 1976, p. 3. This resolve can only be
strengthened by a recent report that state officials have
refused to licence the unloading of Alaskan oil from supertankers
at a terminal near Los Angeles unless federal regulations
limiting hydrocarbon emission into the already smoggy air are
promulgated. International Herald Tribune, 23 September 1976,
p. 4.
93. As noted above in connection with vessels, considerable efforts are
being expended toward the improvement of oily-water separators.
. Under current technological limitations, some oil discharge is
inevitable; there is controversey concerning possible and desir¬
able levels of oil in the effluent. See, for example, U.K.
Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 45; National
Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environment,
Washington, D.C. (1975), at p. 10.
94. The U.K. Department of the Environment has published an assess¬
ment of oil spill risks, basing their methodology on a previous
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of devices to extract oil from the seabed has also increased the
potential injury to the environment caused by operational or accidental
discharges of harmful substances. It is the object of this section
briefly to describe such offshore operations and to indicate the
manner in which certain activities could cause the introduction of
harmful substances into the sea. No attempt has been made herein to
quantify the risk posed by the various offshore activities. An
accurate estimate of such risks is difficult because, as observed
earlier, there is little history upon which to base a forecast and
comparisons with more established areas may be misleading. The
recent U.K. Report which has provided much of the material
for this chapter has hazarded an estimate of risk from North Sea oil
95
development, and the reader is referred to that study. This thesis
is limited to the more modest objective of outlining the nature
96
of the risks which may be presented,
i) operational discharges
Operational discharges are those inputs into the environment
that occur as part of the normal job of searching for, producing or
transporting oil. Five types of operational discharges associated
study done by the Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT).
The basic MIT premise was that the number of accidents was
broadly proportional to the volume of oil handled. U.K.
Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at
p. 62, et seg. The MIT 1974 study was for the U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality.
95. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30.
96. The conclusions of the Department of Environment Report form
part of the basis for the suggested Model Legal Regime for




with offshore petroleum development have been isolated. These are
discussed in the paragraphs below.
Displacement water discharges are similar to the pumping of
ballast water from tankers. Production platforms contain storage
space for oil which is to be held before being pumped to pipeline or
98
tanker. If there is no oil to be stored, the tanks are filled with
water to add to the platform weight and hence its stability. When oil
is pumped into the tanks, the displaced water may be pumped out
through an oily-water separation system or, in the case of tanks
designed with an open bottom, the heavier water is simply pushed out
99
the opening by oil pumped into the tank from the top. Even water
which has passed through the separation treatment will still contain
some oil. In the case of U.K. operations, this has been estimated at
25 parts of oil per million parts (ppm) of water, or 325 tonnes of oil
lOO
per year.
Production water is the water which is mixed with the produced
oil. It may occur naturally or it can result from injection of water
into a field which no longer has sufficient pressure to force the oil
to the surface. ^"0^" The proportion of production water in crude oil
97. Seismic surveys are not included because it is not thought that
the new controlled impact technique has any significant effect on
marine life. See, Shelton, R., "Effects on Fisheries," in
Institute of Petroleum, op. cit. in footnote 46, pp. 75-81, at
p. 75.
98. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 45, at
para. 7, pp. 3-4.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Water or gas injection is also used to prevent subsidence, as
50
varies, ranging from less than one per cent, in new fields to approx¬
imately 30 per cent, in older reservoirs which require water
102
injection. The amount of water in the oil determines where
separation occurs; initially it can be done on the platform, but the
large quantities of water which must be processed as the field declines
makes it more economical to process some effluents on shore.It has
been estimated that processed water will still contain some 25 ppm
of oil, and that this would result in a yearly average discharge
of 250 tonnes of oil from platforms and 75 tonnes from coastal
• i 104termxnals.
Drilling muds are used to prevent loss of well pressure, to cool
and lubricate the drill string and bit, to seal and support the well
105
walls, and to carry cuttings to the surface. The mixture is composed
has happened in Long Beach, California. For this reason Shell
(U.K.) Ltd. uses injection in all offshore development. A.L.
Crockford, in the discussion following a paper given by Williams,
G., "The Geologist and the Environment," published as Chapter 1
of Institute of Petroleum, op. cit. in footnote 46, at pp. 1-2;
the discussion is recorded on p. 3.
102. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 45, at
para. 8, p. 4.
103. Approximately 80 per cent, of U.K. oil will be treated on the
platform. Ibid.
104. Ibid. The U.S. has enacted regulations limiting oily-water
discharges to 50 ppm. In 1971 the average discharge in the Gulf
of Mexico was 41 ppm. National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum
in the Marine Environment, Washington, D.C. (1975), at p. 6.
105. Crockford, A., (et al.) , "Exploratory Drilling Well Control
Practices," in Institute of Petroleum, op. cit. in footnote
46, pp. 5-19, at p. 11. Table I of the cited paper tabulates
"Mud chemical consumption/contamination from North Sea exploratory
wells," giving toxicity levels and "safety factors" for various
chemicals.
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of inert weight material to which chemicals are frequently added, and
106
fluid which is usually water, but may be oil. It is not yet known
how frequently oil-emulsions or oil-based muds are used in the North
Sea, but one writer has suggested that the addition of 2-4 per cent.
diesel oil to water-based fluids for specific tasks is not uncommon.
Cuttings are separated from the mud and dumped into the sea; in the
108
case of oil-based muds, cuttings are first washed. Solids removal
equipment used to purify drilling fluid for re-use does not completely
clean the cuttings, and it has been estimated that about five per
109
cent, of the total weight of cuttings dumped is drilling fluid.
Depending on the characteristics of the well being drilled, this could
amount to 25-50 tons of fluid.Deliberate dumping of drilling mud
106. White, I.C., "The Environmental Effects of Drilling Fluids," a
paper presented to the ICES Workshop on "Hydrocarbons in the
Marine Environment," Aberdeen, 1976, at p. 3.
107. Ibid. Oil-emulsions contain approximately 7-15 per cent, diesel
oil and are used, as are oil-based muds, in exceptional circum¬
stances such as wells being drilled at an acute angle. The
addition of small amounts of diesel oil to water-based fluids is
done to facilitate the common task of lubrication and to prevent
filtrate loss.
108. Crockford, A. (et al.) , op. cit. in footnote 105, at p. 11'. Such
precautions were taken in developing the Netherlands' Placid oil
field. White, I.L. (et al.), North Sea Oil and Gas: Implications
for Future U.S. Development, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman,
Oklahoma (1973), at p. 131.
109. White, I.C., loc. cit. in footnote 106; citing Woldringh, J.,
The Environmental Effect of Dumping Drilling Cuttings in the
North Sea and Wadden Sea, an investigation on behalf of Nether¬
lands Offshore Operators Committee, interim reports 1 and 2
(1973).
110. Ibid., citing Crockford, A. (et al.) {op. cit. in footnote 105)
as well. White observes that this estimate may be high because
of variations in the composition of the drilling fluid used and
amount and rate of production of cuttings.
52
is thought to be unusual because its cost makes shipment to shore for
purification and re-use economically advantageous. There are,
however, small, continuing discharges of mud and chemicals from both
112
exploration rigs and production platforms, as well as additional
113
amounts which may be released operationally or accidentally.
Although the amounts of mud discharged are small and mixing in the
North Sea is rapid, effects of continuous input of even inert materials
into the marine environment are not completely known. Until the
114
changes wrought by mud discharges are known, it may be prudent to
refrain from concluding that they are harmless.
Production testing is simply an operation to ensure that oil can
flow from the formation to the equipment on the platform.^ When the
fluids reach the platform, they are separated into liquid and gas, the
former being burned in the downwind burner. If the burner fails or
combustion is incomplete, oil may be discharged into the sea, but the
111. Letter from Mr. K.D. Evans, U.K. Department of the Environment,
to the writer, 9 June 1975.
112. U.K. Scottish Office, "North Sea Oil and the Environment;
Pollution: An assessment of the risks and action to deal with
incidents," a paper published by the Scottish Office at the
request of the Oil Development Council for Scotland (undated),
at para. 2.8, p. 6.
113. Crockford, A. (et al.), op. cit. in footnote 105, at p. 11.
Mud may be intentionally dumped because severe weather requires
that it be jettisoned to increase stability, because mud treatment
has increased the total volume and the excess must be disposed
of, at well completion, during surface hole drilling, and during
wash down and possibly during control of a well kick. Accidental
mud discharges may result from leaks in the mud system. Ibid.
114. See p. 87, below.
115. Crockford, A. (et al.), op. cit. in footnote 105, at p. 13t
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amount would be limited to only a few barrels.^
Dumping of unwanted materials or substances from platforms or
vessels causes pollution in the sense in which that term is being used
117
because it directly affects the activities of fishermen. Material
which has been diAped includes oil drums, wire rope, heavy machinery
118
and other oil-related debris. Although offshore operators are well
aware of the problems which such dumping can cause fishermen and there-
119
fore attempt to transfer such debris to shore, the convenience of
"the deep six" as a disposal site for bulky or heavy items can
occasionally cause some" employees to yield to temptation. Attempts to
resolve the problem of such dumping are discussed below.
ii) accidental discharges
It will be recalled that Table II-l indicated that the estimated
oil discharged from offshore production was only about one or two per
116. One major oil company has a supply boat equipped for dispersant
spraying standing by during production testing. Ibid., at p. 16.
117. See the definition of "pollution," above at p. 2. Dumping of
sewage and unused food from drilling rigs also occurs, but there
is little evidence to suggest that this results in injury to the
marine environment in the deep and turbulent waters of the North
Sea. Crockford, A. (et al.), op. cit. in footnote 105, at p. 17.
Attention is again drawn to the argument that ignorance of
effects does not support a conclusion that there are no adverse
consequences resulting from such activities.
118. U. K. Scottish Office, op. cit. in footnote 112, at para. 2.9,
p. 6. See also below, at p. 444.
119. Crockford, A. (et al.), op. cit. in footnote 105, at p. 17.
120. Resolution of conflict between the fishing and oil industries
is the raison d'etre of the Fisheries and Offshore Oil
Consultative Group, discussed below at p. 258.
cent, of all inputs to the sea. This figure must be compared with
the number of wells drilled in order to arrive at an approximation of
the risk of accidental discharge from this source. By 1975, about
25,000 subsea wells had been drilled throughout the world, of which
some 600-700 were in the U.K. sector and 123 were in the Norwegian
122
sector of the North Sea. During this period, only four major
accidents occurred, all in the U.K. area and all involving only the
123
release of natural gas. See Table II-4. This experience is
121. See above, p. 22.
122. U.K. Scottish Office, op. cit. in footnote 112, at p. 3; Report
No. 81 to the Storting (1974-1975), at para. 6, p. 8. About one-
third of the U.K. total were gas wells. At that time licensees
were obligated to drill another 150 exploratory wells, in
addition to appraisal and production wells that would be
appropriate. Ibid. The number of obligatory exploratory wells
has increased following the fifth round of U.K. licensing.
123. Ibid., at Annex I, p. 14. Gas is not thought to be harmful to
the marine environment since it disperses rapidly into the
atmosphere, but it may pose a fire risk. Cole, D., "Offshore
Production Practices to Protect the Environment," in
Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 46, pp. 23-27, at p. 23. In
1974 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution reported
that "despite extensive exploration, there is no evidence that
any significant amount of oil has yet escaped /'from offshore
installations in the North Sea], and it would have been easily
visible had it done so," Fourth Report, op. cit. footnote 25,
at p. 44. Although one may question whether a "significant"
amount of oil "would be easily visible" as a matter of course
(for example, is 50 barrels significant? would it necessarily
be visible if discharged at night during high seas and winds
approaching the top of Sir Francis Beaufort's Scale?), as far
as this writer has been able to determine, only minor spills
have occurred so far in both the British and Norwegian sectors.
One such spill occurred in the U.K. Argyll as a result of leaks
in the couplings of two production wells. The Scotsman, 1
October 1975, p. 9.
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TABLE I1-4
MAJOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE LOSS OF NATURAL GAS






Blow out; plugged after 3 days.
Rig blown off location, leaving blowout
preventors and side valves closed on a
live well. Leak of gas when fishing
gear damaged side valve.
A well producing gas was caused to
fracture by a nearby well being drilled
off the same platform. As a result, the
gas was diverted into the drilling well
causing it to blow out. The producing
well was sealed to stop the flow.
1971 21/10 Blow out of gas in early stage of well
(570 metres) before blow out preventors
were installed. The gas flow stopped
of its own accord.
Source: U.K. Scottish Office, North Sea Oil and the Environment,
"Pollution: An assessment of the risks and action to deal with
incidents," (1975), Annex I, at p. 14.
representative of that in other areas; for example, in the U.S.
during the period 1964-1973, 18,123 wells were drilled offshore, but
only four spills in excess of 5000 barrels have occurred—all from
124
production platforms. See Table II-5. Table II-6, a log of spills
larger than 50 barrels arising from U.S. operations on the outer
continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico, indicates that even small
. .. . 125
spills are relatively uncommon.
Despite the limited North Sea history and the record of U.S.
operations to the beginning of the decade, it may be rash to assume
this record will continue. The quest for energy from beneath the
oceans has extended to far more hostile environments than the Gulf
126
of Mexico--or even the southern part of the North Sea. It may be
useful, therefore, briefly to describe some of the causes of accidental
discharges from offshore installations as such information is relevant
not only to present northern North Sea operations, but to projected
127
activities north of the sixty-second parallel.
124. Cole, D., loc. cit. in footnote 123. It is surprising that the
major U.S. spills all occurred from production platforms;
usually the exploration phase is considered more risky because
of greater unknowns. See, U.K. Department of the Environment,
op. cit. in footnote 29, at para. 6.33, p. 56; Lester, T., and
Beynon, L., "Pollution and the Offshore Oil Industry," Marine
Pollution Bulletin (February 1973), pp. 23-25, at p. 23.
125. Although Table II-6 is limited to wells drilled in the Gulf,
this is by far the area of greatest activity to date, 13,500
wells having been drilled in that area compared to 2,500 off
California as of 1972. Lester, T., and Beynon, L., loc. cit. in
footnote 124, citing Oversight Hearings on OCS Lands Act, 1972.
126. See Noroil (November 1975), an issue dealing with petroleum
development in Arctic areas.
127. See below, at pp. 426-427, footnote 15.
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TABLE II-5





























Source: Brockis, G., "Industry Emergency Oil Spill Plans and Pro¬
grammes," in Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 46, pp. 51-54, at
p. 53, citing M.I.T., Analysis of Oil Spill Statistics (1974);
Lester, R. and Beynon, L., "Pollution and the Offshore Oil Industry,
Marine Pollution Bulletin (February, 1973), pp. 23-25.
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TABLE II-6
OIL SPILLS EXCEEDING 50 BARRELS FROM INSTALLATION
ACCIDENTS ON THE GULF OF MEXICO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 1964-1971
Number of Average Barrels









Source: Brockis, G., "Industry Emergency Oil Spill Plans and Pro¬
grammes," in Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 46, pp. 51-54,
at p. 52, citing Wilson, R., "Estimate of Annual Input of Petro¬
leum to the Marine Environment from Offshore Production Operations,"
in Background Papers for a Workshop on Inputs, Fates and Effects
of Petroleum in the Marine Environment, Airlie, Virginia (1974),
Vol. 1, p. 97.
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Blowouts occur when gas or oil escapes, driven by its natural
128
reservoir pressure. Exploration well blowouts are the result of
insufficient weight of the mud column used to counteract pressure
from the well. If well pressure exceeds the hydrostatic pressure
exerted by the mud, blowout preventors (BOPs) can be manually activated
129
to shut the well off below the surface of the seabed. it is
of some importance to note that exploration BOPs are manually
activated; an alert and well-trained drill crew are therefore an
essential component of the BOP system.
Blowouts from production platforms are likely to have been caused
by accidents such as fires or failure of the platform structure or
production system components. As in the case of exploratory wells,
BOPs are placed in the well itself to arrest pressure-borne oil
before it can reach the surface; the BOPs used, however, are auto¬
matic. Should the BOP system of a production well fail, there is the
danger that a large amount of oil will be released into the sea in
addition to the possibility of fire, thus endangering life and
equipment and substituting atmospheric for marine pollution.
128. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 2.
129. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30,
at para. 6.32, p. 56.
130. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 2; U.K. Depart¬
ment of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at para. 6.36,
pp. 56-57. The Santa Barbara blowout occurred when the drill
string from a development well was being removed. BOPs were
activated, but oil escaped because of insufficient well casing
and the highly fissured nature of the seabed. The Bay Marchand
blowout occurred after the safety choke was removed to permit
well maintenance. A fire followed, and some of the other
21 producing wells on the platform were damaged. Lester, T.,
and Beynon, L., op. cit. in footnote 124, at pp. 23-24; citing
60
The amount of oil which might be released into the sea from a
well blowout depends on so many factors that it is difficult to
quantify. For example, the U.K. Department of Environment study
estimates that as much as 3,000 tonnes per day might escape from one
of the more productive wells in the North Sea,^""^ and that in the U.K.
sector, there is a 20 per cent, probability of no blowouts, but a 50
per cent, probability of more than one blowout during the period
132
1967-1980. On the other hand, Norwegian authorities think the daily
133
discharge from a blowout might well be 10,000 tons.
Platform equipment failure could cause a chain of events
culminating in the release of oil and smoke. A recent British Report
has in particular pointed out the possibility of a high pressure gas
line failure which could cause an explosion, eventually resulting in
134
a massive oil spill. It has been pointed out, however, that on a
production platform such an occurrence would cause a drop in pressure
as oil was released, thus automatically actuating the down-hole safety
chokes which would cut off oil flow.^"^
Gaines, T. 43 Journal of Water Pollution Control Federation 651
(1971), Berry, W., Journal of Petroleum Technology (March 1972),
at p. 241, Nelson, R., Journal of Petroleum Technology, (March
1972), at p. 225. See Table II-5 at p. 57.
131. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at
para. 6.35, p. 56.
132. Ibid., para. 2.5, p. 8.
133. Conversation with Christian Hambro, Norwegian Ministry of
Environment, 12 November 1976.
134. U.K. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, op. cit. in
footnote 25, at p. 45.
135. U.K. Scottish Office, op. cit. in footnote 112, at p. 3.
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Installation structural failure on a production platform would
result in the same automatic shut off in production platforms as has
been described for other causes, but this is not true of the manually-
operated BOPs used in exploratory wells. The U.K. Department of the
Environment has minimised the likelihood of an oil discharge from this
source, pointing out that "the possibility of failure coinciding with
a potential blow-out situation is very remote," and has instituted an
136
installation certification system to preclude such an occurrence.
The importance of an effective certification system is emphasised by
the general agreement that collapse of a production platform incorpor-
137
ating oil storage tanks could cause in a particularly large spill.
A collision between a vessel and an installation could well result
in oil discharge from both ship and offshore device, as well as
possibly causing fire. Although this potential source of pollution
was discussed above in connection with vessel accidents, two additional
points may appropriately be made here. First, exploration rigs are
likely to be subject to oil pollution risk from collisions for only a
138
very brief time during the total drilling operation; production
platform discharges from collisions would be limited in the same manner
as the case for equipment or structural failure from other causes. The
second point concerns defensive measures: North Sea production plat¬
forms are lighted, sited "to take account of" essential shipping
136. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at
para. 6.38, p. 57. The Report notes that regular inspections are
an integral part of the certification system. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. U.K. Scottish Office, op. cit. in footnote 112, at p. 4.
Exposure to such risk is said to be about 10 days per year on
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lanes, and are marked on mariners' charts. Prevention of a
collision with a subsea storage tank also depends upon accurate and
widely-distributed charts as well as visual and/or audible warning
devices. The one million barrel Ekofisk oil storage unit extending
above the ocean surface is protected by a concrete wall designed to
141
protect the tank itself if a collision does occur. Other units are
planned to be sited so that the bulk of storage volume is below keel
142
level. This carefully qualified sentence suggests that even if
such units are safely below the draft of the 300,000 ton dwt tankers
planned for North Sea service, a minor portion of the stored fluid may
still be at risk, to say nothing of the cargo, fuel, equipment and
lives on the vessel.
Submarine pipelines are a possible source of marine pollution.
143
Pipelines have long been used on land to transport hydrocarbons, and
average, when an exploration or appraisal well being drilled can
actually yield oil. Ibid.
139. This is required by Article 5(6) of the Continental Shelf
Convention.
140. U.K. Scottish Office, op. cifc. in footnote 112, at p. 4. Both
U.K. and Norwegian installations are also protected by a 500
metre safety zone as permitted by Article 5(2) of the Continental
Shelf Convention.
141. Answer to a question posed in the discussion following a paper by
Cole, D., in Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 46, at p. 29.
142. Ibid. The U.K. Department of the Environment states unequiv¬
ocally that "all storage units envisaged for use in United
Kingdom offshore waters will be below keel levels," and con¬
cludes that collision risks are therefore "negligible." (op.
cit. in footnote 3o, at para. 6.40, pp. 57-58).
143. One of the earliest oil pipelines was the six-mile, two-inch
diameter project built in Pennsylvania in 1865. Larminie, R.,
"The Onshore Handling of Oil," in Institute of Petroleum, op.
cit. in footnote 46, pp. 39-47, at p. 39. Mr. Larminie, of B.P.,
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have proved to be the safest form of terrestrial transport. When
leaks have occurred, the usual cause was faults in pipe manufacture
145
or welding.
The analogies possible between North Sea submarine pipelines and
land pipelines or subsea pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico are limited.
North Sea submarine pipelines are a product of emerging technology;
indeed, one might say with justification that they are the parent
of such technology, for laying and burying of pipelines so long and
146
of such diameter, in deep and troubled waters, has no precedent.
147
It appears likely that any hydrocarbon loss from North Sea
pipelines will be as a result of rupture, rather than leakage around
148 149
valves, corrosion, or some other cause. To minimise the danger
of rupture, submarine pipelines are buried where practicable to
protect them from the impact of anchors, trawlboards and the
presents an interesting account of how petroleum from the
Forties Field is handled after it is landed at Cruden Bay.
144. Strichting CONCAWE, Spillages from Oil Industry Cross-Country
Pipelines in Western Europe, Statistical Summary of Reported
Incidents 1972, Report No. 1/74, The Hague (1974), p. 3.
145. Ibid., p. 5.
146. The present and planned North Sea submarine pipeline system is
depicted in Figure III-l, at p. 125.
147. One writer is less cautious, asserting that "virtually the only
source of oil spillage would be as a result of fracture in the
line." Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 3.
148. Leakage in the couplings between the wellhead flow lines and
the production platform required the shutdown of two wells on
the Argyll field. The Scotsman, 1 October 1975, p. 9. It is
submitted that any coupling or valve presents some risk of oil
discharge from leakage rather than fracture.
149. Corrosion to pipe coatings has occurred much faster than
anticipated, investigations undertaken at the Forties and
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like.^° Further protection is afforded by an external coating of
concrete which also adds weight to counteract buoyancy. ^ There is
152
some doubt as to how vulnerable pipelines which are left or become
exposed are to impacts by trawlboards. A recent Norwegian study has
suggested that the concrete coating can be badly damaged by the heavy
trawlboards now coming into use, thus leaving the denuded pipeline
open to damage.The other view judges such pipelines "quite safe,"
154
and dismisses the possibility of damage by trawling as negligible.
Trawlboards are an issue because fish are apparently attracted to
pipelines which assume the status of artificial reefs: this
phenomenon is not lost on fishermen, some of whom are said to trawl
155
the length of the pipe.
Ekofisk Fields have revealed. The Scotsman, 7 August 1976,
p. 1. Anti-corrosion agents can be added to the fluid trans¬
ported to reduce internal threats to pipeline integrity.
150. Landfall of the huge Ekofisk pipeline presented a difficult
case: "6-7 km. outside Teesside the sea bed was so difficult
(a mixture of sand and clay) that eight passes had to be made
before the pipeline was 2 feet below sea bed. Specified cover
is 2.5 metres, but this is quite simply impossible." Noroil
(October 1975), at p. 68.
151. A 36-inch diameter pipeline floated to the surface after its
concrete jacket began to break away. The pipeline, from the
Brent Field to Firth's Voe in the Shetlands, was empty at the
time. The Scotsman, 15 September 1975, p. 1.
152. The U.K. Department of the Environment thinks that there is
little likelihood that pipelines in the northern part of the
North Sea will become "unburied" because of seabed chararf-pr-
istics. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in
footnote 30, at para. 6.42, p. 58.
153. Noroil (October 1975), at p. 39. The possibility that an initial
break in the concrete coat may lead to further breaking away and a
pipe float as described in footnote 151 should also be considered.
154. Wardley Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 76, at pp. 7-8.
155. Reed, L., "Pollution of the Sea," a paper delivered at the Royal
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A further, and perhaps greater, danger is posed by the possib¬
ility of a large trawler hooking a pipeline in its fishing gear. One
writer has observed that a sizeable trawler traveling at four knots
could exert as much as 20 tons of pressure on a submarine pipeline.
The actual stress would depend upon a number of variables, but it is
conceivable that a fracture could result.
Despite these possibilities of hydrocarbon discharges from
submarine pipelines, the American experience, admittedly different
157
from that planned for the North Sea, has been that pipeline spills
158
have been rare and small. Many writers think that this would also
be the case in the North Sea. Even if a rupture did occur, it is
thought that only a small discharge would result because a significant
Society of Art, Newcastle Meeting, January 1974, at p. 14.
156. Shelton, R., "Effects on Fisheries," in Cole, H. (ed.),
op. cit. in footnote 46, pp. 75-81, at p. 77. Dr. Shelton
observes that in view of the risks involved, priority must be
given to improve trenching technology. Ibid. See Wood, P.,
op. cit. in footnote 18, at p. 36, Figure 4 for a graphic
illustration of North Sea seasonal fishing intensities. This
chart is helpful in suggesting where accidental netting of
pipelines might occur. As fishing activity is more intense near
the U.K. coast, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that pipelines
approaching landfall are more vulnerable to this danger. It
may be useful to point out that the risk of such an incident
varies with the number of pipes and trawlers as well as their
locations; thus, recent U.K. legislation providing H.M.G. with
the authority to control submarine pipeline use and routeing in
an important pollution prevention law.
157. The U.K. Department of the Environment concluded that the
percentage of oil brought to shore by pipeline in the North
Sea was so much greater than that in the U.S. (which depends
heavily upon tankers), that comparisons would be of little value.
Op. cit., in footnote 30, at para. 2.6, p. 8.
158. However, one U.S. pipeline discharge of about 900 barrels has
been reported. Lester, T. , and Beynon, L., op. cit. in
footnote 124, at p. 23.
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spill would entail loss of pressure which would activate automatic
159
shutoff mechanisms. Loss of oil remaining in the pipeline would
vary inversely with water depth because of pressure exerted by the
160
water column. The U.K. Department of the Environment has estim¬
ated that the most probable loss would amount to only a few hundred
tonnes, but under a particular combination of circumstances, the loss
might reach 10,000 tonnes.
Damage to subsea well equipment could be caused by anchors or
trawlboards, and possibly by collision with a deep-draft vessel. This
may become an increasingly probable accident as subsea technology
develops, but at present the use of this technique in the North Sea
162
is limited. Subsea installations depend upon charts and buoy
markers to provide warning to mariners; future subsea wells may have
163
protective shielding as a further precaution. If damage to a sub¬
sea production well occurs, as in the case of its platform-completed
counterpart, down-hole safety chokes are designed to be automatically
159. Wardley Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 76, at p. 8; U.K. Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution, op. cit. in footnote 25,
at pp. 45, 48.
160. Ibid.
161. U.K. D.O.E., op. cit. in footnote 30, at para. 6.46, p. 59.
162. The Ekofisk and Argyll fields have made some use of subsea
completions, and some operators in the U.K. sector are consid¬
ering subsea systems as well. Cole, D., "Offshore Production
Practices to Protect the Environment," op. cit. in footnote 46,
at p. 26. Mobil has in fact employed a subsea production system
in the Beryl field in the U.K. sector. In a recently reported
incident, a West German trawler is alleged to have damaged a
control cable running from a platform to a subsea production
well a mile away. The Scotsman, 3 March 1977, p. 5.
163. U.K. Scottish Office, op. cit. in footnote 112, at p. 5.
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164
activated to staunch petroleum flow.
Sabotage to an offshore installation, pipeline, or vessel could
cause "accidental" discharge of pollutants into the sea and air.
This possibility is being taken very seriously by both the British
and Norwegian Governments, and provision is being made for patrol
165
vessels and aircraft to reduce this potential threat.
B. Effects
There is widespread acceptance of the view that many of man's
activities may well be causing harm to the environment, but at the
same time, there is alarm that we know so little about the precise
nature of the changes being wrought, particularly those which may be
166
occurring so gradually as to be virtually undetectable. A corol¬
lary to this scientific ignorance is that, since many life systems
are slow to manifest the effects of pollution, by the time that
damage can be detected it may be irreversible on any human time
scale. This may mean that legislation must precede definite know-
167
ledge that a dangerous situation exists.
164. U.K. Scottish Office, op. cit. in footnote 112, at p. 5.
165. The nature and scope of the patrol force and the type of
equipment it ought to employ have been the subject of dozens
of newspaper articles, letters to the editor, and papers.
166. Hardy, M., "International Control of Marine Pollution," 11
Natural Resources Journal 296-348 (1971), at p. 297; Birnie,
P., "Main Marine Pollutants," a class study sheet prepared for
honours students at Edinburgh University, at p. 1.
167. Clark, R., "The Biological Consequences of Oil Pollution of
the Sea," in Water Pollution as a World Problem, Europa
Publications, Ltd., London (1970), pp. 53-73, at p. 63.
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The North Sea is used intensively for fishing, navigation,
naval activity and waste disposal. It has been concluded by one U.K.
169
Government Department that there is little use conflict, but it
is submitted that this refers only to human competition for oceanic
resources. From an ecological point of view it must be conceded
that little is known of North Sea characteristics or how man may be
changing them. Although investigations of man's impact on the North
Sea are continuing, much work remains to be done to confirm and
expand preliminary findings. When such information becomes available,
it will be of great value in setting standards for the discharge of
substances into the marine environment.
The subject of how man's activities affect his environment is
properly the province of the scientist. There is a vast scientific
literature on the subject,and the layman ventures into a discussion
of esoterics such as microbial oxidation at considerable risk—both
to himself, and perhaps to others whom he may mislead. These dangers
notwithstanding, it is submitted that a minimal level of scientific
understanding is necessary to enable lawyer and scientist to
168. "The North Sea constitutes only four thousandths of one percent
of the world ocean, yet it yields five percent of the world fish
supply." Goldberg, E., in the "Introduction" of North Sea
Science, MIT Press, London and Cambridge (1973), a collection of
the papers presented at the NATO Science Committee Conference,
Aviemore, Scotland, 15-20 November 1971, at p. 1. Dr. Goldberg
is editor of this book.
169. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Wood, P., op.
cit. in footnote 18, at p. 40. It must be remembered that Mr.
Wood's paper was written before any substantial production in
the northern part of the North Sea, although gas had been
produced in the more congested southern area for some years.
170. See, for example, Moulder, D. and Varley, A., op. cit. in note 2.
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communicate and so to achieve their common goal of environmental
171
protection. This consideration has led to the inclusion in this
thesis of a brief section concerned with the effects of offshore on
development on the environment, and in particular, the changes
wrought on the North Sea, its denizens and its users.
In the subsection immediately below four pollutants which could
exceed the North Sea's capacity to assimilate them are discussed:
oil, installation siting, disposal of wastes, and the discharge of
chemicals.
1. The effect of oil
a) the behaviour of oil at sea
Crude oil spilled into the sea will, in general, spread rapidly
until it reaches a thickness of a few millimetres; for example, on
still water, one cubic metre of oil will spread to a circle 48 metres
172
in diameter in ten minutes. The movement of oil upon the surface
of the water depends upon wind and current, and is therefore
extremely difficult to predict. Despite these uncertainties, it is
known that oil can move great distances under the influence of natural
171. There may also be a case for introducing scientists to the
limitations international law may impose on desirable actions.
172. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 5. The
qualification "in general" is included because except in the
laboratory, oil will usually be influenced by natural forces
such as wind and waves. Although many informative papers have
been published on the behaviour and fate of oil at sea (for
example, Wardley Smith, J., "The Distribution of Oil and
Behaviour of Oil Spills," in Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit. in
footnote 46, pp. 65-71), the reader is particularly directed
to the work of Mr. P.G. Jeffrey of the U.K. Warren Spring
Laboratory, who has conducted extensive research into the
behaviour of oil at sea. See, for example, Jeffrey, P.,
"Large Scale Experiments on the Spreading of Oil at Sea and
its Disappearance by Natural Factors," Proceedings of Conference
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forces and the prevailing winds are westerly. It therefore seems
quite possible that oil discharged in the area of U.K. and Norwegian
174
activity could reach coastlines of Denmark or Norway.
Natural forces also change the oil itself. Refined products
and the lighter fractions of crude oil tend to evaporate quickly,
175
leaving the heavier residues. However, despite their propensity
to evaporate quickly, lighter oils and refined products enter into
solution with sea water far more easily than persistent oils.
on Prevention and Control of Oil Spills, American Petroleum
Institute, Washington, D.C. (1973).
173. Emulsified oil from the Torrey Canyon disaster stayed on the
sea for some 24 days, travelling about 230 miles altogether
and covering a distance of 130 miles. The area affected by
Torrey Canyon oil is therefore some evidence that a spill near
the production wells in the North Sea could reach land. It is
about 100 miles from the Forties field to Peterhead and
approximately 160 miles to the coast of Norway. U.K. Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution, op. cit. in footnote 25,
at p. 45.
174. White, I.L., (et al.),op. cit. in footnote 108, at p. 121.
175. In the North Sea, it has been estimated that about 20 per cent,
of an average crude oil will evaporate in a day, the lighter
parts disappearing within a few hours. Fulleylove, R., op.
cit. in footnote 128, at p. 6; citing Oil Pollution of the Sea
and Shore, a Warren Spring Laboratory Booklet (1972). The U.K.
Department of the Environment estimate that up to 40 per cent,
of the light North Sea crudes may be evaporated within one day
(op. cit. in footnote 30 at para. 8.3, p. 6). But one of the
leading authorities on effects wrought by marine oil spills has
cautioned that the Dona Marika petrol tanker accident has shown
that "predictions about 'non-persistent' oils based on small
scale experiments may be misleading. In this case, about 3000
tons of petrol were spilt into a bay during high winds and heavy
seas, and under these conditions water-in-petrol emulsions were
formed and evaporation rates were subsequently lower than
predicted. A combination of the high toxicity of the petrol and
the reduced evaporation rate resulted in large numbers of
molluscs being affected, the detachment of most of the limpets
in the bay being particularly noticeable." Baker, J., "Effects
on Shore Life and Amenities," in Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit.
in footnote 46, pp. 85-90, at p.88.
Furthermore, they are extremely toxic. Toxicity plus solubility
177
combine to make the so-called "white oils" a great threat to marine
life in certain situations: a spill may be dispersed throughout the
water column (instead of merely floating on the surface) by the
action of wind and waves before it has completely evaporated, thus
reaching a wide range of marine organisms. Because of its toxicity,
if a spill of light or refined petroleum occurs in coastal waters rich
178
in marine life, the destruction may be swift and complete. One
authority has suggested that, because of their destructive properties,
"there seems little that can be done except to treat refined petroleum
products as dangerous cargoes and handle them with appropriate care."
176. Clark, R., op. cit. in footnote 167, at p. 70.
177. See also the discussion of "white oils" in connection with the
1973 IMCO Convention, below at p. 160.
178. The destruction of marine life was severe in three well-known
cases of light oil spills. The Dona Marika has been mentioned
(footnote 175). The Tampico Maru, with a cargo of 55,200 barrels
of diesel oil grounded in a small cove in Baja California in
1957. All forms of marine life were affected; recovery to pre-
spill conditions was estimated to be six years, although
sublethal effects may have persisted beyond this time. The
"West Falmouth" spill, as it is generally termed because of its
location, involved the oil barge Florida which grounded near
that harbour in Massachusetts. Approximately 4,500 barrels of
No. 2 fuel oil was estimated to have been lost. The effects
were extreme: "Trawls made in 10 feet of water soon after the
spill showed that 95 per cent, of the animals collected were
dead." Four years after the incident some effects were still
detectable. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op.
cit. in footnote 23 at pp. 34-35; citing Michael, Von Roalte and
Brown, "Long-Term Effects of an Oil Spill at West Falmouth,
Mass.," 1975 Conference on Prevention and Control of Oil Pollution,
American Petroleum Institute (1975).
179. Clark, R., op. cit. in footnote 167, at p. 70. Professor Clark
acknowledges that this is an unsatisfactory solution.
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Heavier oils which remain on the surface may be affected by a
number of processes—none of which is well understood. The oil slick
has a tendency to form a stable water/oil emulsion, the well-known
"chocolate mousse" which enhances the cohesiveness of slicks and
180
therefore their persistence. A small quantity of oil may be
removed by photo-oxidation and auto-oxidation, processes which are
181
catalysed by sunlight and by salts present in sea water. Bacterial
oxidation may also remove some of the remaining oil, although this
varies with the dilution of the oil in water and with heat, the latter
factor being in large part responsible for the extremely slow oxidation
182 *
of oil spilled in Arctic areas. Oil may also be removed from the
surface of the sea as a result of adsorption on solid particles:
the resultant tarry lumps then sink, but little is known of what happens
180. The emulsion can contain up to 70 per cent, water, thus greatly
increasing the mass and aggravating clean up problems. Wardley
Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 172, at p. 68. The particular
characteristics of North Sea crudes which may affect emulsions
with seawater are being studied by the U.K. Warren Spring
Laboratory. However, pending more complete findings, the
Department of the Environment has concluded that North Sea
crudes are likely to behave in the same manner as the Kuwait
crude which formed an oil-seawater emulsion following the
Torrey Canyon grounding (op. cit. in footnote 30, at para. 8.4,
p. 6, and Appendix H).
181. Schachter, 0. and Serwer, D., "Marine Pollution Problems and
Remedies," 65 American Journal of International Law 84-111
(1971), at p. 89.
182. "Below 10 degrees centigrade, bacterial oxidation is very slow,
and oil spilled in Arctic areas may last as long as 50 years."
Ibid. The "special characteristics" of the Arctic and other
areas have been adduced to support unilateral claims to
extensive coastal jurisdiction (for example, the Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act), and has been mooted
in various versions at UNCLOS III (for example, Article 21(5)
of the Committee III Revised Informal Single Negotiating Text
(A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev./Part III, 6 May 1976). See below, p. 201.
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to them then or the effect they may have on the marine environ-
183
ment. It is clear, however, that some tarry lumps, whether from
submarine or surface pathways, may travel great distances and even¬
tually be washed up on the beach,
b) the effect of oil on man and his environment
There is general scientific agreement that the primary environ¬
mental injury caused by sporadic discharges of crude oil is damage to
184
seabirds, although a great deal of research into possible effects
on plankton, larvae, and various micro-organisms is in progress.
Shelton has concluded that an oil spill in the North Sea is not likely
to affect fish stocks, although economic loss could result from the
fouling of fishing gear and the temporary tainting of fish and shell-
185
fish. Scientists are less confident that spills of toxic petroleum
183. Ibid. Adsorption is more likely to occur near the coast or in
shipping lanes. Thor Heyerdahl's observations of tarry lumps
from the Ra all across the Atlantic have been discounted by
Wardley Smith who notes that both the Ra and the lumps were
drifting. Wardley Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 172, at p.
68. A study on tar balls in the North Sea (in Norwegian) has
been published by Gary B. Smith of the Norwegian Fisheries
Directorate: "Oljeklumper i farvannene Utenfor" Norge (1975).
184. See, for example, Moore, S. (et al.), "Ecological Aspects of
Offshore Exploration and Exploitation," a paper delivered at
the Offshore North Sea Technological Conference and Exhibition,
Stavanger, 3-6 September 1974, p. 20; Croxall, J., "The Effect
of Oil on Nature Conservation, Especially Birds," in Cole, H.
(ed.), op. cit. in footnote 46, at pp. 93-101. In theory,
species which aggregate and frequent the areas most likely to
be subject to oil spills should be at greatest risk, but
Croxall has found that although they are frequent casualties,
their higher reproductive rate compensates for deaths due to
oil. See also, U.K. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollu¬
tion, op. cit. in footnote 25, at para. 134, p. 48.
185. Shelton, R., op. cit. in footnote 156, at p. 76; citing
Korringa, P., 17 Helgolander wiss. Meeresunters 126-40 (1968),
Simpson, A., 2 Field Studies 91-98 (supplement), (1968), and
Cole, H., Oceanology International (1969).
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products or continuing discharges of any oils can be so easily
dismissed.
Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that toxic fractions
of oil on the surface of the open sea can inhibit the reproduction
186
and growth of planktonic animals and plants. This is an important
area of research, because plankton is the base of the pyramid of
187 188
marine life, and produces most of the world's oxygen as well.
Further research is needed, however, particularly into sublethal
effects and to determine what differences may exist between risks as
assessed in the laboratory and those which will be produced by actual
189
activities at sea.
186. See, for example, Johannessen, K., "Effects of Seawater Extract
of Ekofisk Oil on Hatching Success of Barents Sea Capelin," a
paper presented to the ICES Workshop on "Hydrocarbons in the
Marine Environment," Aberdeen, 1976.
187. In the North Atlantic, 1000 pounds of phytoplankton produces:
lOO pounds of zooplankton or shellfish
50 pounds of anchovies and other small fish
10 pounds of smaller carnivores
1 pound of the carnivores harvested by man.
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (U.S.C.E.Q.), Ocean
Dumping, a National Policy (1970), p. 12; citing Ketchum, B.H.,
"Biological Implications of Global Marine Pollution," in Singer,
S.F. (ed.), Global Effects of Environmental Pollution (1970),
pp. 190-94.
188. It has been estimated that phytoplankton produce about 70 per
cent, of the earth's oxygen. Schachter, 0. and Serwer, D., op.
cit. in footnote 181, at p. 87. Suggestions that destruction of
plankton could cause a global oxygen shortage appear to have
been refuted, but even if this is the case, the undoubted
dependence of man on marine life should provide ample reason to
treat the oceans with an abundance of caution. Knauss, J., op.
cit. in footnote 11, at p. 327; citing Broecker, W., "Man's
Oxygen Reserves," 173 Science 1537-38 (1970).
189. Among the many inadequacies of laboratory experimentation is
the necessary limitation of attention to one small facet of the
ecosystem and the impossibility of simulating the multiple
natural occurrences which might coincide with a discharge and
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The effects of chronic discharges of hydrocarbons on marine
organisms is also a function of the toxicity of the effluent,
opportunity for dilution in the sea, and a complex of other variables.
Continuous discharges of effluent into the same area occur primarily
in connection with refining and production operations, although oil
spills associated with loading and unloading cargo may approach the
190
chronic level. oil in effluent discharged from production platforms
is a particular source of concern in respect of North Sea petroleum
development. As mentioned earlier, oily-water separators are still
primitive in that a relatively large amount of oil remains in the
191
discharged effluent. The U.K. Department of the Environment has
concluded that present technology can achieve an average oil effluent
concentration of 30-40 ppm for production platforms, yet they concede
that a continuous exposure to this solution can be expected to cause
192
mortality to several classes of organisms. Moreover, the same Report
so alter the expected effects. National Academy of Sciences,
Petroleum in the Marine Environment, Washington, D.C. (1975),
at pp. 32, 35; citing Straughan, D. (ed.), "Biological and
Oceanographical Survey of the Santa Barbara Channel Oil Spill,
1969-1970," Biology and Bacteriology, Vol. I, University of
Southern California (1971).
190. In the Caspian Sea offshore oil development, natural seepage,
waste waters from refineries and the petro-chemical industry,
vessel-source discharges, and sewage have combined to drastically
reduce all marine life in the area. Although the Caspian does
not enjoy the same flushing action as does the North Sea, "it
cannot be doubted that the exploitation of the North Sea oilfield
exposes it to new dangers." Clark, R., op. cit. in footnote 167,
at pp. 60-61.
191. This is a major impediment to acceptance of the 1973 IMCO
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. See below,
p. 160.
192. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 45, at
pp. 7 (Table 3) and 22; Moore, S. (et al.), op. cit. in footnote
184, at pp. 6, 20.
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points out that the soluble, toxic fractions are unlikely to be
removed by platform oily water separation equipment. Available data
are insufficient to permit generalizations on the effect of North Sea
production platforms on marine life. However, the information that
has been accumulated suggests that as effluent discharged from
production platforms can be harmful to marine life, caution should be
exercised in platform placement so that, to the extent possible, the
mixture can be diluted in the sea before it can affect highly
193
aggregated or otherwise susceptible species.
Early concern with marine oil pollution was directed at the prob¬
lem of begrimed beaches and may well have been more the result of
attention to amenity and economic interests than a desire to protect
194
the environment. Nevertheless, it remains the case that oil
spilled closer to shore is more likely to cause a greater amount of
damage than had it been discharged in mid-ocean, and furthermore, that
such potential damage is more likely to involve all three interests.
As in the cases of toxic and chronic discharges, the impact of hydro¬
carbons which reach the beach on amenity, economic, and environmental
interests depends on many variables, chief among which are the type of
oil and the type of beach.
193. Mr. Lars Foeyn and Mr. Grim Berge, of the Norwegian Institute
of Marine Research presented a paper at the Offshore North Sea
Conference in Stavanger, on 21 September 1976, in which they
reported that minute amounts of oil could interfere with
salmon sensory organs and thus prevent their return to rivers
to spawn. The Scotsman, 22 September 1976, p. 11. See also,
Moore, S. (et al.), op. cit. in footnote 184, at p. 20.




Rocky beaches appear to be little affected by oil discharges.
The natural washing action of the sea minimises environmental damage,
although oil adhering to rocks above the splash zone may persist for
some time, possibly impairing human enjoyment of (and attraction to)
a formerly popular area of great natural beauty.
Sandy beaches are the most usual type of amenity beach, and as
such, may well be severely affected by oil pollution. Both residents
and tourists may suffer amenity loss, and each may incur economic
loss as well, the former losing tourist income and the holiday-maker
perhaps having to spend unanticipated sums to change his plans.
Sandy beaches also tend to absorb oil, and it may persist below
196
the surface for years. It has been suggested that as sandy beaches
are "seldom of fisheries or marine conservation interest, where bird
197
life is unaffected the ecological effects can be tolerated."
Although it is recognised that sandy beaches are less likely to be as
rich in marine life as rocky or mud beaches, it is nonetheless a
cause for concern that the Department of the Environment appear so
ready to condone a rape of nature. It is conceded that economic
limitations preclude complete protection and that perfect restoration
is not possible. It is submitted, however, that every effort should
be made to prevent oil from becoming buried on sandy beaches and that
caution must be exercised to ensure that "tolerable" does not become
synonymous with "expendable."
195. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at
para. 8.19, p. 80.
196. Ibid., at para. 8.20, p. 80.
197. Ibid.
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Oil is most likely to cause damage to estuaries because these
areas shelter abundant and varied organisms. Natural cleaning action
is apt to be limited and oil which reaches the shore is readily
absorbed by the fine sand and mud flats which often comprise the
198
sea/land interface. Plants and animals affected by the oil may
in turn endanger other organisms—including man. It is well known
that shellfish in particular can become tainted from relatively
small amounts of oil in the water which they pass over their gills.
Although the taint is lost if the water clears and few tainted
shellfish are likely to be consumed (at least in an unaltered state),
it has been pointed out that some petroleum fractions contain known
199
or suspected carcinogens. This is yet another situation in which
ignorance of the probabilities of possibly enormous risks dictates
200
prudence.
Salt marshes usually recover well from occasional oil spills,
201
but chronic pollution may result in their destruction. Salt marsh
vegetation is important in erosion control in estuarine creeks, as
198. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30, at
para. 8.21, p. 80.
199. Nelson Smith, A., in Cole, H. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 46,
pp. 105-111, at p. 110 (numerous citations omitted).
200. Caution is also advisable in view of the well-known tendency
of biota to concentrate substances from a few hundred to
several hundred thousand times the concentration in the
surrounding environment. U.S.C.E.Q., op. cit. in footnote
187, at p. 12 (several citations omitted).
201. The Times, 27 April 1973, p. 21. The Nature-Times News Service
reported that Dr. J.M. Baker had conducted experiments on
experimental plots over a period of five years. The results
were published in Environmental Pollution (4, 223; 1973).
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well as providing food for fish and birds. Destruction of salt
marshes can therefore have "ripple effects" which extend beyond the
species and locality originally polluted.
c) mitigating the consequences of oil spills
A number of techniques have been developed to contain and/or
remove oil spills. The choice of methods depends on a number of
factors, particularly weather and sea conditions. It has been
suggested that because of these considerations,
"most of the remedial action and cleanup equipment which is
highly suitable for use 99% of the time in the Gulf of Mexico
would only operate 20% of the time in the Celtic or North Seas."
It may be decided that, on balance, the cost of remedial measures
may not justify the effort, or that the harm which is likely to occur
from efforts to remove or disperse the spill may exceed the probable
204
benefits. In such case, no action will be taken. Nevertheless,
when oil at sea threatens the coast, it is usually desirable to clean
it up, for beach cleaning is very labour-intensive and therefore it
is far more expensive than dealing with an oil spill at sea. A
great deal has been written on the subject of oil spill cleanup;
consequently the paragraphs below are intended only to give the reader
a brief introduction to present and future methods of mitigating the
consequences of marine oil spills and to illustrate the influence of
technology on law.
202. Nelson Smith, A., op. cit. in footnote 199, at p. 107.
203. Wardley Smith, J., op. cit. in footnote 76, at p. 6.
204. Ibid., at p. 12; U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit.
in footnote 3o* at para. 2.16, p. lO.
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i) dispersants
The British Government believe that dispersants are at present
205
the most effective method of combatting oil spills at sea. The
effectiveness of dispersants depends upon distributing an adequate
amount of the solution on the slick, and then mixing the dispersant
206 207
with the oil. This is usually done by spraying from small boats.
Dispersant is loaded on sprayer-equipped vessels in concentrate form
and mixed with seawater prior to use, thus permitting a much greater
2o8
volume of solution to be sprayed than were it pre-mixed. The
primary advantage of dispersants in the North Sea is that they can be
used effectively even when seas are rough and winds are high. The
objection that dispersants used following the Torrey Canyon grounding
caused widespread destruction of marine life because of their toxicity
209
has, in the U.K. view, been overcome. However, even the new
205. U.K. Department of Trade, op. cit. in footnote 33, at p. 9;
U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30,
at paras. 9.7-9.16, pp. 85-88.
206. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 128, at p. 15. The disper¬
sant does not itself remove the oil, but by breaking the slick
up into small droplets, encourages the natural processes of
degradation. Ibid., at p. 16; U.K. Department of Trade, op.
cit. in footnote 33, at p. 10.
207. The U.K. has non-contractual arrangements with a number of
small boat owners to supply vessels for spraying, and spray kits
are stocked at a number of strategic points in the U.K. The
Department of the Environment Report has questioned whether this
arrangement will ensure sufficient vessels should the need for
them arise, and has suggested that the Department of Trade
investigate the possibility of placing some boats on retainers
to guarantee their instant availability (op. cit. in footnote
30, at paras. 10.13 and 11.20, pp. 99 and 112).
208. One barrel of concentrate will cover the same area as 10 barrels
of pre-mixed dispersant. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote
89, at p. 16.
209. U.K. Department of Trade, op. cit. in footnote 33, at p. 9. A
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dispersants retain some degree of toxicity, and it may be that in
sheltered coastal waters mechanical means of oil removal or contain¬
ment would prove more satisfactory from an environmental protection
210
point of view. Moreover, the value of the oil itself may
increasingly be a factor in favour of oil recovery as technology
permits this process to become more efficient.
ii) mechanical oil containment and pick-up devices
The Norwegians favour using booms to contain oil spilled at sea,
believing that on balance, the environment is likely to be better
protected by a less effective device that is non-toxic than by
211
dispersants which are potentially harmful to marine life. Booms
















*Toxicity is the concentration in ppm at which 50% of the
animals (brown shrimp) die in 48 hours.
Source: U.K. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, "The
Toxicity of 140 Substances to the Brown Shrimp and Other Marine
Animals," (J.E. Portmann and K.W. Wilson), Shellfish Information
Leaflet No. 22, December 1971; cited in White, I.L. (et al.) ,
op. cit. in footnote 108, at p. 128 (Table 12) .
210. Any dispersant can cause problems on sandy, muddy and saltmarsh
beaches because finely dispersed oil can penetrate deeply into
the sediments, and may remain buried for years. Baker, J., op.
cit. in footnote 175, at p. 188.
211. The main argument against the use of dispersants is that the
practice may just be dispersing hydrocarbons throughout the
marine environment, with unknown effects. National Academy of
Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environment, Washington, D.C.
(1975), at p. 106. The contrasting British and Norwegian
views are reflected in their legislation and provide an interest¬
ing example of the influence of science and technology upon law.
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are simply floating fences; usually they are long, floating tubes
to which are attached "skirts" which extend the barrier beneath the
water. A number of booms may be arranged in a pattern to contain oil
212
in an area or to keep it out. Although the primary objection to
booms has been that they simply cannot fence oil in or out during
213
rough weather, there are other criticisms as well, including
214
problems with arranging,and mooring the fence. and the excessive
215
time needed to transport the bulky equipment. It may also present
a fire danger to confine petroleum around a leaking well or tanker;
therefore, it may be that booms are best employed as defensive devices
to keep oil out (for example, of harbours) rather than to confine it.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that even the successful use of
booms still leaves the problem of oil removal to be solved, a task
which takes time and requires relatively calm seas.
A second method to contain oil on the surface is by using chemical
"herders." These agents are sprayed on the sea and compete with the
216
oil for free water surface. Herders are said not to harm the
environment; thus, they offer the advantages of boom containment
212. Booms are normally arranged in a "U"-shaped trap, but this may
be impossible if the currents are strong, and alternatively,
booms may be arrayed so as to deflect oil to a collection point.
Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 14.
213. Ibid., at p. 13.
214. Ibid., at p. 14.
215. This shortcoming has been rectified to some extent by the recent
U.S. Coast Guard development of a lightweight boom system which
can be airlifted to the oil spill site.
216. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30,
at para. 9.21, p. 89.
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without attendant problems of transport and arrangement. The primary
disadvantage of booms is retained, however: herders do not work well
in rough weather. Their effectiveness is also reduced if the oil has
2
previously been treated with dispersants or if it is thick and waxy.
Oil may be removed from the surface of the water by mechanical
devices, by the introduction of absorbent materials onto the slick
which soak up oil and are then removed, or by sinking agents to which
the oil adheres.
"Skimmers" are mechanical oil pick-up devices which employ a
system of discs or a belt to which oil adheres and is then scraped
off; an alternative concept uses centrifugal force to thicken the
218
oil to facilitate collection. The effectiveness of skimmers in
the North Sea is limited by their inability to remove oil efficiently
219
in rough weather. A further consideration is the high investment
220
required: The cost of a typical disc skimmer is about £25,000.
Absorbent materials, such as straw or artificial substances,
present no risk to the environment and are not inhibited by rough
weather, although high seas and winds can exacerbate the already
serious problem of the time necessary to collect a large volume of
oil-soaked absorbents. Disposal is also a problem: burning or sinking
would avoid the problem of collection, but there are practical
217. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30,
at para. 9.21, p. 89.
218. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 14.
219. Disc skimmers can work in moderately high seas and so may be of
some use in the North Sea. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
220. U.K. Department of the Environment, op. cit. in footnote 30,
para. 9.23, p. 90.
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problems (crude oil can be difficult to burn completely, absorbents
float) and the transfer of pollution from the sea surface to
atmosphere or seabed is an unsatisfactory solution and is possibly
221
contrary to international customary law. Disposal on shore
necessitates transportation from spill site to a location where the
material can be used as land fill or otherwise utilised. Transport-
222
ation and materials handling costs are therefore a consideration.
Sinking agents, such as powdered chalk or treated sand, can be
used to remove oil from the surface of the sea, but the sunken oil
223
may be harmful to benthic animals and can also foul nets. Sunken
oil does not decompose as quickly as oil which is exposed to sunlight
and atmosphere; moreover, it may be carried by bottom currents far
beyond the original site of the sinking. These drawbacks suggest
221. For example, Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment states that States
have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." Article 4(2) of the Committee III Revised Single
Negotiating Text (developed at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea) is a similar provision, and
Article 5 of that document provides that "(i)n taking measures
to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environ¬
ment, States shall so act as not to transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or
transform one type of pollution into another." See the
discussion of emerging international customary law, below at p. 96.
222. Fulleylove, R., op. cit. in footnote 89, at p. 13. Dumping
sites on land can be difficult to find. This is one reason
dumping at sea is increasing. The Oslo Dumping Convention
addresses this problem in a provision which requires Parties to
apply that instrument so as to prevent diversion of ocean
dumping to other areas. See below, p. 205.
223. Shelton, R., op. cit. in footnote 156, at p. 76 (numerous
citations omitted). Dr. Shelton observes, "Of all the methods
available for alleviating the effects of oil pollution on
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that sinking agents should be used only after a careful weighing
224
of alternative means of oil clearance.
iii) beach cleaning techniques
These techniques are similar to those employed for oil slicks
at sea, but are usually far more labour-intensive. On sandy beaches,
oil is usually removed by shovel manually; the use of power shovels
even where logistics permit this action may result in more environ-
225
mental damage than protection. Absorbents are frequently used,
small armies of volunteers being necessary to collect the oil-soaked
materials. Dispersants can also be used to break up oil and, in the
case of rocky beaches, this may be the only alternative to leaving
the oil to degrade naturally. The latter alternative should be care¬
fully considered, however, because even modern dispersants can cause
22(
injury to the delicate organisms which are found between the tides.
2. The effect of placing installations offshore
One writer has concluded, after studying the problems associated
with oil production in the Gulf of Mexico, that
tourist beaches and diving birds, sinking is the least acceptable
to fisheries interests. Unfortunately, it is still probably the
only method of dealing quickly with very large spillages." Ibid.
224. A further consideration is the availability of a suction dredger
to fully utilise the potential of this method to quickly remove
large quantities of oil from the sea surface. Wardley Smith,
J., replying to a question in the discussion following his paper
cited in footnote 172, at p. 73.
225. Baker, J., op. cit. in footnote 175, at p. 88. Dr. Baker con¬
cludes that drastic removal techniques 'feuch as bulldozing, burn¬
ing, and cutting of oiled vegetation are all more destructive
biologically than just leaving the oil, except where thick,




"The significant conflicts between oil production and
the marine environment are not the apparently obvious
ones—oil slicks, spills and major accidents—but rather
problems due to dredging, soil displacement, silting, 227
navigational restrictions and underwater obstructions."
The effects caused by the actual placement of offshore installa¬
tions on or into the seabed is a new and little-researched problem.
Little is known of the effects such placement has on currents, fish
migrations, or benthic organisms, to cite but three examples. Even
seabed trenching and dredging for pipeline burial and channel
deepening—obviously activities which disturb the pre-existing
order—remain inadequately researched. It is well known that dredging
can damage nursery areas, but further research is needed in order to
ascertain the true cost of mineral extraction from the sea.
3. The effect of oil-related debris
Debris dumped from offshore installations or associated vessels
has damaged fishing gear and is the subject of discussions between
228
fishermen and the oil industry. Such debris, although possibly
containing traces of oil or chemicals, is for the most part inert,
229
and is not thought to pose significant danger to marine life.
227. St. Amat, L., Journal of Petroleum Technology (1972), at p. 385.
The quotation is a paraphrase of Dr. St. Amat's findings in Les¬
ter, T. and Beynon, L., op. cit. in footnote 124, at p. 24. This
is also the conclusion of the National Academy of Sciences, Pet¬
roleum in the Marine Environment, Washington, D.C. (1975), at p.
89, which also points out the effects on wetlands and estuaries.
228. See below, pp. 258-262.
229. However, some inert material, such as mud, can detrimentally
affect marine life when discharged in high concentrations. Effects
include interference with photosynthesis, feeding, and gill block¬
age. White, I.C., op. cit. in footnote 106, at p. 5. The National
Academy of Sciences, Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, Wash¬
ington, D.C. (1975), has estimated daily litter frgm 26 mobile rigs
and 10 producing wells in the North Sea at 0.5 (10 kg)/year.
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4. The effect of chemicals
Little is known about the effects of chemicals upon the
marine environment. This is especially true in the case of
small amounts of toxic substances introduced into the same area
on a continuing basis as can occur with installation discharges.
Bactericides, for example formalin and pentachlorophenol, are
230
frequently added to drilling muds. If the mud is then discharged
(or accidently lost) from the drilling rig, these toxic chemicals
could damage marine life, the extent of the injury depending
upon the circumstances, such as rig location, etc. Evidence
2
from the laboratory suggests that such chemicals could be damaging,
but this writer has not discovered evidence of concerted invest¬
igation into the possible effects of such chemicals under actual
conditions at sea.
C. Conclusion
Two fundamental points of relevance to the control of marine
pollution in the North Sea have emerged from this description of its
causes and effects. First, it is apparent that knowledge of effects
Assumptions for rigs: 50-man crews, 365 day year, 1.07
kg/person/day. Assumptions for production wells: 30 man-
days/year, 0.8 kg/person/day. Table 8-11, p. 420. The NAS
had earlier concluded that litter has little effect on marine
life, the primary problem occurring when it was washed up on
beaches (p. 406).
230. Shelton, R., op. cit. in footnote 156, at p. 76.
231. Shelton says only that "this would not lead to a 'significant'
depression in total benthic or fish production," but he admits
that "it could taint the flesh of fish living on the benthos and
thus reduce their market acceptability." Ibid. It is submitted
that too little is known about the long-term effects of such
chemicals on human consumers (especially those who influenced
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wrought by man's activities in the marine environment is woefully
inadequate. This is particularly true in the case of long-term
effects; for example, we simply do not know with certainty how
chronic discharges of oily water from production platforms may be
altering the web of marine life. Professor Clark's warning that
because many life systems are slow to manifest the effects of
pollution, by the time that damage becomes evident it may be
irreversible on any human time scale is clearly to be heeded. And
his suggestion that the potential consequences of man's activities
may require legislation which precedes definite knowledge of danger
232
is of particular significance.
A second point which emerges from this description of the causes
and effects of marine pollution is that the law is also dependent
upon technology. A law which demands behaviour which is technologically
impossible (for example, oily-water discharge standards) for the
233
present is of little value in environmental protection. The
crucial point is therefore tailoring law to technology—and
encouraging technological advances. The legislator must know what
234
technology is available, the engineer must know what is needed.
It is clear that interdisciplinary communication is a prerequisite to
an effective legal regime of marine pollution control.
by cultural or economic considerations depend upon affected
benthic organisms as a source of protein) to entrust their
safety to their sense of taste, a perception easily misled.
232. Clark, R., op. cit. in footnote 167, at p. 71.
233. See the discussion of the 1973 IMCO Convention, below at p. 160.
234. Each must also consider other disciplines as well, for example,
science, economics, politics, sociology.
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGULATING POLLUTION
FROM SEABED OPERATIONS
A. Introduction
The present international law of marine pollution control
resembles an uncompleted mosaic created by a group of novices:
individual tiles lie isolated or are heaped randomly in an unplanned
work which may someday contain no gaps—but which few would consider
the meaningful expression of a plan. So it is with the present
international legal regime which is not the result of design, but
has evolved according to the crisis and the political climate of the
moment. A new approach is needed.
In this and the following chapter (which is concerned with
liability), the present international law relevant to marine pollution
is examined. Most of the present law of marine pollution control is
the result of inter-Governmental agreement formalised by treaty.
Custom as a source of law is also relevant, however, and this chapter
will begin with an examination of the present and emerging customary
law of marine pollution control.
1. International customary law
The general principles governing the use of the sea which bind
States because such principles are regarded as "customary" are general
indeed. Such principles include:
1. Freedom of the high seas.
2. Reasonable regard for the rights of others.
3. Non-abuse of rights.
4. A prohibition on using property in a manner which
90
may injure others.1
To these should be added the more recent doctrine that the coastal
State has "inherent" sovereign rights over the natural resources of
' 2
its continental shelf. These rules of international customary law
are important in their own right, but they are also interesting
because, as Professor E.D. Brown has observed, "the more detailed
conventional rules are very largely but the development of the general
3
rules provided by international customary law." Indeed, as the
relevant British and Norwegian law is to a great extent predicated
» upon these conventional rules, international customary law is reflected
4
in municipal law as well. Evidence of customary law rules may be
found in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (which purports
to codify customary law),^ the decisions of international tribunals,
and the opinions of qualified writers.
1. Hardy, M., "International Control of Marine Pollution," 11 Natural
Resources Journal, 296-348 (1971), at p. 310.
2. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports, para.19 (1969).
3. Brown, E.D., The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens and Sons,
London (1971), p. 127.
4. See Chapters Six to Nine.
5. See the High Seas Convention, Preamble. There is some question as
to what extent the Convention actually does codify customary law.
For example, Article 5 requires a "genuine link" between the flag
State and its vessels—a provision clearly directed at flag of
convenience States and which is ignored in practice. Signed 29
April 1958, in force 30 September 1962; Cmnd. 1929 (1963). The
U.K. is and Norway is not a party to this Convention.
6. Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides that judicial decisions and teachings of
qualified publicists are a "subsidiary means" for the determination
by the I.C.J, of the rules of law.
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a) the High Seas Convention
Freedom of the seas has historically included the freedom to navi¬
gate and to fish. Newer freedoms reflect man's technical progress:
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines are both specified by
the High Seas Convention Article 2 in an illustrative list of high
seas freedoms.
The freedoms of the sea in this or any list are not absolute.
The rules of customary law already referred to - reasonable regard for
the rights of others, non-abuse of rights, and a prohibition on using
property in a manner which may injure others - are different aspects
of the same concept: a right may be limited when it infringes the
right of another. Thus, Article 24 of the High Seas Convention
requires that
"Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent
pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from
ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation
and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking
account of existing treaty provisions on the subject."
The doctrine of reasonable use has been expressly affirmed by the
International Court of Justice (hereafter, I.C.J.) in the recent
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case wherein the majority observed that even
so fundamental a freedom as fishing must be exercised with "reasonable
7
regard to the interests of other States."
b) decisions of international tribunals
Although there is as yet no significant body of case law regarding
0
marine pollution, four decisions which limited State rights are
7. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, I.C.J. Reports, para. 10 (1974).
8. Hardy, M., "Offshore Development and Marine Pollution," 1 Ocean




i) the Trail Smelter Arbitration
The Tribunal was asked to decide whether, if a Canadian smelter
were found to have caused damage in the U.S., the smelter should be
required to stop causing such damage. The Tribunal found that
principles of international law precluded any State from using or
permitting its territory to be used in a way which would cause injury
by fumes to another State or the persons or property therein, "when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence." Canada was therefore under an inter¬
national legal duty to ensure that the damage complained of was halted.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration may have lost some of its force
because, although the holding applied to a narrowly defined set of
circumstances, it has been invoked to support a variety of far more
general propositions.^ However, provided that the other requirements
are present, the fact that an activity is occurring outside the
Hardy points out that the absence of case law is relevant not only
to the subject matter, but in regard to questions of foresee-
ability of harm and standard of proof required, "both issues
which would be of crucial importance in any inter-State dispute
regarding marine pollution arising out of offshore exploitation."
Ibid.
9. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 Reports
of International Arbitration Awards 1905 (1941); 35 American
Journal of International Law 684-736 (1941) .
10. Second op. cit. in footnote 9, at pp. 716-717. To avoid such
damage, the operations of the smelter were made subject to a
regime set out in the Arbitral Decision, ibid., at pp. 717 efc
seq.
11. For example, Trail Smelter has been cited to support the notion
of coastal State high seas "custodianship" on behalf of the inter¬
national community, specificially with reference to the Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The flaw in this
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territory of a State, yet under its jurisdiction, is not generally
thought to pose an obstacle to application of the principle. Thus,
in the words of Professor Fleischer,
"it is difficult to find any convincing material
to support a conclusion that the State's obligation
to control vessels under its registry is in
principle different from the obligation to control
its territory (even if the fiction of regarding a ^
ship as territoire flottant is not generally accepted)."
As another writer has observed, if a State is forbidden by the
Trail Smelter principle from using its own territory in a way which
causes injury in another State, a fortiori the acting State should
be prohibited from so using the high seas in which it has no property
interest."^
A similar argument by yet another authority yields a similar
conclusion in the case of offshore installations:
"If the Continental Shelf is not the 'territory' of the
coastal State, it is at least 'within its jurisdiction' in
relation to exploration and exploitation of natural resources."*
ii) the Corfu Channel Case
In this case the I.C.J, was asked to decide whether Albania was
argument, as pointed out by Professor Jennings, is that the
arbitral award "concerned the duty owed to a territorial neighbour
and not a duty owed either to oneself or to mankind in general."
Jennings, R., "A Changing International Law of the Sea," 31 .Cam¬
bridge Law Review 32-49 (1972B), at p. 44 (footnote 20).
12. Fleischer, C., "Pollution from Seaborne Sources," in Churchill, R.
(et al.) (eds.), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. Ill,
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London,
(1973), pp. 78-102, at p. 81.
13. Green, L.C., "International Law and Canada's Anti-Pollution Legis¬
lation," 50 Oregon Law Review 462-490 (1971), at p. 478.
14. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 3, at p. 182.
15. Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Reports, p. 4 (1949).
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responsible under international law for damage caused to British
vessels by mines in Albanian waters. The Court decided that "certain
general and well-recognised principles" applied, including every
State's "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other States." Albania's "grave
omissions" of warning to the British of impending disaster resulted in
her international responsibility.^ The Corfu Channel Case is of
limited value, however, because the Court held only that Albania had a
duty to warn of dangers in her territory of which she had (actual or
imputed) knowledge—not that the duty extended to preventing such
dangers.
17
iii) the Lac Lanoux Arbitration
This arbitration resulted from a dispute between France and Spain
over the former's plan to divert waters draining into Spain, and to
provide other water resources as compensation. The Tribunal found
that, although France was not free to ignore Spanish interests in
exercising her own rights, in this case Spanish interests had been
sufficiently considered. The Lac Lanoux Arbitration is evidence that
the general principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is firmly
established in international law, and a State found to have breached
18
this duty will be liable for the consequences.
16. Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Reports (1949), at pp. 22-23.
17. 53 American Journal of International Law 156-171 (1959).
18. Cf. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, International Law, London, (8th
ed., 1955), pp. 346-347, wherein it is stated that the duty to
use property so as not to injure that of another is "a general
principle of law recognised by civilised nations."
95
iv) the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
In 1945 the United States in the "Truman Proclamation" unilater¬
ally declared that she exercised exclusive jurisdiction to explore
19
and exploit the natural resources of her continental shelf. This
assertion not only went unchallenged, but gradually was imitated by
other States. In the 1951 Abu Dhabi Arbitration, the arbitrator con¬
cluded that a doctrine which imbued the coastal State with exclusive
rights over the natural resources of its continental shelf could in
no form have assumed the "hard lineaments" required of international
customary law.^° The Continental Shelf Convention was concluded at the
first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva in
21
1958 and came into force in 1964. This treaty, dealing with the
nature and extent of coastal State rights in respect of the adjacent
continental shelf did not purport to codify customary law as did the
High Seas Convention. Thus, in 1969 at the time of the North Sea
Cases, it was unclear whether the continental shelf doctrine conferring
certain rights over the adjacent seabed on coastal States had yet
become incorporated into international customary law. The I.C.J,
decided that it had.
The Court, in deciding an issue of seabed delimitation involving
Denmark and the Netherlands (which were Parties to the Continental
Shelf Convention) and the Federal Republic of Germany (which was not a
Party), found that
19. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, September 28, 1945, 10
Federal Register 12303 (1945); 4 Whiteman 756.
20. Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 47 American
Journal of International Law 156-159 (1953), at p. 158.
21. Signed 19 April 1958, in force 10 June 1964; Cmnd. 2422 (1964).
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"the rights of the coastal State in respect of
the area of continental shelf that constitutes
a natural prolongation of its land territory
into and under the sea exist ipso facto and
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over
the land, and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural ^
resources. In short, there is here an inherent right."
Following this decision, it is clear that a coastal State need not be
a Party to the Continental Shelf Convention to claim sovereign rights
over this subsea area. It is, however, unclear how much earlier (if
at all) than the I.C.J, opinion non-Parties could claim rights over
the continental shelf. That question is relevant to the development
of the U.K. and Norwegian sectors because the latter State was not a
Party to the Continental Shelf Convention at the time of delimitation
23
in 1965. Moreover, the case illustrates the development of
customary law, a process which is relevant indeed to the control of
marine pollution in the North Sea.
2. "Emerging" international customary law?
Technology is shrinking our world and confirming our interdepend¬
ence. State A's offshore drilling may affect State B; State C's
nuclear tests may cause injury to all. These new problems require
new solutions, two of which, law and organisations, are of particular
relevance to the control of marine pollution.
Advances in technology may require the rapid development of law
to regulate actions hitherto unimagined, for example, offshore
52 American Journal of International Law 858-862 (1958).
22. Op. cit. in footnote 2, at para. 19.
23. See below, p. 420.
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petroleum development, nuclear powered supertankers. The same
organisational skills which enabled technological advances are in¬
creasingly to be found employed in the regulation of their creations.
The proliferation of organisations—inter-governmental, non¬
governmental, and private—involved directly or indirectly in the
regulation of activities which could result in marine pollution
profoundly affects the development of both international and municipal
law.
Organisations are important to pollution control in two distinct
but related ways: 1) Behavioural norms formalised by the organis¬
ation may be faithfully practised and become regarded as obligatory,
thus satisfying the two criteria for classification as international
customary law. 2) Such norms may also be accorded respect as if they
were law, even though they are observed for political or other reasons.
In both cases norms contribute to the legal regime of pollution con¬
trol; in the first instance this is because they have actually become
part of the legal framework. In the latter instance, such norms
complement but remain external to the legal regime. The present
regime of pollution control in the North Sea is, in the writer's view,
composed of a complex network of observed behavioural norms. Some of
the dozens of organisations which may influence the law of marine
pollution control in the North Sea are briefly described below, and
mention is also made of unilateral acts of States,
a) U.N, organs and organisations
i) the U.N. General Assembly
Certain Resolutions of the General Assembly are of particular im¬
portance to the development of international law. Regardless of the
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position one takes on the question of whether such Resolutions ultra
vires the express provisions of the Charter are binding, there is
little question that in certain cases they do influence State
24
behaviour. Moreover, the General Assembly has adopted several
25
Resolutions which authorise pollution control work. The First
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, convened at Geneva
26
in 1958 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution resulted in the
27
adoption of four Conventions. Work of the U.N. Sea-bed Committee,
24. For example, General Assembly Resolution 2574D (XXIV), the
"moratorium resolution," declared that States and persons were
bound to refrain from all activities of seabed exploitation in
the area beyond national jurisdiction. Although the Resolution
was adopted by only a vote of 68-28-28 and the U.S. had voted
against it, that State denied an application from Deapsea Ventures
for mining rights and protection in the mid-Pacific, stating, "The
appropriate means for the development of the law of the sea is
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and
not unilateral claims." Deepsea Ventures, Inc., "Notice of
Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for
Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment," 14 Inter¬
national Legal Materials 51-65; U.S. State Department Reply,
14 International Legal Materials 66, (1975). Cf. the UNCTAD
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 88
(XII), which "reaffirms the sovereign right of all countries
freely to dispose of their natural resources ...." and affirms
the right of nationalization to effect this right. 11 Inter¬
national Legal Materials 1474-1475 (1972).
25. Resolution 2414, 17 December 1968: Promotion of pollution
control treaties (adopted without objection); Resolution 2467B,
21 December 1968: Requested a study on pollution control
(119-0-0); Resolution 2566, 13 December 1969: Requested a
study of pollutants and their control (unanimous); Resolution
2749, 17 December 1970: Declaration of principles governing the
seabed, etc. beyond national jurisdiction (108-0-14); Resolution
2750C, 17 December 1970: Decided to convene a conference on the
law of the sea (108-7-6).
26. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1105 (XI), 21 February 1957.
27. Besides the High Seas and Continental Shelf Conventions already
mentioned, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu¬
ous Zone and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas were adopted and came into
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constituted by the General Assembly, led eventually to a Resolution
calling for a Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(hereafter, UNCLOS III). It would be misleading to credit the General
Assembly with the law which may be incorporated in the UNCLOS III
Convention—but that organisation would certainly be indirectly
responsible. Indeed, as the negotiations at UNCLOS III may already
be affecting the present law of the sea (for example, indicating
apparent trends to 12-mile territorial seas and 200 mile Fishing or
Exclusive Economic Zones) it is safe to assert that the General
Assembly has already influenced the development of the law of the sea.
ii) The International Law Commission (ILC)
The ILC was established by the U.N. General Assembly to assist
the parent body in its duties of
"promoting international co-operation in the
political field and encouraging the progressive ^3
development of international law and its codification."
The ILC was very much involved in determining the current law of
the sea, having submitted the 73 Draft Articles upon which the 1958
29
Conventions are based, but in recent years its influence has waned
and it was not invited to to submit a similar set of Draft Articles
to UNCLOS III.^° The ILC has continued its work, however, and its
force on 10 September 1964 and 20 March 1966. The U.K. is a
Party to both instruments; Norway to neither.
28. Charter of the United Nations, Article 13 (1)(a); Bowett, D.,
The Law of International Institutions, Stevens and Sons, London
(2d ed., 1970), p. 50.
29. See Report on the First United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea Cmnd. 584 (1958).
30. The ILC is distrusted by some developing States who view it as
an organisation which seeks to perpetuate a system of law which
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recent Draft Articles on State Responsibility, declaring that every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State, may well prove to be an important con¬
tribution to the development of that aspect of international law."^
iii) UNCLOS III
The objective of this Conference is to conclude a "package deal"
covering the known spectrum of law of the sea issues as listed in the
Conference agenda. This awesome task was divided among three
Committees:
1. Committee I: the legal regime for the sea-bed and
ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction.
2. Committee II: all law of the sea issues not
assigned to the other Committees, plus a wide
variety of specified items, including, inter alia,
the continental shelf, proposals for an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and innocent passage.
3. Committee III: marine pollution, scientific
research and transfer of technology.
At the time of this writing, UNCLOS III had met five times and was
32
planning a sixth session. Following the third session, the Chairman
of each Committee produced an Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT),
which was intended to serve as a "procedural device" to facilitate
they had no part in making and which is inimical to their best
interests. Professor D.H.N. Johnson, lecture in International Law
of the Sea, London School of Economics, 5 December 1973. Because
UNCLOS III did not start from a set of Draft Articles, each
substantive issue is the subject of tactical and strategic alliances
among States who seek to optimise their self interest.
31. See the Report of the ILC on its 25th Session, May-July 1973,
A/9010/Rev. 1 (XXVIII). Five remaining Draft Articles expand and
clarify the basic provision on State responsibility.
32. UNCLOS III sessions and dates of meeting follow: New York (Decem¬
ber 1973); Caracas (June 1974); Geneva (March 1975); New York
(March 1976, August 1976). The sixth meeting is planned for New
York in May, 1977.
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agreement, and
"not in any way [to] be regarded as affecting either
the status of proposals already made by delegations
or the right of delegations to submit amendments or
new proposals."
A Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) has incorporated changes
resulting from the fifth session. ?
Despite the express limitation of the RSNT to the status of a
procedural device, it is clear that these documents are of considerable
evidentiary value to predictions of the nature and scope of the
emerging legal regime. Several provisions of the Committee II and
Committee III RSNTs are relevant to the existing legal regime of
pollution control in the North Sea and will be discussed as appropriate.
iv) the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE)
The UNCHE was convened in Stockholm in 1972 pursuant to General
33
Assembly Resolution. Two results of the Conference were directed to
increased control of environmental pollution: 1) the adoption of the
34
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, and 2) the establish¬
ment of the United Nations Environment Programme.
The Declaration contains 25 Principles, setting forth an "environ¬
mental ethic," and an "Action Plan" of over 100 Recommendations designed
to implement it.^ These constituents of the Declaration have been
33. General Assembly Resolution 2398 (XXIII), 3 December 1968.
34. The Declaration is contained in 11 International Legal Materials
1416-1469 (1972).
35. An Inter-governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution (I.W.G.
M.P.) also adopted a number of "guiding principles" (distinct from
the "general principles" in Chapter I of the Declaration), includ¬
ing nine of particular interest here:
"(1) Every State has a duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment and, in particular, to prevent pollution that may
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widely recognised as declaring to some extent existing norms of
affect areas where an internationally shared resource is located.
(2) Every State should adopt appropriate measures for the pre¬
vention of marine pollution, whether acting individually or in
conjunction with other States under agreed international arrange¬
ments.
(3} States should use the best practicable means available to
them to minimise the discharge of potentially hazardous sub¬
stances to the sea by all routes, including land-based sources
such as rivers, outfalls and pipelines within national jurisdic¬
tion, as well as dumping by or from ships, aircraft and platforms.
(4) States should ensure that their national legislation pro¬
vides adequate sanctions against those who infringe existing
regulations on marine pollution.
(5) States should assume joint responsibility for the preserv¬
ation of the marine environment beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
(17) In addition to its responsibility for environmental pro¬
tection within the limits of its territorial sea, a coastal State
also has responsibility to protect adjacent areas of the environ¬
ment from damage that may result from activities within its
territory.
(18) Coastal States should ensure that adequate and appropriate
resources are available to deal with pollution incidents resulting
from the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources in
areas within the limits of their national jurisdiction.
(20) All States should ensure that vessels under their registra¬
tion comply with internationally agreed rules and standards
relating to ship design and construction, operating procedures
and other relevant factors. States should cooperate in the devel¬
opment of such rules, standards and procedures, in the appropriate
international bodies.
(21) Following an accident on the high seas which may be expected
to result in major deleterious consequences from pollution or
threat of pollution of the sea, a coastal State facing grave and
imminent danger to its coastline and related interests may take
appropriate measures as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate, or
eliminate such danger, in accordance with internationally agreed
rules and standards."
Guiding principle 3 reflects the extensive work that the I.W.G.M.P.
had done in efforts to conclude a convention on the control of
ocean dumping which finally resulted in the London Dumping Con¬
vention at the end of 1972. Principle 21 states the basic
principle of the 1969 Intervention Convention.
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of international law,"^ and the instrument itself as "a first step
37
toward the development of international environmental law."
Principles and Recommendations particularly pertinent to
pollution from petroleum development activities in the North Sea
include:
Principle:
6 states that excessive discharge of toxic substances
into the environment must be halted
7 requires States to take all possible steps to prevent
pollution of the seas by substances that are liable
to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea
21 provides that States have the responsibility to ensure
that resource exploitation within their jurisdiction
does not damage the environment of other States or
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
22 obligates States to develop further the international
law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage
caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control
of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction
25 asserts that States shall ensure that international
organisations play a co-ordinated, efficient and
dynamic role for the protection and improvement of
the environment.
Four Recommendations are noteworthy.
Recommendation 48 asks for international cooperation to safeguard
the marine environment from adverse effects caused by natural resource
exploitation or discharge of wastes which may affect the seas.
36. See, for example, Birnie, P., "The Basic Obligation to Protect
the Marine Environment", in Stein, R. (ed.), Critical Environmental
Issues on the Law of the Sea, International Institute for Environ¬
ment and Development, London (1975), pp. 1-8, at p. 4.
37. Mr. J.A. Beesley of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs is
a particularly outspoken advocate of this view.
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Number 86 recommends:
"that Governments, with the assistance and guidance of
appropriate United Nations bodies, in particular the
Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of
Marine Pollution (GESAMP):
(a) Accept and implement available instruments on
the control of the maritime sources of marine
pollution;
(b) Ensure that the provisions of such instruments are
complied with by ships flying their flags and by
ships operating in areas under their jurisdiction
and that adequate provisions are made for reviewing
the effectiveness of, and revising, existing and
proposed international measures for control of
marine pollution;
(c) Ensure that ocean dumping by their nationals
anywhere, or by any person in areas under their
jurisdiction, is controlled and that Governments
shall continue to work towards the completion of,
and bringing into force as soon as possible of, an
over-all instrument for the control of ocean dumping
as well as needed regional agreements within the
framework of this instrument, in particular for
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, which are more at
risk from pollution."
This Recommendation is part of the development of international law
regulating ocean dumping which had resulted in the Oslo Convention
earlier in 1972 and the London Dumping Convention in the waning days
e 4-v. 4. 38of that year.
Recommendation 88, which is intended to ensure that GESAMP reviews
its "Review of Harmful Chemical Substances" annually, is also relevant
to the 1973 IMCO Convention and the London Dumping Convention to which
39
are annexed lists of harmful substances classified by GESAMP.
Recommendation 92 asks that Governments collectively accept the
38. The control of dumping is discussed below at pp. 204 et seg.
39. The 1973 IMCO Convention is discussed below at pp. 160 et seg.
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"guiding principles" formulated by the I.W.G.M.P. for UNCLOS III and
the 1973 Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO)
40
Conference which concluded the 1973 IMCO Convention,
v) the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP)
The UNCHE approved the establishment of an organisation consist¬
ing of a Secretariat, headed by an Executive Director, a Fund, and a
41
Governing Council. The UNEP was recognised by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1973 when the new organisation was asked to survey the
living resources of the sea in cooperation with the Food and Agri¬
culture Organisation (FAO) and to "continue to direct special attention
to the question of environmental protection of the seas, and in
42
particular its living marine resources." In the years since its
inception, UNEP has become involved in a number of projects relevant
to marine pollution control, including the initiation of regional
43 44
programmes and contributing to existing programmes both with
40. The "guiding principles" relevant to marine pollution control
are listed in footnote 35.
41. Declaration, Chapter Three.
42. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3133 (XXVII), 13 December 1973.
43. The most notable regional programme is a joint effort of UNEP,
IMCO and FAO to control pollution in the Mediterranean. (See
Final Act of the Conference on the Protection of the Medi¬
terranean Sea, 15 International Legal Materials 285-318 (1976).)
Work on a proposed treaty to control pollution in the Medi¬
terranean from land-based sources is continuing, and it has been
reported that following agreement on a set of principles, a
Convention may be opened for signature at the end of 1977.
International Herald Tribune, 12-13 February 1977, p. 2.
44. The UNEP assisted developing countries to attend the IMCO Sym¬
posium on Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, held in
Acapulco 22-31 March 1976, for the purpose of assisting ratifi¬
cation of the 1973 IMCO Convention. For a synopsis of UNEP's
continuing assistance to existing programmes, see Marine
Pollution Bulletin (1974), p. 90.
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particular reference to developing States. UNEP effectiveness has,
however, been somewhat inhibited by the inadequate resources of its
45
voluntary Fund (and, perhaps, by its geographical isolation in
Nairobi).
b) U.N, agencies
i) The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation
IMCO is a specialised agency of the U.N. composed of approximately
90 States, established in 1959 to deal with maritime matters. Under¬
standably, the Organisation tends to view law of the sea issues from
a shipowner's perspective. IMCO's activities include the setting of
standards relevant to both vessel safety and pollution control as
well as the adoption of laws and guidelines to ensure their observance.
The Organisation is a depository for most of the Conventions discussed
in this thesis, including some (such as the 1954 International Conven¬
tion for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, and the London
Dumping Convention) which were concluded under other auspices. A
brief description of some of IMCO's current work may indicate trends
in the law of vessel-source marine pollution control.
The new Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) works
closely with the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and several sub¬
committees on general and technical aspects of marine pollution con¬
trol. The MEPC has been particularly concerned with the implementation
of the 1973 IMCO Convention and the technical problems which must be
46
overcome before this will be possible. Thus, at its Fifth and Sixth
45. Payments from member States have lagged far behind their pledges.
The Times, 31 March 1976, p. 6.
46. See below, p. 160.
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Sessions, the MEPC discussed oily-water separation equipment, oil
and other reception facilities, and problems associated with the
Annex dealing with the transportation of liquid chemicals in bulk.
A related but distinct issue was the possibility of complementing the
1973 Convention by retrofitting existing tankers with segregated
47
ballast tanks.
The Legal Committee is currently considering, inter alia, civil
liability for pollution damage from substances other than oil, a
possible convention on Wreck Removal and Related Issues, and proposals
48
for a treaty elaborating a Regime of Vessels in Foreign Ports.
The MSC is primarily concerned with vessel standards and proced¬
ures, including vessel routeing, and this wide area of responsibility
also includes crew training. Since most vessel accidents are caused
by human error rather than mechanical failure, efforts of the MSC
(in co-operation with the International Labour Organisation and
several non-governmental organisations) to draft an International
49
Convention on Training of Seafarers are particularly important,
ii) GESAMP
The Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution
(hereafter, GESAMP) is composed of 12 experts from Russia, North
America, Japan, Scandinavia, Poland, Netherlands, France and the United
Kingdom. The Group also includes representatives of the sponsoring
47. The 1973 IMCO Convention requires only that all new ships over
70,000 tons be constructed with segregated ballast tanks. As the
current glut of tanker capacity suggests that it is likely to be
some time before new tankers are needed, the MEPC has been con¬
sidering retrofitting as a means of bringing old ships up to new
ship standards.
48. IMCO, Annual Report (1975-76), paras. 67-70, p. 18.
49. Ibid., at para. 21, p. 6.
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agencies and observers from interested international organisations
(for example, ICES—described below) which brings the total member¬
ship to approximately thirty.
GESAMP is sponsored by the FAO, UNESCO, IMCO, the World Health
Organisation, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GESAMP has been very
active in providing the scientific assistance necessary for standard
setting; for example, the Group's findings determine the classifi¬
cation of substances in the 1973 IMCO Convention and the London
Dumping Convention^0 (which will be described later).
iii) The Inter-governmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)
The IOC was established in 1960 within UNESCO for the purpose of
promoting scientific investigation of the world's oceans. IOC is
composed of States, although it works closely with FAO, WMO and IMCO,
as well as with UNESCO, which acts as the Secretariat. A number of
programmes conducted under the auspices of the IOC are summarised
below.
The Long-term and Expanded Programme of Oceanic Exploration and
Research (LEPOR) is a programme intended to increase knowledge of the
oceans. The Global Investigation of Pollution in the Marine Environ¬
ment (GIPME) is a co-operative prpgramme which is itself a major part
of LEPOR. GIPME is concerned with the effects of substances input into
50. GESAMP has a number of Working Groups concerned with specific
aspects of marine pollution, which include the biological effects
of oil on living organisms, the effects of non-oil agents on the
marine environment, effects of offshore development of the
seabed on the environment, and the siting of areas for ocean
dumping. MEPC III/4/1, 2, 4 and MEPC III/34/l/Add.1. (Compiled
by Dr. Viktor Sebek in an unpublished paper for the Advisory
Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea.)
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the sea. The International Co-ordination Group (ICG), supported by
FAO, IAEA, IMCO, UN, UNESCO and WMO is involved in the implementation
of GIPME.
The Integrated Global Ocean Station System (IGOSS) is a joint
IOC/WMO programme intended to provide information for global monitor¬
ing systems. The IGOSS pilot project is concerned with hydrocarbon
data and includes a Norwegian study on tar balls in the North Sea."'1
The International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE) is a pro¬
gramme of international co-operation in oceanic exploration during
the decade of the 1970s. IDOE was endorsed by the U.N. General
52
Assembly in 1968, and was established by the IOC in the following
year as part of LEPOR.
c) non-U.N. inter-governmental organisations
i) The European Economic Community
As all the North Sea littoral States except Norway are members
of the EEC, that organisation offers excellent opportunities for
agreement on a regional regime of pollution control. Although the
Community has become involved to a significant extent in environ¬
mental questions rather late in its life, it is now quite active.
A Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting
in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the Programme of Action of the
European Communities on the Environment (hereafter, the 1973 Declar¬
ation) , although containing a section on marine pollution in a chapter
51. A paper in Norwegian by Gary B. Smith, "Oljeklumper I Farvannene
Utenfor Norge," published by the Norwegian Fisheries Directorate
(1975 Nr. 6) reports on this problem.
52. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2414 (XXVIII).
110
entitled "Action Specific to Certain Areas of Common Interest," was
really only a general statement of marine pollution problems. How¬
ever, the 1973 Declaration provided a foundation upon which to build
more concrete structures to control marine pollution, including work
in the areas of standard setting, information sharing and marine pollu-
53
tion control. A number of actions have been taken; the most impor¬
tant is the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from
Land-Based Sources, for which the Community was responsible (dis-
54
cussed below). Agreement in principle has been reached on a Coun¬
cil Directive on the reduction of pollution caused by certain dan¬
gerous substances discharged into the aquatic environment of the Com¬
munity.^ Actions planned include, inter alia, rules for operational
discharges of dangerous substances from ships in the territorial sea
and the establishment of standards and procedures for the discharge of
53. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 6/76, para. 2,
p. 16.
54. Council Decision of 3 March 1975 concluding the convention for the
prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources (75/437/EEC).
Other relevant documents include: Council Decision of 3 March 1975
concerning Community participation in the Interim Commission es¬
tablished on the basis of resolution no. Ill of the convention for
the prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources (75/
438/EEC), Council Recommendation of 3 March 1975 regarding cost
allocation and action by public authorities on environmental mat¬
ters (75/436/Euratom, ECSC, EEC), Council Directive of 16 June 1975
on the disposal of waste oils (75/439/EEC), Council Directive of 16
June 1975 concerning the quality required of surface water intended
for the abstraction of drinking water in the Member States (75/440/
EEC), Council Decision of 24 June 1975 establishing a common pro¬
cedure for the exchange of information between the surveillance and
monitoring networks based on data relating to atmospheric pollution
caused by certain compounds and suspended particulates (75/441/EEC).
55. The problem which was resolved concerned the difference in views
between eight Members (plus the Commission) which thought that dis¬
charges of the most toxic pollutants should be limited by setting
emission standards, and the U.K. which wanted quality objectives
only. Bulletin of the European Communities, 12/1975, point 1502.
The U.K. position is that its fast rivers and strongly-flushed
Ill
56
such substances into the aquatic environment of the Community. It
is of particular interest to note the Community's role in developing
57
a regional Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
58
and its interest in acceding to the Baltic Convention. It is possible
that inter-regional agreement on standards and procedures may be a
first hesitant step toward a more nearly global convention for the
protection of our environment—a convention built from larger bargaining
59
units than individual States. Finally, the recent treaty intended
to reduce the discharges of harmful substances into the Rhine should
also be mentioned as an instrument of potentially great value in
reducing the volume of pollutants entering the North Sea.
ii) The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
ICES, to which both the U.K. and Norway belong, is an inter¬
governmental body co-ordinating the investigations of 18 North Atlantic
States (including the U.S. and Canada) into that ocean. ICES acts as
an advisory body to a number of organisations, including the North-east
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the Baltic Commission and the
Oslo Commission. Although ICES does have working groups concerned with
seas are national assets which enhance its economic position, that
quality standards would protect the environment, and that uni¬
formity for its own sake would be unjustified.
56. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 6/76, para. 3, p. 17.
57. Ibid., at para. 4, p. 17.
58. Ibid., at para. 4.1, p. 17.
59. It is arguable that the blocs bargaining at UNCLOS III are another
example of larger bargaining units, although it must be remembered
that the States within blocs are drawn together by many factors
which may actually override geographical proximity, for example,
the mutual interests of landlocked States.
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such problems as oil and mud, it does little research iself, acting
more as a Secretariat to member States by compiling and publishing
reports and statistics and organising working parties and conferences.
Cooperative Research Report No. 58 j_s a recent publication extending
60
earlier monitoring work conducted in the North Sea to the Atlantic.
iii) The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
The OECD is a group of Western industrialised States concerned
i
with problems related to economic growth, including pollution control.
The OECD has made a number of recommendations to members, the most
important of v/hich are the Recommendation on Guiding Principles
62
Concerning Environmental Policies, which established the general
OECD approach to pollution control, and the Recommendation on the
Implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle, which is concerned with
allocation of environmental protection costs.^
iv) The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
The CCMS was formed in 1969 with the objective of investigating
how a better environment might be created for the societies of NATO
60. The Report was published in January, 1977. A report on extended
baseline studies will also be published in the future. Letter
from Mr. Hans Tambs-Lyche, General Secretary, to the writer
9 March 1977.
61. Although the OECD can hardly be termed a "regional organisation"
as such States as the U.K., Norway, the U.S. and Japan are grouped
by interest rather than geography, because Norway is a member, the
OECD offers an advantage over the EEC in respect of developing the
control of North Sea pollution.
62. May 26, 1972.
63. November 14, 1974. Other relevant Recommendations include a
Declaration on Environmental Policy, and Principles Concerning
Transfrontier Pollution, both of November 14, 1974.
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members. CCMS does not engage in research itself nor engage in
executive action; instead, the Committee "normally proceeds by
inviting members to propose subjects and to indicate studies they
would be willing to pilot " ^ a Pilot Study on Coastal Water
66
Pollution was started in 1970 and at the end of a year a Conference
on oil spills was convened. One result of that Conference was a
decision to proceed within IMCO toward a treaty to control vessel-
source oil discharges—an effort which contributed to the conclusion
67
of the 1973 IMCO Convention. The Pilot Study itself is concerned
with two aspects of Coastal Water Pollution; 1) the establishment
of a dynamic mathematical model of North Sea Pollution, and 2) preven¬
tion of oil pollution from oil spills,
d) non-governmental organisations
NGOs are a growing force in the determination of international
law. Some NGOs seek to influence the development of international
law directly: such organisations as the National Wildlife Federation
in the U.S., the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds in the U.K.
64. Train, R., "A New Approach to International Environmental Co¬
operation: The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Soc¬
iety," 22 Kansas Law Review 167-191 (1974), at p. 172, citing
"Note by the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs
on the Organization of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society," NATO Unclassified Doc. AC/274-D/l (Nov. 17, 1969) at 3.
65. Ibid., at p. 5 of the NATO Document. There is, however, a NATO
Sub-Committee on Oceanographic Research which has investigated a
number of important problems. See Allan, T. "Collaboration
within the Alliance Advances Marine Research," NATO Review,
February 1977, at pp. 12-19.
66. The CCMS Pilot Study on Coastal Water Pollution has not yet been
published. Letter from Mr. L. Klette, Secretary to CCMS, to the
writer, 28 October 1976.
67. Papers read at the Conference are collected in NATO CCMS, Coastal
Water Pollution of the Sea by Oil Spills, No. 1, Brussels (1970).
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and the Norwegian Conservation Society are active at both national
and international levels, although it is thought that they are most
effective when seeking to influence individual States to advocate
68
certain positions in international fora. Industrial groups, such
as the American Petroleum Institute, the General Council of British
Shipping, and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF),
although not usually thought of as NGOs, are non-governmental organ¬
isations which employ similar means to influence the development of
law favourable to their own interests. Some NGOs, however, while very
much interested in international legal developments, tend to concen¬
trate their attention on subjects which are themselves relevant to the
development of international law. This is particularly true of NGOs
concerned with scientific inquiry, such as the International Council
of Scientific Unions (ICSU) and its functional arms, the Scientific
Committee on the Problems of the Environment (SCOPE, concerned with
environmental monitoring), and the Scientific Committee on Oceanic
Research (SCOR, concerned with the promotion of international
scientific inquiry into the marine environment).
e) convention commissions
Commissions, meeting periodically, are afforded an opportunity
to assess the operation of the convention and, if necessary, take
corrective action. The Oslo Convention is representative of treaties
which have such Commissions. Thus, it is the duty of the Oslo Com-
68. Rambach, P. and Stein, R., "Non-Governmental Organizations:
A Force for Change in the Law of the Sea," in Stein, R. (ed.),
Critical Environmental Issues on the Law of the Sea, Inter¬
national Institute for Environment and Development, London
(1975), pp. 53-57, at p. 54.
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mission to supervise implementation of the Convention, to act as a
Secretariat, to review the condition of the seas in the Convention
area, to evaluate control measures and to consider whether different
69
measures are needed. The Oslo Commission is therefore vested
with substantial authority to shape the Convention without actually
amending it. A Draft Resolution recommending that the Convention be
interpreted to apply to certain petroleum exploitation activities
(which will be described in detail later) is an example of how a
commission may influence the development of law.
f) unilateral acts of States
There are numerous examples of unilateral acts of States which
promote the development of customary law. The Anglo-Norwegian Fish¬
eries Case provided impetus to the development of the doctrine of
straight baselines. The case arose following U.K. protests concerning
the Norwegian practice of constructing baselines linking the outer edge
of the skjaergaard and headland points as the basis from which to
measure her territorial sea. The U.K. did not protest this practice
for some time; when she did, the U.K. position was that international
law required that baselines be measured from the low water mark.
The I.C.J, decision, based in part on a finding of U.K. acquiescence,
70
was that the Norwegian action was not contrary to international law.
Thus, although "delimitation of sea areas always has an international
71
aspect" which requires consideration of the rights of other States,
69. Oslo Convention, Article 17.
70. J.C.J. Reports, (1951), p. 116.
71. Ibid., p. 132.
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the doctrine was found to have been implicitly accepted by the U.K.
Seven years later it was incorporated into the Geneva Convention on
72
the Territorial Sea.
A more recent example is the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act of 1970. Canada, as a nation characterized by a long
coastline and a small merchant fleet has consistently advocated a
regime of marine pollution control which favours coastal State
protection rather than freedom of the seas. The Act became law in
73
1970, following Canadian concern over the possible passage of U.S.
supertankers through the Northwest Passage from Alaska to the East
74 75
Coast, the Arctic oil spill by the tanker Arrow, and Canadian
dissatisfaction with the 1969 Intervention and Civil Liability
76
Conventions.
72. Territorial Sea Convention, Section II. One writer has observed
that the I.C.J, decision loosened a conservative law, and so
made agreement at Geneva possible. Rosenne, S., The Law and
Practice of the International Court, Vol. I, Sijthoff, Leyden
(1965), p. 18.
73. 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47 (Can.). The text of the Bill which became
the Act is printed in 9 International Legal Materials 543-554
(1970).
74. Keating, B., "North for Oil: Manhattan Makes the Historic North¬
west Passage," 137 National Geographic 374-391 (1970); Rein-
hard, W., "International Law: Implications of the Opening of
the Northwest Passage," 74 Dickinson Law Review 678-690 (1970).
75. Clark, R., " The Biological Consequences of Oil Pollution of the
Sea," in Water Pollution as a World Problem, Europa Publications
Ltd., London (1970), pp. 53-73, at p. 67.
76. Canada objected to the 1969 Brussels Conventions because:
1. Concern was with remedy rather than prevention.
2. The Civil Liability Convention did not place liability on
the cargo owner as well as the shipowner.
3. Money damages only included destruction within territorial
limits and excluded pollution damage to fishing vessels
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In brief, the Act prohibits the deposit of waste in Arctic
waters within lOO miles of the Canadian coast and imposes strict
liability on the owner and/or operator of any vessel which causes
damage. The Canadian authorities are also empowered to control
navigation and establish vessel construction standards. Vessels
within Arctic waters may be boarded to determine compliance with the
Act, and may be excluded from the area if they are found to be sub¬
standard.
77
The U.S. promptly protested the Canadian action. In reply,
Canada observed that the Act was analogous to the Truman Proclamation:
it was merely a unilateral act necessary for the development of inter-
78 79
national law. Whether or not this is a valid analogy, it is a
and interests outside the territorial sea.
4. Oil pollution presented special dangers to the Canadian
Arctic which would not be adequately protected under the
Draft Conventions.
Hardy, M., op. cit. in footnote 1, at p. 328.
77. Department of State Press Release, No. 121, 15 April 1970; 9
International Legal Materials 605-606 (1970). The U.S. statement
said in part, "International law provides no basis for these pro¬
posed unilateral extensions of jurisdictions on the high seas,
and the United States can neither accept nor acquiesce in the
assertion of such jurisdiction."
78. Canadian Reply to the United States Government, 16 April 1970.
9 International Legal Materials 607-615, (1970). The Canadian
reply cited several U.S. assertions of jurisdiction on the high
seas, such as nuclear tests areas, and stated that Canada had the
same rights to protect its vital interests: "The proposed anti¬
pollution legislation is based on the overriding right of self-
defense of coastal states to protect themselves against grave
threats to their environment." For a critical view of the use of
"self defence" as a justification for coastal State interference
with the freedom of navigation on the high seas, see Brow^E.D.,
op. cit. in footnote 3, at pp. 142-143.
79. Several writers have observed that the assertion of sovereign
rights over the continental shelf infringed no existing interests,
unlike interference with navigation on the high seas.
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tenable hypothesis that the Canadian action made the unilateral
assertion of coastal State functional jurisdiction over extensive
80
areas more acceptable to the developed countries. Indeed, there
has been a spate of such claims, the more remarkable of which include
that of the U.S.A. (a 200 mile exclusive fishing zone, notable
because that State has historically protested such actions by other
81
States), Mexico (a 200 mile exclusive economic zone in which the
coastal State will have, inter alia, sovereign rights over all natural
resources)^ Norway (a 200 mile fisheries zone, discussed below)
84
and the U.K. (a 200 mile exclusive fisheries zone). The U.K. Claim
is interesting because it reflects the EEC common fisheries policy:
in effect, this is an instance of an international organisation making
a unilateral claim. Finally, it should be noted that Canada has built
upon the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, extending her
85
fisheries limits to 200 miles.
80. Prior to the Canadian action the assertion of extensive coastal
State jurisdiction was associated with South American States.
It is suggested that the unilateral act of a developed North
American State imbued the concept of extended coastal State
jurisdiction with a new respectability in the view of other
developed States.
81. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Public
Law 94-265; 15 International Legal Materials 634-650 (1976).
82. Decree on Constitutional Change to Account for Exclusive
Economic Zone Beyond Limits of Territorial Sea; 15 Inter¬
national Legal Materials 380-387 (1976).
83. See below, p. 484.
84. Fisheries Limits Act, 1976.
85. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order; 15 International
Legal Materials 1372-1375 (1976).
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3. Conventions
The remainder of this chapter examines existing and proposed con¬
ventions on the legal regime of pollution control in the North Sea.
These conventions will be reviewed briefly as they have been exten¬
sively analysed elsewhere, concentrating instead on recent developments:
1. The work of the Conference on Safety and Pollution
Safeguards in the Development of North-West European
Offshore Mineral Resources.
2. The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973.
3. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploita¬
tion of Seabed Mineral Resources.
In addition, the work of UNCLOS III will be described as appropriate.
B. Pollution from Seabed Operations
Whether influenced by politics, convenience, or necessity,
conventions intended to control marine pollution have been primarily
concerned with the discharge of oil from vessels. In consequence,
there is no single comprehensive instrument concerned with the control
of seabed operations in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North
Sea. The present legal regime is a patchwork of treaties and national
legislation. The need for a comprehensive convention to control this
potential source of marine pollution has, however, been recognised,
and the work of the Offshore Pollution Conference and UNCLOS III pro¬
vide an indication of the form such a convention is likely to assume.
1. The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
As mentioned above, both the U.K. and Norway are Parties to the
Continental Shelf Convention, although the latter only acceded to the




Article 1 defines the term "continental shelf" using distance
87
and depth exploitability criteria. The ambiguity of this provision
is not a problem in the North Sea because that entire area has been
accepted by the littoral States as one characterised by a continental
shelf.
The coastal State is granted "sovereign rights" only for the pur¬
pose of exploring and exploiting continental shelf natural resources.
As sovereignty is limited, coastal State authority to enact law is
likewise limited: jurisdiction cannot exceed sovereignty. It is
expressly provided that sovereign rights do not extend to the super-
88
jacent water and air space.
Coastal State sovereign rights likewise do not entitle that State
to exclude pipelines and cables from its continental shelf unless
exclusion is reasonably necessary for continental shelf resource
development.
86. Norway did not accede to the Continental Shelf Convention until
she secured a delimitation agreement with the U.K. and Denmark
which recognised her sovereign rights over the continental shelf
beyond the Norwegian Trough. See below, p. 420.
87. Continental shelf means "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the terri¬
torial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploit¬
ation of the natural resources of the said areas "
88. Article 3.
89. Article 4. As the freedom to lay submarine pipelines and cables
beneath the high seas is an international customary law right,
all States must permit the reasonable exercise of this right on
their continental shelves. Cf. High Seas Convention Articles 2,
26. In the North Sea, pipelines laid between the U.K. and the
Norwegian sector are regulated by bilateral agreement. The only
instance of a pipeline crossing the continental shelf of a third
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Article 5 is directly concerned with regulating the rights
granted to the coastal State in respect of its continental shelf.
In developing the natural resources of its continental shelf, the
coastal State must not "unjustifiably" interfere with navigation,
90
fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea.
Although "unjustifiable" is not defined, the plain meaning of the term
suggests that it is indistinguishable from the "reasonable use" test
of the High Seas Convention and international customary law.
The coastal State may place on the continental shelf "installa¬
tions or devices" to develop its natural resources, and may establish
91
"safety zones" around them. The safety zones may extend up to a
500 metre radius from the outer edge of such installations or devices,
and within that area the coastal State may take measures to protect
92 93
them. All ships must respect such safety zones, but no express
State is in the case of the gas pipeline from the Norwegian sec¬
tor to Germany, which crosses the Danish shelf. Although pursuant
to the terms of a bilateral treaty with Germany, Denmark has
claimed authority to apply her laws to foreign pipelines on her
continental shelf, there have been no problems in regard to the
Ekofisk-Emden pipeline. In fact, it is arguable that Denmark
is under a High Seas Convention (and customary law) duty to
"draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the
discharge of oil from .... pipelines .... or resulting from the
exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil taking
account of existing treaty provisions on the subject," and in
the reasonable application of its regulations to the pipeline,
it is only fulfilling a legal obligation.
90. Article 5(1).
91. Article 5(2).
92. Article 5(2), (3). The "measures" which may be taken are not
defined, but certainly must comply with the customary law re¬
quirement that they be "reasonable," considering their function
of installation protection.
93. Article 5(3). This controversial provision purports to bind
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authority is granted to the coastal State to exclude foreign
navigation. Moreover, Article 5(6) prohibits interference with "the
94
use of recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation."
The coastal State must
"undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate
measures for the protection of the living g,-
resources of the sea from harmful agents."
Once again, it will be the coastal State which will in the first
instance determine what measures are appropriate. The imposition of
this ambiguous duty upon the coastal State is, however, evidence that
jurisdiction within the safety zone is subject to limits: it is a
functional jurisdiction.
The final Article of relevance to this thesis concerns the
even States non-Parties to the Convention. On the one hand it
is arguable that a State cannot be bound by a treaty without
its consent (cf. Vienna Convention, Article 34). On the other
hand, it may well be the case that it is a reasonable use of
the sea that the coastal States have the right to exclude
vessels from the safety zones and that all foreign flag vessels
are under a correlative duty to remain outside. "Safety" is
clearly a reasonable justification for limiting freedom of the
seas, but it must be considered in the context of specific
circumstances.
94. Although the possibility of clusters of installations which
might severely restrict navigation was considered by the com¬
mittee which drafted this Article, no provisions relating to
possible conflict between seabed development and navigation
were adopted by the Geneva Conference. Gutteridge, J., "The
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf," 35 British
Yearbook of International Law 102-123 (1959), at p. 122. One
writer has ventured the view that "the rigs must be established
in such a way that the right of sailing between points A and B
remains possible, but the right to sail over point X is not
guaranteed unless traversing point X is essential for navigation
between A and B." Warbrick, C., "The Regulation of Navigation,"
in Churchill, R. (et al.) (eds.), New Directions in the Law of
the Sea, Vol. Ill, British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, London (1973), pp. 137-154, at p. 143.
95. Article 5(7).
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delimitation of continental shelf boundaries among Parties to the
96
Continental Shelf Convention. If boundaries are not determined
by agreement, they shall be the median line unless "special circum-
97
stances" justify another method of delimitation. A network of
bilateral agreements has now almost completely determined continental
shelf delimitation within the North Sea.^® Table III-l on the follow¬
ing page tabulates continental shelf delimitation agreements which
determine the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea. (Figure
III-l on page 125 illustrates continental shelf boundaries for the
entire North Sea.)
As indicated in Table JII-1, the equidistance formula has been
used in every instance of boundary delimitation, although not in every
instrument. The U.K.-Norwegian boundary ignores the presence of the
Norwegian Trough, an area that in places exceeds 200 metres, and
therefore does not meet one of the criteria for determining the area
96. Article 6.
97. Professor E.D. Brown considers four possible "special circum¬
stances": geographical considerations, mineral deposits,
navigation and fishing rights, and historical special circum¬
stances in The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, op. cit. in footnote
3, at pp. 62-70. He concludes that "It is clear from the record
that exceptional geographical circumstances constitute the main
category of 'special circumstances'." Moreover, "The only
situation which would seem to justify reference to natural
resources as constituting special circumstances is that where
a coastal State had acquired exclusive rights to such resources
independently of, and prior to, the development of the Contin¬
ental Shelf doctrine." The available evidence indicates that
the nature and extent of North Sea hydrocarbon reserves was
virtually unknown prior to the delimitation Agreements.
98. a small area adjacent to Belgium remains undelimited. Outside
the North Sea as herein defined delimitation among littoral
States has not yet been agreed. The U.K. and France dispute
concerning delimitation of the Western Approaches to the Straits
of Dover is to be decided by an arbitral tribunal—a decision
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TABLE III-l
TREATIES RELEVANT TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE









































1. Cmnd. 3253 (1967), Cmnd. 3254 (1967), Cmnd. 5173 (1972).
2. Cmnd. 3278 (1967), Cmnd. 5193 (1973).
3. Cmnd. 5192 (1973). The original delimitation formula
between the U.K. and Denmark and the U.K. and the Nether¬
lands was based on equidistance. The U.K. merely substituted
Germany for Denmark and the Netherlands following agreement
among those three States.
4. Cmnd. 2757 (1965).
5. 634 United Nations Treaty Series 71 (1968), ibid., p. 414.
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FIGURE III-l
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Source: Norwegian Ministry of Industry, Report No. 30 to the




of a coastal State' s continental shelf. As Figure III-l indicates,
many of the major hydrocarbon reservoirs in the northern part of the
North Sea cluster along the U.K.-Norwegian median line. Had the
Norwegian Trough formed the outer limit of the Norwegian continental
shelf, these major fields would have been subject to the exclusive
sovereign rights of the U.K.
It is interesting to note that every bilateral agreement de¬
scribing the U.K. and Norwegian sectors provides for exploitation of
deposits which may be intersected by boundary lines. These provisions
are quite general, obligating the Parties only to "consult" or "agree"
on methods to develop the deposit. In the case of the U.K. and Norway,
common deposits have been discovered under the sectors of both
Parties, and additional agreements have been and are being concluded.^"0
which must consider the possible "special circumstances" of the
British Channel Islands off the French coast. The Anglo-French
Arbitration Agreement is published by H.M.S.O. in Cmnd. 6280
(1975). The U.K.-Norwegian boundary is undefined above
61° 44' 12".
99. J.C.J. Reports (1969), paras. 32, 46, 69, 81. In the North Sea
Cases the I.C.J, found that the Federal Republic of Germany was
not obliged to accept the equidistance formula of continental
shelf delimitation submitted by her adjacent neighbours Denmark
and the Netherlands, because:
1. Germany, though a signatory to the Convention, had not
ratified it nor otherwise accepted it, nor had the equi¬
distance method become international customary law.
2. There was no particular delimitation formula which had
emerged as international customary law.
Following the Court's decision, the three litigants reached
an agreement which recognised German sovereign rights in a
specified area extending to the opposite State's (U.K.'s) median
line. This necessitated a new U.K.-German Agreement as well as
additional U.K.-Denmark and U.K.-Netherlands Agreements to
account for the extension of the German sector to the median
line.
100. Article 4 of the U.K.-Norway Agreement provides that if a single
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The dispute settlement provisions in the delimitation agreement
are also imprecise. The first U.K.-Netherlands Agreement and the
U.K.-Germany Agreement provide for "consultations" in the event of a
i
dispute involving the positioning of installations near the boundary
line. The second U.K.-Netherlands Agreement of 1965 is devoted
entirely to settlement of disputes involving deposits which straddle
the boundary line. Should the parties fail to reach agreement pursuant
to specified criteria, provision is made for arbitration. However,
only disputes which may prevent maximum recovery from the deposit are
subject to arbitration, and the question of whether a field may be so
classified will itself be subject to agreement. Moreover, as has been
pointed out by an authority on arbitration, the "preliminary question"
is a hurdle which is frequently difficult to clear.'1"0'''
Both the U.K.-Denmark Agreements provide that in the event of a
dispute concerning a shared deposit, the Parties shall seek to reach
agreement, an objective unencumbered by procedural criteria or guide¬
lines. The drafting of these provisions suggests that a high priority
has not been placed on the inclusion of formal dispute settlement
procedures in the delimitation Agreements. It may be that the Parties
thought that such provisions would be better left to ad hoc formulation
when the need arose. Support for this hypothesis may be found in the
provisions of bilateral Agreements concerning pipelines and shared
geological structure, including a petroleum field, extends
across a dividing line and is exploitable from the other side,
the Parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, attempt
to agree on the most effective method of exploitation and the
allocation of proceeds. See below, p. 138.
101. Johnson, D.H.N., "The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal,"
30 British Yearbook of International Law 152-177 (1953).
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deposits which are discussed below.
2. The Oslo Dumping Convention
This regional Convention controls the disposal of wastes at
sea.^ If a Draft Resolution of the Oslo Commission is approved,
the Oslo Dumping Convention may regulate the disposal of wastes
from seabed development activities. As the Convention is exclus¬
ively concerned with "dumping" of substances from "ships and
aircraft," the definitions of these terms provided by Article
19 will determine to what extent the Convention may apply.
Article 19(2) includes within the expression "ships and air¬
craft," "floating craft whether self-propelled or not, and fixed
or floating platforms." The various "installations or devices"
used in offshore oil development are therefore clearly included.
"Dumping" is defined in the pertinent Article as
"any deliberate disposal of substances and materials into
the sea by or from ships or aircraft other than:
a) any discharge incidental to or derived from the nor- ^
mal operation of ships and aircraft and their equipment."
The accidental loss of anchors, cables, oil drums, etc. is
not "dumping" nor, more importantly, is any discharge "incidental"
to normal operations. The meaning of "incidental" is therefore
of great importance in determining the extent to which "fixed or
floating platforms" are subject to the Oslo Dumping Convention.
102. See below, p. 136.
103. The Oslo Convention is discussed more fully below, at p. 205.
North Sea States Parties include the U.K., Norway, Denmark,
the Netherlands and France. Belgium and Germany are expected
to ratify the Convention in 1977.
104. Article 19(1)(a). Emphasis added.
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The plain meaning of the word "incidental"-1-05 is consistent
with an interpretation which would include discharges of substances as
a direct result of petroleum exploitation activities within the
definition of "dumping." Vessel or platform discharges such as sewage
and garbage are associated with seabed development, but they are not
part of the actual exploitation activity: they are incidental to it.
The disposal of oil-related substances at sea (for example, oil drums,
cables, etc.) to simplify supply logistics is a closer case. If such
items are as a matter of course disposed of at sea it is difficult to
argue that this activity is "incidental" to seabed development. On
the other hand, the occasional disposal at sea of items from supply
boats or platforms is arguably not an integral part of the seabed
development process (especially if done by an employee who is aware
that what he is doing is both illegal and contrary to company regula¬
tions) . The systematic discharge of shavings from pipe-laying barges
and the disposal of oil-related debris from vessels and platforms is
distinguishable in degree, if not in kind, from the examples just men¬
tioned. Clearly such activities are part of the seabed development
process. They are not incidental to it.
At the third meeting of the Oslo Commission it was recommended
"that disposal of pipes, metal shavings and other
material which may present a serious obstacle to
fishing or navigation {cf. Annex 11(1)(b) of the
Convention), resulting from off-shore hydrocarbons
exploration and exploitation operations, should be
105. "Casual, not essential," The Concise Oxford Dictionary,
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1956). "Secondary or minor, but usually
associated," Webster's New World Dictionary, World Publishing Co.,
New York (1962). The travaux preparatoires of the Oslo Con¬
vention are not available to the public. Letter from Mr. G.F.
Buxton, Secretary, Oslo Commission, to the writer, 6 March 1975.
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regarded as acts of deliberate disposal
pursuant to Article 19, and thus
falls under the scope of the Oslo Convention."
This Draft Resolution was advocated because of perceived need
and defended as being within the terms of the Oslo Convention because
it is not expressly excluded. Thus, the Commission pointed out that
although "fishermen of many nations are affected by what is dumped
on the different countries' Continental Shelf areas," international
agreements in force and awaiting sufficient ratifications to become
effective are not addressed to the control of this form of pollution.
The 1973 IMCO Convention, although applicable to vessels and platforms,
was interpreted by the Commission to exclude waste from seabed
operations from its scope and, in any event, was not yet in force.
The London Dumping Convention expressly excludes the disposal of
108
wastes associated with development of seabed mineral resources.
The Paris Convention, even when it becomes effective, would be unsat¬
isfactory because it does not apply to ships, and
"Even if the convention might apply to the dumping
of metal objects from platforms (Article 3(c)(iii))
it could not be a satisfactory framework because the
problems of pollution for supply boats, pipelaying
barges, craneboats etc. clearly fall outside the
scope of the convention. It would complicate
matters unnecessarily if the problems of bulky
waste from oil-related activities on the Continental
Shelf were to be dealt with under different conventions."
106. OSCOM (76) 13, Agenda item 7.
107. Ibid., p. 2; 1973 IMCO Convention, Article 2(3)(ii), (4).
The 1973 IMCO Convention is discussed below, at p. 133.
108. London Dumping Convention, Article 11(1) (c) . The London
Dumping Convention is discussed below, at p. 209.
109. OSCOM (76) 13, Agenda item 7, p. 3. The Paris Convention is
discussed below, at p. 134.
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The Oslo Convention was thus nominated by default.
In concluding that the regulation of oil-related debris dumping
could be included under the Oslo Convention, the Commission conceded
that
"Certain delegations might wish to observe that
it was not the intention to let the Oslo Convention
apply to waste or other matters directly arising
from or related to the exploration, exploitation
and associated off-shore processing of seabed
mineral resources. It might further be argued
that if the question had been given a more careful
consideration during the elaboration of the Oslo
Convention an explicit exception similar to Article
III(c) in the London Convention would have been
introduced in the Oslo Convention. Whatever merit
this hypothetical line of argument might have it
must be stressed that the wording of the convention
does not exclude the type of dumping in question,
and that following a strict interpretation of the
convention it is difficult to exclude waste from
^
the off-shore industry on the basis mentioned above."
In considering the question of "incidental" activities, the
Commission equated "incidental" with "normal" and concluded that "the
most obvious interpretation" of the term as used in the Convention
would be to exclude normal "ship" wastes, such as sewage, but not to
exempt normal industrial wastes. This interpretation was said to be
consistent with the framework to be established by the 1973 IMCO Con¬
vention and the Oslo and Paris Conventions: the IMCO Convention was
intended to control the normal "ship" discharges not included as
"dumping," and the latter two Conventions could and should therefore
be interpreted as regulating industrial discharges.
The Commission did not decide how the Convention should be
applied to the control of oil-related debris, but suggested as one
possibility that such disposal be made subject to the requirement of
110. OSCOM (76) 13, Agenda item 7, pp. 4-5.
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a special permit. ^ The Convention provides that
"Containers, scrap metal, tar-like substances liable
to sink to the sea bottom and other bulky wastes
which may present a serious obstacle to fishing or
navigation"
112
may only be dumped pursuant to a "specific permit." Such permits
are issued by the national authorities and would, said the Commission,
in practice be made contingent on the discretionary provisions in the
Convention which authorise such authorities to require that dumping
be done only in "deep water", that is, water which is at least 2,000
113
metres deep and at least 150 miles from the nearest land. This
requirement would exclude all regulated dumping from the North Sea.
In concluding the Draft Resolution, the Commission recognised
the need to ensure that the suggested rules be followed, it was
suggested that an expert group might be established to consider
practical measures to control the disposal of oil-related debris. In
addition, the Government of Norway appended a Note as Annex II to the
Draft, registering its concern in particular about the disposal of
metal shavings produced by pipe-laying barges and proposing some
measures to facilitate implementation of the Draft Resolution. These
suggestions, which are either in force or under consideration in the
Norwegian regulatory system, include:
1. A requirement that containers and large
metal objects be marked with the operator's name.
111. OSCOM (76) 13, Agenda item 7, p. 6. See also the discussion of
the fund established by the U.K. Offshore Operators Association
to compensate U.K. fishermen for damage to gear caused by oil-
related debris, below at p. 256.
112. Oslo Convention, Annex 11(1)(b).
113. Ibid., Annex 11(4).
114. OSCOM (76) 13, Agenda item 7, Annex II, para. 2.1, p. 2.
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2. Requiring that containers be fitted
with lids and that platforms have
^
minimum storage capacity for containers.
3. The introduction of a system
^
of logging wastes transported.
4. Inspection of the seabed during ^
drilling, pipelaying, and production.
3. The 1973 IMCO Convention
Although this Convention does not apply to "dumping" or releases
directly arising from seabed operations, it does regulate the discharge
of oil and the disposal of garbage from fixed and floating platforms.
Drilling rigs and other platforms are treated as ships, and must
therefore comply with the requirements of the Convention applicable
to vessels of 40O gross registered tons (GRT) and above, other than
118
oil tankers. It is expressly provided that insofar as practicable,
they shall be fitted with the oil discharge monitoring and control
systems, oily-water separation equipment, and tanks for oil residues
119
which are required for ships of 40O GRT or more. The oil-water
separation equipment must produce an oil in effluent content of no
more than 10O parts per million, the 1954 IMCO Convention standard.
120
It is therefore subject to the same criticisms as that standard.
Drilling rigs and platforms subject to this Regulation must also keep
115. 0SC0M (76) 13, Agenda item 7, Annex II, para. 2.2, p. 2.
116. Ibid., para. 2.3.
117. Ibid., paras. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6.
118. 1973 IMCO Convention, Annex I, Regulation 21.
119. Ibid., Regulations 16 and 17 of Annex I.
120. See below, p. 155.
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records of all operations involving the discharge of oil or oily
• 4. 121raixtures.
Fixed or floating platforms engaged in seabed operations, as
well as vessels within the 500-metre safety zone, are prohibited from
disposing of garbage in that area, except that ground food wastes may
be disposed of when the locus is more than 12 nautical miles from
. , 122
land.
4. The Paris Convention
The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-
based Sources (hereafter, the Paris Convention), was concluded at a
Conference composed of most of the same States that are Parties to the
123
Oslo Dumping Convention, which includes all the North Sea States.
The Paris Convention was opened for signature 4 June 1974 and will
come into force 30 days after the seventh instrument indicating a
124
willingness to be bound by that instrument is deposited. The Paris
Convention is interesting not only because it is being considered as
a possible instrument to control pollution from offshore installations,
but also as a regional response which, though a distinct Agreement, is
de facto an expansion of the Oslo Dumping Convention. The identical
125
geographical area is covered, there is the same provision by which
121. 1973 IMCO Convention, Annex I Regulation 21.
122. Ibid., Annex V, Regulation 4.
123. Also included are Austria, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and
Switzerland. The italicized States are landlocked and therefore




the Parties agree to apply pollution prevention measures in such a
way as to avoid transferring pollutants to marine areas outside the
126
Convention area, and there are annexed lists of pollutants classi¬
fied by potential danger. It is of significance that persistent oil,
not expressly included in the Oslo Dumping Convention Annexes, is
specifically mentioned in the "black list" of most dangerous pollut-
127
ants contained in Part I of Annex A, and that non-persistent oils
128
are a new addition to the "gray list." The Parties to the Paris
Convention will, therefore, be obliged to "undertake" to eliminate
pollution of the sea by persistent oil from land-based sources, and
129
to "limit strictly" similar inputs of non-persistent hydrocarbons.
How is a Convention concerned with the control of pollutants
from land-based sources applicable to the development of offshore
mineral resources? The answer to this question depends upon the inter¬
pretation given to Article 3(c) (iii) of that instrument.
The "pollution from land-based sources" to which the Paris Con¬
vention applies means "the pollution of the maritime area," including
that from
"man-made structures placed under the jurisdiction
of a Contracting Party within the limits of ^
the area to which the present Convention applies."
There is controversy concerning the precise meaning of this
provision: can it be interpreted to include various types
126. Article 7.
127. Annex A, Part I, 5.




of drilling and production installations working on the continental
shelf, or was it only meant to apply to artificial islands? A member
of the Norwegian delegation has opined that "both opinions can be
131
argued very soundly." In his view, the question
"will probably not be decided by a strict legal
interpretation of the definition but /willy depend
on whether a majority of the countries party
to the convention feel that it is a suitable
international instrument to deal with pollu- ^2
tion from oil activities on the continental shelf."
The present writer is persuaded by that observation, noting that a
similar dominance of need and convenience over purely legal consider¬
ations appears to have resulted in the Draft Resolution of the Oslo
Commission discussed above. Should it be decided that the Paris Con¬
vention does apply to offshore installations, the inclusion of
persistent and non-persistent oils and hydrocarbons in Annex A will
provide the coastal State with the obligation to regulate operational
discharges of oily water as well as dumping of unwanted substances and
materials.
5. Bilateral Agreements
The Ekofisk and Frigg Agreements between the U.K. and Norway are
concerned with the transportation of hydrocarbons from the Norwegian
sector to the U.K. and, in the case of the Frigg Agreement, with the
development of a deposit which straddles the boundary line dividing
the two areas. This brief account of the two Agreements is particularly
concerned with the prevention and control of pollution from pipelines
131. Hambro, C., "International Conventions Relating to Pollution
Resulting from Offshore Oil Activities in the North Sea Area,"
a paper presented at the Offshore North Sea Conference, 1976.
at p. 8.
132. The question is being studied by an interim commission. Ibid.
137
and deposits which may involve the interests of both States.
133
a) The Ekofisk Agreement
As indicated by Figure III-l, the Ekofisk Field and related
deposits are located completely within the Norwegian sector. However,
the Norwegian Trough has made submarine pipelines to Norwegian land-
134
falls economically, if not technically, unfeasible. In conse¬
quence, the Norwegian Government has concluded this Agreement with the
U.K. which provides for a pipeline to transport petroleum from the
Ekofisk Area to a refinery at Teesside, England. After an initial
period during which transportation was effected by tanker directly
to Norway, the pipeline was completed, and it is now in use.
The pipeline is subject to Norwegian licence over its entire
135
length and U.K. licence within the U.K. sector. The pipeline com-
136
pany must be Norwegian, but the pipeline is subject to Norwegian
137
and British concurrent jurisdiction. Routeing of the pipeline,
important both from the standpoint of conflict with other ocean
users and possible marine pollution resulting from damage caused by
138
such conflict, is subject to the agreement of the two Governments.
All pipelines, including those which feed into the main trunk line,
"shall to the extent possible be subject to a uniform safety
133. Signed 22 May 1973, effective on the same date. Cmnd. 5423
(1973); 13 International Legal Materials 26-30 (1974).







standard." When the Norwegian Government decides to terminate use
of the pipeline, it is responsible for removing it, unless the U.K.
agrees to assume control for purposes of transporting petroleum from
140
its own sector exclusively. The removal provision satisfies the
requirement of Continental Shelf Convention Article 5(5) that "(a)ny
installations which are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed."
A Commission consisting of three representatives from each State
141
is responsible for administering the Agreement. Provision is also
142
made for the settlement of disputes by arbitration.
The Ekofisk Agreement is of modest scope. It does not require
uniform standards for pipelines, although substantial agreement has
been reached in this regard, and lack of uniformity has caused no
difficulties in practice. It is also noteworthy that the issue of
civil liability for damage caused by the Ekofisk pipelines is left to
national and customary international law. The Ekofisk pipelines will
be subject to the 1976 Civil Liability Convention (discussed in Chap¬
ter Four), but it is regrettable that an interim provision concerned
with compensation was not included in the bilateral Agreement.
143
b) The Frigg Agreement
The Frigg gas field straddles the U.K.-Norwegian boundary line.
This Agreement concerns development of the shared deposit as well as
its transmission to the United Kingdom.
139. Article 8.
140. Article 10(2), (3).
141. Article 24 (1) .
142. Article 25.
143. Cmnd. 6491 (1976).
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The most important provision of the Agreement relating to
pollution control is Article 23 which provides:
"The two Governments undertake to make every endeavour
jointly and severally, after consultations, to ensure
that the exploitation of Frigg Gas or the operation of
any installation or pipeline involved in that exploitation
shall not cause pollution of the marine environment or
damage by pollution to the coast-line, shore facilities
or amenities, or vessels or fishing gear of any country."
The Agreement contains . a number of provisions which promote pollution
prevention by requiring some effort toward uniform construction and
safety standards, but most of the legal provisions relevant to pollution
control are contained in the national legislation of the two States.
Part I of the Agreement provides, in essence, that the Govern¬
ments shall exploit the field as a single unit and shall attempt to
agree on apportionment of the reserves before the commencement of
144
production. Although each State retains jurisdiction over instal-
145
lations located in its own sector (with the consequence that U.K.
law applies to U.K. installations and Norwegian law to Norwegian
installations), the two Governments are required to consult one another
for the purpose of agreeing upon uniform safety and construction
146
standards for installations and pipelines. Inspectors of both
Governments are granted access to all installations in the field, an
inspector from one Government may request an inspector from the other
Government to exercise his powers, and inspectors are empowered to
144. Articles 1 and 2. Each Government must require its licensees
to enter into agreements with licensees of the other Government
to give effect to this Agreement.
145. Article 29.
146. Articles 7(1)» (2); 17(1).
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order the cessation of any or all activities if in his judgment such
action is necessary to avert or minimise an accident involving danger
147
to life. In practice, relations between the two Governments have
been harmonious and informal: A great deal of the daily regulation
148
of activities is done by telephone.
Part II of the Agreement is concerned with "Transmission of gas
from the Frigg Field Reservoir." Provision is made for two pipelines,
Norwegian and British, which run from the respective sectors to St.
Fergus, Scotland. The provisions in the Agreement concerning the
Norwegian pipeline are similar to those discussed in connection with
the Ekofisk Agreement: The Norwegian pipeline must be owned by
Norwegian legal entities, it is subject to Norwegian civil and criminal
149
law although concurrent U.K. jurisdiction is not excluded, the
150
pipeline route is subject to approval by both Governments, the two
Governments are required to consult with one another regarding uniform
construction and safety standards for the two pipelines,and they
are obligated to appoint inspectors to ensure compliance with such
152
standards. This Agreement is also similar to the Ekofisk Agreement
in that provision is made for a six-person Commission which is respons¬
ible for implementation, and a three-person arbitral tribunal may be
constituted at the request of either Government to settle disputes not
147. Article 8.







resolved by the Commission.
6. Conference on Safety and Pollution Safeguards
in the Development of North-West European
Offshore Mineral Resources
In March, 1973 a group of delegates representing North-West
European States met in London to discuss issues of common interest
concerning the development of offshore mineral resources. Papers
were presented and discussed over a two-week period in respect of two
major issues: technical and safety aspects of pollution control, and
civil liability for pollution damage. At the conclusion of the Confer¬
ence it was decided to begin preparations for conventions concerned
with each of these two aspects of marine pollution from offshore
154
mineral development. The paragraphs below are a brief account of
preparations for a regional convention to control pollution.
The Conference concluded that the present situation, in respect
of pollution control from seabed operations, required a coordinated
155
approach among the North-West European countries. It should be an
objective that uniform standards affording the greatest possible
protection be established as soon as possible.^ ^ The concerned
States should examine the requirements for a regime incorporating
such standards, communicating their activities directly and during
such international discussions as those of IMCO, ICES, ILO and the UN.
153. Articles 27, 28.
154. Conversation with Professor Carl August Fleischer, 12 November
1976.
155. SPC (73) 18 Final, para. 1.
156. Ibid., para. 2.
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In the light of the above conclusions, it was recommended that:
1. Relevant information be freely exchanged among
those North-Western European States that have
or contemplate offshore operations.
2. Working Parties should consider environmental
protection, including those areas in which
national safety requirements may differ, and
should assign "the freedom of movement of mobile
installations and equipment" priority in the
list of issues to be considered.
3. It should be considered whether a regional
agreement is possible when the working groups
have made satisfactory progress.
4. A further conference of the countries concerned
should be convened, perhaps in 1975, to review
developments and plan for the future.
Three Working Groups were formed: WG 1 was concerned with
environmental matters (for example, collection and evaluation of data
and environmental criteria relevant to the design of offshore instal¬
lations) , WG 2 was to consider construction and use of offshore
facilities, and WG 3 was to deal with personnel safety, health and
157
welfare. WG 2, chaired by Mr. Nils Vogt, is of particular relevance.
WG 2 is charged with examining existing and proposed national
requirements for construction and use of offshore installations, with
158
especial reference to mobile installations. The major objective of
this Group is to determine how far national standards can be made
uniform. Specific areas of investigation include:
1. Monitoring of design and construction.
2. Design strength, seaworthiness and stability
of main structure and strength of integral
parts.
157. Annex to Working Papers.
158. Appendix II.
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3. Equipment installed including oil/water
separation equipment to operate within
specified standards for maximum permissible
oil content in discharged waters.
4. Underwater technology.
5. Movement of installations.
6. Hazards from ships.
The Working Groups have completed their tasks, and the Confer¬
ence planned for 1975 (but not convened) will now probably meet in
159
the Netherlands in mid 1977. There is wide agreement on the stan¬
dards set by WG2, but Governments hold differing views on the question
of whether such agreement should be memorialized in a Treaty or ought
to be informal. It is possible that IMCO may assume responsibility
for an Agreement, thus expanding its scope beyond North-Western Euro-
16q
pean States and providing established administrative machinery.
7. UNCLOS III: RSNT Articles relevant to control
of pollution from seabed operations
It will be recalled that the RSNT is a procedural device intended
to facilitate agreement and does not represent accepted proposals
itself. Indeed, many proposals are extremely controversial. Com¬
mittee II considered a number of priority questions in its fifth
session, including the legal status of the EEZ, definition of the
outer edge of the continental margin, and delimitation of the terri¬
torial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf between adjacent or
161
opposite States. The definition of the outer limits of the
159. Conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Director of Legal and Economic
Department, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 24 November 1976.
160. Ibid.
161. A/COND.62/L.17, paras. 11 and 12, pp. 2 and 3.
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continental margin was a particularly controversial topic during the
162
debates in that session. Committee III was primarily concerned
with the provisions of those Articles relating to protection and
preservation of the marine environment from vessel-source pollution,
including the competence of the coastal State to set standards for
vessels in the territorial sea, the EEZ, and special areas of the EEZ,
16 3
as well as the question of enforcement. In view of the continuing
debate over provisions of the RSNT, it is emphasised that, while the
Text is an important indication of trends, great caution should be
exercised in drawing conclusions based on it.
a) RSNT Articles concerned with the continental shelf
The RSNT provides that the continental shelf shall extend to
the outer edge of the continental margin or 200 nautical miles from
164
the baseline, whichever is farther. The exploitability criterion
165
has been removed. Although this change would have no effect on the
delimitation of the North Sea continental shelf, it would be relevant
indeed to the U.K. and Norway as they seek to delimit their respective
166 '
sectors in northern and western areas.
162. Rose, W., "The Continental Shelf and Margin," a paper presented
to the Society for Underwater Technology Sea Law Group Conference,
2 December 1976.
163. A/CONF.62/L.18, paras. 7 and 8, pp. 2 and 3.
164. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.l/Part II (hereafter, Committee II), Article
64.
165. It will be recalled that the 1958 Convention employed a 200
metre depth or exploitability delimitation criterion. An
excellent account of the present Continental Shelf Convention
is provided by Gutteridge, J., op. cit. in footnote 94.
166. Another modification of the Geneva Convention determination of
145
The coastal State would be expressly empowered to take
reasonable measures to prevent pollution from "pipelines" on its
continental shelf, thus reducing an ambiguity in the present Geneva
Conventions which on one hand declare that all States enjoy the right
167
to lay submarine pipelines beneath the high seas, and note the
customary law obligation to enact legislation to control pollution
168
from "pipelines" on the other. The coastal State is also given
control over pipeline routeing on its continental shelf, thus clari-
169
fying the High Seas and Continental Shelf Conventions,
b) RSNT Articles concerned with the EEZ
The Exclusive Economic Zone (hereafter, the EEZ) is a proposed
area outside the territorial sea, extending from the baseline 200
nautical miles.° Although delimitation of the U.K. and Norwegian
EEZ in the North Sea need not necessarily conform to the present con-
continental shelf area of great importance to the U.K. outside
the North Sea concerns islands: although islands are still
accorded a continental shelf in the proposal, "Rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."
Committee II, Article 128(3). Should this provision be adopted,
the present and planned use by the U.K. of the tiny rock
"Rockall" to extend the area of her continental shelf and EEZ
would have to be supported by resort to other arguments, for
example, that the Rockall Plateau is a "natural prolongation"
of Scotland within the meaning of the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases or Committee II, Article 64 and therefore appertains
to the U.K.
167. High Seas Convention, Articles 2, 26; Continental Shelf Con¬
vention, Article 4.
168. High Seas Convention, Article 24. The RSNT provision is
Article 67(2) in the Committee II Text.
169. Committee II, Article 67(3); High Seas Convention, Article 26;
Continental Shelf Convention, Article 4.
170. Committee II, Article 45.
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tinental shelf sectors, the fact that all boundaries were established
according to a principle of equidistance certainly conforms to the
requirement that EEZ delimitation
"be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles, employing, where appropriate,
the median or equidistance line, and taking
account of all the relevant circumstances."
Within the EEZ the coastal State would have:
" (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether renewable or non-renewable, of
the bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters;
(b) exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to
the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures;
(c) exclusive jurisdiction with regard to:
(i) other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the
water, currents and winds; and
(ii 1 scientific research;
td) jurisdiction with regard to the preservation of the
marine environment, including pollution control and
abatement
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171. Committee II, Article 62(1). The Denmark/German/Netherlands lat¬
eral boundaries were established by negotiation and do not follow
the equidistance principle. It is a matter for speculation whether
Germany's two North Sea neighbours would be willing to concede EEZ
area to conform to the relinquished continental shelf area. If it
appears likely that within the North Sea the U.K. and Norwegian
EEZs will be geographically identical with their continental
shelves, the same may not be true of areas extending into the
North Atlantic. Although the EEZ is limited to 200 miles, it will
be recalled that the continental shelf is only limited to this
maximum if the continental margin does not extend beyond 200 miles.
Thus, in areas in which the continental margin exceeds 200 miles,
jurisdiction is limited to that concerning the continental shelf—
which contains no pollution control jurisdiction provisions.
172. Committee II, Article 44. The three RSNTs are not coordinated, so
that there are occasional instances of overlap, as is the case
147
It is evident from the above abstraction that the coastal
State is given considerably greater authority in the EEZ than in the
continental shelf area. "Sovereign rights" include those for the
purpose of conserving and managing all natural resources, thus extend¬
ing functional jurisdiction to fisheries. More relevant to this
thesis, however, is (b) which clearly indicates that only the coastal
State may erect installations in the 200 nautical mile zone, and
moreover, that such structures can be placed in the EEZ for any pur-
173
pose (for example, a nuclear power station on an artificial island).
Item (d) is welcome because it proposes to confer express jurisdiction
on the coastal State to control pollution in an area extending 200
miles from the coast. But it is important to note that the coastal
State would only be granted "jurisdiction"—not "exclusive jurisdiction."
As will be seen later, the RSNT contemplates shared jurisdiction in the
EEZ with the flag State. Furthermore, although the coastal State
would be authorised to take reasonable measures to prevent pollution
from pipelines on the continental shelf, no such powers are conferred
in respect of vessels in the EEZ. Finally, it is of interest to note
that where the continental margin extends beyond 200 miles, the coastal
here where both Committee II and Committee III are concerned with
coastal State control of marine pollution. It is also of inter¬
est to note that although the coastal State has sovereign rights
in respect of both renewable and non-renewable resources within
the EEZ, the proposal contained in Article 51(2) would require a
coastal State to determine its capacity to harvest living
resources in the EEZ and to "give other States access to the
surplus of the allowable catch." There is no comparable pro¬
vision in respect of non-living resources.
173. Committee II, Article 48 elaborates coastal State jurisdiction
over installations in the EEZ and Article 68 provides that such
rights also apply on the continental shelf, thus covering the
possible case of a continental shelf which extends beyond 200
miles.
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State would have no jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels. As is
the case today, exclusive jurisdiction to prevent pollution from
174
vessels on the high seas would rest with the flag State.
c) RSNT Articles concerned with the high seas
Committee II Article 76(1)(d) provides that although freedom to
construct artificial islands and other installations is a recognised
freedom of the high seas, it is subject to the regime of the contin¬
ental shelf. Thus, although when it extends beyond the EEZ the
continental shelf lies beneath the high seas, the coastal State would
retain the exclusive right to construct and operate installations in
175
such an area.
d) RSNT Articles concerned with standards
One of the most contentious issues at UNCLOS III is that of
setting standards for marine pollution control. The crux of the issue
is, who should set such standards? Many coastal States understandably
take the view that they are in the best position to determine needs
and to enforce compliance. This view is not beyond challenge even if
the larger question of the best interests of the international commun¬
ity is ignored. Most coastal States are developing. They are not in
a position to set environmental protection standards predicated upon
empirical investigation; indeed, they must import technology to comply
with existing international environmental standards such as those in
the IMCO Conventions. Moreover, even the developed States are finding
it difficult to assume the burden of unilateral enforcement in a 200
mile band of coastal waters. It is suggested that internationally
174. It could also rest with a proposed Seabed Authority.
175. This is confirmed by Articles 48 and 68 cited in footnote 173.
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agreed standards are more likely to be observed by States involved in
their formulation, and uniformity may aid mutual enforcement as well.
In considering the international community, two points are
noteworthy. First, although it is true that, as Canada has claimed
in defence of her Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, unilateral
action may be necessary in order to set high standards that would
become compromised in an international agreement, it has also been
observed that in the absence of international obligation, some States
may become "coasts of convenience" which permit degradation of adjacent
176
waters for economic gain. Internationally agreed standards may
certainly be diluted by such States, and it is conceded that unless
international standards became customary law "coast of convenience"
States could simply refuse to be bound by a treaty thought to be
inimical to their best interests. Conversely, it may be that complete
coastal State freedom to set standards unilaterally would be less
effective in protecting the total marine environment. On balance, it
appears that preservation of the earth's interdependent and continuous
marine environment would be best served by internationally set stand¬
ards, including those for "special areas."
The second point is a corollary of the first: it is clear that
environmental protection has an economic cost (though, unhappily for
environmentalists, frequently there is not a corresponding environmental
gain readily ascertainable in dollars, pounds, or kroner) that few
States would voluntarily assume if other States did not. A drilling
176. Hallman, R., "Environmental Regulation of Marine-Based Activities
(Non-Vessel) in Areas of National Jurisdiction," in Stein, R.
(ed.), Critical Environmental Issues on the Law of the Sea,
International Institute for Environment and Development, London
(1975), para. 9 at p. 15.
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rig which is required to be equipped with expensive pollution control
devices may well be relegated to storage in a quiet Norwegian fjord
while its less concerned competitors win contracts to drill off
coasts of convenience.
Article 18 in Part III of the RSNT is concerned with standards
to prevent pollution from seabed operations. This proposal would
require all coastal States to establish national laws to control
pollution from "sea-bed activities subject to their jurisdiction" and
from "artificial islands, installations and structures under their
177
jurisdiction." Such laws would be "no less effective" than
"generally accepted" international standards. All States (not just
coastal States Parties) would be obligated to "establish global and
regional rules" to control such pollution.
It is evident that this scheme is designed to put a "floor" on
pollution control standards by the use of a "no less effective"
provision. The intent of this ambiguous proposal is that standards
could vary so long as they were above the minimum. The establishment
of minimum standards by reference to "generally accepted international
rules" is fraught with danger, however, for although there is an
unequivocal obligation on all States to set such standards, there is
no mention of how soon this must be done. Moreover, there is no
standard of "general acceptance." For example, it is unclear whether
a signed but unratified convention would provide obligatory minimum
standards. Nor is the case of voluntary compliance with a convention
free from doubt; for example, would wide acceptance of the International
177. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part III (hereafter, Committee III), Article
18(1).
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Chamber of Shipping "Pollution Prevention Code" (intended to implement
some of the 1973 IMCO Convention provisions on a voluntary basis)
qualify the Convention or the Code as "generally accepted" international
standards? The criteria for evaluating the general acceptance of
conventions would probably include the number of ratifications required,
the number received, and the period since the instrument was opened
for acceptance. It is relevant to note here that a State which has
only signed but not ratified or otherwise signified acceptance of a
178
convention is not bound. And, it may also be pointed out that con¬
ventions can require protracted periods of time to become effective;
for example, the 1969 IMCO Amendments (discussed below) will not come
into force until January, 1978.
C. Pollution from Tankers and Support Vessels
179
1. The 1954 IMCO Convention
a) background
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil (hereafter, the 1954 IMCO Convention) resulted from
U.K. concern about the increase of coastal marine pollution in the
years following World War II. In 1952 the British Government appointed
the "Faulkner Committee" to
"consider what practical measures can be taken to
prevent pollution by oil of the waters around the
coasts of the U.K. and to report."
180
The Faulkner Report, published in July, 1953, concluded that the
178. Cf. the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra at p. 95.
179. Cmnd. 595 (1958), 327 United Nations Treaty Series 3-33.
In force 26 July 1958. Both the U.K. and Norway are Parties.
180. Committee on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
(Chairman: P. Faulkner, CB) (1953).
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best approach to the problem was to attempt to conclude an international
agreement aimed at controlling the discharge of persistent oils by
181
vessels. In 1954 a Conference was convened under the auspices of
the British Government. The Convention which resulted was later
deposited with IMCO after that Organisation had come into being.
The 1954 IMCO Convention was the first and is still the most
widely ratified international convention intended to control the prob¬
lem of marine pollution. At this writing 58 States owning some 90-95
182
per cent, of world sea-going shipping are regulated by its provisions.
, , 183
b) summary
The Convention was amended in 1962 and, as all Parties to the
original instrument have accepted the amendment as well, the discussion
184
of the 1954 IMCO Convention below includes the 1962 Amendments.
The 1954 IMCO Convention is concerned with regulating operational
185
discharges of certain oils or oily mixtures from ships in areas
181. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 190, cols. 332-333, 14 December 1954;
Hansard, H.C. Vol. 805, cols. 573-574, 30 October 1970.
182. IMCO Document OPC/Circ. 63, 10 December 1976.
183. The 1954 IMCO Convention has been described in detail by a number
of writers (for example, Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 3),
and will therefore be only summarised in this thesis.
184. Cmnd. 3354 (1967), 60O United Nations Treaty Series 332-355.
In force 18 May 1967, except for Article 14 which became
effective 28 June 1967.
185. The prohibited act is a "discharge," defined as "any discharge
or escape howsoever caused," Article 1(1). The scope of this
definition is considerably reduced by Article IV(b), pursuant to
which an exception is provided for an escape "resulting from
damage to a ship or unavoidable leakage, if all reasonable
precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage
or discovery of the leakage for the purpose of preventing or
minimising the escape." This exception is wide enough to form
the basis of a defence to almost any accidental leakage.
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adjacent to the coast. Within designated zones, and subject to
187
exceptions, it is illegal for a sea-going vessel registered with
a Party to discharge crude, fuel, heavy diesel or lubricating oil in
a concentration greater than 100 parts of oil per million parts of a
mixture (ppm).1^®
Among the changes wrought by the 1962 Amendments was the expan¬
sion in breadth of the original 50-mile prohibited zones to 100 miles
in many areas. The North Sea was already bordered along much of its
coastline by a lOO-mile zone; the replacement of 50-mile sections by
the larger breadth zone in effect closed the entire semi-enclosed sea
189
to tanker discharges.
A second aspect of the 1954 IMCO Convention scheme to control
operational hydrocarbon discharges from vessels is a requirement that
each Contracting Government take "all appropriate steps" to provide
190
oil reception facilities at ports for non-tankers, to provide sim-
191
ilar facilities for tankers at oil loading terminals, and to insure
186. Contained in Annex A to the Convention, "Prohibited Zones."
187. In addition to accidental discharge (mentioned in footnote 185),
these include discharges to safeguard life, ship, or cargo as
well as disposal of residue from purifying fuel or lubricating
oil, provided that such disposal is made as far from land as
practicable, Article IV(a)(c).
188. "Oil" and "oily mixture" are defined in Article 1(1); Article III
contains the prohibition of discharges within designated zones.
189. Annex A (2): "The following sea areas, insofar as they extend more
than 50 miles from the nearest land, shall also be prohibited
zones .... (b) (iii) The Norwegian, North Sea and Baltic Sea Zone
shall extend for a distance of 100 miles from the nearest land
along the coast of Norway and shall include the whole of the North






the adequacy of such facilities at repair ports for both types of
192
vessel. Both the U.K. and Norway have some facilities, but many
193
observers think that they are inadequate.
Enforcement of the Convention is exclusively by the flag State
if the offence occurs on the high seas; however, it is expressly pro¬
vided that the coastal State is not barred from acting in regard to
194
incidents occurring within its territorial sea. The enforcing
State is to apply its own law, subject to the provision that penalties
must be of sufficient severity to deter such offences and not less
severe than penalties possible in respect of like offences within its
195
territorial sea.
The primary device used to detect offences is the Oil Record
Book which must be kept for any tanker or other ship using oil as
196
fuel. When any of several specified operations involving oil occurs,
197
the circumstances must be duly logged in the Oil Record Book.
Inspection other than by the flag State may only be made while
198
the vessel is within a port in the inspecting State's territory.
192. Article VIII (1) (c).
193. See below, pp. 354 and 478, footnote 209.
194. Article XI.
195. Article VI(2). As a check on this requirement, it is also pro¬
vided that Parties must report to the Organisation the penalties
actually imposed for a violation, Article VI(3).
196. Article IX(1). The form which the Oil Record Book must take is
specified in Annex B to the Convention.
197. Article IX(2).
198. Article IX(5). The language of this provision is wide enough
to permit inspection of a foreign vessel in an offshore
terminal.
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Should inspection reveal that the Oil Record Book was missing or
that it contained an irregular entry, this could be used as evidence
that an illegal discharge of oil had occurred,
c) comments
The 1954 IMCO Convention has been criticised on many grounds,
the most important of which concern enforcement and scope. The
major objection in regard to enforcement is that it is left to the
flag State. Vessels flying "flags of convenience" are frequently
sub-standard both in physical specifications and operating procedures—
199
and are seldom prosecuted by the flag State for reported offences.
Moreover, even when the flag State is conscientious, detection is
2oo
difficult and the burden of proving that a discharge within the
prohibited zone exceeded the permissible concentration is severe.
The limited scope of the 1954 IMCO Convention also significantly
reduces that instrument's effectiveness to control marine pollution.
The Convention does not apply to accidental spills or to discharges
outside narrow prohibited zones. The "parts per million" formula
still permits a significant quantity of oil to be discharged. There
is no provision dealing with responsibility for pollution damage.
Furthermore, "oil" is defined so narrowly that the more toxic
refined petroleum products are not subject to the Convention, and only
199. The U.S. Coast Guard's Environmental Impact Statement on the
1973 IMCO Convention noted that of seven vessels reported to
their flag State, only two were proceeded against. Congress
of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Oil
Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution
and Safety Measures (1975), at p. 78, footnote 1.
200. See footnote 288 at p. 360 for a comment on progress in the
U.S. in overcoming the problem of detection.
156
certain categories of vessels are included.
Some of the deficiencies concerning enforcement and scope have
been and are the subject of attempted remedies in Amendments to the
1954 IMCO Convention, the 1973 IMCO Convention, and at UNCLOS III.
2. The 1969 Amendments to the 1954 IMCO Convention
202
In 1969 the IMCO Assembly by Resolution adopted a number of
Amendments to the 1954 IMCO Convention. The 1969 Amendments have
only recently received the required ratifications, and will enter
203
into force 20 January 1978.
The 1969 Amendments will replace parts of oil per million
parts of effluent as a measure of permissible discharge with an
allowable discharge per mile formula. This change reflects increasing
general concern about oil pollution reinforced by experimental evidence
from the U.K. Department of Industry's Warren Spring Laboratory that
the parts per million criterion was not an accurate indicator of
potential environmental damage. A supertanker with a large capacity
and high pumping rate could dilute large quantities of oil with sea-
water and thus introduce oil into a limited area at an alarming rate.
This was especially true if the vessel were stationary or slow
201. The exemption of tankers of less than 150 GRT and other ships
of less than 500 GRT, as well as naval vessels and ships on
Government service is a significant loophole.
202. IMCO Assembly Resolution A.175 (VI).
203. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, "Bulletin
of Legal Developments," 25 February 1977, p. 29, citing IMCO
Press Release No. 1/77, 28.1.77. As of January 1977, 37 States
had accepted the 1969 Amendments. IMCO Document OPC.3/Circ.30.
Both the U.K. and Norway have accepted the Amendments, and the
former State has voluntarily applied them to vessels flying its
flag. So long as no discharges occur in "prohibited zones" there
is no conflict with the 1954 IMCO Convention.
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steaming. The Warren Spring findings suggested that the amount of
oil discharged, whether mixed with water or not, in relation to the
distance travelled by a ship was a better indicator of potential
205
environmental damage than the ratio of oil to water.
"Oily mixture" is redefined by an amended Article 1(1) to in¬
clude effluent with any oil content, thus excising the 100 ppm require¬
ment. The rules on discharge of oil and oily mixtures have been
amended in respect of both tankers and other ships. Discharges from
tankers are permitted only when:
"(i) the tanker is proceeding en route;
(ii) the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil
content does not exceed 60 litres per mile;
(iii) the total quantity of oil discharge on a
ballast voyage does not exceed 1/15,000 of
the total cargo-carrying capacity;
(iv) the tanker is more than 50
miles from the nearest land."
The North Sea will be better protected from damage caused by
operational discharges of oil from vessels when the 1969 Amendments
come into force. Although the area will no longer be a "prohibited
zone," it should be noted that even when it enjoyed that status, dis¬
charges of less than 100 ppm concentration were permitted. The new
litres per mile formula, complemented by the provision of a 50 mile
cordon sanitaire will greatly increase environmental protection in
204. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 805, col. 576, 30 October 1970.
205. Ibid., at col. 577.
206. Article III (b). Subsection (c) of this Article provides that a
tanker discharge is permissible if it is ballast from a cargo
tank so cleaned that any effluent therefrom, if it were dis¬
charged from a stationary tanker into clean calm water on a
clear day, would produce no visible traces of oil from tanker
bilges is excepted, falling under the regulations which apply




The 1969 Amendments permit the use of the Load on Top system
207
described above. (At certain stages of the LOT procedure, dis¬
charges in prohibited zones could violate the maximum permissible
limits of 100 ppm imposed by the 1954 IMCO Convention.) The newly
"un-prohibited" centre of the North Sea would be unlikely to experi¬
ence increased risk from LOT discharges because, even if they were
found to be more damaging than discharges 6f 100 ppm which are pres¬
ently permitted, the point would be academic. As discussed above,
vessels in ballast in the North Sea are rarely in the area long
enough to enable the oil/water separation prerequisite to any LOT
.. , _ 208discharge to occur.
The 1969 Amendments also permit discharges from non-tankers
when:
"(i) the ship is proceeding en route;
(ii) the instantaneous rate of discharge of
oil content does not exceed 60 litres
per mile;
(iii) the oil content of the discharge is
less than 100 parts per 1,000,000 parts
of the mixture;
(iv) the discharge is made as ^Qg
far as practicable from land."
This represents a significant tightening of non-tanker discharge
criteria; under the 1962 Amendments discharges must only be "as far
as practicable from land."
The 1969 Amendments have taken an inordinately long time to
207. See discussion of the LOT system, supra, at p. 23.
208. Ibid.
209. Article III (a).
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receive the required ratifications to come into force. Paradoxically,
one major reason for the delay is that many States claim to be pre¬
paring to approve the 1973 IMCO Convention (discussed below) in-
210
stead. This comprehensive instrument designed to replace the
patched-up 1954 model contains a number of controversial provisions
which have generated considerable debate. Resolution of problems
preventing 1973 IMCO acceptance could take some time—far more than
would be necessary to obtain the ratifications necessary to bring the
1969 Amendments into force. In consequence, the Ninth IMCO Assembly
adopted a Resolution urging Governments to accept the 1969 Amend-
211
ments, a Resolution appended to the 1973 IMCO Convention advocated
212
similar action, and a number of organisations and writers have
emphasised the value of the 1969 Amendments to protection of the marine
environment.
214
3. The 1971 Tanks Amendment
The Amendments adopted on 15 October 1971 to the 1954 IMCO Con¬
vention concerning Tank Arrangements and Limitation of Tank Size (here¬
after, the Tanks Amendment) is an attempt to minimise the loss of oil
210. Another reason is that the influx of new members to the Conven¬
tion has made it difficult to garner the required two-thirds
majority necessary for amendment.
211. IMCO Assembly Resolution A. 348 (IX).
212. Resolution 1, adopted by the International Conference on Marine
Pollution, 1973.
213. See, for example, Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea,
Annual Report 1975, pp. 6-7. IMCO is also concerned that the 1969
Amendments have not come into force and has repeatedly urged mem¬
bers to accept them (see, for example, MEPC III/WP.7, 27 June
1975).
214. Adopted pursuant to IMCO Assembly Resolution A. 246 (VII); Cmnd.
5071 (1971), 11 International Legal Materials 267-276 (1972).
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likely to follow the rupture of a cargo tank. The Amendment, not
215
yet in force, specifies criteria for tank size and arrangement in
respect of tankers for which the building contract was let on or after
1 January 1972, and those delivered after 1 January 1977. Vessels
flying the flag of States which have accepted the Amendments (which
means all Parties to the Convention, as acceptance has been made
mandatory) must carry certificates which attest compliance. A vessel
which does not carry the required certificate must be prevented
from sailing by the flag State and may, after consultation with the
flag State, be barred from coastal State ports and off-shore terminals.
Both the U.K. and Norway have complied with an IMCO Resolution
accompanying the Resolution setting out the Amendment urging Govern-
216
ments to implement the Tanks Amendment as soon as possible.
217
4. The 1973 IMCO Convention
a) background
The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (here-
218
after, the 1973 IMCO Convention) was one of two instruments result¬
ing from an International Conference on Marine Pollution, convened in
215. As of 22 October 1976 the Tanks Amendment had been accepted by
19 States, including the U.K. and Norway. Enclosure with a'
letter from Mrs. A. Meldrum, IMCO Public Relations Officer, 27
January 1977.
216. Resolution 11, adopted by the International Conference on Marine
Pollution, 1973.
217. Cmnd. 5748 (1974); 12 International Legal Materials 1319-1444
(1973). Open for signature 15 January 1974.
218. The other was the Protocol relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil.
See below, p. 195.
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London in 1973. Although one can find inspiration for the Conference
219
in Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly which evidence environ¬
mental concern, direct responsibility is traceable to a 1969 IMCO
Resolution in which it was decided to convene a Conference in 1973
for the purpose of drafting a comprehensive Convention to control
i ii 220vessel-source pollution.
The 1973 IMCO Convention is not in force, having been accepted
221
only by three States at this writing, nor is it likely to become
effective for some years, primarily because of its technical require¬
ments (discussed below). Despite this pessimistic prediction, some
parts of the Convention which can be readily implemented (primarily
those requiring the discharge per mile formula of the 1969 Amendments)
have been incorporated in a voluntary "Pollution Prevention Code (Oil
222
Tankers)" prepared by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS).
223
Approximately 80 shipping companies have subscribed to the Code.
The writer believes that the Code is to be welcomed as a positive step
towards an effective regime of environmental protection, although it
is conceded that there is some force to the argument that compromise
219. General Assembly Resolutions 2398, 2414, 2467 (XXIII). The U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment Recommendation 86(e) is
also relevant.
220. IMCO Assembly Resolution A. 176 (VI).
221. Jordan, Kenya and Tunisia had accepted the 1973 IMCO Convention
as of 13 May 1976. IMCO Document MP/Circ. 5.
222. International Chamber of Shipping, "Pollution Prevention Code
(Oil Tankers)," London (1976).
223. Horrocks, J., "The 1973 Marine Pollution Convention." Marine
Policy (January 1977), pp. 52-60, at p. 60. Mr. Horrocks is
with the Secretariat of the ICS.
162
may delay acceptance of the Convention in toto.
b) pollution control provisions
The 1973 IMCO Convention was intended to replace the 1954 IMCO
Convention and its Amendments with a far more comprehensive instru¬
ment, one that regulated marine pollution caused by oil and other
substances, whether resulting from operation or accident. The new
Convention will apply to both vessels and fixed or floating platforms,
but it expressly excludes discharges directly associated with seabed
224
operations from its scope.
The 1973 IMCO Convention also differs from its predecessors in
that it contains detailed requirements for vessel equipment and con¬
struction—in fact, only about 10 of the 140 pages constituting the
final document are devoted to the body of the Act; the remainder are
technical Annexes, Protocols, and Resolutions.
Parties are required to enact national laws to apply Convention
225
provisions to ships flying their flags. The actual pollution con¬
trol provisions are contained in five Annexes, only the first two of
which must be accepted: Annex I, oil; Annex II, noxious liquid sub¬
stances; Annex III, packaged substances; Annex IV, sewage; Annex V,
garbage. These Annexes are described in pertinent part below,
i) Annex I
"Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil," sets
224. Article 2(3) (ii). Although the definition of "ship" includes
vessels "of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environ¬
ment," individual Annexes exempt ships below various tonnages and
there is the usual provision that the Convention is not applic¬
able to warships or other ships owned or operated by a State and
used on Government non-commercial service. Article 3(3).
225. Articles 1, 3(1), 4.
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discharge standards for "petroleum in any form"—including the
226
refined "white oils" hitherto exempt from IMCO regulation. The
formula used is substantially that of the 1969 Amendments, with the
additional provision that the maximum permissible volume of oil which
may be discharged has been reduced from 1/15,000 to 1/30,000 of capac-
227
ity in the case of new tankers. Two changes to the discharge
regulations for non-tankers are noteworthy: First, the new provisions
apply to ships of 400 GRT, whereas the 1954 IMCO Convention and the
1969 Amendments exempted vessels under 500 GRT. This change may close
a large loophole, for many supply vessels operating in the North Sea
fall into the 400-500 GRT class and have thereby escaped regulation as
228
non-tankers under the Convention. A second difference from the 1969
Amendments is that non-tankers are not subject to the discharge per
mile formula, although the 100 ppm oil in effluent maximum remains.
This relaxation of standards may not be too significant, however, for
discharges remain permissible only while the ship is en route, and
small vessels are unlikely to exceed the former limit of 60 litres of
oil per mile in the required dilute effluent.
Five "special areas" have been designated in which only dis¬
charges of "clean ballast" are permitted. "Clean ballast" is ballast
water which
226. Annex I, Regulation 1.
227. Annex I, Regulations 1(6), 9(1)(a).
228. See below, p. 477. Annex I, Regulation 9(2) requires the flag
State to ensure that "as far as practicable and reasonable,"
ships of less than 400 GRT should be equipped to comply with
the provisions of the Convention applicable to non-tankers.
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"if it were discharged from a ship which is
stationary into clean calm water on a clear day
would not produce visible traces of oil on the surface
of the water or on adjoining shorelines or cause
a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the 229
surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines."
Clean ballast is also that in which the oil in effluent can be
proven not to exceed 15 ppm, notwithstanding the presence of visible
230
traces. It is regrettable that, unlike the 1954 IMCO Convention
provisions, the North Sea is not included in the 1973 Convention's
231
list of prohibited areas. The 50-mile belt of coastal waters
remains an area into which no oil from tankers may be discharged,
and a specific provision establishing a similar 12-mile zone for
non-tankers replaces the "as far as practicable from land" provisions
232
of the 1969 Amendments.
The 1969 Amendments will permit the LOT procedure; the 1973
IMCO Convention will require it for existing tankers. Within three
years following the Convention's entry into force, existing tankers
must be fitted with slop tanks and oil discharge monitoring and control
233
systems. New tankers of 70,000 tons deadweight (DWT) must be fitted
229. Annex I, Regulation 1(16).
230. Ibid.
231. Annex I, Regulation 10(1).
232. Annex I, Regulation 9(1)(b); cf. 1969 Amendments Article III
(a) (iv) . The 1954 IMCO Convention does require non-tankers
to observe prohibited zones. The 1973 IMCO Convention also
incorporates a list of exceptions similar to that of its
progenitors. Annex I, Regulation 11.
233. Annex I, Regulation 15(1).
165
234
with segregated ballast tanks. Other construction requirements
for both existing and new tankers include regulations on "Limitation
of Size and Arrangement of Cargo Tanks," a provision similar to the
1971 Tanks Amendment, and "Subdivision and Stability," an inclusion
235
addressed to tanker safety.
Tankers over 150 GRT and other vessels more than 400 GRT must be
surveyed and certificated. An initial survey before the ship is put
into service or before Certificate issuance is required; "periodical
surveys" of vessel structure and equipment will be specified by the
2 36
"Administration" at intervals not to exceed five years, and "inter¬
mediate surveys" specified at intervals not exceeding 30 months are
intended to ensure that equipment, including oil discharge monitoring
and control systems, oily-water separators and oil filtering systems
237
meet the requirements set out in the Annex.
An "International Oil Pollution Certificate (1973)" is required
for all tankers over 150 GRT and other vessels more than 400 GRT which
sail to ports or off-shore terminals under the jurisdiction of other
238
Parties to the Convention. Certificates may be issued to the vessel
of one Party by the Government of another Party, but it is expressly
provided that Certificates may not be issued to the vessels of non-
234. Annex I, Regulation 13(1).
235. Annex I, Regulations 24, 25. Cf. the brief description of the
1971 Tanks Amendment, above, at p. 159.
236. "Administration" means the Government of the State under whose
authority the ship or platform is operating. Article 2(5).
237. Annex I, Regulation 4(1).
238. Annex I, Regulation 5(1).
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239
Parties. The form of the Certificate is specified in Appendix II
240
to the Ann6x. Certificate duration corresponds to that of "period-
, . ,,241ical surveys.
The new Convention requires oil reception facilities at oil
loading terminals, repair ports and other ports in which ships have
242
oily residues to discharge. Such facilities must be "adequate to
meet the needs of the ships using them without causing undue delay to
243
ships." The locations and reception capacities are specified in
extensive lists which will become obligatory one year after the Conven-
244
tion comes into force. There are provisions requiring standard
discharge connections to simplify the transfer of oil as well as
245
detailed requirements for the maintenance of oil record books,
ii) Annex II
"Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid
Substances in Bulk" sets discharge criteria for substances which are
classified according to their potential danger:
1. Category A: Substances which may "present a major
hazard to either marine resources or human health or
cause serious harm to amenities or other legitimate
uses of the sea " [for example, tetraethyl lead./
2. Category B: Substances which may "present a hazard
239. Annex I, Regulation 6.
240. Annex I, Regulation 7.
241. Annex I, Regulation 8.
242. Annex I, Regulation 12(1).
243. Ibid.
244. Annex I, Regulation 12(2), (3), (4).
245. Annex I, Regulations 19, 20.
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to either marine resources or human health or cause
harm to amenities or other legitimate uses of the
sea " /for example, carbon tetrachloride/
3. Category C: Substances which may "present a minor
hazard to either marine resources or human health or
cause minor harm to amenities or other legitimate uses
of the sea " /for example, benzene/
4. Category D: Substances which may "present a recog¬
nisable hazard to either marine resources or human health
or cause minimal harm to amenities or other legitimate
uses of the sea " /for example, ethyl acetate/^
More than 400 "noxious liquid substances" have been evaluated
to date in what is intended to be a continuing process, and are listed
in Appendix II to Annex II. Unclassified liquid cargoes must be car¬
ried "under the most severe conditions proposed," that is, they are
treated as Category A substances. A list of liquid substances that
have been evaluated but found to fall outside Categories A-D /for
247
example, wine/ is appended to the Convention.
Annex II is intended to regulate discharges of noxious liquid
248
substances from vessels carrying such cargoes in bulk. Separate
provisions are made for each category, although all benefit from the
same exceptions for safety, damage under certain conditions, and
pollution control that qualify application of Annex I. In addition,
the Baltic and Black Seas are designated as "Special Areas" and are
subject to more stringent discharge regulations in the case of cate-
249
gorxes A, B and C.
246. Annex II, Regulation 3(1). See also Appendix I, "Guidelines
for the Categorization of Noxious Liquid Substances."
247. Appendix III, "List of Other Liquid Substances Carried in Bulk."
248. Annex II, Regulation 2(1).
249. Annex II, Regulations 1(7), 5(7).
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The discharge of Category A substances is prohibited.jf
tanks containing Category A substances are to be washed, the residue
must be discharged into a reception facility until the concentration
251
is below a prescribed level and the tank is "empty". The tank may
then be washed at sea, provided that:
1. The tank is filled with water to at least five
per cent, of its capacity.
2. The ship is proceeding en route at a speed of at
least seven knots.
3. The discharge is made below the waterline.
4. The discharge is made at least 12 nautical miles
from land in water of at least 25 metres depth.
The discharge of Category B substances is permitted when:
1. Done pursuant to procedures approved by the flag
State. Procedures are to be "based upon" IMCO
standards and must ensure that the concentration of
the substance in the wake astern of the ship does
not exceed 1 ppm.
2. The quantity of cargo discharged conforms to Government
standards and in no case exceeds one cubic metre or
1/3,OCX? of the tank capacity in cubic metres, whichever
is greater.
252
3. Requirements 2, 3, and 4 of Category A are satisfied.
The regulations governing discharges of Category C substances
differ from their Category B counterparts only in that the allowable
concentration of the discharged substance in the ship's wake is in¬
creased to 10 ppm and the permitted maximum quantity of cargo dis¬
charged is raised to three cubic metres or 1/1,OOO, whichever is
250. Annex II, Regulation 5(1).
251. Appendix II sets out the permissible residual concentration
for each substance.
252. Annex II, Regulation 5(2).
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253
greater. Category D discharges are permitted when requirements 2,
3 and 4 are met.^^
Vessels carrying noxious liquid substances in bulk are subject
to survey and certification requirements similar to those discussed
255
in connection with oil tankers. This Annex lacks detailed provis¬
ions setting out vessel construction and equipment requirements and
operating procedures, but Parties are obligated to enact "appropriate"
256
national regulations in respect of these new vessel types. Regu¬
lations for chemical tankers must contain at least all the provisions
of the IMCO Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying
257
Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk.
Parties to the Convention are required to appoint surveyors to
25Q
check compliance with its provisions. The essence of very detailed
provisions setting out surveillance procedures is that compliance shall
be monitored by referring to entries in a Cargo Record Book as well as
observation. Tank washing at an oil reception facility required prior
to the discharge of Category A substances must be certified by the sur¬
veyor and the concentration of tank effluent measured (unless it would
259
cause "undue" delay to the ship). On the other hand, the master is
253. Annex II, Regulation 5(3).
254. Annex II, Regulation 5(4).
255. Annex II, Regulations 10, 11, 12.
256. Annex II, Regulation 13(2).
257. Annex II, Regulation 13(3); IMCO Assembly Resolution A.212
(VII).
258. Annex II, Regulation 8(1).
259. Annex II, Regulation 8(2), (3), (4).
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responsible for logging discharges at sea. The Cargo Record Book
must be completed every time one of a list of specified transferring
operations occurs and must be kept on board the ship in a place con-
261
venient for inspection.
Finally, it should be noted that the Parties undertake to pro¬
vide the reception facilities necessary to the successful operation of
the Convention. Reception facilities for the noxious liquids carried
must be provided at both cargo and repair ports to receive tank wash¬
ings as well as slop tank discharges. This requirement differs from a
similar provision in Annex I in that there are no guidelines to limit
national Government discretion in the matter of determining need, and
there is no time limit for compliance,
iii) Annex III
"Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances
Carried by Sea in Packaged Forms, or in Freight Containers, Portable
Tanks or Road and Rail Tank Wagons" (hereafter, Packaged Substances
Regulations) is one of three optional Annexes. This Annex is far less
detailed than Annexes I and II, consisting of only eight Regulations
and no Appendices.
Packages are required to be "adequate" to protect the marine
environment and must be durably marked with the technical name and with
262
an indication that the contents are harmful. The shipping documents
must also use the technical name of the substances and must include a
260. Annex II, Regulation 8(5)-(9).
261. Annex II, Regulation 9.
262. Annex III, Regulations 2, 3. Trade names are not to be used as
descriptions and where possible identification shall be assisted
by the use of U.N. numbers.
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declaration attesting that the shipment offered for carriage is prop-
263
erly packed, marked and labelled. Vessels carrying harmful sub¬
stances must have a hazardous goods manifest on board, describing them
264
and recording their location. The master or owner of a ship may
be required by national law to provide at least 24 hours notice to the
appropriate port authority of his intention to load or unload such
26 5
packaged goods as may be specified.
The discharge of packaged substances, including their containers




"Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from
Ships," is intended to reduce discharges of raw sewage into coastal
267
waters. To this end, ships of 200 GRT or certified to carry more
than 10 persons are limited as follows:
1. If discharging sewage which has been comminuted and
disinfected, such discharge may occur no closer than
four nautical miles from land.
2. If discharging sewage which has not been comminuted
and disinfected, such discharge may occur no closer
than 12 nautical miles from land.
263. Annex III, Regulation 4(1), (2).
264. Annex III, Regulation 4(3), (4).
265. Annex III, Regulation 8.
266. Annex III, Regulation 7, Resolution 19, "Recommendation Con¬
cerning the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried
by Sea in Packaged Forms or in Freight Containers, Portable
Tanks or Road and Rail Tank Wagons," recommends studies on the
problems of this potential source of pollution.
267. Annex IV is optional.
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In either case, the sewage must have been stored in holding tanks and
discharged at a moderate rate when the ship is en route at a speed of
at least four knots, in accordance with national regulations based
268
upon IMCO standards. If the vessel has an approved sewage treatment
plant certified by the flag State to meet IMCO standards sewage dis¬
charge can occur anywhere with no further requirements as to vessel
269
speed, etc. These discharge regulations do not apply to discharges
necessitated by safety or life saving considerations, or resulting
270
from damage under certain conditions.
Vessels subject to Annex IV are subject to survey and certifi-
271
cation in respect of sewage treatment equipment. This Annex is
/
similar to Annex I in that standard discharge connections are re-
272
quxred, and analogous to Annex II in respect of a provision which
obligates Parties to undertake to provide reception facilities but
273
leaves it to the State to determine need,
v) Annex V
"Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from
Ships" prohibits discharges:
1. Within 25 nautical miles of land for dunnage,
lining and packing materials which will float.
268. Annex IV, Regulation 8(1) (a).
269. Annex IV, Regulation 8(1)(b).
270. Annex IV, Regulation 9.
271. Annex IV, Regulations 3-7.
272. Annex IV, Regulation 11.
273. Annex IV, Regulation 10. Resolution 20, "Provision of Standards
and Test Methods Concerning Discharge of Sewage," urges IMCO
to develop standards and test methods as soon as possible.
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2. Within 12 nautical miles for food wastes and all
other garbage including paper products, rags,
glass, metal, bottles, crockery and similar refuse.
Disposal of all plastics, including synthetic ropes, synthetic fishing
nets and plastic garbage bags, is prohibited. More stringent reg-
275
ulations apply to the five "special areas" included in Annex I.
This Annex applies to all ships, and there are special provisions for
276
fixed or floating platforms as well. The familiar exceptions made
for discharges necessary for safety or life saving and resulting from
vessel damage have been complemented by a third exception: the accid¬
ental loss of synthetic fishing nets or repair materials, provided
277
that all reasonable precautions have been taken to prevent such loss.
Governments of Parties undertake to provide adequate reception facili¬
ties and to report to IMCO instances in which such facilities are
278
alleged to be inadequate,
c) enforcement provisions
The IMCO Conference was greatly influenced by the second meeting
of UNCLOS III which was scheduled for Caracas some seven months later.
Nowhere in the Convention is this more evident than in the provisions
for enforcement, which were deliberately left vague.
The flag State remains primarily responsible for enforcing the
274. Annex V, Regulation 3(1). Annex V is optional.
275. Annex V, Regulation 5.
276. Annex V, Regulations 2, 4. See above, p. 134.
277. Annex V. Regulation 6.
278. Annex V, Regulation 7. Resolution 21, "Provision of Reception
Facilities for the Discharge of Sewage and Disposal of Garbage,"
urges Governments to ensure reception facilities for sewage and
garbage are adequate as soon as possible.
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Convention. As in the 1954 IMCO Convention, although another State
may request prosecution, it is the flag State which is the judge of
whether "sufficient evidence is available to enable proceedings to
279
be brought in respect of the alleged violation." However, it is
also provided that
"Any violation of the requirements of the present
Convention within the jurisdiction of any Party to
the Convention shall be prohibited and sanctions shall ^qq
be established therefor under the law of that Party."
The extent of coastal State "jurisdiction" is ambiguous as that term
was deliberately left undefined pending agreement at UNCLOS III—a
course of action also reflected in the 1972 London Dumping Convention
although it was provided that the question would be examined after
281
UNCLOS III had agreed. Two major issues remain to be resolved.
First, how far from the baseline does such jurisdiction extend? If
it is decided that coastal State jurisdiction to enforce the provi¬
sions of the 1973 IMCO Convention should extend only to the territor-
282
ial sea, it is probable that the distance will be 12 miles. On
the other hand, if (as seems more likely) at least some coastal State
jurisdiction in respect of vessel-source pollution is included in its
279. Article 4(1). Cf. 1954 IMCO Convention, Article X(2). Also as
in the earlier Convention, penalties for violations shall be
adequate and equally severe irrespective of where the offence
occurred, Article 4(4).
280. Article 4(2), emphasis added. The coastal State may either
take proceedings or turn its evidence over to the flag State.
281. See below, p. 212. Resolution 23 of the 1973 IMCO Conference,
"Nature and Extent of States' Rights over the Sea," declares
that the decision of the 1973 Conference reflects a clear inten¬
tion to leave the question of the nature and extent of States'
rights over the sea to UNCLOS III.
282. RSNT, Committee II, Article 2. The present U.K. territorial sea
is 3 miles and that of Norway 4 miles.
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Exclusive Economic Zone powers, "within its jurisdiction" could mean
200 nautical miles. This result would give the U.K. and Norway con¬
trol of pollution from foreign flag vessels in their sectors of the
North Sea—a radical departure from the lex lata. Provisions of the
283
RSNT relevant to vessel-source pollution are discussed below.
The second unanswered question concerns the nature of coastal
State powers within the geographical zone agreed upon at UNCLOS III.
will be observed from the quoted provision that the coastal State
284
"shall" prohibit violations of the Convention. What rights
correlative to this duty will the coastal State enjoy? It is clear
that the lex ferenda must differ substantially from the lex lata,
for coastal State powers over foreign flag vessels are severely
limited at present. Vessels passing through the territorial sea
2 85
enjoy an ambiguous right of innocent passage and, subject to the
2 86
relevant doctrine of hot pursuit, are on the high seas subject
287
only to the jurisdiction of the flag State. As in the issue of
geographical extent of jurisdiction, it is submitted that the best
283. See below, p. 196.
284. This obligation could be avoided by turning the evidence over
to the flag State for proceedings.
285. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, Article 14(1). See Fitzmaurice, G., "Some Results of
the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: Part I—the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Related Topics,"
8 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 73-121 (1959).
Innocent passage as formulated in the RSNT is described below
at p. 196.
286. High Seas Convention, Article 23.
287. High Seas Convention, Article 6(1). See the discussion of the
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, above at p. 116
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evidence of the lex ferenda relevant to coastal State powers to
enforce this Convention will be found in the Articles of the RSNT.
All ships required by the Convention to carry a Certificate
are subject to inspection while in ports or off-shore terminals under
288
the jurisdiction of a Party. However,
"Any such inspection shall be limited to verifying
that there is on board a valid certificate, unless
there are clear grounds for believing that the con¬
dition of the ship or its equipment does not correspond
substantially with the particulars of that Certificate."
That the meaning of "clear grounds," a criterion unencumbered by
guidelines to application, will be a central issue in any contested
inspection is a foregone conclusion. While the international law of
290 291
"reasonability" and "equality of treatment" would appear to
provide some help, it is submitted that without further definition,
"clear grounds" is more likely to be determined by power politics
than law.
If the "clear grounds" provision represents a concession to
292
shipowning (and socialist) States, the provision obligating the
288. Article 5(2).
289. Ibid.
290. High Seas Convention, Article 2.
291. Both the U.K. and Norway are Parties to the 1923 Geneva Conven¬
tion and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports
which requires equal treatment of national and foreign ships in
regard to access to ports. U.N., Laws and Regulations on the
Regime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1956).
292. The Soviet Union is extremely reluctant to permit inspection of
its vessels in foreign ports. A Draft International Convention
on the Regime of Vessels in Foreign Ports submitted to IMCO by
the U.S.S.R. provides that "the local authorities shall not,
however, carry out inspection, or search of the master's safe
if the master gives formal assurances that the vessel complies
177
coastal State to "take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall
not sail until it can proceed to sea without presenting an unreason-
293
able threat of harm to the marine environment" may represent the
other side of the compromise. Although the coastal State may
"grant such a ship permission to leave the port or
offshore terminal for the purpose of proceeding 294
to the nearest appropriate repair yard available,"
it is not obliged to do so. While this provision may permit "coast
of convenience" States to release vessels if they consider it to be
in their short-term economic interests to do so, few coastal States
concerned with the preservation of their own territory and adjacent
waters would be likely to release a substandard vessel carrying cargo
likely to return without the ship.
A coastal State Party which takes action against a ship for
violation of the Convention is required to notify the flag State
295
immediately.
Article 5(4) obligates Parties to apply the "requirements of
the present Convention" to vessels of States non-Party "to ensure
that no more favourable treatment is given to such ships." Although
this may appear to conflict with the well-known rule of international
customary law that
with the provisions of paragraph I of this Article [the duty
to comply with the port State's lawsj and that there are no
objects in the safe which could be used in violation of the






"a treaty does not create either obligations
or rights for a third State without its consent,"
it is submitted that no conflict exists. Parties are not obliged
to apply "the Convention" to non-Parties, but to apply its "require¬
ments" and then only so far as may be necessary to prevent unequal
297
treatment. It is entirely possible for the coastal State to use
powers conferred upon it by other sources of international law to
coerce compliance with the Convention. The most obvious example
would be that of barring "sub-standard" vessels from her ports. So
long as discrimination is based on the Convention, and especially if
the Convention is widely accepted, this action would not be inconsis¬
tent with international customary law.
The paragraphs of the preceding Article dealt with violations
of the Convention's provisions concerning Certificates. Article 5
is, therefore, primarily concerned with construction and equipment
standards, although discharge violations might well be detected
following the wider inspection permitted under the circumstances dis¬
cussed above.
Article 6 provides that inspections of a ship subject to the
Convention may be made in a port or offshore terminal of a Party to
298
monitor compliance with Convention discharge provisions. Inspection
296. This rule is incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, Article 34.
297. This interpretation is consistent with Article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention which provides that "A treaty shall be inter¬
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose."
298. Article 6(2). The use of the permissive term "may" rather than
the mandatory "shall" could prove significant if a port author¬
ity were reluctant to prosecute vessels upon which its revenues
179
procedure is not described nor limited; thus, although it would be
likely to commence with a careful perusal of the appropriate Record
Book, it could well extend to detective work such as cargo residue
assay. Inspection of pollution control equipment and vessel construc¬
tion is clearly relevant as evidence of a discharge violation—but
is it permitted? Article 5 required particular circumstances for
inspection beyond the determination that the vessel carried a valid
Certificate. It is submitted that any inspection relevant to the
enforcement of the Convention will be concerned with both aspects of
pollution control: defective equipment as evidence of potential
pollution and any evidence relevant to an unpermitted discharge. If
this view is correct, the inspection restrictions imposed byArticle 5
are without effect.
An inspecting State which detects or suspects a discharge
violation is limited to submitting a report detailing the circumstan-
299
ces to the flag State. The master must be notified if it is
"practicable" to do so. Although the plain meaning of the term em¬
ployed in this context contemplates communications, it may well be
used to prevent communicating information to a suspect likely to flee
the jurisdiction."^00
Any Party with relevant evidence must make it available to the
depend. See, International Law Association: "The Concept of
Port State Jurisdiction," a Report to the New Delhi Conference
(1974).
299. Article 6(2).
300. Article 6(3). The captain of the Halcyon the Great, a tanker
of 227,000 tons, upon learning that Canadian authorities were
to seize his vessel, simply sailed beyond Canadian jurisdiction,
the efforts of a police launch which pursued the tanker being
of no avail. The Scotsman, 2 November 1974, p. 6.
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flag State. As in the 1954 IMCO Convention, the duty of the flag
State is limited to prosecuting only if, in its determination, a
violation has occurred. The flag State must inform the complaining
State and IMCO about what action—if any—has been taken.
A Party may also inspect a ship in its port or offshore term¬
inal upon receiving a request to do so from another Party."*01 Such
inspection is limited to detecting evidence of unlawful discharges
anywhere and must itself be based on "sufficient evidence." The port
State must report any such investigation to both the flag State and
the Party requesting it so that appropriate action can be taken. Al¬
though more extensive comments are reserved for discussion below, a
summary of this provision may add useful perspective.
First, it should be observed that the inspecting State (here¬
after, the port State) is not obligated to inspect at the request of
another State; it "may" do so. Only reports from States Party to
the Convention may be acted upon. Since the discharge may occur "in
any place" the locus might well have been the territorial sea of the
complaining State—or a State non-Party for that matter. (The locus
of discharges which the port State suspects to have occurred without
a report from another State is not specified; however since Article
6 purports to confer limited powers to inspect on the coastal State,
it appears to contemplate discharges outside coastal State "juris¬
diction"—within which a coastal State may "cause proceedings to be
302
taken in accordance with its law.") Finally, it is evident that
301. Article 6(5). Article 7 provides for compensation in cases of




the "appropriate action" pursuant to the Convention is that of
flag State investigation and prosecution as is the case in the ana¬
logous provision in which the port State initiates an investigation
of discharge violation,
d) other provisions
Article 16, containing the so-called "tacit acceptance" proced¬
ure, is the most important of the remaining provisions. The essence
of this provision is that silence means assent to amendment of the
technical aspects of the Convention incorporated in Annexes and
Appendices.
An amendment to an Annex shall be deemed to have been accepted
at the end of a period to be determined if not objected to by at
least one-third of the Parties or by Parties representing at least
half of the global merchant GRT, provided that the appropriate IMCO
body may decide that such amendment requires acceptance by two-thirds
of the Parties owning 50 per cent, of the world's merchant GRT."^0^
A similar provision not including the proviso applies to amendment of
Annex Appendices. Articles remain subject to an affirmative two-thirds
vote of Parties owning at least 50 per cent, of the world's merchant
304
GRT.
The significance of the tacit amendment procedure is that it
permits the rapid amendment of provisions subject to technical
obsolescence without the ratification requirement which may require
national legislation by each Party. The need for a provision of
303. Article 16(2) (f) (ii). The MEPC has been designated the
"appropriate body."
304. Article 16(2) (f) (i).
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this sort has been graphically demonstrated by the 1960 Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention which, though the subject of many
proposed amendments, was never amended. The 1974 SOLAS Convention
has incorporated a tacit amendment procedure in an attempt to facil¬
itate amendment acceptance.
Article 10 provides that disputes relating to the Convention
shall, if settlement by negotiation is not "possible," be submitted
at the request of any of them to arbitration as set out in Protocol
II. Protocol II provides for a three-person arbitral tribunal. The
problems associated with the constitution of such a panel have been
reduced somewhat by providing that:
1. One Arbitrator shall be nominated by each Party
and the two first named shall nominate the Chairman.
2. If the Chairman has not been nominated
following a specified period, the ^q-j
IMCO Secretary-General may nominate him.
3. If one of the Parties has not nominated
an Arbitrator at the end of a specified
period, the Secretary-General may nominate
the Chairman who may then ask the ^qq
Secretary-General to nominate the third member.
The 1954 IMCO Convention provides for reference to the Inter¬
national Court of Justice unless the Parties agree to submit the dis¬
pute to arbitration. While the provisions contained in Protocol II
305. A similar amendment procedure is employed by the International
Civil Aviation Organisation. Annexes to the ICAO Convention
become effective within three months unless a majority of
Parties register their disapproval. (Article 90(a)).
306. Protocol II, Article III.
307. Protocol II, Article IV(1).
308. Protocol II, Article IV(2), (3).
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are certainly welcome additions to the 1973 IMCO Convention, it is
regrettable that reference to the I.C.J, was not offered as an alter¬
native means of dispute settlement. This may well indicate the de¬
sire of Conference delegates not to prejudice the UNCLOS III negoti¬
ations from which may emerge fora especially created for such
functions.
e) comments on the 1973 IMCO Convention
The 1973 IMCO Convention has been the subject of considerable
comment and criticism. It is proposed in this section to discuss
some of these comments and to point out developments related to the
Convention. The discussion has been subdivided into the general sub¬
jects of "equipment and technology" and "standards and enforcement."
i) equipment and technology
That oil reception facilities are necessary to the effectiveness
of the 1973 IMCO Convention is widely recognised. In 1971 the IMCO
Assembly in a Resolution which recalled the 1969 Amendments and
anticipated the 1973 Convention invited member Governments "to ensure
the provision and maintenance of adequate facilities as soon as
309
possible." Following the 1973 Conference, it became apparent that
not only were adequate oil reception facilities needed, but facilities
to receive chemicals, sewage and garbage must be provided as well if
the Convention were to become widely ratified. a further IMCO
Assembly Resolution was adopted, urging Governments to ensure the
309. IMCO Assembly Resolution A.235 (VII).
310. The MEPC has observed that "certain States had reported difficul¬
ties in accepting and implementing the 1973 Convention, partic¬
ularly with regard to the provision of the necessary reception
facilities and monitoring equipment for the discharge of oil."
MEPC III/WP.7.
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provision of reception facilities as soon as possible and, in the
case of "special areas," not later than 1 January 1977. ^
At the second session of the MEPC, the Oil Companies Inter¬
national Marine Forum (hereafter, OCIMF) announced that it was devel¬
oping guidelines for the installation of the oil reception facilities
312
which are required by Regulation 12 of Annex I. This document,
"Draft Guidelines for Assessment of Reception Facility Tankage at
Oil Loading Ports" (OCIMF, May 1975), was submitted the following
year to the MEPC third session, along with the report of an ad hoc
313
Working Group on Reception Facilities. Two conclusions emerging
from this work were: 1) the need for oil reception facilities must
be carefully studied so that these expensive installations are not
overbuilt; and 2) the disposal of oily effluent at offshore loading
installations presents particular problems of storage or transporta¬
tion. Following the MEPC fifth session, the Working Group submitted
a set of Draft Guidelines on Means for Ensuring the Provision and
Maintenance of Adequate Reception Facilities in Ports - Part I - Oily
314
Wastes. An amended version of this Draft has now been adopted by
315
the MEPC. The Working Group is continuing its investigation; at
this writing a questionnaire concerning present facilities in ports
311. IMCO Assembly Resolution A.348(IX).
312. MEPC III/5. OCIMF is an association of oil companies inter¬
ested in the marine transportation of petroleum and represents
those interests at IMCO.
313. MEPC III/WP.5.
314. MEPC VI/8.
315. MEPC VI/WP.3 and MEPC VI/WP.3/Add.1.
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for the reception of oily wastes is outstanding.
The development of adequate monitoring (and on new ships, con¬
trol) equipment is generally thought to be necessary before the dis-
317
charge provisions of Annex I can be observed. The OCIMF has
stated that not only is there as yet no completely satisfactory
monitoring equipment for persistent oils, but
"the provision of monitors for clean oil tankers
definitely requires the development of new
technology, perhaps more so than any other
single provision within the 1973 Convention."
This problem was recognised at the Conference, and Regulation
15(6) of Annex I provides that where in the view of IMCO such equip¬
ment is not obtainable, the flag State may waive compliance, provided
an alternative procedure established by IMCO is adopted. Indeed,
Resolution 10 of the Conference recommends the promotion of studies
to develop "more sensitive, accurate and reliable oil content measur¬
ing instruments to cope with the full range of oils covered by that
Annex."319
An MEPC Working Group has been investigating this problem and
submitted a Draft International Performance and Test Specifications
for Oily-Water Separating Equipment and Oil Content Metres to the MEPC
fifth session.330 This document has been amended and approved by the
316. MEPC VI/WP.3/Add.1, Annex I.
317. MEPC III/WP.7.
318. OCIMF, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973: Position of the Oil Companies International
Marine Forum (October 1974), p. 10.
319. Resolution 6 recommends that studies be undertaken to ascertain




MEPC which has decided to submit a Resolution to the Assembly in-
321
viting Governments to adopt and apply the specifications.
A number of issues are raised by the vessel construction re¬
quirements of the Convention. Some commentators have observed that
322
restricting the already weakened construction requirements to
new,.large ships (unlikely to be built in the current tanker glut)323
324
means that such requirements are temporarily without effect. The
opposite view is based primarily upon economic considerations: ves¬
sels which must comply with such requirements as segregated ballast
are more costly to build and operate. Few maritime States would
enthusiastically accept requirements which would place their fleets
at a competitive disadvantage. Moreover, many Third World States
simply may not have the economic and technological resources to
321. International Institute for Environment and Development,
"Report on the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of MEPC," (unpub¬
lished and undated), para. 5, p. 7.
322. McManus, R., "The New Treaty on Vessel Pollution," Oceans
(July 1974), pp. 59-65, at p. 64. Mr. McManus cites the
rejection of a U.S./U.S.S.R. proposal that double bottoms be
used to provide segregated ballast as a retreat from desirable
construction requirements.
323. It has been suggested that even when construction of new
vessels accelerates, replacement demand for tankers is likely
to be for vessels below 70,000 DWT (to avoid the IMCO con¬
struction requirements) and above 250-300,000 dwt (the optimal
size for the expanding Middle East-U.S. journey). The
Economist, 12 February 1977, p. 104.
324. It is submitted that since the Convention is not likely to
come into force before 1980, the year in which The Economist
predicts tanker demand is likely to revive, the current
excess tanker capacity is without practical effect on the
vessel construction requirements of the Convention. It has
been suggested by the Executive Director of UNEP that current
excess tanker capacity be converted by requiring segregated
ballast on existing vessels. The MEPC is currently devoting
considerable attention to this possibility. MEPC III/WP.7.
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comply with vessel construction requirements and operation proced-
325
ures.
ii) standards and enforcement
An important problem which must be resolved before Annex II
can be satisfactorily implemented concerns the establishment of
procedures and arrangements for the discharge of noxious liquid sub-
326
stances into the sea. Many liquid chemicals remain to be classi¬
fied, a task made more difficult by the practice of identifying them
327
only by trade names. Even after classification, problems remain,
including measuring the residue remaining in the cargo tanks, assess¬
ing the effect of the ship's wake on chemical concentration, and
determining the characteristics of non-soluble substances before and
325. This problem was a particular concern of the Symposium on
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, held in Acapulco,
22-31 March 1976. As much of the Third World merchant marine
is composed of used vessels from the developed States, one
view is that assistance to the Third World ought to include
the conversion of such ships to acceptable standards.
326. Conference Resolution 13, "Procedures and Arrangements for
the Discharge of Noxious Liquid Substances into the Sea,"
recommended studies to develop uniform standards for Annex
II and to consider, on the basis of such standards, the
form which the Cargo Record Book ought to take. Resolutions
14-16 are also concerned with the implementation of
Annex II.
327. MEPC II/WP.7. At its third session the MEPC invited
members to investigate the extent to which their Govern¬
ments could assist in laboratory tests of uncategorized
substances to facilitate implementation of Annex II. A new
Sub-Committee on Bulk Chemicals has been established with
the primary task of elaborating safety and pollution
prevention measures related to the handling and carriage
of noxious chemical substances in bulk. IMCO, Annual
Report (1975-1976), para. 52, p. 15. This subject was
also extensively discussed at the Acapulco Symposium.
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after discharge.
The extent of coastal or port State jurisdiction to enforce
the Convention has not been determined because UNCLOS III has not
agreed upon a Convention. Until some decision is taken on coastal
State or port State jurisdiction to enforce, the discharge prohibi¬
tions of the 1973 Convention will depend upon the flag State for their
effective observance—something less than a certainty in the case of
329
vessels flying flags of convenience.
5. The 1969 IMCO Intervention Convention^
The International Convention relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (hereafter, the 1969
IMCO Intervention Convention), to which both the U.K. and Norway are
Parties, came into force 6 May 1975.
The 1969 IMCO Intervention Convention defines under what circum¬
stances Parties may interfere with foreign vessels on the high seas
328. Horrocks, J., op. cit. in footnote 223, at p. 58.
329. "Records for oil tanker losses and the amount of oil spilled in¬
to the oceans were set in the first nine months of last year—
well before the wreck of the Argo Merchant and the current rash
of tanker mishaps—according to industry figures. Thirteen
tankers were declared a total loss in the first nine months of
last year, according to the Tanker Advisory Center, an industry
organization based in New York City." International Herald
Tribune, 13 January 1977, p. 5. The article points out that the
wreck of the Argo Merchant as well as seven other tanker accid¬
ents off the U.S. within one month all involved vessels flying
the Liberian flag. Although the Liberian fleet's record is not
as bad as some other flag of convenience States, it neverthe¬
less is much worse than that of such States as the U.K. or
Norway. Another recent article analysing the question of flag
of convenience safety concludes that "(f)lags of convenience
are less safe than other flags. But they are more profitable—
and they'll multiply." The Economist, (12 March 1977), pp. 81-82.
330. Cmnd. 4403 (1970); 9 International Legal Materials 25-44 (1970).
As of 24 December 1976, 31 States were Parties to the Inter¬
vention Convention. IMCO Doc. CSI/Circ. 32.
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to protect their territory from damage by oil pollution. The
essence of the Agreement is set out in the first Article which
provides,
"Parties to the present Convention may take such
measures on the high seas as may be necessary to
prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger to their coastline or related interests from
pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil,
following upon a maritime casualty or acts related
to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected
to result in major harmful consequences."
Analysis of this Article will in large part summarise the Convention.
a) place of intervention
332
The Convention confers a right to act only on the high seas;
however since the locus of the casualty is not specified, the spill
itself could come from an area of ocean under a greater or lesser
degree of national jurisdiction, for example the Exclusive Economic
333
Zone or territorial sea. This may result in an interesting situ¬
ation, depending upon the outcome of UNCLOS III as well as other
developments in the law of the sea. When the Convention was drafted
the primary concern was to agree on coastal State rights to deal with
oil pollution from vessels outside the territorial sea—a distance
of 3 and 4 miles from the U.K. and Norway respectively. However, the
likely emergence of the 12-mile territorial sea and the 200-mile EEZ
has made the right to intervene on the high seas less important.
331. The MEPC is considering a manual on intervention guidelines.
MEPC III/WP.7.
332. Article VII.
333. Professor Brown has considered various combinations of casualty
and damage locus in his analysis of the Convention. Op. cit.
in footnote 3, at p. 147.
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This is especially true in the case of straits, areas of particular
danger to shipping. The right to intervene on the high seas could
become irrelevant in over 100 straits (including the Straits of
Dover) if a universal 12-mile territorial sea were adopted. Should
coastal States be given powers to prevent pollution in their EEZ's
the importance of this Convention in the entire North Sea would be
greatly lessened. In fact, the writer suggests that whatever powers
UNCLOS III gives the coastal State they are unlikely to be more re¬
stricted than this Convention. Thus, the wide acceptance of a UNCLOS
III Agreement could, in the writer's view, diminish the importance
of the 1969 IMCO Intervention Convention,
b) permissible intervention
The coastal State may act only "to prevent, mitigate or elimin¬
ate grave and imminent danger". The nature and extent of coastal
State action will necessarily vary according to circumstance, but
it is limited both by a Conventional and customary law requirement
334
that it be proportional to the damage sought to be prevented.
Additional safeguards are provided by Articles requiring compensation
for measures taken in contravention of the Convention"*^ and provid-
336
ing for dispute settlement.
334. Article V(l). The specified calculus of proportionality re¬
quires that account be taken of the extent and probability of
damage if the measures are not taken, the likelihood that the
measures will be effective and the extent of damage which may
result from such measures. Article V(3). See also The I'm
Alone, 2 U.S. Department of State Arbitration Series 1-7
(1931-1935).
335. Article VI.




The protection afforded by the Convention to States Parties
includes their coastlines and "related interests." Examples of
such interests are contained in Article 11(4), which provides:
"4. 'related interests' means the interests of a
coastal State directly affected or threatened
by the maritime casualty, such as
(a) maritime coastal, port or estuarine
activities, constituting an essential
means of livelihood of the persons
concerned;
(b) tourist attractions of the area concerned;
(c) the health of the coastal population and
the well-being of the area concerned,
including conservation of living
marine resources and of wildlife."
This Article was quoted because its interpretation would, in large
part, determine the answer to the question of to what extent the
Convention authorises coastal State interference to protect its int¬
erest in the development of petroleum from the continental shelf.
The plain meaning of this provision suggests that a new item
(d), "the development of the resources of the continental shelf"
could be included and may well be implicit. Article 11(4) is con¬
cerned with coastal State interests vulnerable to oil pollution; no
geographical restriction (for example, "within its territorial sea")
qualifies its scope. Indeed, one analysis of the Conference travaux
preparatoires indicates that the question of geographical limitation
338
was only considered in relation to fisheries interests.
337. Emphasis added.
338. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 3, at p. 150.
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The possibility of a collision between a ship or a mobile
drilling platform which is drifting or is out of control and an off¬
shore installation of any type is a source of great concern to both
339
U.K. and Norwegian authorities. The legal right of the coastal
State to intervene in such a situation may be clarified when a Con¬
vention on Wreck Removal and Related issues, currently being devel¬
oped by the IMCO Legal Committee, assumes its final form and is
340
accepted. In the interim the limits to coastal State discretion
to act in the hypothetical situation are defined by this Convention
and international customary law. Application of the convention is
determined by two additional definitions which help to describe its
scope,
d) oil
The 1969 IMCO Intervention Convention applies only to actions
to prevent oil pollution (although the 1973 Protocol, discussed be¬
low, is intended to apply to actions in regard to other pollutants).
341
"Oil" means crude, fuel, diesel and lubricating oil. It is clear,
therefore, that an action to prevent a collision which would not
result in oil pollution (for example, a steel jacket drifting towards
a gas rig) is not covered by the Convention. The more probable case,
however, would be that which might result in at least some oil pollu¬
tion (for example, a supply ship drifting towards a drilling rig on




See above, p. 43.
IMCO, Annual Report (1975-1976), para. 69, p. 18.
Article 11(3).
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result in major harmful consequences." If this criterion cannot be
satisfied and intervention is for the purpose of preventing collision
damage (which may incidentally also result in a small discharge of
oil), it follows that such action could not be supported by refer¬
ence to the Convention. Action would therefore have to be based on
342
international customary law.
e) following a maritime casualty
Action under the Convention is only authorised "following upon
a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty." A "maritime
casualty" means
"a collision of ships, stranding or other incident
of navigation, or other occurrence on board a ship
or external to it resulting in material damage or ^43
imminent threat of material damage to a ship or cargo."
342. Writers differ on the question of whether the Intervention Con¬
vention codifies customary law and is therefore applicable to
all States, or whether it creates rules applicable inter partes.
The former view numbers among its proponents Beesley, J., "Rights
and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian
View," 3 Journal of Maritime Law, 1-12 (1972); Cundick, R.,
"High Seas Intervention: Parameters of Unilateral Action," 10
San Diego Law Review 514-558 (1973); and Sweeny, J., "Environ¬
mental Protection by Coastal States: The Paradigm from Marine
Transport of Petroleum," 4 Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law 278-306 (1974). Writers of the view that inter¬
vention may only occur inter partes include Churchill, R., "U.K.,"
in Churchill, R. (et al.) (eds.), New Directions in the Law of
the Sea, Vol. Ill, British Institute of International and Com¬
parative Law, London (1973), pp. 281-301; and Lucchini, L.,
"La pollution des mers par les hydrocarbures: les Conventions
de Bruxelles de novembre 1969 ou les fissures du droit inter¬
national classique," Journal du Droit International (1970), at
p. 809 (cited by De Semet, A., "Policing on the High Seas: With
Special Reference to the North Sea," in Churchill, R. op. cit.
in this footnote, at pp. 193-205. Professor Brown suggests that
under certain conditions customary law might justify intervention
(op. cit. in footnote 3, at pp. 144-145), as does Professor Swan
(Swan, P., "International and National Approaches to Oil Pollu¬
tion Responsibility: An Emerging Regime for a Global Problem,"




A "ship" includes any "sea-going vessel" or "floating craft"
but does not include
"an installation or device engaged in the exploration
and exploitation of the resources of the sea-
bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof."
Two observations are relevant to this discussion. First, it
will be noted that action may only be taken ex post facto, a require¬
ment criticised by many writers and a factor in the Canadian Govern-
347
ment's refusal to assent to the Convention.
The second problem is, in the writer's view, more likely to
occur on an examination paper than in practice in the North Sea.
As drill ships are subject to the Convention only when they are not
"engaged in the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
sea-bed," a variety of line-drawing problems could present them¬
selves. For example, is a drilling ship being blown off station to¬
ward an adjacent mobile platform "engaged" in drilling? Is it more
like an "installation" than a "ship?" In the context of the U.K. and
Norwegian sectors of the North Sea the problem posed is likely to
involve those two States and to be resolved by close coordination
between the two Governments as well as the offshore operators. Fur¬
thermore, it is submitted that, as in the case of intervention to
prevent collision damage, bona fide interference with other users of
344. Article 11(2) (a).
345. Article 11(2)(b).
346. Ibid.
347. Gold, E., "Marine Pollution and International Law," 3 Journal
of Maritime Law 13-33 (1972), p. 27; Hardy, M., op. cit. in
footnote 1, at p. 328.
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348
the sea is not inconsistent with international customary law.
349
6. The 1973 Protocol
Delegates to the Brussels Conference which resulted in the
Intervention Convention recognised the importance of agreement on
similar provisions involving non-oil pollutants. Accordingly, a
Resolution was appended to the Intervention Convention recommending
that IMCO should intensify its work on all aspects of pollution by
non-oil agents, and that in the event of a threat of such pollution,
States "co-operate as appropriate in applying wholly or partially the
provisions of the Convention." IMCO's work culminated in the Protocol
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollu¬
tion by Substances Other than Oil, 1973 (hereafter, the 1973 Protocol),
which was adopted at the 1973 IMCO Conference. It is not yet in force.
The Protocol follows the 1969 Intervention Convention very
closely, the major difference being the substitution of "substances
other than oil" for "oil":
"Parties to the present Protocol may take such
measures on the high seas as may be necessary
348. Professor Cheng's test of the necessity of self-preservation
cited by Professor Brown is relevant here: "The law of neces¬
sity is a means of preserving social values .... it is the great
disparity in the importance of the interests actually in con¬
flict that alone justifies a reversal of the legal protection
normally accorded to these interests, so that a socially import¬
ant interest shall not perish for the sake of respect for an
objectively minor right." As "the necessity of self-preservation
merely excuses what would otherwise be an unlawful act," it is
necessary to weigh the conflicting interests in every case.
Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 3, at pp. 143, 145, citing
Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunals, Stevens and Sons, London (1953), p. 74.
349. Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil, 1973, H.M.S.O.
(1974); 13 International Legal Materials 605-610 (1974).
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to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and
imminent danger to their coastline or related
interests from pollution or threat of pollution
by substances other than oil following upon a
maritime casualty or acts related to such a
casualty, which may reasonably be expected ^50
to result in major harmful consequences."
Substances other than oil include both those which are enumer¬
ated in a list prepared by GESAMP and others
"which are liable to create hazards to human
health, to harm living resources and marine
life, to damage amenities or to interfere
with other legitimate uses of the sea."
Although the intervening Party is the judge of whether unlisted sub¬
stances are "liable to create hazards" etc., he is charged with proving
that such intervention was necessary because the substances would
reasonably pose a danger analogous to that of any of the substances
352
listed by GESAMP.
7. UNCLOS III: RSNT Articles relevant to control of
pollution from vessels
a) RSNT Articles concerned with the territorial sea
The RSNT provides that States may establish a territorial sea
353
of up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline. This extension from
the present U.K. 3-mile and Norwegian 4-mile limit would give the two
States increased control over vessel-source pollution because, sub¬
ject to the right of innocent passage, they would exercise sovereignty




353. Committee II, Article 2.
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of innocent passage and to define coastal State jurisdiction over
foreign vessels in its territorial sea.
The present Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, 1958,
provides that "passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State," but
354
provides no further guidance. The RSNT rectifies this omission
by listing a number of acts which would be considered ipso facto
prejudicial to the coastal State, including
"Any act of wilful and serious pollution,
contrary to the present Convention.
The RSNT provision would apparently permit pollution caused
accidentally (even by gross negligence) during innocent passage,
and it would impose a very heavy burden of proof upon the coastal
356
State to show that pollution was wilful. Nevertheless, it
does provide that wilful disregard of whatever standards are ulti¬
mately agreed upon subjects a vessel to coastal State jurisdiction.
The present Committee II text provides that the coastal State
may make laws relating to innocent passage through its territorial
357
sea in relation to, inter alia, navigation safety, the protection
354. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
Article 14(4).
355. Committee II, Article 18(2)(b).
356. Birnie, P., "Prevention of Pollution from Ships: Problems and
Progress," a paper read at a seminar at the University of Wales
Institute of Science and Technology, 17 November 1975, at p.
17; Lowe, V., "UNCLOS III: The Informal Single Negotiating
Text," a paper prepared for the Labour Party (1975), at p. 9;
Lowe, V., "The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Regulations," 12
San Diego Law Review 624-643 (1975) .
357. Committee II, Article 20(1)(a).
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of installations, the protection of cables and pipelines,
360
the conservation of living resources, and the preservation of the
environment of the coastal State and the prevention of pollution
361
thereof. Such laws would have to be "in conformity" with the
proposed Convention, and
"shall not apply to or affect the design, con¬
struction, manning or equipment of foreign ships
or matters regulated by generally accepted inter-
national rules unless specifically authorised by such rules."
It is evident that the standards ultimately incorporated in a UNCLOS
III Convention will be of the greatest importance in determining the
nature and scope of future U.K. and Norwegian legislation. (Committee
III efforts to formulate pollution standards are discussed below.)
The coastal State is expressly empowered to establish traffic
separation schemes in its territorial sea, in particular, for ships
carrying dangerous cargoes, including tankers. The importance of
this provision to the North Sea is that it would, in the context of a
newly-authorised 12-mile territorial sea, permit the application of
U.K. vessel traffic control regulations to all ships passing through
the British side of the Straits of Dover.
b) RSNT Articles concerned with the high seas
The term "high seas" in the RSNT does not include the EEZ."^^
358. Committee II, Article 20(l)(b).
359. Committee II, Article 20(1)(c).
360. Committee II, Article 20(1)(d).
361. Committee II, Article 20(1)(f).
362. Committee II, Article 20(2). As mentioned above, the ambiguity
of "generally accepted" is conducive to auto-interpretation.
363. Committee II, Article 75.
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If this extremely controversial proposal is accepted, the North Sea
beyond the 12-mile limits proposed for littoral States would no longer
be high seas, but would be rather a zone sui generis. This is import¬
ant to vessel-source pollution control because ships on the high seas
364
remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State.
An extensive provision detailing flag State duties reflects an attempt
365
to induce such States to exercise their jurisdiction effectively.
The proposal would require every State to take such measures for its
vessels as "are necessary" to ensure safety at sea, including those
set out in the Article relating to vessel construction, manning and
operation. Of particular interest is a proposed paragraph which
would require a State whose vessel had been involved in a marine
casualty causing personal injury or damage to shipping or installa-
366
tions of another State to hold an inquiry. The proposal stipulates
that such inquiry be before (or by) "a suitably qualified person,"
although there is no requirement that it occur promptly or that find¬
ings be made available to interested bodies (for example, IMCO).
Yet another RSNT proposed Article provides for a right of hot
pursuit in respect of violations which occurred in the EEZ or on the
367
continental shelf—including safety zones. This inclusion provides
368
a welcome clarification of a potentially serious problem.
364. Committee II, Article 80(1).
365. Committee II, Article 82.
366. Committee II, Article 82(7).
367. Committee II, Article 99(2).
368. See the discussion of hot pursuit in the Section on U.K. law,
below at p. 290.
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c) RSNT Articles concerned with standards
States are required to act through "the competent international
369
organisation" or diplomatic conference to set standards for
vessel-source pollution. These international standards must be
complemented by national regulations enacted by flag States which
371
are "no less effective." Coastal States are authorised to estab¬
lish standards in their territorial sea "in the exercise of their
sovereignty," subject only to the preservation of the right of
372
innocent passage. The wide discretion of the coastal State to
promulgate unilateral standards is emphasised by the deletion of
a provision from this Article as it appeared in the ISNT, which re¬
quired that "consistent with the aim of achieving maximum possible
uniformity of rules and standards governing international navigation,"
the coastal State laws "conform to the international rules and
373
standards."
The coastal State may establish laws to enforce international
standards in their EEZ's. However, where
374
1. International standards are inadequate
to meet "special circumstances," and
2. The coastal State reasonably believes that a
369. This is likely to be either IMCO or UNEP.
370. Committee III, Article 21(1).
371. Committee III, Article 21(2).
372. Committee III, Article 21(3).
373. ISNT, Committee III, Article 21(3).
374. No other State or Organisation is authorised to determine
standards in the area.
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specific part of its EEZ should be designated ^75
a special area pursuant to enumerated criteria,
the coastal State may establish national laws
"implementing such rules and standards or navigational
practices as have been made applicable by the ^7^
competent international organisation for special areas."
As ambiguous as this provision is, it is considerably more precise
377
than the corresponding provisions (there were two) of the ISNT.
Although a number of questions should be answered before this provis¬
ion is included in a Convention (for example, the limits to coastal
State discretion imposed by "the competent international organisation"),
one thing is clear: there will be some form of the "special area"
provision in any likely version of a Convention. Whether or not it is
tied in with the EEZ, it is likely to extend 100 miles from the coastal
State. Canada, an advocate of the special zone concept at UNCLOS III,
could then incorporate its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act con¬
veniently into the new area of coastal State jurisdiction. This is
of particular importance to the North Sea, for although it is not
known at present what characteristics might constitute "special cir¬
cumstances," there are certainly "recognised technical reasons" for
distinguishing the North Sea from the remainder of the Atlantic—as
is clearly evidenced by the 1954 IMCO Convention Annex which designates
375. The area must be one where "for recognized technical reasons
in relation to its oceanographical and ecological conditions,
as well as its utilization or the protection of its resources,
and the particular character of its traffic, the adoption of
special mandatory methods for the prevention of pollution from
vessels is required." Committee III, Article 21(5).
376. Ibid.
377. ISNT, Committee III, Article 20(4), (5).
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that semi-enclosed body of water a "prohibited area." A petition to
"the competent international organisation" by the littoral States of
the North Sea (that is, those "most interested") would be a powerful
application for the most complete protection possible available from
international standards.
d) RSNT Articles concerned with enforcement
These Articles include provisions for limited "port State"
378
jurisdiction and enforcement to complement that of the flag State.
Briefly, port State jurisdiction contemplates coastal State investi¬
gation and, where permitted, prosecution of foreign flag vessels
present in its ports for violations of internationally-agreed discharge
379
standards, regardless of the locus of the offence. If the alleged
discharge occurred in the national waters or EEZ of another State, the
380
port State may institute proceedings only if:
1. Requested by the State with jurisdiction over
the area in which the discharge allegedly
occurred.
2. Requested by the flag State.
3. Requested by the State damaged or threatened.
378. Port State jurisdiction was proposed at the 1973 IMCO Conference,
but was rejected. The International Law Association Report on
Port State Jurisdiction suggests that an effective scheme of
port State jurisdiction to complement flag State jurisdiction
would, in respect of offences committed within its territorial
waters, require the port State to investigate and, in specified
circumstances, confer a right and possibly a duty on such State
to prosecute. Op. cit. in footnote 298, at p. 4.
379. Note that proceedings may occur only in respect of discharge
(not vessel construction) violations. "Port" also includes
off-shore terminals.
380. The discretionary "may" replaces the mandatory "must" of ISNT,
Committee III, Article 27. A coastal State which thinks it in
its own best interests not to take action is, under the RSNT
Article, free to ignore an alleged offence.
203
4. The violation has or will pollute the port
State's internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ.
If a vessel does not meet international seaworthiness standards or
threatens damage to the marine environment, the port State may use
"administrative" means to prevent it from sailing, except that the
port State shall permit the vessel to proceed to the nearest repair
382
yard. The limitation of means to "administrative," a qualification
not present in the ISNT, is clearly meant to preclude the use of force
to prevent sailing. Although it is recognised that the limitation of
force may be even more important than quarantine of unsafe ships in
protecting man's environment, the recent example of the supertanker,
Halcyon the Great, which escaped arrest in Canada by simply sailing
beyond Canadian jurisdiction may indicate how this provision will
actually work."^®^
Proceedings for violations of national pollution control law
applicable to the territorial sea or EEZ (and not limited to "dis¬
charges"), may be taken only by the State whose laws are alleged to
have been violated. This may occur when the vessel is in that State's
ports or, subject to conditions, while the vessel is in the territor-
384
ial sea or EEZ of the coastal State. The effectiveness of port
381. Committee III, Article 28(2).
382. Committee III, Article 29. Cf. the 1973 IMCO Convention,
Article 5(2), above at p. 160.
383. See footnote 300 above.
384. A coastal State may inspect a vessel navigating in its terri¬
torial sea when there are clear grounds for believing that the
vessel has, during its passage, violated national law conforming
to international standards or international standards
themselves. When the evidence warrants it, proceedings (includ¬
ing arrest of the vessel) may be taken. Committee III, Article
204
State jurisdiction and enforcement is therefore extremely dependent
upon the level of international standards.
D. Pollution from Dumping at Sea
1. Background
In 1969, the U.N. General Assembly asked the Secretary-General,
in co-operation with the specialised agencies and intergovernmental
organisations concerned, and with a view to the forthcoming U.N. Con¬
ference on the Human Environment, to:
1. Review harmful substances in the environment,
2. Review national and international activities
dealing with control of marine pollution,
3. Seek the views of Member States on re
Pursuant to this Resolution IMCO requested GESAMP to prepare a list of
substances whose "hazardous characteristics must be assessed taking
into account, not only human toxicity but also aquatic toxicity and
over 300 substances into those requiring special measures to prevent
30(2). Coastal State actions in respect of pollution by foreign
vessels in its EEZ are more restricted. The coastal State may
inspect a foreign vessel navigating in its EEZ only when the
factors necessary for territorial sea inspection are present,
and in addition, 1) the violation must have "resulted in substan¬
tial discharge and significant pollution of the marine environ¬
ment" and 2) the suspected vessel must have either refused to
give information or have supplied information "manifestly at
variance with the evident factual situation," or the circumstances
of the case must justify inspection. Committee III, Article
30(5). Proceedings can only be taken if there has been "a
flagrant or gross violation" of relevant law in the EEZ which
has caused or threatens to cause damage to the coastal State, its
territorial sea or its EEZ. Committee III, Article 30(6).
385. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2566 (XXIV), 13 December 1969,
adopted unanimously.
lation of marine pollution by treaty.
their effects on amenities."
386
The resulting document classified
386. C XXVI/18Add.1.
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escape into the marine environment, and others which would require
387
special precautions only in certain circumstances.
Work was also begun on legal machinery which would afford the
environmental protection indicated by the GESAMP report. The United
States submitted a draft convention to the U.N. Inter-Governmental
388
Working Group on Marine Pollution in 1971 and later that year the
instrument was refined at Ottawa.
In Norway, work had started on a regional convention. The Nor¬
wegian Government submitted a draft convention to a group of North-
389
West Atlantic States in 1971. Some months later, in October 1971,
a Conference was convened in Oslo, at which a five-nation Draft Con-
390
vention was introduced. This document became the Oslo Convention.
Work continued on a global ocean dumping convention and although
the goal of producing such an instrument in time for signature at the
June, 1972 UNCHE was not realised, it was postponed only until Novem¬
ber of that year when the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea
was signed at London. The Oslo and London Dumping Conventions will be
considered in the order in which they were signed.
391
2. The Oslo Dumping Convention
The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
387. GESAMP 111/19, Annex V.
388. The U.S. Draft is published in 10 International Legal Materials
1021-1028 (1971).
389. Letter from Mr. Jan Wessel Hegg, First Secretary, Norwegian
Embassy, London, to the writer, 11 February 1975.
390. Ibid.
391. Cmnd. 4984 (1972); 11 International Legal Materials 262-266
(1972).
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from Ships and Aircraft (hereafter, the Oslo Convention) was opened
for signature in that Norwegian city on 15 February 1972 and came into
force 7 April 1974. This regional Convention was signed by 12 States
and has been ratified by nine Governments, including those of the U.K.
392
and Norway. The Convention is limited geographically to an area
393
of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans which includes the North Sea.
The probability that Parties might simply transfer their disposal of
harmful substances to areas beyond the Convention zone is sought to
be reduced by the inclusion of a requirement that Parties apply the
394
Convention in such a manner as to avoid that result. In the U.K.
and Norway, authorities do not think that ocean dumping for which they
are responsible is now occurring outside the zone, although reluctance
to issue permits has meant that more wastes have had to be disposed of
395
on land.
The Oslo Convention uses a system of permits to regulate the
dumping of substances which have been classified according to danger.
Annex I classifies substances for which no dumping permit may be issued,
unless they "occur as trace contaminants in waste to which they have
not been added for the purpose of being dumped." This list includes
organohalogen and organosilicon compounds, suspected carcinogens, heavy
392. Other signatories include the Federal Republic of Germany,
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Iceland, Netherlands,
Portugal and Sweden. Ireland has also ratified the Convention.
Cf. the Paris Convention, above, at p. 134.
393. Article 2.
394. Article 3.
395. Conversations with Mr. D. Stott, Principal and Mr. A. Templeman,
Senior Executive Officer, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries
for Scotland, 25 April 1975; conversation with Dr. 0. Schreiner,
Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority, 17 November 1976.
207
metals and plastics.
Annex II enumerates substances and materials which require a
permit; it also contains criteria for disposal. Three major groups
of substances are contained in Annex II;
1. Toxic materials (for example, arsenic).
2. Waste such as scrap metal and "tar-like
substances .... which may present a ^gg
serious obstacle to fishing or navigation."
3. Non-toxic substances potentially dangerous
due to quantities dumped or because of their
reduction of amenities.
A Commission of representatives from each Contracting Party
determines what quantities of the Annex II inventory shall be defined
as "significant" and thus subject to permit.
Dumping of substances and materials not listed in Annex II is
allowed, but it still requires "approval of the appropriate national
397
authority or authorities."
Issuance of permits or approvals for dumping must conform to
Annex III requirements. This Annex is in essence a checklist of
factors to consider when drafting a permit or approval. Its three
subdivisions concern:
1. Characteristic of the waste (for example, amount,
type).
2. Characteristic of the dumping site and method of
deposit (for example, geography, packing).
396. See the discussion above concerning the possible use of this
provision to control the dumping of oil-related debris from
offshore petroleum development, at p. 128.
397. The appropriate authorities are the Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (for England and Wales); the Department
of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland; and the Norwegian
State Pollution Control Authority.
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3. General considerations and conditions
(interference with other users, alternative
means of disposal).
Two exceptions to the permit system are based on safety considerations.
First, it does not apply to force majeure caused by weather, nor to
other causes which endanger human lives or the safety of ships or air-
398
craft. Second, if a Party "in an emergency" decides that an Annex I
substance cannot be disposed of on land without "unacceptable danger
or damage," it must consult the Commission. That body must recommend
action, but the Party is only under a duty to "inform the Commission
399
of the steps adopted in pursuance of its recommendation." These ex¬
ceptions are certainly open to abuse, yet they are not major deficien¬
cies: it is unlikely that a fraudulent explanation would be used by
one violating the Convention because detection is so difficult that as
a rule he need provide none at all.
A potentially far more limiting provision of the Oslo Convention
is the exclusion of "incidental" discharges from the definition of
dumping. This was discussed above in connection with seabed operations,
and it was also mentioned that disposal of garbage, plastic cups, etc.
was not regulated by the Oslo Convention.^00 The latter point is per¬
haps worth emphasizing here: it was intended that the 1973 IMCO Con¬
vention regulate sewage and garbage discharges, yet because these pro¬
visions are part of an instrument with controversial provisions in
relation to oil and liquid chemicals, the North Sea is unlikely to be
398. Article 8(1).
399. Article 9.
400. See above, p. 128.
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protected from this form of pollution for several years.
Enforcement is by each Party for ships and aircraft subject to
its jurisdiction. This includes its own ships and aircraft wherever
they may be, all ships and aircraft loading for dumping in its terri¬
tory, and all ships and aircraft believed to be dumping in its terri¬
torial sea. The Parties agree to work toward "co-operative proced¬
ures" for enforcing the Convention on the high seas. Until such pro¬
cedures are developed only the flag State may enforce observance of
the Convention on the high seas and the Convention has conferred no
additional jurisdiction to enforce upon its Parties.
402
3. The London Dumping Convention
The Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea (hereafter, the
London Dumping Convention) was concluded on 13 November 1972 at an
inter-governmental conference held in London and came into force 27
September 1975. Both the U.K. and Norway are Parties.
The London Convention is essentially a global version of the
Oslo Convention discussed above. The mechanism of control—substance
classification and permit issuance by national authorities—is
similar. There are, however, a few important differences in scope and
procedure.
"Dumping" means
"any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes of
other matter from vessels, aircraft, plat-
forms or other man-made structures at sea,"
401. It will also be recalled that Annexes 4 and 5 regulating sewage
and garbage discharges are optional.
402. Cmnd. 5169 (1972); 11 International Legal Materials 1291-1314
(1972).
403. Article III (1) (a) (i), emphasis added.
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and includes the disposal of vessels, etc. as well. The latter
provision appears likely to have been included ex abundanti cautela
to ensure that ocean dumping which involves scuttling a vessel along
405
with its cargo is expressly subject to regulation. In contrast,




"Dumping" does not include incidental and unintended disposal,
nor that related to "the exploration and exploitation and associated
offshore processing of sea-bed mineral resources.As mentioned
409
above, this express exclusion effectively precludes an interpreta¬
tion by the London Commission analogous to that of the Oslo Commission
by which "incidental" discharges from fixed or floating platforms
410
might be regulated.
Dumping is prohibited without a permit issued by the national
404. Article III (1) (a) (ii), emphasis added.
405. A vessel and its cargo of nerve gas were scuttled by the U.S.
in "Operation Chase," described by Professor E.D. Brown in
"International Law and Marine Pollution: Radioactive Waste
and other Hazardous Substances," 11 Natural Resources Journal
221-255 (1971), at p. 249 et seq. The scuttling of vessels
to form reefs for breakwaters or to attract and protect fish
would not be "dumping" because the activity would qualify as
"placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal
thereof" under Article III(1) (b) (ii) , an exception to the
definition of "dumping."
406. Oslo Convention, Article 19(1).
407. Article III (1) (b) (i).
408. Article III (1) (b) (ii) .
409. See p. 130.
410. This was in deference to UNCLOS III. Timagenis, G., "Inter¬
national Control of Dumping at Sea," Anglo-American Law Review
(1973), pp. 157-187, at p. 178.
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authority of the State in which the material is loaded or the flag
411
State if the loading State is not a Party. Whether a permit may
be issued and the form it shall take depend upon the nature of the
matter to be dumped.
Annexes I and II are lists of toxic substances similar to those
appended to the Oslo Convention. Annex I contains extremely dangerous
materials (such as organohalogen and specified heavy metal compounds)
412
for which no permit to dump may normally be issued. Annex II com¬
piles less hazardous materials (such as some pesticides) "requiring
special care." If present in "significant amounts" in wastes to be
dumped, such disposal can occur only after issuance of a "prior
413
special permit." Unlike the Oslo Convention, there is no body
414
designated to determine what may constitute a significant amount.
A Party's treaty obligation to issue any permit "only after careful
consideration of all the factors set forth in Annex III" is the sole
check on auto interpretation of "significant amounts" by the national
authority. Annex III contains "provisions to be considered in estab¬
lishing criteria governing the issue of permits" which are those set
415
out in the Oslo Convention. The dumping of matter not included in
411. Articles IV(1), VI(2).
412. Article IV (1) (a).
413. Article IV(l)(b); Timagenis, G., op. cit. in footnote 410, at
pp. 179-180.
414. Cf. Oslo Convention, Article 6.
415. Several points are listed under each of three headings:
Characteristics and Composition of the Matter, Character¬
istics of Dumping Site and Method of Deposit, General
Considerations and Conditions.
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Annexes I or II still requires a "prior general permit" which must be
issued according to Annex III criteria.
Exceptions to the regulation of ocean dumping are provided for
416
safety reasons and in emergencies "posing unacceptable risk relating
to human health and admitting no other feasible solution" for which a
417
special permit may be issued. Prior to issuance, the Party must
418
consult other countries likely to be affected and the Organisation
(discussed below). The Organisation must "promptly" "recommend"
appropriate procedures to the issuing State which shall endeavour to
follow them to the "extent feasible."
States Parties are responsible for applying the Convention to
their own vessels and aircraft, those of other States which are in
their territory or territorial sea and loading matter which is to be
dumped, and for
"vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms ^
under its jurisdiction, believed to be engaged in dumping."
A Party must also "take in its territory appropriate measures to pre¬
vent and punish conduct in contravention of the provisions of this
.,420Convention.
The obligation to apply the provisions of the Convention to
vessels, etc. "under its jurisdiction" differs from the Oslo require-
416. Article V(l).
417. Article V(2).
418. As Article V(2) provides that consultation shall occur with
"any other country or countries that are likely to be affected,"
it is clear that even non-Parties must be consulted.




ment only in that the latter refers to the territorial sea, and
evidences the more sensitive political consideration in the global
forum that the deliberations at UNCLOS III not be prejudiced. As
UNCLOS III has not yet concluded a Convention defining coastal State
jurisdiction in respect of dumping, it is only possible to conclude
that the extent of such jurisdiction is not specified by the Conven-
422
tion.
On the high seas, beyond the undefined area of national juris¬
diction, there is a duty to co-operate with other Parties in develop¬
ing procedures to apply the Convention, "including procedures for the
reporting of vessels and aircraft observed dumping in contravention
423
of the Convention." There is no express provision for reciprocal
enforcement on the high seas. The cautious phrasing of "duty to co¬
operate in developing procedures" even falls short of the Oslo Con¬
vention provision whereby each Party "undertakes to issue instructions"
to its inspection services to report observations of actual or sus-
424
pected violations of that Convention. The London Convention, like
its regional predecessor, does not confer additional bases of juris¬
diction upon Parties; it only obligates its member States to implement
the Convention's provisions in respect of vessels, etc. already subject
421. Oslo Convention, Article 15(1)(c).
422. Timagenis, G., op. cit. in footnote 410, at p. 183. Article
XIII provides that the Parties agree to discuss the question
of coastal and flag State jurisdiction no later than 1976.
Although the Parties have met, as yet no decisions which
clarify this issue have yet been taken.
423. Article VII(3).
424. Oslo Convention, Article 15(2).
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to its jurisdiction.
IMCO has been designated as the secretariat Organisation respons-
426
ible for Convention implementation. The first consultative meeting
among the Parties was held in London 20-24 September 1976, and it is
427
planned to meet during the same month in 1977.
4. UNCLOS III: RSNT Articles Relevant to Control of
Pollution from Dumping at Sea
The question of coastal State geographical jurisdiction to apply
and enforce its law which the London Dumping Convention left to UNCLOS
III has been tentatively resolved by the RSNT. Article 20(5) provides
that:
"Dumping of wastes and other matter, within the
territorial sea and the economic zone or onto the
continental shelf shall not be carried out without
the express prior approval of the coastal State,
which has the right to permit, regulate and control
such dumping after due consultation with other
States which by reason of their geographical
situation may be adversely affected thereby."
Jurisdiction would therefore extend to the more distant of 200 miles
or the edge of the continental margin, even if it is beyond the EEZ.
This provision is complemented by Article 26(1)(a) relating to enforce¬
ment which provides for coastal State jurisdiction in that respect
"within its territorial sea or its economic zone or onto its continental
425. Nor does the Convention establish State liability for damage
caused by dumping, expressly providing that Parties undertake
to develop procedures for liability assessment, as well as for
dispute settlement. Article X.
426. IMCO, Annual Report (1975-1976). Article XIV(1) provides that
the Parties shall meet to discuss organisational matters not
later than three months after the Convention comes into force,
and Article XIV(2) provides that the Parties shall designate
a competent existing Organisation to act as Secretariat.
427. Sierra Club, "International Report," (12 November 1976).
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, ,.428shelf.
The RSNT clearly gives the U.K. and Norway authority to control
dumping in their sectors of the North Sea. Although an UNCLOS III
Convention incorporating these provisions could not bind non-consenting
429
States, even if those States most likely to dump in the North
Sea—the littoral States—were not bound, they would be likely to
observe them in practice, both because of public opinion and self-
interest. Such behaviour could well lead to the development of a
430
regional customary law.
Two other provisions of the RSNT are noteworthy. First, although
States are required to establish national laws to control dumping,
431
they need only "endeavour" to establish international standards.
If the required endeavours fail, the result could be a patchwork of
national standards governing dumping in an area which may extend beyond
200 miles to the continental margin. Secondly, Article 20(5) confers
a "right" on the coastal State to regulate dumping—but it does not
obligate States to regulate such activities. From an environmental
protection point of view, this is most regrettable. Whether permitted
by a coastal State of "convenience" or "lethargy," ocean dumping has
the potential to injure the entire global community. Man is diminished
by the loss of a "piece of the main" in the same manner as is the case
428. The existing Oslo and London Convention obligations to control
dumping from vessels and aircraft registered in the State or
flying its flag are retained, as are the loading for dumping
provisions. Committee III, Article 26(1)(b), (c).
429. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34.
430. Cf. the Asylum Case, I.C.J. Reports (1950), p. 266.
431. Committee III, Article 20(1), (4).
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when the damage spreads to "real property."
E. Conventions Promoting Inter-State Co-Operation
432
1. The Bonn Agreement
The Agreement for Co-operation in dealing with Pollution of the
North Sea by Oil (hereafter, the Bonn Agreement) was signed in the West
*
German capital on 9 June 1969, and entered into force two months
later. The Agreement is a regional scheme of co-operation among North
Sea States and is intended to facilitate remedial action when oil
pollution "presents a grave and imminent danger to the coast or related
433
interests of one or morf Contracting Parties."
Co-operation depends upon communication; accordingly the Agree-
ment is essentially a formal vehicle to facilitate the flow of inform¬
ation relevant to oil pollution control. Each Party must inform the
others of its national organisation responsible for dealing with oil
434
pollution, including authorities in the communications channel.
Information relevant to the development of oil pollution control must
also be shared.
Parties must "request" masters and pilots of their ships and
aircraft to report casualties causing or likely to cause marine oil
432. Cmnd. 4205 (1969), 9 International Legal Materials■359-364
(1970).
433. The Bonn Agreement is more geographically restricted than the
Oslo or Paris Conventions, applying on*y to North Sea States:
Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic cf Germany, Nether¬
lands, Norway, Sweden and the U.K. The Agreement was prompted
by an extraordinary meeting of the IMCO Council in 1967 which
urged that co-operation procedures in the event of marine pollu¬
tion be studied. Preamble to the Agreement.
434. Article 4(a), (b).
435. Article 4(c).
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pollution and the nature and extent of oil slicks "likely to consti¬
tute a serious threat to the coast or related interests of one or more
436
Contracting Parties." When a Party learns of such a casualty or
437
oil slick it must immediately inform the threatened Party.
Each Party is responsible for monitoring oil pollution within a
438
specified zone of the North Sea. Most zones are the exclusive
responsibility of one State (this is the case with Norway), but the
U.K. has, in addition to an exclusive zone, shared responsibility in
439
two zones: 1) with Belgium and France; 2) with France. The zonal
authority must assess the danger presented by the casualty or oil
slick and continue observation so long as the menace remains within
the area. Threatened States must be informed immediately of the assess-
440
ment and action taken. The zonal authority is not obligated to
abate oil slicks or deal with casualties which it may discover in its
area of responsibility, though, as zones are based on geographic prox¬
imity to the responsible State, co-operative action transcending the
express requirements of information sharing is probable. A Party which
does require assistance is authorised to request help from other mem¬
bers of the Agreement which, in turn, are required to "use their best
441
endeavours" to fulfill the request.





440. Article 6(1), (2).
441. Article 7.
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all of which, in the writer's view, are traceable to that instrument's
inability to adapt. The Bonn Agreement was drafted before offshore
petroleum development in the North Sea had really commenced. The co¬
operation contemplated is therefore that necessary following a ship¬
ping casualty—the Torrey Canyon situation. As a comparison of
Figures III-l (p. 125 ) and III-2 (on the following page) will readily
indicate, the zones of responsibility do not conform to the delimit¬
ation of the continental shelf. This would make extension of the
Agreement to oil pollution resulting from seabed operations awkward.
Christian Hambro has suggested the need for
1. A common policy among the Parties on dealing
with oil spills.
2. Guidelines for Party co-operation in actually
dealing with a pollution incident.
442
3. General agreement on compensation for assistance.
Professor E.D. Brown has commented that it is surprising that non-oil
substances were not included in the Agreement, especially since the
requirements of co-operation only would appear to be singularly
443
unobjectionable. Perhaps the points raised by these two commenta¬
tors will be discussed and acted upon at a planned meeting of the Bonn
Agreement which is to consider additional international co-operation
444
to control oil pollution.
It is suggested that consideration be given to the establishment
442. Hambro, C., "International Conventions Relating to Pollution
Resulting from Offshore Oil Activities in the North Sea Area,"
a paper presented to the Offshore North Sea Conference,
Stavanger 1976, p. lO.
443. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 3, at p. 160.
444. Hambro, C., op. cit. in footnote 442, at pp. 10-11.
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FIGURE III-2
Source: U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Envi¬
ronmental Pollution, Accidental Oil Pollution of the Sea,
Pollution Paper No. 8, H.M.S.O. (1976), Figure 6, at p.
165.
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of a permanent Commission to administer the Bonn Agreement. The com¬
mon denominator of the enumerated criticisms is that the Agreement is
inflexible: Original deficiencies remain uncorrected and growth to
meet problems of a changing environment has not been possible. The
Oslo Convention provides a ready benchmark: although (in the writer's
view) the plain meaning of that Convention indicates a concern with
the regulation of commercial dumping, the Oslo Commission has recom¬
mended that certain kinds of oil-related debris disposal also be in-
445
eluded. A Bonn Commission could well have ensured that the Agree¬
ment was a living document by similar actions—and it still could.
446
2. The 1971 Nordic Agreement
The Agreement Between Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden
Concerning Co-operation in Taking Measures Against Pollution of the
Sea by Oil (hereafter, the 1971 Nordic Agreement) is an instrument
including essentially the same provisions as the Bonn Agreement. The
major difference is that the Nordic Agreement requires Parties to
447
obtain equipment to deal with significant oil slicks and to assist
other Parties in investigating violations of oil pollution regulations
448
"within the territorial or adjacent waters of the contracting States."
Geographical scope is defined only by the vague criterion of adjacency
and the regulations which may be violated are not identified.
445. See above, p. 128.
446. Lay, S. (et al.) (eds.) New Directions in the Law of the Sea,
Vol. II, Documents, British Institute of International and




The regulations which may be violated, though not defined are
not limited. The provisions concerning vessel inspection clearly
contemplate mutual assistance in the enforcement of the 1954 IMCO
Convention, a step beyond the Bonn Agreement. Should the scope of the
Nordic Agreement be expanded to include non-oil agents, it could well
become a de facto amendment to other conventions (for example, Oslo)
by permitting reciprocal inspection inter partes. Although it would
be preferable to provide for such enforcement in the instrument whose
terms are being enforced, if such agreement proves impossible de facto
amendment by the 1971 Nordic Agreement (or other regional instruments)
would be a welcome addition to the legal regime of pollution control
in the North Sea.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF LIABILITY FOR MARINE POLLUTION
A. Introduction
The unification of the international law of civil liability for
marine pollution through conventions removes some of the ambiguity
from situations otherwise governed by international customary law.
How precise a given convention is and its acceptability to potentially
conflicting interests will depend upon the circumstances. The law of
liability is primarily concerned with obtaining compensation for the
victim. Unification of civil liability rules can assist a legal
regime to approach this objective in three important ways:^"
1. It can reduce the practice of "forum shopping"
by which those victims with greater resources
receive greater compensation than their less
affluent brethren. If the view that public policy
ought to encourage a system of law which compensates
for loss for all victims is accepted, the
reduction of forum shopping is to be welcomed.
2. It can reduce conflicting laws and judgments. It
is well known that merely obtaining a judgment
does not ensure that the victim will be compensated,
and one contributor to this unacceptable situation
is the complexity of the conflict of laws.
3. The victim may be denied compensation completely if
he is subject to the law of a particular State.
This may or may not appear to be "fair," but the
wider forum provided by a convention is likely to
result in a closer approximation of "international
public policy"—to the extent it exists.
Sections "B" and "C" below are concerned with conventions dealing
with liability for damage from seabed operations, and liability for
damage from vessels. In the case of the former, international
1. Fleischer, C., "Liability and Compensation," a paper presented
to the Offshore North Sea Conference, Stavanger (1974) .
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customary law (and private agreements) still determine the rights
and duties of the parties in such cases, for no convention concerned
with liability for such operations is yet in force. The section of
this thesis on vessels contains a discussion of two IMCO Conventions
which are limited to liability for oil pollution. Although the IMCO
Legal Committee is devoting considerable time to the possibility of
a convention concerned with liability for pollution damage caused
by non-oil agents, at present recovery for such damage remains
2
governed by the rules of international customary law.
B. Liability for Damage from Seabed Operations:
The 1976 Convention
The March, 1973 meeting of North-West European States considered
both the technological and safety aspects of pollution from seabed
3
operations, and civil liability for such damage. The Conference
devoted three days to the latter topic, concluding that "a regional
solution by way of a Convention between members of the Conference
4
was considered desirable." It was decided that the first step
should be the exploration of a voluntary arrangement among offshore
operators and secondly, the formation of a working party to draft
a regional convention which could then be submitted to a further
meeting of all the participating States.^
2. IMCO, Annual Report (1975-1976), para. 67, p. 18.
3. See above, at p. 141.
4. Conference on Safety and Pollution Safeguards in the Development
of North-West European Offshore Mineral Resources, Summary
Papers (12-23 March 1973), SPC(73)20 Final, para. 3.
5. Ibid., para. 4.
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In 1974 a Draft Convention was produced by the Working Group
during a session at The Hague. This Draft served as a basis for
further discussion during a meeting in Paris in November of that
6
year. At the Paris meeting, at a bilateral U.K.-Norwegian discus¬
sion in August, 1975, and at a Conference held in London in October,
1975, further progress was made. Following the London Conference,
it was possible for one member of the Norwegian delegation to write
that agreement had been reached that liability should be strict and
7
limited: only the level of liability remained as a major issue.
This issue was resolved following several meetings of technical ex-
Q
perts. A Convention was concluded on 17 December, 1976, and will
9
be open for signature in London from 1 May 1977 to 30 April 1978.
The discussion below highlights important aspects of the 1976
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from
Exploration and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (hereafter,
the Convention). References to travaux preparatoires concern activi¬
ties at the October, 1975 London Conference. The four main areas of
concern are pollution damage, strict liability, limited liability,
and other provisions.
6. Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations,
Conference Papers (20-31 October), General (C. L. 2).
7. Hambro, C., "International Conventions Relating to Pollution
Resulting from Offshore Oil Activities in the North Sea Area,"
a paper presented at the Offshore North Sea Conference,
Stavanger (1976), at p. 13.
8. General C. L. 39(76).
9. The Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth day follow¬
ing the date of deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession. Article 20(1).
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1. Pollution damage
The operator of an installation at the time of an incident
shall be liable for any resultant pollution damage.^"0
'"Pollution damage* means loss or damage outside the
installation caused by contamination resulting from
the escape or discharge of oil from the installation
and includes the cost of preventive measures
and further loss or damage outside the ^
installation caused by preventive measures."
The Convention applies only to oil contamination, a restriction
that excludes damage caused by debris dumping, fire, explosion, and
that which is caused by the discharge of refined products not defined
12
as oil. The vague and undefined term "contamination" clearly
applies to the coating of nets, vessels and beaches, but its scope
must eventually be determined by the practice of courts applying
national law pursuant to the rules of private international law, where
13
applicable. Although it has been observed that the Convention does
10. Article 3(1) . Liability for a series of occurrences attaches
to the operator at the time of each occurrence.
11. Article 1(6).
12. "Oil" means crude oil and natural gas liquids in any effluent,
including crude oil treated to facilitate transportation, as by
adding or removing fractions. Article 1(1). The U.K. delega¬
tion wanted natural gas liquids excluded because the Oil
Industry International Exploration and Production Forum (E and P
Forum) had given assurances that such substances posed no risk
of pollution. Delegations from Denmark, France and the Nether¬
lands pointed out that if there was no risk that oil companies
might be liable, there was no need to narrow the Convention.
C. L. 11/Rev. 1, p. 2.
13. Hambro, C., "The Draft Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Caused by Exploration and Exploitation of Subsea
Mineral Deposits," a paper presented to the seminar on maritime
law, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, Oslo (21 January
1976), at p. 5. Translation of this paper from Norwegian was
made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation.
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not by its terms bar recovery by such claimants as disappointed
14
holiday makers, as neither U.K. nor Norwegian courts are likely to
permit recovery without proof of economic loss, the Convention may
in these cases be little improvement over the status quo. This
point is likewise relevant to environmental damage which is notori¬
ously difficult to quantify and may be excluded from the geographical
scope of the treaty. The new Convention will apply only to incidents
which occur beyond the coastal low-water line at an installation
15
under the jurisdiction of a Controlling State, and which cause
damage in the territory of a State Party or in the areas in which,
in accordance with international law, it has sovereign rights over
natural resources.^ Compensation for contamination of fish in
the high seas above the continental shelf is payable only if they
17
have been reduced to possession.
Oil must come from the installation; thus, the operator would
not be liable for damage caused by oil leaking from a tanker which
collided with the installation or from failure of ship's equipment
14. Ibid.
15. Article 1(4).
16. The elliptical formulation concerning "sovereign rights" is a
change from the 1975 Draft Convention provision which referred to
the "continental shelf," and is clearly intended to permit juris¬
diction to extend beyond the continental shelf. (See the dis¬
cussion of the proposed EEZ in the UNCLOS III RSNT, above, at
p. 145.) This provision would not affect the U.K. and Norwegian
sectors of the North Sea. "Incident" means any occurrence, or
series of occurrences having the same origin, which causes
pollution damage. Article 1(8). Preventive actions may be taken
anywhere. Article 2.
17. Hambro, C., loc. cit. in footnote 13.
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while loading from a single point mooring buoy.
18
"Installation" is broadly defined, and includes:
1. "Any well or other facility, whether fixed or
mobile, which is used for the purpose of exploring
for, producing, treating, storing, transmitting
or regaining control of the flow of crude oil from
the seabed or its subsoil."
2. "Any well which has been used for the purpose of
exploring for, producing or regaining control of the
flow of crude oil from the seabed or its subsoil and
which has been abandoned after the entry into force
of this Convention for the Controlling State
concerned."
19
3. Any natural gas well while being drilled or worked upon.
4. Any exploratory well involving deep drilling
to search for minerals other than
crude oil, gas or natural gas liquids.
5. Any facility normally used to store crude oil from
the seabed or subsoil.
The four major potential sources of marine oil pollution from
offshore petroleum development are thus included as "installations:"
18. Article 1(2). Where a well or wells are directly connected to a
platform or similar facility, the complex will constitute one
installation (for example, the Frigg Field). This is relevant
to liability limitation which is based on each "installation."
It is expressly provided that the Convention shall not apply to
"ships" as defined in the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
(discussed in the text immediately below).
19. A natural gas well is included in the Convention during drilling,
but is excluded during work classified as normal maintenance.
Article 1(2)(c). One concern is that oil might be encountered
in drilling for natural gas liquids. Resultant pollution could
come within the Convention.
20. The requirement of deep drilling would appear to exclude present
sand and gravel extraction as well as possible gathering of
manganese nodules from the seabed. The latter possibility
appears to be remote in any case; a chart, "Surface Distribution
of Ferromanganese Deposits on the Ocean Floor," distributed by
the U.N. Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) indicates
no significant deposits of those minerals in the North Sea. Map
No. 2696X, undated, based on data from Lamont-Doherty Geological
Observatory, Columbia University, New York.
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mobile platforms, fixed installations, storage installations, and
pipelines. As installations are covered only insofar as they are
21
substantially or completely seaward of the low-water line, pipe¬
line leakages which enter the sea from the land would not come within
the Convention.
Preventive measures include reasonable measures to minimise
pollution damage, including those taken by the operator—except for
"well control measures and measures taken to protect, repair or re-
22
place an installation." This drafting was intended to prevent the
operator from not acting because of cost to him, and is also intended
to prevent him from recovering the substantial cost of relief well
drilling at the expense of other claimants, since it is to his advan-
23
tage to do this anyway to preserve the reservoir.
2. Strict liability
The Norwegian position throughout negotiations was that liability
ought to be strict: offshore petroleum development is a hazardous
activity the risks of which ought to fall on the entrepreneur rather
than an innocent victim. The initial British view was that this bur¬
den on offshore operators would be too great, but by the 1975 London
Conference the U.K. delegation had agreed that, subject to exceptions,
the operator of the installation at the time of an incident would be
strictly liable for oil pollution damage.
The "operator" is the person so designated by the Controlling
21. Article 1(2). This limitation was introduced by the U.K. dele¬
gation to exclude land installations such as refineries. C. L.
11/Rev. 1., p. 3.
22. Article 1(7).
23. Hambro, C. op. cit. in footnote 13, at p. 6.
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State, whether licensee or not, and in the absence of such designation
24
the person in overall control of installation activities. If an
installation has more than one operator they shall be jointly and
25
severally liable. Joint and several liability also applies when
damage results from two or more installations or when there has been
a change of operators during the incident, unless such damage is
26
reasonably separable. Liability is channeled through the operator:
no claim outside the Convention may be made against the operator, and
27
no claim at all lies in respect of his servants and agents. This
provision is somewhat more restrictive than alternatives considered
which would have barred claims against any person directly or indir¬
ectly involved in the activities of the operator, or against the
servants or agents of such persons, and which would have included
28
preventive measures or salvage operations. The adoption of the
narrower provision is strong evidence to support the plain meaning of
Article 4 that actions not expressly prohibited therein are permitted.
It is likely that persons, such as subcontractors, who are liable to
24. Article 1(3). The "Controlling State" is the State exercising
"sovereign rights in the area in which the installation is situ¬
ated or in the case of an installation extending into two or
more such areas, the State designated by agreement. Article 1(4).
25. Article 3(2).
26. Article 5.
27. Article 4. It is provided that nothing in the Convention shall
prejudice the question of whether the operator liable for damage
has a right of recourse. Thus, the burden of proving negligence
and collecting damages from a third party is transferred from
the victim to the operator.
28. Proposals listed in Draft Convention Article 4.
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suit outside the Convention may insist on "hold harmless" clauses in
contracts for offshore activities and may contract for insurance as
well. Such persons are not likely defendants unless the damage is
of such severity that a plaintiff finds it advantageous to use a
29
"defendant of convenience" to avoid the Convention liability limits.
Three exceptions to strict liability are provided: cases of
30
force majeure, instances in which a well was abandoned pursuant to
the authority of the Controlling State more than five years before
the incident,^ and, where the victim was in some measure responsible
32
for his injury, to the extent of that responsibility.
3. Limited liability
a) The 1975 Draft Convention
The fundamental difference between the U.K. and Norway concerning
liability limitation resulted in large part from differing estimates
of probable and possible pollution damage.
The Draft Convention produced in 1974 left the question of a
ceiling on liability open. Norway and another delegation favoured
unlimited liability; the U.K. and the remaining States urged limits
29. An example of this practice is the increasing tendency to sue
the manufacturer of the aircraft involved in commercial airline
injury and death cases, in addition to the airline which is likely
to be protected by convention liability limits. Martin, P.,
"Death and Injury in International Air Transport," 41 Journal
of Air Law and Commerce 255-269 (1975), at pp. 262-264.
30. Article 3(3). This includes war, hostilities, civil war, in¬
surrection, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevit¬
able and irrestible character, a deliberate adoption of the
1969 Civil Liability Convention formulation. C. L. 13/Rev. 2.,
p. 5. A U.K.-French Amendment which would have also excluded
the operator from liability for pollution damage caused by





ranging from 20 to 40 million dollars per incident. This impasse
was broken at the October, 1975 Conference when the Norwegian Govern¬
ment indicated a willingness to accept a limitation on operator
liability subject to the conditions that
1. The ceiling should be set sufficiently high
to cover possible pollution damage.
2. Contracting States should have the
right to stipulate a higher limit than ^4
specified in the Convention, or no limit at all.
Agreement on the ceiling of liability depended upon some common
view of possible damage and limits of the insurance market. In the
Norwegian view, a blowout"^ might result in damages of up to $60 mil¬
lion; the Association of Norwegian Insurance Companies had indicated
36
that $40 million was an insurable amount. The U.K. position was
that the maximum insurance available per operator was an amount be¬
tween $20 and $25 million, and that costs following a blowout would
be well within a $25 million liability limitation in the worst con-
37
ceivable incident. The Conference also had for consideration a
document made available by the E and P Forum, estimating the cost of
the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout at $16 million.
Although agreement was not reached on the issue of liability
limits at the London Conference, the U.K. and Norwegian delegations
33. General (C. L. 2), p. 5.
34. General (C. L. 5), p.,4.
35. Damage caused by a pipeline rupture was estimated to be far less
than from a blowout.
36. General (C. L. 5), p. 4.
37. General (C. L. 7), p. 4; Note (undated and unpaged). The U.K.
also thought that a State Party should not have the right to
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were moving towards compromise by its conclusion. In a "Compromise
Proposal by the Norwegian Delegation Based on Chairman's Proposed
Formula," it was proposed that the limit of liability be $50 million,
each Party retaining the right to impose higher or unlimited liabil-
38
ity for operators within its own jurisdiction. Insurance would only
be required to a limit of $30 million. On the final day of the Con¬
ference, Norway proposed a further compromise: liability would be
limited to $35 million and compulsory insurance to $25 million for
five years, after which the ceiling would rise to $45 million and $40
39
million respectively. The U.K. delegation was unable to accept
this proposal, objecting not only to the limits, but to the require¬
ment of self-insured excess which it was believed would prevent any
40
but the largest companies from expanding their operations. This
difference of opinion (a reflection of the underlying divergent U.K.
and Norwegian oil development policies evident throughout the nego¬
tiations) was not overcome and the Conference concluded by producing
a second Draft Convention rather than an instrument open for signature.
In December 1975, a Meeting of Technical Experts was convened in
Paris to consider possible maximum oil outflow and pollution damage.
By May of 1976, estimates, based on this and subsequent meetings, had
been received from all States which had attended the Conference.
Estimated valuation of damages for a blowout of 10,000 tons per day
vary the liability limits of the Convention within its own
territory.
30. W. G. 45.
39. W. G. 53.
40. C. L. 14/Rev. 1, p. 1.
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ranged from $275.5 million (Germany) to $30 million (U.K.). (Norway
submitted a partial estimate which did not include a total.) A
blowout of 3,000 tons per day was estimated to result in damage of
between $265.5 million (Germany) and $17.5 million (U.K.). It
should be pointed out that the German estimates were far higher than
the next highest, which were $117.4 million for 10,000 tons per day
42
(Denmark) and $62.1 million for 3,000 tons per day (Netherlands).
The estimates accumulated in 1976 were used by the Chairman as a
basis for discussion in the December 1976 Conference which resulted
in a Convention.
b) Convention liability limits
Four basic provisions constitute the skeletal structure of liab¬
ility limitation. First, the operator is entitled to limit his liab¬
ility for each installation and each incident to 30 million Special
43
Drawing Rights (hereafter, SDRs) for five years after the Convention
has been opened for signature, after which the ceiling will be raised
44
to 40 million SDRs. Secondly, the operator is required to maintain
insurance or other financial security in such amount and of such type
as the Controlling State shall specify, but the amount must be at
41. Minutes of the Meeting of Technical Experts, held on 3 and 4 May
1976. Estimates of flow duration were either 100 or 90 days for
both quantities of oil.
42. In addition, the E and P Forum submitted an estimate of $25 mil¬
lion based on a computer program which examined 5,000 accident
possibilities. Ibid.
43. Special Drawing Right is defined as that which is used by the
International Monetary Fund. Article 1(9).
44. Article 6(1). In the event that more than one operator is liable,
the aggregate liability shall not exceed the highest amount that
could be awarded against any one of them. Article 6(3).
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least 22 million SDRs initially and 35 million SDRs five years after
45
the Convention is opened for signature. Thirdly, provision is made
for changing the amounts of the liability ceiling or financial secur-
46
ity required. Finally, it is provided that a State Party may
deviate from the Convention's liability limits:
"This Convention shall not prevent a State from providing
for unlimited liability or a higher limit of liability
than that currently applicable under Article 6 for
pollution damage caused by installations for which it
is the Controlling State and suffered in that State or
in another State Party; provided, however, that in so
doing it shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality.^
Such provision may be based on the principle of reciprocity."
These four points will be discussed immediately below.
The provisions relating to liability limits and required finan¬
cial security are very close indeed to the Norwegian compromise pro¬
posal. At the time the Convention was agreed, December 1976, the
value of a SDR as expressed in U.S. dollars was approximately $1.17.
Thus, the initial liability limit was approximately $35 million with
48
a scheduled rise to approximately $47 million in five years. Insur¬
ance requirements were $26 million rising to $41 million.
The use of SDRs as a measure of liability is a most unusual
45. Article 8(1). This provision does not apply to operators which
are States Parties (that is, the British National Oil Corporation
and Statoil), and the Controlling State may exempt any operator
from this requirement in relation to claims arising from acts of
sabotage or terrorism. Article 8(1), (5). The latter provision
is clearly a compromise between the U.K. view that the operator
should not be liable for damage caused by acts of terrorism and
the Norwegian view to the contrary.
46. Article 9.
47. Article 15(1).
48. "Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from
Offshore Operations," an undated paper published by the E and P
Forum, at p. 2.
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provision. Previous liability conventions in the fields of both
49 50
maritime and air law used gold francs as the monetary system for
establishing liability. This was done for two reasons:
1. To establish a standard independent of currency
fluctuations.
2. To protect against inflation by linkigj
the limits to the real value of gold.
Suitability of the gold standard to liability convention
objectives has become subject to doubts, however, because floating
exchange rates and high and fluctuating free market gold prices
mean courts must decide whether to use the "official" or "free
52
market" value of gold as the basis of conversion. One disadvantage
of the gold standard is that it is reckoned on a single relationship,
that of the currency in question to gold. A more stable relationship
I
would be possible by linking the value of gold to several currencies,'
54
or using SDRs instead of gold as a unit of value. The new
Convention has adopted the latter approach: as SDRs are defined
"as a cocktail or basket of the 16 currencies of countries that each
49. See the discussion of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
immediately below.
50. An example is the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (1929) ,
commonly known as the Warsaw Convention. 137 League of
Nations Treaty Series 11 (1929).
51. Heller, P., "The Value of the Gold Franc—A Different Point of
View," 6 Journal of Maritime Law 73-103 (1974-75), at pp. 94-95.
52. Asser, T., "Golden Limitations of Liability in International
Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis," 5 Journal of
Maritime Law 645-669 (1974), at p. 646.
53. Ibid., pp. 666-667.
54. Ibid., p. 668.
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do 1% or more of world trade,the problem of "official" versus
"market value" will not arise. The Convention is presently unique
in its use of SDRs; it is suggested that application of the new
measure of liability will be observed closely by organisations inter¬
ested in concluding new liability conventions or amending present
. 56
agreements.
Although the Convention is not linked to an external index (for
example, a consumer-price index) to counteract the influence of in¬
flation, provision is made for amendment of liability or insurance
57
limits. A Committee composed of a representative of each State is
established pursuant to the Convention for the sole purpose of consid¬
ering this question. If a State Party considers that liability or
insurance limits are inadequate, or otherwise unrealistic, that State
58
may convene a meeting of the Committee to consider the matter.
55. Heller, P., op. cit. in footnote 51, at p. 103, quoting from
The Economist (15 June 1974), at p. 107, and referring also to
IMF Survey of 17 June 1974.
56. "According to the Outline of Reform of the international
monetary system, 'the SDR will become the principal reserve
asset and the role of gold and of reserve currencies will be
reduced. The SDR will also be the numeraire in terms of which
par values will be "expressed.'" Ibid., quoting IMF Survey of
17 June 1974, p. 196.
57. Article 9. The problem of what to do about inflation—if
anything—in regard to liability limits incorporated in a
Convention was a major obstacle to agreement as late as Nov¬
ember 1976. Conversation with Professor Carl August Fleischer,
12 November 1976. Article 9 reflects a Swedish proposal that
a standing Committee comprised of all member States be estab¬
lished to review the adequacy of Convention liability limits.
W. G. 46. The proposed Committee would have met annually,
unlike the adopted provision which contemplates ad hoc
meetings called by concerned States Parties.
58. Article 9(2).
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The Committee will take decisions by an affirmative vote of at least
59
three-quarters of the States Parties to the Convention, but may only
60
recommend changes to member States. A tacit acceptance procedure is
employed, whereby States Parties which have not notified the depository
61
Government that they are unable to accept the recommended amount within
62 63
six months of notification shall be deemed to have accepted it.
Article 15(1), which permits deviation from Convention liability
limits and which was quoted above, is the price paid for agreement. This
provision may be justifiably criticised as defeating one of the primary
64
purposes of the Convention, viz. the establishment of uniform standards.
The Norwegian insistence on higher or unlimited liability limits is a
perceived self-interest not unlike that of the United States in relation
59. Ibid. In making its recommendation the Committee must take into
account events causing or likely to cause pollution damage which
relate to the objects of this Convention (for example, damage
caused by another blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel), changes
in abatement and clean up costs, and the availability of insurance
against the risk of liability for pollution damage.
60. Ibid.
61. The U.K. is the depository Government. Articles 19 and 26.
62. The six-month period may be altered by agreement and specified
in the recommendation.
63. Article 9(3), (4). A State acceding to the Convention is only
bound by a unanimously accepted recommendation. This provision,
plus the procedure for change by a three-fourths majority vote,
raises the possibility that some States may be bound by the
amended limit, while others are bound by the unamended limit.
Article 9(5).
64. States Parties which have elected to provide for higher liability
must apply the law of the Controlling State to determine the
amount of the operator's liability. However, States Parties
which do not elect to be bound by Article 15 are not affected
by its provisions authorising higher liability. Article 15(2),
(3). It is possible, therefore, for plaintiffs damaged in
different States Parties to have varying limits restricting
their claims.
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to the Warsaw Convention concerned with carriage by air. The
writer agrees that this provision is regrettable, but considers that
the only real choice was a Convention including such a provision
or no Convention at all.
4. Other provisions
The Convention is similar to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
in that the operator must constitute a fund equal to his possible maxi-
mum liability to avail himself of limited liability. Like the earlier
Convention, a person liable may himself claim for the costs of prevent-
67
ive measures, constitution of the fund precludes levy against other
68 69
assets, and the insurer is also entitled to establish a fund. The
65. U.S. dissatisfaction with the limited liability provisions of the
Warsaw Convention (concerned with air carrier liability for
passenger injury or death) prompted that State to require that
any air carrier engaged in international transportation which
involves a point in the U.S. that is the origin, destination or
an agreed stopping place, accept liability several times that
specified in the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld, A. and
Mendelsohn, A., "The United States and the Warsaw Convention,"
80 Harvard Law Review 497-602 (1967).
66. Article 6(5) . The fund must be constituted in the State Party
in which the action is brought. Actions may be brought only in
the courts of any State Party where pollution damage occurred
or in the courts of the Controlling State. Damage suffered in
an area in which a State has sovereign rights over natural
resources pursuant to international law shall be deemed to have
been suffered in that State. Article 11.
67. Article 6(10). The fund shall be distributed among claimants
pro rata. Article 6(6).
68. Article 7(1). This provision only applies if the claimant has
access to the court administering the fund and the fund is
actually available to satisfy his claim. Article 7(2). Moreover,
the operator may not limit his liability if it is proved that the
pollution damage was caused by his act done deliberately with
actual knowledge that pollution damage would result. Article 6(4).
69. Article 6(12). A claim for compensation may be brought
directly against the insurer. Article 8(3).
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requirement that an operator constitute a fund has been criticised on
the basis that, unlike the Civil Liability Convention which applies to
ships, this Convention concerns assets which cannot readily be moved
from the jurisdiction and a fund is therefore not necessary.^0 While
conceding that this point has merit, it may also be observed that the
requirement of liquid assets in a fund specified for satisfaction of
claims affords oil pollution victims a convenient source of compen¬
sation when compared to the complex procedures which may be required
71
to convert a defendant's assets into cash.
The States Parties may by unanimous agreement invite States bord¬
ering the North Sea, the Baltic Sea or the Atlantic Ocean North of 36°
72
N. to accede to the Convention. This provision clearly contemplates
the possibility of including Oslo and Baltic Convention States within
73
the new legal regime. The Convention may, therefore, become the
cornerstone of a larger regional structure. Indeed, should sub¬
sequent treaties among other regional States be concluded on the
lines of this instrument, even larger arrangements may emerge.
The result could be the development of global or quasi-global stand¬
ards and procedures from a regional agreement rather than from a
70. E and P Forum, op. cit. in footnote 48, at p. 2.
71. It is also possible for a mobile installation to be moved out
of the jurisdiction, although a licensee who wished to retain
his right to conduct petroleum development operations in the
licensed area would be unlikely to engage in such behaviour
or permit a subcontractor to do so.
72. Article 18.
73. Oslo Convention States which have not signed the new Convention
are Finland, Iceland, Portugal, and Spain. Baltic Convention
States which have not signed the new Convention include
Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and the
Soviet Union. Article 18 would also permit the United States
and Canada to accede to the Convention.
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world conference of States, such as UNCLOS III. It is the writer's
view that conventions invariably represent the "lowest common denomin-
74
ator" among States, each of which is pursuing its own self-interest.
The Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting
from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, al¬
though not without fault, is the product of comparatively rich, devel¬
oped countries well aware of marine pollution problems.. It may there¬
fore set higher standards than would be likely to result from a larger
representation of the world's States. As such, it is a model not un¬
worthy of emulation.
C. Liability for Damage from Vessels: The IMCO Conventions
75
1. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (hereafter, the Civil Liability Convention) was a companion to
the Intervention Convention produced at the 1969 Brussels Conference,
a meeting inspired by the Torrey Canyon disaster two years earlier.
The Civil Liability Convention came into force 19 June 1975 and binds
76
both the U.K. and Norway. Although the Civil Liability Convention has
77
been discussed by many writers, its essential features will be outlined
74. The writer also subscribes to Professor Cheng's view that the
greater a State's perceived self-interest, the more likely that
State is to insist that such self-interest be preserved. See
Cheng, B., "Centrifugal Tendencies in Air Law," 10 Current Legal
Problems 200-228 (1957).
75. Cmnd. 4403 (1970); 9 International Legal Materials 45-67 (1970).
76. Thirty States were Parties to this Convention as of 21 December
1976. IMCO Document CLC/Circ. 37, 21 December 1976.
77. The Civil Liability Convention is analysed in detail by Brown,
E.D., in The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens and Sons, London
(1971), at pp. 163-181.
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here as part of the assessment of the present legal regime of pollution
control in the North Sea.
a) basic provisions
The three basic provisions of the Civil Liability Convention con¬
cern the form of liability, liability limitations, and the person liable,
i) strict liability
The owner of a ship at the time of an incident is strictly liable
for pollution damage caused by the resultant discharge or escape of oil.
Exceptions are provided in cases of force majeure, damage caused by a
third party who intended to cause such damage, and damage caused wholly
by the wrongful act of an authority responsible for maintenance of nav-
78
igational aids. Damage caused negligently or intentionally by the
victim exonerates the owner wholly or partially from liability to that
79
person.
Why should an owner who has exercised reasonable care be held
liable regardless of his fault? The comments of authorities on the
theory of civil liability invariably involve a comparison of the owner's
and the victim's position. The owner, it is argued, is in a far better
position to bear and distribute the risk which is, after all, caused by
80
his entrepreneurial efforts. On the other hand, the victim may be
innocent, probably does not have the resources to bear the risk, and al-
81
most certainly would have severe problems in proving fault.
78. Article III (2).
79. Article III (3) .
80. Mendelsohn, A., "Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution," 38 George
Washington Law Review 1- 31 (1969), at p. 25.
81. Keeton, G., "The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon: English Law Aspects,"
21 Current Legal Problems 94-112 (1968), at p. 111.
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ii) limited liability
The shipowner may limit his liability to 2,000 francs per incid¬
ent for each ton of his ship's tonnage up to a limit of 210 million
82
francs. Limited liability only applies if the owner constitutes a
fund equal to his possible liability with an appropriate authority in
any of the States in which an action could be brought (that is, the
83
damaged State Party). The fund is distributed among claimants on a
84
pro rata basis. The fund serves a dual purpose: it ensures that re¬
sources are available to meet claims up to the Convention limits, and
it protects the shipowner, for once it is in existence, no other claims
may be made against him and ships or other property held as security
85
must be released. As in other schemes involving strict liability
with a ceiling, the Civil Liability Convention sets off increased
probability of compensation with the certainty that liability will
86
not exceed a pre-agreed limit.
iii) owner's liability
The owner is made liable under the Convention—and he is liable
87
only according to it. Servants and agents are expressly exempt from
82. Article V(l). The limitation does not apply if the incident
occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the
owner. Article V(2). Professor Brown has pointed out that the
liability ceiling was set in large part by the capacity of the
London insurance market. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote
77, at p. 174, footnote 60.
83. Articles V(3), IX.
84. Article V(4).
85. Article VI.
86. This is the case with the Warsaw Convention limiting air carrier
liability.
87. Article III. When oil pollution damage results from two or more
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suit, but nothing is said about other potential defendants—such as
the cargo owner who is likely to have a substantial interest in the
marine transportation of his petroleum—and it is clear that an action
against them outside the Convention is possible. Designation of the
shipowner as the exclusive defendant under the Convention apparently
88
was the result of a compromise necessary to reach any decision, but
it is balanced to some extent by the Fund Convention (discussed below)
which derives its revenues from cargo owners,
b) scope
As in most conventions, the definition of terms employed therein
largely describes the instrument.
"Ship" means sea-going vessels "actually carrying oil in bulk as
89
cargo." In other words, the Convention applies only to tankers on
cargo voyages.
"Owner" is the registered owner or, if there is no registration,
the person owning the ship. In socialist States the term means the
90
company operating the ship.
"Oil" means persistent oils such as crude, fuel, heavy diesel,
lubricating and whale oil, whether carried as cargo or in the bunkers
of a vessel which is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo. This def¬
inition restricts the Convention still further by excluding refined
products from coverage.
ships, the owners shall be jointly and severally liable for all
damage which is not reasonably separable.




"Pollution damage" means "contamination damage" caused by the
escape of oil from the ship, wherever such escape may occur. It also
includes the cost of preventive measures. "Contamination damage" is
not defined, so the latent line-drawing problems inherent in this circ¬
ular definition must be resolved, as they occur, by reference to the
plain meaning of the terms. Clearly the term would cover the fouling of
beaches; most likely it would not cover loss by fire feeding on an oil
slick. Although the escape can occur anywhere, the damage must be in
the territory or territorial sea of a Contracting State. The locus of
91
preventive measures is not qualified, however, and may be anywhere.
Finally, it should be observed that "claimant" is undefined and
unqualified. This aspect of the Convention's scope becomes particularly
significant when compared to the TOVALOP scheme discussed below, which
provides that only Governments can claim reimbursement,
c) other
A certificate attesting that insurance or other financial security
adequate to cover liability under the Convention is in force must be
carried by ships actually carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk
92
as cargo. The flag State is charged with issuing certificates to its
93
own ships and preventing them from trading if they are uncertificated.
Compulsory insurance, intended to ensure that funds are available even
in cases of flag of convenience or one-ship company vessels, also applies
91. Professor Brown's careful reading of the travaux preparatoires
confirms the plain meaning of the Convention. Brown, E.D., op.
cit. in footnote 77, at pp. 170-171. cf. 1976 Civil Liability
Convention, above at p. 226, footnote 16.
92. Article VII(1) , (2), (3).
93. Article VII(6).
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to the vessels of States non-Parties. Thus, Article VII(11)
provides that
"each Contracting State shall ensure, under its
national legislation, that insurance or other
security to the extent specified in paragraph 1 of
this Article is in force in respect of any ship,
wherever registered, entering or leaving a port in
its territory, or arriving at or leaving an offshore
terminal in its territorial sea, if the ship actually
carries more than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo."
94 95
Both the U.K. and Norway have complied with this provision.
The possible question of whether this Article is valid under
international law must be answered in the affirmative. The coastal
State exercises in international customary law a right of sovereignty
over its territory and its territorial sea, although the latter is
qualified by a right of innocent passage. As coastal State rights do
not proceed from the Civil Liability Convention, there is no question
of an attempt to bind a non-Party without its consent. The possible
issue of interference with the right of innocent passage, relevant
were the provision applicable to ships merely transiting the territor¬
ial sea, is not a consideration in this case where compulsory insurance
is indistinguishable from customs or immigration requirements which are
clearly a sovereign right. It should be observed, however, that if
the coastal State has relinquished some part of its sovereignty as by
a treaty requiring the equal treatment of foreign vessels within the
ports of States Parties, administration of the certification requirement
96
must be impartial.
94. See below, at p. 375.
95. See below, at p. 476.
96. Both the U.K. and Norway are Parties to the Geneva Convention
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A plaintiff may claim directly against the insurer, thus simpli-
97
fying the claims procedure. The insurer may invoke most of the
defences which the shipowner might have used, and may join the ship-
98
owner in the proceedings.
The issue of forum shopping disbussed above is resolved by
providing that the courts of the damaged Contracting State have
99
exclusive jurisdiction.
2. The Fund Convention'*"00
A Resolution*"0"*" appended to the Civil Liability Convention rec¬
ognised two deficiencies of the instrument just concluded and accord¬
ingly considered that an additional compensation scheme should be elab¬
orated, with particular reference to two principles:
"1. Victims should be fully and adequately
compensated under a system based upon the
principle of strict liability.
2. The fund should in principle relieve the
shipowner of the additional financial
burden imposed by the present Convention."
The International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (here¬
after, the Fund Convention) was concluded in 1971 to give effect to these
and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 1923
which provides for equality of access to ports normally used by
seagoing vessels.
97. Article VII (8) .
98. However, the insurer may not use the bankruptcy or winding up
of the owner as a defence. Ibid.
99. Article IX(1).
100. Cmnd. 5061 (1972); 11 International Legal Materials 248-301
(1972) .
101. Resolution on establishment of an international compensation
fund for oil pollution damage, Annex to the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention.
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• • 102 ^ t ^ 103principles. It is not yet in force.
a) full compensation of victim
The Fund Convention provides assistance for victims who were not
adequately compensated under the Civil Liability Convention because:
104
1) their case was covered by certain of the exceptions, 2) the owner
liable was unable to pay the claim, or 3) their claims exceed the
liability limits.Compensation is limited to 450 million francs.
b) shipowner relief
The shipowner and his guarantor may seek indemnification from
the Fund for liability under the Civil Liability Convention which
exceeds 1,500 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage or a total of
125 million francs, whichever is less.^"0^ Relief is thus available for
the amount between these figures and the Civil Liability Convention
108
ceiling of the lesser of 2,000 or 210 million francs, respectively.
102. Preamble, Article 2.
103. As of January 1977, 11 States were Parties and slightly less
than one-quarter of the total quantity of 750 million tons of
contributing oil required for entry into force remained to be
accounted for. IMCO Document IFC/Circ.12, 5 January 1977.
104. However, the Fund does not incur obligation in cases of war, hos¬
tilities, civil war, or when the oil came from a Government ship,
or when the claimant cannot prove that the damage resulted from
an incident involving one or more ships. The last exemption
places a heavy burden of proof on the victim. See footnote
at p. 414. The Fund is also exonerated in cases of third party
responsibility to the extent of that responsibility. Article
4(2), (3).
105. Article 4(1). The owner may also claim from the Fund.
106. Article 4(4). The Fund Assembly may vote to increase the maximum
up to 900 million francs. Article 4(6).
107. Article 5(1).
108. The Fund need not reimburse the owner and his guarantor if it is




The Fund is financed by assessing oil imports. Any person who
in one calendar year receives more than 150,000 tons of contributing
oil"1"*0 carried by sea at
1. a port or terminal installation^"^ in a
Contracting State, or
2. at any installation in a Contracting State
when the point of landing was in a non-
Contracting State
is liable for contributions as determined by the Assembly of the Fund
112
Convention. To facilitate such assessment, the Assembly is respons¬
ible for drafting an annual estimated budget. It is interesting to
note that unless a Contracting State assumes the obligation to contrib¬
ute to the Fund, it is "persons" (actually, oil companies) upon whom
the Fund Convention imposes that duty. The Director of the organisation
established pursuant to the Fund Convention may "take all appropriate
action" directly against persons who default on their obligation to
contribute, but the Contracting State is responsible for the establish¬
ment and imposition of sanctions,
d) organisation and administration
The Fund will have an Assembly, a Secretariat headed by a Director
owner the ship did not comply with several enumerated IMCO Con¬
ventions including the 1954 Convention, and such non-compliance
caused the damage.
109. "Associated persons" are also included, thus precluding the div¬
ision of received oil to avoid contributions. Article 10(2).
110. "Contributing Oil" includes designated crude and fuel oils.
111. This term includes offshore installations.




and an Executive Committee.
The Assembly is a plenary body whose duties include matters of
organisation and procedure as well as responsibility for the annual
budget,"'"''"^ the annual contributions, auditing and approval of Fund
accounts,and settlement of claims against the Fund.^® Regular
119
sessions of the Assembly will occur annually.
The Executive Committee, constituted of approximately one-third
120
of Assembly members, is elected by the Assembly according to crit¬
eria concerned with exposure to risk from oil pollution, tanker fleet
121
size, and quantity of oil imported. The Executive Committee shall
122
meet at least annually, but may meet more often. The primary func¬
tion of the Executive Committee is to act in the place of the Assembly
in administering the Fund. Responsibilities in this regard include
approving claim settlements and instructing the Director on matters
123
concerning the Fund and the Civil Liability Convention.
The Secretariat, composed of the Director and supporting staff,
is responsible for the usual duties of the office, for example
114. Article 16.





120. Article 22(1) .




personnel administration, records, etc. as well as administration of
the Fund's assets. The Director is the chief administrative officer
of the Fund. Where internal regulations so provide, the Director may
deal with claim settlement without prior approval from the Assembly
or the Executive Committee.
The Fund Convention also contains detailed provisions concerning
finances, voting transition, and final clauses which will not be
considered.
D. Conclusion
The 1976 Convention will provide increased protection for the
victims of oil pollution damage by complementing the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention. Although this
trio is characterised by individual deficiencies and is limited in
scope collectively, the new Convention is evidence that the law of
compensation for marine pollution damage is developing. Its pro¬
visions on such matters as liability and insurance limits, as well as
the use of SDRs as a unit of value, will be influential in determin¬




Four industry agreements designed to compensate victims of
damage caused by offshore petroleum development and transportation^"
became effective before agreement of analogous international con¬
ventions regulating liability. Table V-l on the following pages
lists three conventions discussed in Chapter Four and the industry
compensation schemes described below. The tabular summary of charac¬
teristics is intended to facilitate comparison of the two approaches
to compensation for damage relating to petroleum development.
B. Compensation for Damage Caused by Seabed Operations
2
1. Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement
Companies Parties to the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement
(OPOL) accept strict liability up to a maximum of $25 million per
1. In addition to the agreements described in this chapter, the
Institute of Petroleum's Code of Safe Practice for Drilling
and Production in Marine Areas and the International Chamber
of Shipping's "Pollution Prevention Code" are relevant. The
Code of Safe Practice is a technical publication providing
guidelines for offshore drilling; the "Pollution Prevention
Code" voluntarily implements certain parts of the 1973 IMCO
Convention and was described briefly at p. 161.
2. OPOL came into effect on 1 May 1975 and will remain in force
for six years and thereafter from year to year. Clause XI;
"OPOL," a booklet published by the Offshore Pollution Liability
Association Limited, London (1976), at p. 3. The Agreement has
been amended twice. The amendments of 12 September 1975 exten¬
ded the geographic scope to States other than the U.K., clari¬
fied the definition of "Public Authority," and re-defined the
term "Offshore Facility" to include wells and to exclude facil¬
ities relating to gas except during certain periods. On 23
March 1976 the original liability limit of $16 million was
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incident for pollution damage and for the cost of remedial measures
4
when injury has resulted from an escape or discharge of oil from
offshore exploration or production operations.^
OPOL is open to actual or intended operators of offshore facil¬
ities located within the jurisdiction of all North Sea States except
Belgium.^ The Offshore Pollution Liability Association Limited was
7
formed to administer the Agreement.
International conventions typically set off strict liability
against a liability ceiling that can only be broken in case of actual
g
fault or privity of the defendant; however, this is not the case with
OPOL because as a private Agreement it cannot bar a plaintiff from
the lower limit was inadequate. There are no plans for further
amendment at present, although the Association continues to review
the acceptability of the Agreement. Letter to the writer from Mr.
J.R. Keates, Managing Director, The Offshore Pollution Liability
Association Limited, 22 July 1976.
3. "'Incident' means any occurrence or series of occurrences arising
out of one event which results in a Discharge of Oil." Clause 1(13).
4. "'Oil' means crude oil and natural gas liquids, including such
materials when mixed with or present in other substances."
Clause I(10).
5. Clause IV(A). "Discharge" includes "escape." Clause 1(11).
6. Clauses 1(3) and 11(B). "Operator" is a member agreed to act as
such. Clause 1(5). In joint ventures the "operator" will usually
be designated by the operating agreement. OPOL, op. cit. in foot¬
note 4 at p. 2. "Offshore facilities" include wells, drilling
units, platforms, offshore storage terminals, single buoy moorings
and pipelines, but does not apply to abandoned wells, facilities
for the production, storage or transport of natural gas or natural
gas liquids, or any craft not being used for the storage of crude
oil. Clause 1(7). No membership list is available to the public,
but the 16 original signatories to the Agreement include the well-
known oil companies.
7. Clause II(A).
8. For example, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention provides that
255
pursuing other remedies under the law. Thus, the strict liability
provisions are similar to those found in conventions in that the oper-
9
ator must demonstrate financial competence to meet possible claims,
he may be excused from liability in cases of force majeure and acts
of third parties,^ and nothing in the Agreement is intended to pre¬
clude a Party from attempting to recover all or part of the compensa¬
tion paid from third parties.^
The OPOL liability ceiling is $25 million per incident and there
12
is no limit on total claims against OPOL Parties. A claimant who
wishes to benefit from OPOL provisions is bound by the $25 million
limit. However, in contrast to his position under the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention, the claimant need not seek redress exclusively
through the Agreement and may ignore OPOL and sue for damages under
municipal law.*"^
The $25 million ceiling per incident is divided, so that $12.5
million is available to satisfy damage claims and an equal amount is
"Where the owner, after an incident, has constituted a fund in
accordance with Article V, and is entitled to limit his liabil¬
ity, no person having a claim for pollution damage arising out
of that incident shall be entitled to exercise any right
against any other assets of the owner in respect of such
claim." 1969 Civil Liability Convention, Article VI(1)(a).
9. In the event the operator is unable to meet his liability under
OPOL, the remaining Parties must meet such obligations. Clause
111(2).
10. Clause IV(B). Acts of any Government or the claimant may also
bar recovery. These exceptions are essentially those found in
Article 111(2), (3) of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
11. Clause VIII(G).
12. Letter from Mr. J.R. Keates, 22 July 1976.
13. Clause VII, OPOL, op. cit. in footnote 4, at p. 4.
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designated to cover the cost of remedial measures. Any person may
claim for pollution damage and a "public authority" may claim for
remedial measures.^ Damage need not necessarily be within the waters
16
of a State designated by OPOL. As no claims have yet arisen under
the Agreement, it is not yet known whether economic loss must be
17
proved before compensation will be awarded.
Division of the $25 million may well work to the disadvantage of
claimants seeking compensation for clean up. Although if one category
is exhausted it may be replenished by funds from the other, should the
second half also be depleted, the unsatisfied claims must be pro-rated
within each category. Clean up costs are likely to be far greater than
18
damage claims, yet they could be pro-rated even though pollution
14. Clause IV(A).
15. "Public authority" includes both the national Government and
any other public body competent under municipal law to carry
out remedial measures. Clause 1(4).
16. Clause IV(A); OPOL, op. cit. in footnote 4, at p. 2.
17. Letter from Mr. J.R. Keates, 22 July 1976. Provision is made
for arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce. Clause IX. Reference is made to this procedure in
connection with another agreement, below at p. 268, footnote 56.
18. For example, an industry estimate of the economic cost of the
Santa Barbara blowout computed cleanup and well-control costs
at $10.4 million of the total $16.4 million. The highest damage
category was "recreational value lost" at $3.1 million. As
noted in the discussion above, it is unknown whether this type
of damage would be compensable under OPOL. The estimated "prop¬
erty value loss" was $1.2 million. An estimate by the Oil Com¬
panies Exploration and Production Forum submitted to the Inter¬
governmental Conference on the Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations, London, 20
October to 31 October 1975, document L.3. This account of the
Santa Barbara incident is reflected in an estimated "Valuation
of Damages" submitted to the Conference by a technical Working
Group. The U.K. estimate of $30 million is entirely composed
of dispersant costs; other delegations allocated some damage
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damage claims totalling $12.5 million are fully satisfied. Were it
not for the classification system all claims would be pro-rated in
reference to the $25 million ceiling, a more equitable distribution
of relief.
The definitions of "pollution damage" and "remedial measures"
support the suggestion that claims for the latter are likely to be
dominant. "Pollution damage" is defined as
"direct loss or damage (other than loss of or damage
to the Designated Offshore Facility involved) by a ^
contamination which results from a Discharge of Oil."
The Agreement does not define "direct" loss or damage; the plain
meaning of the term suggests that when the issue does arise the
claimant will have to sustain a heavy burden of showing both proximate
cause and economic loss.
On the other hand, the term "remedial measures" means any
reasonable measures taken by the Party from whose facility an oil
discharge occurs and by any public authority to control and clean up
20
the oil. "Reasonable" is considerably less restrictive than
"direct," and compensation is likely to be awarded accordingly.
The above criticisms notwithstanding, OPOL is likely to be an
effective arrangement for the settlement of most claims arising from
costs. The Norwegian estimate was incomplete, although figures
for "Combat Against Oil Slick" and coastal cleaning were $20.2
and $44.0 million, respectively. Minutes of the Meeting of
Technical Experts, 3 and 4 May 1976.
19. Clause I(12).
20. A Party may be compensated for remedial measures to combat
pollution from his own facility with the exception of measures
to control the well or to protect, repair, or replace the
facility. Clause 1(14).
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oil pollution caused by offshore petroleum development. OPOL was
formed to provide an efficient settlement procedure, to encourage
immediate remedial action by Parties, to ensure that claims can be
21
met and to avoid jurisdictional problems. The contractual edifice
erected for this purpose, if limited, is sound. And, until the 1976
Convention concerning such compensation comes into force, OPOL stands
alone.
2. Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group
The Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group (hereafter,
the Group) was formed on 24 July 1974, thus bringing together repre¬
sentatives from the British Government and the offshore oil and fish¬
ing industries,
"To exchange information on general matters
concerning the fishing and oil industries,
to discuss broad principles and to keep under
review developments in connection with the
exploitation of offshore oil and gas resources
with the object of fostering close relations
between the two industries so that each may
carry out its operations with minimum inter¬
ference to the other /"and to] examine in ^
sub-committee particular technical problems."
The standing membership of the Group includes representatives
from the Scottish Trawlers' Federation, the Scottish Fishermen's
Federation, the British Trawlers' Federation, the United Kingdom
Offshore Operators' Association (UKOOA), the Departments of Energy,
Trade, Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (DAFS), and the Ministry
21. OPOL, op. cit. in footnote 4, at p. 1.
22. Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group, Progress Report,
June 1975, p. 1.
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of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). Other Government Depart¬
ments may be advised or invited to participate when the Group thinks
this appropriate. As its terms of reference indicate, the Group has
no executive powers, but is primarily intended to discuss and study
problems created by conflicting uses of the U.K. continental shelf
and its superjacent waters. Discussion occurs in plenary sessions
which are held several times annually; much of the Group's work, how¬
ever, is entrusted to sub-committees. Two such sub-committees have
been concerned with matters of direct relevance to this study:
restrictions imposed on the movement of fishing vessels, and damage
to fishing gear caused by oil-related objects in the marine environ¬
ment.
The Group, recognising that the increased use of the North Sea
required better communication to minimise user conflict, has agreed
on three steps to facilitate the safe navigation of fishing vessels:
1. The weekly information bulletin prepared by
DAFS which already contains basic information
concerning offshore oil activity has been
expanded to include submarine obstacles which,
while not a danger to normal navigation,
could interfere with fishing.
2. Information concerning emergency hazards,
such as drifting buoys, is now included at
the end of the regularly-scheduled late night
fishing news on commercial radio.
3. At the request of the fishing industry, the
positions of navigational hazards are now
provided in Decca readings as well as
the traditional latitude and longitude.
23. DAFS acts as Secretariat to the Group.
24. Fisheries and Offshore Consultative Group, op. cit. in foot¬
note 22, at pp. 3-4. The DAFS has also published a booklet,
"Fishermen and North Sea Oil Developments: A Ready Reference
260
In addition, the procedures intended to ensure that buoys are properly
25
laid and marked is under review.
Agreement on what if anything should be done to resolve the
problem of restricted access to fishing grounds has proved more
elusive. The Group has agreed to examine the impact of the offshore
oil industry on commercial fishing with particular reference to the
issue of fishing ground loss. The study was initially limited to
investigation of the Forties Field development, but has now been ex-
26
tended to the entire North Sea. The fishing industry is watching
this investigation and awaiting its results with particular interest,
for one possible recommendation which could emerge is adoption of the
fishing representatives' proposal that the industry should be compen-
27
sated in some way for the loss.
The fishing industry was in fact successful in its quest to
obtain compensation for damage to fishing gear caused by oil-related
debris on the seabed. The scheme agreed upon by the Group involves
a two-step claims procedure. In step one, the skipper of a fishing
vessel which has suffered loss or damage of fishing gear reports the
28
incident to the DAFS. The Fishery Officer may assist in identifying
the company responsible for the debris, if this is necessary, by con¬
sulting records of offshore operations in the area in which the damage
to Offshore Activities for Fishermen," which sets out basic
information.
25. Ibid., p. 4.
26. Ibid., p. 9.
27. Ibid.
28. Explanatory leaflet issued by DAFS/MAFF, July 1976.
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occurred. The owner then files a claim directly with the company
responsible. The difficulty here, as in other claims (such as that
for oil pollution damage under the 1971 Fund Convention and imple¬
menting legislation), is proving that the alleged offender did in
29
fact cause the injury complained of. How likely is it that such
common items as wire rope or anchors can be traced to their last
owner when damage is caused in an area of intensive offshore activ¬
ity? And even if such proof is possible, how many fishermen would
conclude that on balance, the prudent course of action would be to
suffer the certain loss based on equipment replacement rather than
hazard the stormy seas of litigation and an uncertain return? Such
considerations motivated the Group to take a second step.
If damage to fishing gear from oil-related debris occurs and
the claimant is unable to identify the responsible company, he may
30
seek reimbursement from a UKOOA compensation fund. The fund is
available only to U.K. fishing vessels which are damaged by debris on
the U.K. continental shelf.^ It is administered by the three fishing
industry groups and a committee composed of a representative from
each federation settles claims on the merits of each case. Settlement
is final and binding, and is in lieu of any claim against any UKOOA
29. Under Article 4(2)(b) of the Fund Convention, if the claimant
cannot prove that the damage complained of resulted from an
incident involving one or more ships, no compensation is pay¬
able. This provision, incorporated into U.K. law by S. 4(7)
of the 1974 Merchant Shipping Act, has been the subject of
complaint by some U.K. local authorities. Advisory Committee
on Oil Pollution of the Sea, Annual Report, (1974), p. 8.
30. Explanatory leaflet issued by DAFS/MAFF, July 1976.
31. Ibid.
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member arising out of the same incident.
Establishment of a compensation fund is to be watched with inter¬
est, for it may herald similar compensation schemes (voluntary or
imposed) for damage caused by other offshore activity. The theory
that the innocent victim ought to be compensated by the entrepreneur
whose risk-taking caused the damage (and who will pass this addition¬
al cost of doing business on to the consumer in any event) will be
tested. Is such an arrangement so open to fraudulent claim as to be
an inequitable imposition on the offshore operator? The answers pro¬
vided by the Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group will influ¬
ence developments beyond its limited terms of reference.
C. Compensation for Damage Caused by Vessel-Source Pollution
32
1. TOVALOP
TOVALOP is an acronym for Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution. This Agreement among tanker
3
owners is similar to the OPOL arrangement among offshore operators.
32. Signed 7 January 1969, in force 18 September 1969. TOVALOP
became effective when fifty per cent, of the world's tankers as
measured by gross tonnage (excluding those owned by a Govern¬
ment or under 3,000 tons) became subject to the Agreement.
Clause III. By July, 1972, over 99 per cent, of "free world"
tanker GRT were subject to TOVALOP. The original Agreement is
at 8 International Legal Materials 497-501 (1969); as amended,
that Agreement is contained in "TOVALOP," a booklet published
by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd.,
London (1973). The amendments expanded the definition of
"oil" to include residuals, "Government" to mean local Govern¬
ment that a national Government will act for, and added
"threat of discharge" to "discharge." An amendment to Clause
IV which took effect 28 February 1977 will be included when
the booklet is reprinted. Letter from Mr. D.B.A. Ockenden,
Assistant to Managing Director, to the writer, 4 March 1977.
33. Like OPOL, TOVALOP is administered by an Association to which
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In essence, tanker owners who have agreed to the TOVALOP scheme are
presumed negligent if one of their tankers discharges or threatens
to discharge oil which damages or may damage the coastline of any
34
State. However, the owner is not liable to any Government which
35
has a right to recover under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
a) tanker
"Tanker means a tank vessel (whether or not self-propelled)
designed and constructed for the carriage of bulk petroleum by sea,
regardless of whether such craft is actually used for transportation
of hydrocarbons."^ This definition, unqualified by the requirement
that the vessel be carrying petroleum in bulk, is wider than the
Civil Liability Convention, and would include such vessels as a sur¬
plus tanker used temporarily as a floating storage tank as well as
tankers on ballast voyages.
b) owner
The "owner" of a tanker is the one who holds title thereto,
except that in the case of a bareboat charter, the charterer is con-
37
sidered to be the owner. This is significant because in practice a
each tanker owner who is a Party to the Agreement must belong.
The Association provides information and technical advice on
pollution control in addition to its administrative duties.
34. Clause IV. A "threat" of discharge means "a grave and imminent
danger of such a discharge." Clause 1(1).
35. This amendment follows the coming into force of the Convention.
It is planned to continue TOVALOP for some years. Letter from
Mr. Ockenden, 4 March 1977.
36. Clause 1(a). Liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural
gas are expressly excluded.
37. Clause 1(b). Under a bareboat charter, the charterer must
supply the crew and necessary supplies at his own expense.
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tanker owner is likely to provide in the charter agreement that the
charterer is to act on his behalf and an oil company which has con¬
tracted for the vessel may well be better placed geographically and
38
financially to deal with an oil spill than would be a tanker owner.
c) presumed negligence
Liability under TOVALOP is based on negligence, but the burden
of proof is reversed, the defendant shipowner being presumed negli¬
gent unless he can prove otherwise. This differs from strict liabil¬
ity in that in the latter case, exceptions to liability are allowed
for such causes as war and the acts of third parties. But when the
burden of proving negligence is reversed, these narrow categories
are eliminated. A defendant might well prove that a defective valve,
for example, had been carefully inspected and maintained and that the
damage complained of was therefore not his fault. The plaintiff's
chances of recovery even with the burden of proof reversed are thus
39
far less under a system of fault liability.
d) liability limits
40
The maximum liability per incident under TOVALOP is the lesser
38. Becker, G., "Vehicles for Reimbursement of Oil Pollution Dam¬
age," 9 Houston Law Review 669-675 (1972), at p. 670.
39. One writer has stated that presumption of fault is little more
than the application of res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine likely
to be applied in vessel-source pollution cases in any event.
Furthermore, he quotes a British insurance official testifying
before a U.S. Senate Sub-committee who observed that "faced
with a choice between $5 million with absolute liability and
$10 million with a presumption, the latter was *a much more
attractive proposition.'" Mendelsohn, A., "Marine Liability
for Oil Pollution," 38 George Washington Law Review 1-31
(1969), at pp. 7, 19-20.
40. Clause VI. "'Incident' means any occurrence or series of
occurrences having the same origin which causes, or creates
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41
of $10 million or $100 per gross registered ton (GRT). These
limits are much lower than those of other legislation and agreements,
and do not approach possible clean up costs which could result from
an incident involving a modern supertanker. This inadequacy results
from both the use of GRT as a measure of capacity to cause pollution
damage and the low liability ceiling.
A "gross ton" is 100 cubic feet of permanently enclosed space
within a vessel; GRT therefore has nothing to do with weight, but is
an indication of volume. On the other hand, deadweight tonnage (DWT)
is the actual weight of the persons and objects onboard a vessel re¬
quired to bring her down to her load line from the light condition,
42
for example cargo, stores, passengers, ballast. GRT has tradition¬
ally been used to calculate liability, but DWT is a more meaningful
measure because it is more closely related to the actual cargo capa¬
city of a tanker, and it is oil carried as cargo which primarily
43
determines the cost of oil cleanup.
The Torrey Canyon case suggests that both the $10 million and
$lOO/GRT liability limits employed by TOVALOP are inadequate. Al¬
though the Torrey Canyon's owners paid $7.2 million to the British
44
and French Governments, the amount claimed exceeded $16 million.
a grave and imminent danger of causing damage by pollution."
Clause I (j).
41. Like OPOL, the liability limits only apply if the claimant
chooses to use the Agreement.
42. Ereli, E., The Environmental Regulation of the Sea and its
Resources, University of Houston (First draft, second printing;
1972), at p. 367.
43. Mendelsohn, A., op. cit. in footnote 39, at pp. 10-11 and footnote 34.
44. Note, "Liability for Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water Quality
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The Torrey Canyon was a 60,000 GRT tanker carrying about 118,000 tons
45
of oil, approximately half of which was released into the sea. If
one accepts the figure of $16 million as the true cost of the clean
46
up, it costs about $270 to clean up one ton of oil. When, as is
47
frequently the case, DWT exceeds GRT, the clean up cost per gross
ton of oil spilled will be higher. It has been calculated, for ex¬
ample, that in the case of the Torrey Canyon the DWT:GRT ratio was
2:1; the clean up cost was therefore $540 per gross ton, on the
48
assumption that total costs were $16 million. Even assuming the
clean up costs to have been the $7.2 million which was actually the
49
settlement amount, the costs come to $233 per gross ton. It is
therefore clear that TOVALOP would not meet the full clean up costs
of a discharge like the Torrey Canyon in all important particulars
and, a fortiori, the Agreement would be inadequate to compensate
those who would bear the cost of cleaning up the discharged oil from
50
one of the tankers now in operation which dwarf their predecessors.
Improvement Act of 1970," 55 Cornell Law Review 973-991 (1970),
at p. 982, and sources cited therein.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., at footnote 78, citing Sweeney, J., "Oil Pollution of the
Oceans," 37 Fordham Law Review 155-i.og1 (1968), at pp. 157-158.
47. The ratio of carrying capacity to gross tonnage may vary from
217:1 to 1/5:1. The Federal Water Pollution Control Administra¬
tion used a ratio of 1.8:1 to calculate a clean up cost of
$450 per gross ton. Note, loc. clt. in footnote 44 (citation
omitted).
48. Sweeney, J., loc. cit. in footnote 46.
49. Note, loc. clt. in footnote 44.
50. For example, the 542,000 DWT Baillus, one of two tankers built
for Shell, has the potential to release five times as much oil
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It is ironic that an Agreement, which like the Civil Liability Con¬
vention is a child of the Torrey Canyon, should be inadequate to com¬
pensate for clean up costs should that incident be repeated. The
retention of unrealistically low liability limits in the Agreement
tends to support the view of some writers that TOVALOP was merely
an attempt to forestall more comprehensive national legislation.^
TOVALOP is also limited by restrictions on the geographic and
material scope of "pollution damage" and the persons who may claim
compensation.
"Damage by pollution" is limited to physical contamination dam¬
age to coastlines resulting directly from a discharge of oil. TOVALOP
does not, therefore, include damage from fire or explosion, consequen-
52
tial damage, or ecological impairment. Although "discharge" is
broadly defined so as to include either an intentional or accidental
53
occurrence, "oil" is limited to crude oil and its residuals, and
54
lubricating oil. Refined products are not likely to cause the physi-
as was possible from the Torrey Canyon. It should also be noted
that the Agreement contains no provision to compensate for in¬
flation.
51. See, for example, Mendelsohn, A., op. cit. in footnote 39, at
pp. 8-9; Brown, E.D., The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens
and Sons, London (1971), at pp. 163-164, footnote 3.
52. Clause 1(h). The definition of "coast lines" makes it clear
that TOVALOP is concerned with land rather than marine pollu¬
tion: "'Coastlines' means land (including structural improve¬
ments thereon) adjoining the sea, inland waterways, lakes,
bays, harbours, and estuaries." Clause 1(g).
53. "Discharge" includes spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting,
emptying or dumping of oil. Clause 1(f). TOVALOP therefore
applies to both accidental and operational discharges.
54. Clause 1(e). "Residuals" includes, but is not limited to,
asphalt, bitumen, fuel oil and heavy diesel oil.
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cal contamination to beaches with which the Agreement is concerned
55
and are therefore excluded.
A tanker owner found liable under TOVALOP must either remove the
contaminating oil or pay the costs reasonably incurred by the national
56
Government concerned for oil removal. In some cases the Government
may initiate cleanup action (and may be entitled to do so under stat¬
ute) . On other occasions neither local nor national Government may
be capable of or wish to assume clean up responsibility.^ Although
TOVALOP was originally restricted to claims by national Governments,
pursuant to amendment "Government" now includes local bodies on whose
behalf the national Government acts. As only Governments may claim,
organisations and individuals (such as beach-front property owners)
may not claim compensation under TOVALOP. It is clear that this in¬
dustry Agreement is a limited response to the Torrey Canyon which
members are in no hurry to expand. The Preamble states that it is
recognised that traditional maritime laws and practice may be inade-
55. It will be recalled that although crude oil may be more obvious
in the marine environment and on the beach, the toxic proper¬
ties of refined products make them more dangerous to life. See
Chapter Two.
56. Clause IV. Members of TOVALOP are required to maintain finan¬
cial capability to fulfil obligations under the Agreement.
Clause 11(C). In practice, the owner's claim has been paid
through insurance with Protection and Indemnity Associations
(P and I Clubs) or other underwriters. Becker, G., "Short
Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and CRISTAL," 5 Journal of
Maritime Law 609-632 (1974), at pp. 620, 626. Claims not set¬
tled may be resolved by conciliation and arbitration under the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. Clause VII(K).
(Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration, ICC publication No.
291, is available from the British National Committee, Inter¬
national Chamber of Commerce, London.)
57. Letter from Mr. Ockenden, 4 March 1977. There have been no
problems with the standard of cleanliness: the clean up oper¬
ation continues until the authorities are satisfied. Ibid.
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quate to compensate both Governments and tanker owners for the costs
of avoiding or mitigating oil pollution damage. The patent inade¬
quacy of the lex lata as a vehicle to compensate innocent victims
was apparently overlooked.
It is clear that TOVALOP owes its existence more to shipowner's
self interest than to the principle that someone who damages another's
property ought to pay for it. Available evidence of payments made
under the Agreement reinforces this view; it has been reported that





The Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution (hereafter, CRISTAL) provides a fund to augment the
resources of the Civil Liability Convention and TOVALOP. CRISTAL, in
force since 1971, is essentially a private interim measure intended
to increase the money available for oil pollution compensation pending
60
the coming into force of the 1971 Fund Convention.
58. Becker, G., op. cit. in footnote 56, at pp. 626-627. A U.K.
Government claim for combatting the Allegro-Pacific Glory
collision oil spill in 1970 (described below at p. 362) resul¬
ted in a TOVALOP payment of $800,000. Shell Briefing Service,
"Oil Spills Offshore—Compensation and Remedies," (January
1976), at p. 2.
59. A copy of the Contract as amended to May 20, 1976 was made
available to the writer through the courtesy of AMOCO, London.
The original Contract is reproduced in 10 International Legal
Materials 137-144 (1971).
60. CRISTAL came into force 1 April 1971, less than three months
after the Contract was executed, when oil companies receiving
over 50 per cent, of the world's crude and fuel oil carried by
sea had become Parties. S. Ill(A); Oil Companies Institute for
Marine Pollution Compensation Ltd., CRISTAL, "Memorandum," p. 3
(July 1, 1976). CRISTAL will remain in force until 120 days
270
Like the Fund Convention, CRISTAL seeks to spread the risk of
liability for oil pollution damage by providing that in certain in¬
stances the owner of oil cargo carried by sea may become liable in an
amount up to $30 million. This Contract thus provides that both inter¬
ests on whose behalf the carriage of oil by sea is undertaken may
become liable for certain costs of pollution abatement.^
CRISTAL becomes obligated to pay compensation to a claimant when
the oil causing the injury was owned by a Party to the Contract at the
62
time of the incident, and when the tanker is entered in TOVALOP or
the owner is liable under the Civil Liability Convention.^ The formula
to determine the amount of compensation payable under CRISTAL emphasises
the supplementary nature of the Contract: as it was not intended that
the oil companies assume liabilities any person might already have
incurred, such sums are subtracted from the CRISTAL liability ceiling
64
of $30 million. In the case of an owner or bareboat charterer,
after the Fund Convention becomes effective. Clause III(C)(2).
61. The administration of CRISTAL is done by the Oil Companies Insti¬
tute for Marine Pollution Compensation Limited, a Bermuda Corpor¬
ation which is also a Party to the Contract. As of the beginning
of 1976, between 90 and 95 per cent, of the total crude oil moved
by the sea was subject to CRISTAL. Shell Briefing Service, op.
cit. in footnote 58, at p. 3.
62. An Amendment to Clause IV provides that a Party may elect to be
considered the owner of oil cargo even though he in fact is not.
This change was prompted by the Metula grounding off Chile in which
case the vessel was owned by a CRISTAL Party, but the cargo was
owned by a non-Party (the Chilean Government). The Amendment is
designed to extend CRISTAL coverage to such cases. Conversation
with Mr. H.A. Steyn, Managing Director, Marine Pollution Compens¬
ation Services Ltd., 29 March 1977.
63. Clause IV(A)(2), as amended.
64. Becker, G., op. cit. in footnote 38, at p. 673.
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CRISTAL liability will be reduced by the owner's maximum liability
under TOVALOP (the lesser of $100/GRT or $10 million) plus an addi¬
tional $25/GRT for which Protection and Indemnity Clubs have assumed
65
responsibility. This "clean up deduction" ensures that CRISTAL
does not pay claims for which TOVALOP is liable.
The limit of CRISTAL liability to other damaged persons is deter¬
mined after satisfaction of shipowner's claims in excess of the clean
66
up deduction. CRISTAL liability to other persons is computed by
67
subtracting from $30 million:
1. The amount paid to the owner or bareboat charterer
between his liability under TOVALOP and $30 million.
2. The amount of the owner's or charterer's liability
to Governments under TOVALOP, if such Governments
elect to take compensation under the scheme.
3. The owner's clean up costs up to $125/GRT or $10
million, whichever is lesser.
4. The liability of the owner or bareboat charterer
under applicable law, statutes, regulations or
conventions, to the extent that such liability is
reasonable enforceable and that recovery thereon
is practicable.
As CRISTAL is intended to serve as an interim Fund Convention, it
is pertinent to inquire if there are significant differences between
the two instruments. Three determinants of scope are of particular
65. Clause IV(C)(1), as amended; conversation with Mr. H.A. Steyn,
29 March 1977.
66. Should the owner's clean up costs exhaust CRISTAL, other persons
will receive nothing. Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollu¬
tion Compensation Ltd., op. cit. in footnote 60, at "Memorandum",
pp. 6 and 7.
67. Clause IV(C)(2), as amended, emphasis added. The original para¬
graph 4 provided for deduction of the maximum amount to which
such persons were legally entitled. The amended paragraph is
likely to result in much smaller deductions from the $30 million
272
relevance: definitions, type of liability, and liability limits.
(See Table V-l on pages 252-253.)
a) definitions
CRISTAL definitions are much closer to those of the Civil Liab¬
ility Convention and the Fund Convention than they are to those em¬
ployed by TOVALOP. The terms "tanker" or "ship," "oil," and "pollution
damage" are particularly important in describing the scope of the Con¬
tract. CRISTAL defines a "tanker" or "ship" as "any sea-going vessel
and any sea-borne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil
68
in bulk as cargo." This is consistent with the Civil Liability
Convention and the Fund Convention and has the practical effect of
excluding discharges from tankers in ballast. It is clear that all
three instruments are directed at the occasional catastrophic spill
rather than operational discharges such as oily ballast water or cank
washings. As major spills constitute but a small fraction of all oil
entering the ocean from marine transportation, this qualification
69
restricts the protection afforded by CRISTAL greatly. In practice,
most of CRISTAL's claims have been for compensation in excess of the
TOVALOP plus P and I Club limit of $125/GRT in cases involving tankers
of less than 5,000 GRT.^° Even small spills from such vessels can
easily cost more to clean up than is payable under the TOVALOP/P and I
Club tonnage limitation, and most of the approximately $4 million paid
available for distribution to "Persons" who qualify for CRISTAL
compensation.
68. Clause I(A).
69. See Chapter Two.
70. Conversation with Mr. H.A. Steyn, 29 March 1977.
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by CRISTAL at the time of this writing has been for small amounts.
"Oil" means any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy
diesel oil and lubricating oil whether carried on board a ship as
72
cargo or in its bunkers. Should TOVALOP expand its definition of
"oil" to include refined products, the CRISTAL definition would prob¬
ably be amended to conform to it, but there are no plans to expand
73
the Agreements in this respect.
"Pollution damage" employs the Convention and Fund definition:
it includes direct damage to the land territory and the territorial
sea, and also encompasses the cost of preventive measures and further
74
loss caused by such measures. In this respect, the Contract is
more liberal than TOVALOP (which is confined to damage to coastlines),
but it is still pertinent to note that no one may claim for ecological
damage or for injury "which is remote, or speculative, or which does
75
not result directly from the escape or discharge."
b) type of liability
It will be recalled that the Civil Liability Convention employs
a standard of strict liability with enumerated exceptions, and that
the Fund Convention applies when no liability arises under the Con¬
vention because of such exceptions, because the owner cannot meet his
71. The largest claim paid was for $1.3 million which was the excess
payable over the 1125/GRT limits in the case of a small ship
which spilled oil in the St. Laurence River. Ibid. Approxi¬
mately $1 million in claims against CRISTAL are outstanding.
72. Clause I(D).




financial obligations, or because the owner's liability exceeds the
76
limits of the Civil Liability Convention. CRISTAL is considerably
more restrictive.
It was observed above that CRISTAL becomes liable only if the
shipowner is liable under TOVALOP or the Civil Liability Convention.
Thus, while the Fund Convention will employ a near-absolute liability
standard (in effect providing insurance against the strict liability
exceptions), CRISTAL adopts the Civil Liability Convention's strict
liability standard by reference and adds nothing to the scope of
protection afforded oil pollution victims.
The same criticism may be made in respect of the second raison
d'etre of the Fund Convention: whereas the Fund will compensate
victims when the shipowner cannot meet his financial obligations under
the Civil Liability Convention, the private Contract deducts the
Convention maximum from its liability ceiling, regardless of the
shipowner's ability to pay.
c) liability limits
It will be recalled that the maximum liability possible under
the Fund Convention is $36 million, although that amount may be doubled
if the Fund Assembly so decides. This figure may be compared to the
$30 million CRISTAL maximum, but the comparison must be tempered with
the knowledge that because of the numerous deductions allowable under
the Contract, the maximum allowable compensation under that instrument
is far less likely to ever be available than would be the case under




It would be unfair to criticise CRISTAL for attempting to
represent itself as a comprehensive private agreement intended to
make reparation for any oil pollution injury. The Contract has only
the modest objectives which have been mentioned above. It is not out
of place, however, to observe that while CRISTAL has performed a
valuable service to the world community in the creation of an interim
fund, this undertaking effectively describes the limit of CRISTAL's
contribution. CRISTAL must therefore be regarded as a valuable part
of the legal regime of marine pollution control, but it is additional
evidence that private agreements are unlikely to go beyond the scope
78
of incipient national and international law.
77. As in the case of the other private agreements, CRISTAL liab¬
ility limits only apply to claimants under the Contract.
78. Indeed, it has been observed that CRISTAL may well be rendered
ineffective in some jurisdictions which establish large funds
under national law, such as that proposed in several Bills now
before the U.S. Congress. For example, S. 2666 (as it was during
the 94th Congress, 1st Session) provides for absolute and
unlimited liability for oil clean up costs. Sec. 5(a). On the
other hand, should the U.S. pursue its own legislative remedies
to the exclusion of the Fund Convention, that instrument may
well remain unratified, thus ensuring the life of CRISTAL.
Conversation with Mr. H.A. Steyn, 29 March 1977.
CHAPTER SIX
U.K. LAW REGULATING POLLUTION FROM SEABED OPERATIONS
A. Introduction
The present regime of British law relevant to the control of
North Sea pollution has been shaped to a large extent by treaty.
International customary law is generally considered to be part of
the law of the land. Treaties, however, must be implemented into the
U.K. legal system by enabling legislation.^ Most of the British law
discussed herein was enacted to comply with treaty obligations which
bind Her Majesty's Government (H.M.G.). See Table VI-1 on the next
page. There are two significant effects of this situation. First,
because U.K. law must substantially conform to the terms of the
treaty, Parliament's freedom to legislate is somewhat circumscribed.
Even the regulation of vessels in U.K. harbours may be subject to
2
the terms of treaties binding H.M.G.
The second point is a corollary of the first: municipal law
conformity with international treaty obligations is necessary because
a State may not plead the absence or inadequacy of the law in answer
3
to a claim for breach of an international duty. The majority
1. Brierly, J., The Law of Nations, Clarendon Press, Oxford (6th
edition, 1963), at p. 89; Brownlie, I., Principles of Public
International Law, Oxford University Press (1973), at pp. 45, 49.
2. See, for example, the remarks of Sulivan, J.A., the General Man¬
ager and Secretary, Milford Haven Conservancy Board, in "Milford
Havert," a case study appearing in British Institute of Inter¬
national and Comparative Law, Environmental Law: International
and Comparative Aspects, London (1975), pp. 137-144. Col. Suli¬
van particularly regrets the necessity that legislation control¬
ling pollution in U.K. harbours conform to IMCO Convention
requirements (at p. 138).
3. Brownlie, I., op. cit. in footnote 1, at p. 36. This principle
was used by the arbitral tribunal in the well-known Alabama
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Control of Pollution Act 1974
Note: The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 consolidated earlier
legislation.
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view is that failure to achieve conformity is not itself a direct
4
breach of international law; however, many of the Parliamentary
Debates during which British laws relevant to marine pollution con¬
trol were discussed indicate that such conformity was intended.
Express legislation may also be necessary to extend municipal
law beyond Her Majesty's realm, as was held to be the case in
R. v. Keyn.In that case, involving an alleged criminal act in U.K.
territorial waters, it was held that the court was without jurisdic¬
tion because the common law extended only so far as the land was un¬
covered by water; beyond that line of demarcation a court of Admiralty
was the appropriate forum. It was necessary that the common law be
expressly extended to the territorial sea by statutory instrument.
This action was in fact taken by the enactment of the Territorial
6
Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878. The Continental Shelf Act 1964 was
Claims case in rejecting the British defence of absence of muni¬
cipal law. (United States—Great Britain Claims Arbitration,
1872, reported in Moore, Arbitrations, p. 653.)
4. Brownlie, I., op. cit. in footnote 1, at p. 38; McNair, The Law
of Treaties, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1961), at p. lOO; Fitz-
maurice, G., "General Principles of International Law," 92
Receuil des Cours 5-227 (1957, Vol. II), at p. 89. Sir Gerald
observes that although non-conformity of municipal with inter¬
national obligations does not result in a direct breach of inter¬
national law ipso facto, "the State is in a posture of non¬
compliance with its international obligations so long as this
position persists." Thus, the situation is unclear when a State
adopts legislation actually contrary to its international oblig¬
ations. In some cases—such as expropriation without adequate
compensation pursuant to municipal law—the law itself undoubt¬
edly does constitute a breach. Ibid.
5. 2 Ex.D. 63, 168 (1876).
6. R. v. Martin presented a slightly different case. In that case
it was held that the court did have jurisdiction, but there was
no specific provision for extraterritorial application of U.K.
law so as to make the act in question (which had occurred onboard
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enacted in part to extend U.K. law to that submarine area, thus
precluding the problem raised in R. v. Keyn.
As noted earlier, U.K. law relating to prevention of marine
pollution has developed along the lines of the international conven¬
tions. Early treaties were primarily concerned with the control of
vessel-source oil pollution; for example, the 1954 IMCO Convention
7
discussed in Chapter Three. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1955
implemented that Convention and heralded the modern U.K. legal regime
8
of marine pollution control. Refinements to legislation intended to
9
control vessel-source oil pollution continued and a succession of
10
instruments came into force in the following years, but it was not
until 1974 that the scope of British regulation of marine pollution
a U.K.-registered aircraft outside the U.K.) an offence.
2 Q.B. 272 (1956). See Cheng, B., "Crimes on Board Aircraft,"
12 Current Legal Problems 177-207 (1959), at p. 178.
7. See above, at p. 151.
8. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1955 and its successors were
consolidated in the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971,
discussed below. British legislation relating to the control
of pollution dates at least from the sixteenth century, but
before the middle of the twentieth century British legislation
(as well as that of other States) was for the most part of
limited scope and effect. See Teclaff, L., "International
Law and the Protection of the Oceans from Pollution," 40
Fordham Law Review 529-564 (1972), at p. 529.
9. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1963, the Oil in Navigable
Waters Act 1971. These instruments were also consolidated
in the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971.
10. The most important instruments to come into force in the
period immediately following 1964 were the Petroleum (Pro¬
duction) Regulations 1976 (discussed at p. 297 ) and the
Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971
(described at p. 308 ).
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was significantly expanded. In that year the Dumping at Sea Act^
extended the control of vessel-source pollution to substances other
12
than oil. In 1975 an important Act intended to control marine
pollution from submarine pipelines was enacted, thus providing H.M.G.
with express authority to control these sub-sea transportation systems.
These major steps in the development of U.K. marine pollution
control legislation will be discussed in detail below. The sections
are organised by pollution source and applicable sections of U.K. law
are discussed under each heading in chronological order. (The
Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976 replace 1966 Regulations.)
A final word of introduction concerns changes which may be occurring
in the international law of the sea. It should be remembered, when con
sidering the legal regime described below, that possible events at
UNCLOS III and elsewhere may well alter the present law significantly.
The reader is referred to Chapter Three in this regard, especially
to the descriptions of RSNT proposals.
11. This Act enabled the U.K. to ratify the Oslo and London
Dumping Conventions (described above at p. 205 and p. 209).
The Dumping at Sea Act is discussed at p. 382.
12. The Dumping at Sea Act 1974 is complemented by the Control
of Pollution Act 1974 which, when the applicable provisions
come into force, will regulate the disposal of materials in
the sea by the use of pipe outfalls and similar devices.
Discussion of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 is outside
the scope of this investigation; however, a thorough analysis
of that instrument is provided by McLoughlin, J. in "The
Control of Pollution Act 1974," published in the Journal of
Planning and Environment Law (1975), pp. 16-24, 77-85,
192-207.
13. The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, discussed below
at p. 332.
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B. Pollution From Seabed Operations
14
1. Continental Shelf Act 1964
This Act was intended to provide for
"the exploration and exploitation of the contin¬
ental shelf; to enable effect to be given to
certain provisions of the Convention on the
High Seas done in Geneva on 29th April 1958; ^
and for matters connected with those purposes."
The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that
the coastal State exercises over her continental shelf "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
16
resources." This Act incorporates into British law rights conferred
by the Convention (or, possibly, customary law). Immediately follow¬
ing the enactment of this legislation Her Majesty's Government rati¬
fied the Convention which, in accordance with Article 11, came into
force thirty days later.^
In the early part of the 1960's exploration of the southern part-
of the North Sea was beginning, stimulated by the discovery of the
18
onshore Groningen gas field in the Netherlands in 1959. As offshore
14. 1964 Chapter 29, in force 15 April 1964.
15. Preamble to the Act.
16. Continental Shelf Convention, Article 2(1).
17. The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was ratified by
the U.K. on 11 May 1964 and came into force on 10 June of that
year. Cmnd. 2422 (1964) .
18. The first offshore wells in the North Sea were drilled off the
coast of the Netherlands in the early 1960's, but intense
exploration of the Danish, Norwegian, and U.K. continental
shelves did not begin until the middle of the decade. White,
I.L. (et al.), North Sea Oil and Gas, University of Oklahoma
Press (1973), p. 3 and sources cited therein. See also Gaskell,
T., "Oil and Gas in the North Sea," in Goldberg, E. (ed.), North
Sea Science, NATO North Sea Science Conference, Aviemore (15-20
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discoveries of gas occurred, North Sea States showed an increasing
interest in obtaining sovereign rights over the natural resources
of their continental shelves. Amidst speculation that hydrocarbon
deposits might be located in that part of the continental shelf
likely to become subject to U.K. sovereign rights, the U.K. nego-
19
tiated delimitation agreements with her North Sea neighbours.
The prospect of offshore energy united Parliament in the common goal
of enacting the Continental Shelf Act as quickly as possible to
20
facilitate North Sea development.
The Preamble also states that a purpose of the Act is to enable
effect to be given to certain provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conven¬
tion on the High Seas. The High Seas Convention provisions incorpor¬
ated into British law by the Continental Shelf Act are closely con¬
nected with the development of offshore resources. The High Seas
Convention imposes an obligation on States to draw up regulations
to prevent marine pollution caused
"by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines
or resulting from the exploitation and exploration
November 1971), MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London (1973), pp.
450-463. The first gas production from the U.K. sector occurred
on 7 March 1967 from the West Sole Field. U.K. Department of En¬
ergy, Continental Shelf Act Report for the year 1966-67. The
first oil was brought ashore from the U.K. sector by tanker from
the Argyll Field in 1975. U.K. Department of Energy, Develop¬
ment of the Oil and Gas Resources of the United Kingdom, H.M.S.O.
(1976), at p. 4.
19. Delimitation is discussed above at pp. 122 et seg.
20. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 688, col. 224, 28 January 1964. It is
also noteworthy that the first criterion for licence issuance
was stated by the responsible Minister to be "(t)he need to
encourage the most rapid and thorough exploration and econom¬
ical exploitation of petroleum resources on the Continental
Shelf." Hansard, H.C. Vol. 692, col. 897, 7 April 1964.
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21
of the seabed and its subsoil,"
as well as requiring States to take measures to prevent pollution
22
from radioactive wastes. In 1971, the Continental Shelf Act was
amended by the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act. The new Act repealed
S. 5 of the Continental Shelf Act (which concerned the discharge of
oil from pipelines or seabed operations), incorporating an amended ver¬
sion of that Section into its provisions. The Continental Shelf Act
retains some incidental provisions relating to the control of marine
pollution, but is now primarily important because it extends U.K. jur¬
isdiction to the continental shelf. These jurisdictional provisions
will be discussed immediately; the new provisions for the control of
oil pollution from pipelines and seabed operations are discussed in
23
the section relating to the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act.
S. 1 of the Continental Shelf Act is broadly concerned with est¬
ablishing in British law the rights specified by the Continental Shelf
Convention. Thus, "any rights" which the U.K. may exercise in respect
of the natural resources of the seabed outside territorial waters
24
belong to Her Majesty. Pertinent sections of the law regulating
21. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 24.
22. Ibid., Article 25. As noted above in connection with the dis¬
cussion of the High Seas Convention, the provisions contained
therein purport to be declaratory of international customary
law. Assuming this to be true, the U.K. would have been under a
duty to regulate pollution of the sea by oil and radioactive
wastes even before she ratified the High Seas Convention.
23. See below, p. 322.
x
24. Rights in relation to control are exercisable by the National
Coal Board. S. 1(2). Other natural resources, such as gravel,
are managed by the Crown Estate Commissioners pursuant to S. 1
of the Crown Estate Act 1961. (See, generally, Sibthorp, M.,
(ed.), The North Sea: Challenge and Opportunity, published for
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licence issuance for petroleum exploration and production on land
25
are extended to the U.K. continental shelf. Licences for explor¬
ation or production in offshore areas have been issued pursuant to
26 2 7
Regulations by the Secretary of State for Energy.
The rights conferred on licensees may be exercised only in
28
zones described by Order in Council as "designated areas." These
29
now include virtually all of the U.K. North Sea continental shelf.
the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies by
Europa Publications, Ltd., London (1975). Because rights claimed
are not defined in the Act, should new rights in respect of the
seabed accrue to the U.K. (for example, as a result of an agree¬
ment at UNCLOS III), on a textual interpretation of S. 1 such
rights could be exercised under the provisions of the present Act.
25. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 Ss. 2 and 6 relating "to the
granting of licences to search and bore for, and get, petroleum"
on land are expressly extended to the U.K. sector by S. 1(3) of
the Act. This is an excellent illustration of Hardy's observa¬
tion that regulations controlling offshore operations have
evolved from terrestrial origins. See Hardy, M., "Offshore
Development and Marine Pollution," 1 Ocean Development and In¬
ternational Law 239-273 (1973-74), at p. 251, and the discussion
of the evolution of U.K. licensing policy in the section below
examining the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976.
26. The Petroleum (Production) Regulations (1976 No. 1129) .
27. S. 1(6). The Secretary of State is obligated to report to Par¬
liament annually on licences granted and held, hydrocarbon
production, and the formula used to compute licence fees. Ss.
1(5), (6). The Minister of Power was responsible for licence
issuance under the Act, but several organisational changes have
now vested that duty with the Secretary of State for Energy.
28. S. 1(7) .
29. Conversations with Mr. J. Harvard, Department of Energy, 16 June
1976. At the end of 1976, designated areas were established by
six Orders. See the Continental Shelf (Designation of Areas)
Order (1964 No. 697), and the Continental Shelf (Designation of
Additional Areas) Orders (1965 No. 1531), (1968 No. 891), (1971
No. 594), (1974 No. 1489), (1976 No. 1153). Some areas were des¬
ignated by the U.K. before delimitation agreements with other
North Sea States had been reached. Early designated areas were
therefore those that were near to the U.K. so as to minimise
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S. 2 of the Act provides that "safety zones" may be created by
Orders in Council to protect installations^0 from risks posed by
vessels. ^ This provision implements the right conferred by Article
5(3) of the Continental Shelf Convention. Pursuant to S. 2, Orders
have been issued prohibiting ships from entering an area 500 metres
from the outer edges of specified installations in designated areas
32
without permission from the Secretary of State. Unauthorised and
unexempted entry into a prohibited zone subjects the owner or master
to fine or imprisonment unless the accused can prove that the master
neither knew of nor reasonably could have ascertained the existence
possible conflict with Britain's North Sea neighbours. Hansard,
H.L. Vol. 253, cols. 912-13, 3 December 1963. The effect of the
Norwegian Trough was likewise unresolved in 1964, though it was
the U.K. view that "the Norwegian Deep is not deep enough to
preclude Norway from operating on the subsoil of the shallower
waters beyond." Mr. John Peyton, the Parliamentary Secretary to
the Ministry of Power, reported in Hansard, H.C. Vol. 688, col.
276, 28 January 1964.
30. "Installation" is not defined by the Act, but spokesman's com¬
ments during Parliamentary debate suggest that it should be
given a wide interpretation: "In this Bill the term /'installa¬
tion/ is used generically and includes such things as drilling
platforms situated above the surface of the sea and connected to
the sea-bed by legs, and also barges which are anchored to the
sea-bed and from which drilling operations are carried out,
either over the stern or through the barge bottom." Hansard,
H.L. Vol. 253, col. 914, 3 December 1963. Article 5 of the Con¬
tinental Shelf Convention refers to "installations or devices"
which are "on the continental shelf" (paragraph 2, emphasis
added), and provides safety zones for those "which have been
erected" (paragraph 3). As S. 2 of the Act implements the right
to establish safety zones around "installations" conferred by
Article 5 of the Convention, there is little doubt that safety
zones can only be established around "installations" that are
stationary. On the other hand, U.K. jurisdiction extends to
installations even when they are in transit.
31. S. 1 (7).
32. Safety zones are published in notices to mariners which are
issued by the Admiralty. See Samuels, A., "The Continental
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of the prohibited zone.
The prohibition imposed by the Protection of Installations
Orders is inconsistent with the rule of international customary law
which provides that freedom of navigation is a freedom of the high
34
seas. However, freedom of navigation is not absolute; it must be
35
balanced by a duty of reasonable usage. Thus, in some cases the
freedom to navigate on the high seas may be restricted. The legal
basis for U.K. safety zones is Article 5(2) of the Continental Shelf
Convention. Article 5(2) provides that the coastal State may estab¬
lish safety zones around installations on its continental shelf and
"take in those zones measures necessary for their protection." What
"measures" may be taken is not specified though some regulation of
navigation is clearly authorised, for Article 5(3) provides that
"(s)hips of all nationalities must respect these safety zones."
Shelf Act 1964," in British Institute of International and Com¬
parative Law, Developments in the Law of the Sea 1958-1964,
London (1965), pp. 155-167, at p. 166. Exceptions are provided
for repair of a submarine pipe or cable, provision of service
to an installation or inspection of an installation under
government authority, a lighthouse authority ship in connection
with safety of navigation duties, movements to save life or
property, intrusion because of weather or when in distress.
These exceptions are enumerated in each Order at S. 2(1).
33. S. 2(2). The penalty on summary conviction is a maximum fine
of £100 and/or imprisonment of up to three months; on indict¬
ment the fine is unlimited and the prison term may be up to one
year.
34. High Seas Convention, Article 2(1).
35. Ibid., Article 2: "These freedoms, and others which are recog¬
nised by the general principles of international law, shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas.". See also Warbrick, C., "The Regulation of Navigation,"
in British Institute of International and Comparative Law, New
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Although there have been a number of instances in which foreign
36
vessels have violated U.K. safety zones, as of mid 1976 there had
37
been no disputes resulting from the U.K. prohibitions. The absence
of protest by other States is some evidence that the prohibition of
38
traffic within 500 metres of installations is reasonable and it may
also suggest that the U.K. law has been accepted as international
customary law. However, it must be remembered that caution is required
when inferring the opinio juris element of customary law from an ab¬
sence of protest. On the one hand it may well indicate a tacit accept¬
ance that a new right which infringes on the freedom of the high sea
has been created; however, as the majority of the P.C.I.J, in the
Lotus case observed, it does not follow that because a State has re¬
frained from acting in a certain way that it believes that it is leg-
39
ally bound to do so. A cluster of rigs, especially in the more con-
Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. Ill, London (1973), at
pp. 137-154.
36. The number of breaches of U.K. safety zones has risen from 16
in 1971 to 50 in 1973. See Birnie, P., "The Legal Background
to North Sea Oil and Gas Development," in Saeter, M. and Smart,
I. (eds.), The Political Implications of North Sea Oil and Gas,
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo and I.P.C. Science and Technology
Press Ltd., Guildford (1975), pp. 19-50, at p. 42 in her
footnote 17.
37. Conversation with Mr. K. Mayo, Department of Energy, 16 June
1976.
38. Some writers have suggested that a 500 metre zone, agreed upon
before the advent of supertankers is, if anything, insufficient
to safeguard against collision risk. Birnie, P. op. cit. in
footnote 36, at p. 22. U.K. operators have asked H.M.G. to
unilaterally extend safety zones to 1,000 metres. The Scotsman,
2 March 1977, p. 9. Cf. the Norwegian operators' view that safe¬
ty zones should surround installation clusters, below, at p. 438.
39. The Lotus, P.C.I.J., Series A. No. 10 (1927). See "'Emerging'
international customary law?" above at p. 96.
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gested or strategically important sections of the North Sea, might
well engender protest by foreign States as an unreasonable infringe-
40
ment of the traditional high seas freedoms.
S. 3 of the Act applies U.K. criminal and civil law to designa-
41
ted areas. Criminal law applies to acts or omissions,
"on, under or above an installation in a designated
area or any waters within five hundred metres
of such an installation" and which could, if
committed in any part of the U.K., "constitute an ^
offence under the law in force in that part" of the U.K.
This provision raises both international and British legal issues.
The international law question is whether the jurisdiction
claimed exceeds that granted either by the Continental Shelf Convention
40. By mid 1976 safety zones had been designated in respect of some
50 U.K. installations. Department of Energy, "Fact Sheet 2: Oil
from the U.K. Continental Shelf," (July 1976), at p. 5.
41. S. 8 of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971.
amends S. 3 of the Continental Shelf Act by extending its applic¬
ation to include territorial waters as well as designated areas.
42. Although S. 3(1) is not expressly limited to criminal law, the
term "offence" suggests that it excludes civil grievances. This
implication is supported by Parliamentary Debates. Hansard, H.L.
Vol. 253, cols. 913-914, 3 December 1963. S. 3(2), discussed
immediately below in the text, was intended to transfer the civil
law, although it was recognised that some Acts (such as the Wire¬
less Telegraphy Act and the Radioactive Substances Act) which are
expressly extended by Order pursuant to S. 3(2) would indirectly
concern criminal law. Hansard, Standing Committee A, 3rd sitting,
col. 108, 26 February 1964. Enforcement of U.K. criminal law on
installations is by the constable of the area which services the
installation. S. 11(3) and administrative practice. The body
of criminal law extended to installations is limited to that
which has the "character of universality." Sibthorp, M. (ed.),
op. cit. in footnote 24, at p. 168, footnote 66. This source
also quotes Samuels as remarking that "it remains to be seen how
far, if at all, the drinking and betting and gaming laws will be
applied to installations as having comparable conditions and con¬
stituting a 'microcosm of the United Kingdom,'" Samuels, A., op.
cit. in footnote 32, at p. 166. The most important problem with
the extension of British law offshore is that of enforcement.
The Aberdeen constable is responsible for activities on installa¬
tions in the North Sea that are farther from Aberdeen than
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or by international customary law. Two provisions of the Convention
are relevant. Article 5(4) provides that installations and devices
on the continental shelf are under the jurisdiction of the coastal
State, but cautions that they are not islands and do not have a
territorial sea. In the following paragraph, Article 5(5) requires
that if abandoned or disused, installations must be entirely removed.
Jurisdiction in the safety zone is therefore not based on territorial
43
sovereignty, but is of a limited concessionary nature. Does this
jurisdiction allow the application of British criminal law to foreign
vessels within the safety zone? What of application to foreign air¬
craft flying above an installation?
The right to interfere with a foreign flag vessel on the high
seas is limited but can the safety zone be classified as high seas?
The Continental Shelf Convention expressly authorises a functional
zone, thus distinguishing it from the high seas. As in the question
of prohibiting entry into the zone, application of coastal State crim¬
inal law in that area depends for its validity in international law
(at least vis a vis Parties to the Continental Shelf Convention) on
whether it is a reasonable exercise of the authorised zonal function.
In the case of the U.K., the control of prosecutions by H.M.G. has
ensured that British criminal law has been applied sparingly to foreign
vessels.^
Aberdeen is from Dublin, yet transportation to such locations
must be arranged on an ad hoc basis. Chief Constable Alexander
Morrison of Aberdeen describes offshore police work in the special
"Oil Register" supplement to The Scotsman, 28 January 1975.
43. Birnie, P., op. cit. in footnote 36, at. p. 21.
44. Although the Department of Trade has powers under S. 3 of the
Act to control foreign flag vessels within the safety zone, so
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A more difficult question is raised by the doctrine of hot
pursuit. The High Seas Convention and international customary law
authorise the pursuit of a foreign ship which has violated the laws
of a coastal State. Hot pursuit may be commenced when the foreign
vessel is in the internal waters, territorial sea, or contiguous
45
zone of the coastal State and may continue on the high seas so long
as pursuit is not interrupted. The foreign vessel may be arrested,
but any action by the coastal State must be proportional to the offence
alleged, and in the event that interference is unjustified or dispro-
46
portional, compensation must be paid.
Is there a right of hot pursuit from installation safety zones?
This question has not arisen in practice, so there is little from
47
which to infer the existence of customary law. Perhaps the strong¬
est argument for the view that there is a right of hot pursuit from
far regulations have been agreed on a voluntary basis. Archer,
J., "Government Responsibilities for Maritime Safety," 19 Trade
and Industry 130-134, at p. 134 (18 April 1975). The Department
of Trade objection to inadequate and substandard crews on some
supply vessels flying foreign flags has not been resolved by such
agreement. Conversation with Dr. J. Cowley, 11 June 1976.
Agreement was sought because although U.K. jurisdiction is made
possible by the entry of supply vessels into British ports,
there is no applicable British law. Ibid.
45. Hot pursuit from the contiguous zone can only occur for offences
related to purposes for which that zone was established, that is,
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations. Terri¬
torial Sea Convention, Article 24(1). The U.K. does not claim
. a contiguous zone and has opposed a right of pursuit for acts
committed therein, although accepting that violations in the
territorial sea or internal waters justify commencement of
pursuit from the contiguous zone. Brownlie, I., op. cit. in
footnote 1, at p. 246, and sources cited therein.
46. High Seas Convention, Article 23; the I'm Alone, 2 U.S. Depart¬
ment of State Arbitration Series 1-7 (1931-1935).
47. Conversation with Mr. K. Mayo, Department of Energy, 16 June
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the safety zone to the high seas is that such a right must be implied
48
from the very nature of the zone. It is improbable that an intruder
will linger within the zone if he believes that arrest is imminent.
However, if a customary law right of hot pursuit from installation
safety zones has developed, it must be consistent with the reasonable
use requirement which attempts to accommodate competitive activities.
The safety zone, like the contiguous zone, is predicated upon function.
It is suggested that an implied right of hot pursuit from safety
zones is limited to the objective of ensuring installation safety
or safeguarding the coastal State's sovereign rights over the seabed.
It will be remembered that Article 3(1) of the Act also purports
to extend national criminal laws to foreign aircraft above an instal¬
lation. This is a claim ultra vires the express provisions of the
Continental Shelf Convention. Can it, however, be implied or found
in customary law?
It is arguable that a right to control aircraft over an instal¬
lation is implied in the Continental Shelf Convention. In the
Reparations for Injuries Case, the I.C.J, found that the right to
claim for damages caused to an employee of the United Nations, though
1976. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships,
military aircraft, or ships and aircraft on Government services
specially authorised to that effect. High Seas Convention,
Article 23(4). Thus, a supply vessel would be prohibited from
pursuing an offender, and H.M.G. should ensure that any type
of "protection vessel" has the requisite authorisation.
48. A U.S. District Court found that international customary law
authorises hot pursuit from a fisheries zone. Fidell, E.,
"Hot Pursuit from a Fisheries Zone," 70 American Journal of
International Law 95-101 (1976), commenting on U.S. v. Fishing
Vessel Taiyo Maru No. 28; U.S. v. Kawaguchi [395 F. Supp. 413
(D. Me. 1975)]. Another writer suggested that the case merely
made explicit a right which was implicit in customary law.
Ciobanu, D., "Hot Pursuit from a Fisheries Zone: A Further
Comment," Ibid., at pp. 549-553.
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not expressly provided for in the Charter, was conferred upon the
organisation by necessary implication because such power was
49
essential to the performance of U.N. duties.
In the case of installations, the coastal State is given juris¬
diction to control activities actually on the installations. Activi¬
ties immediately over an installation, as by a hovering helicopter,
quite clearly could seriously interfere with coastal State jurisdic¬
tion and control. On the other hand, a reconnaissance flight or
satellite at a height of several miles would not be likely to conflict
with activities on the installation. It may be, then, that under the
customary law criterion of reasonable use, the coastal State is en¬
titled to the jurisdiction necessary to reasonably exercise its
sovereign rights over the natural resources of the continental shelf,
and this includes the regulation of low-flying aircraft.
The second issue concerns possible multiple prosecutions under
U.K. law. S. 3(1) must be read with S. 11(1) which provides that
prosecutions of offences committed under S. 3(1)
"may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental
purposes be treated as having been committed, in any
place in the United Kingdom."
The effect of these two provisions is that an offender may be prosec¬
uted in any court in the U.K.—and possibly by two or more courts
where the act or omission complained of are peculiar to each juris¬
diction. An accused could conceivably be required to defend himself
before courts in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland."*0 This
49. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, I.C.J. Reports (1949), p. 174.
50. Prof. Lauterpacht has noted that it would also "be possible to
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provision, though potentially onerous, is not unique. H.M.G.'s
position was that the wide criminal jurisdiction thus provided for
would be closely controlled to preclude vexatious prosecution.
Civil jurisdiction concerning offshore operations activities is
extended to territorial waters and designated areas by an Order in
52
Council effecting extraterritorial extension. Pursuant to this sec¬
tion, an Order has divided the designated areas into English, Scottish
53
and Northern Irish sections. The locus of the act complained
prosecute in Scotland for any offence against Scots law a person
committing on an installation off the coast of Cornwall an act
which was not an offence under English law." Lauterpacht, E.,
(ed.), British Practice in International Law (1964), pp. 55-56;
cited by Sibthorp, M., (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 24, at p.
168, footnote 67. Mr. Samuels (op. cit. at footnote 32) dis¬
agrees with this interpretation.
51. As Mr. John Peyton, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister
of Power, explained to the House of Commons, "(t)he fact that a
person may thus be exposed to criminal proceedings in two coun¬
tries is not of itself novel. This is the position under the
Merchant Shipping Acts, and careful examination of the experience
under those Acts has not led the Government to believe that
there is any need to have second thoughts about what we are doing
here." Hansard, H.C. Vol. 692, col. 884, 7 April 1964.
52. S. 3(2). As with criminal jurisdiction, S. 8 of the Mineral
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act amends the civil law
extension of the Continental Shelf Act to add territorial waters
to the designated areas specified in S. 3 of the Act. The limit¬
ation of civil jurisdiction to matters of seabed operations
leaves the question of civil jurisdiction in respect of other
occurrences open, for example, slander spoken on an installation.
Sibthorp, M. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 24, at p. 169, footnote
69.
53. The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order (1968 No. 892). The
Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Orders (1971 No.
721) and (1974 No. 1490) extend civil jurisdiction to newly
designated areas. The 1968 Jurisdiction Order has been suggested
by some as delimiting a "Scottish sector" over which an indepen¬
dent Scotland could exercise sovereign rights. This suggestion
conflicts with the principles of continental shelf delimitation
between adjacent States as declared by the I.C.J, in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases. I.C.J. Reports 1969. See the article
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of determines which of these courts has exclusive jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is exclusive for civil litigation because the Govern¬
ment cannot exercise the control over litigation that they can in
cases of criminal prosecutions. It was decided that only one court
should have jurisdiction to prevent possible multiple litigation
which could require a defendant to appear in various parts of the
54
U.K., perhaps in connection with the same action.
Several Acts are expressly extended to designated areas by
provisions of the Continental Shelf Act. Thus, Part II of the Coast
Protection Act which requires Department of Trade consent before any
work which is likely to cause an obstruction or danger to navigation
55
may be commenced now applies to the continental shelf. Pursuant
to this provision, the Government has express control over the siting
of installations and devices, and it can control the location of
obstructions to shipping lanes.^
by Hugh Stevenson in The Times, 1 March 1976, at p. 17 and the
letter of John Grant to The Times, 3 March 1976, at p. 18
commenting on the article. Both the Court and the Continental
Shelf Convention (in Article 6) accord priority to agreement
between the interested States and then suggest other methods of
delimitation—none of which is a pre-existing internal instru¬
ment of one of the parties.
54. "We have therefore done our best to ensure that a person would
be prosecuted in only one country. We are satisfied that crim¬
inal proceedings would not be taken in both countries, but where
civil proceedings are concerned, where there might be a multitude
of plaintiffs, it would be very undesirable that the wretched
defendant should be pursued in two countries at the same time
and where .... there might be two different results." Hansard,
Standing Committee A, 3rd sitting, col. 107, 26 February 1964.
55. 12 & 13 Geo. 6 Ch. 74; Continental Shelf Act, S. 4.
56. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 253, col. 914, 3 December 1963. Extension
of the Coast Protection Act in practice "means that consent must
be obtained for each drilling operation and for all offshore
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The Wireless Telegraphy Act was extended by the Continental
Shelf Act at the urging of the Post Office. In summary, it author¬
ises the Postmaster General to control the use of wireless telegraphy
57
on or near installations.
S. 7, authorising application of the Radioactive Substances Act
1960 to the continental shelf by Order was included to comply with
the obligation imposed by Article 25 of the High Seas Convention.
Use of radioactive substances on the continental shelf
"is likely when someone seeking to explore what
is under the Shelf lowers a sealed neutron.
The radioactive rays sent out from the neutron
will be reflected in such a way as to
reveal the qualities of the surrounding strata."
S. 7 gives H.M.G. control over such activities.
S. 8(1) extends those parts of the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885
pertaining to punishment for cable damage and compensation for gear
sacrificed to avoid such damage to all submarine cables under the high
59
seas, and to pipelines as well. This provision might be challenged
production facilities." Offshore operators are warned that pro¬
posals to drill within "clearways" (see Figure II-3, p. 42 ) are
subject to protracted approval proceedings. Continental Shelf
Operations Notice No. 18, March 1973. Operations Notices are
published by the Department of Energy to advise offshore opera¬
tors on matters of U.K. law and policy. The Coast Protection
Act now provides H.M.G. with authority to control the laying of
buoys, an activity which has been the basis for fishermen's com¬
plaints that such objects constituted unreasonable interference
with fishing. Banel, R., "North Sea Hazard Warning System,"
The Scotsman, "Oil Register" supplement, 26 January 1976.
57. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 253, col. 915, 3 December 1963; H.C. Vol. 692,
col. 885, 7 April 1964.
58. Hansard, Standing Committee A, 4th sitting, col. 145, 4 March
1964.
59. The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order (1968 No. 892) extends
both the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 and the Radioactive Sub-
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by a defendant prosecuted pursuant to it. U.K. criminal juris¬
diction to prosecute in respect of telegraph cables is based on
S. 27 of the High Seas Convention and expansion of the enabling Act
beyond the scope of the Convention could be questioned. S. 8 is so
broadly drafted that it would authorise U.K. prosecution of a
foreign national for damage to a foreign pipeline, so long as the
pipe rests on the U.K. continental shelf. However, Article 24 of
the High Seas Convention requires all States to draw up regulations
to prevent oil pollution from pipelines. The argument that S. 8(1)
is merely a reasonable fulfillment of this duty is persuasive.
The remaining provisions deal with incidental matters of little
60
relevance to the control of marine pollution.
In conclusion, it may be said that the Continental Shelf Act
1964 is an effective instrument for the extension of U.K. law beyond
her territory. Although certain provisions may be criticised as
perhaps exceeding their basis in international law, in practice
H.M.G. has acted in accordance with present global norms. Moreover,
as there is a clear trend to expanded coastal State jurisdiction
in State practice and as evidenced by UNCLOS III negotiations, the
Continental Shelf Act appears destined to remain uncontroversial.
stances Act 1960 to designated areas. The Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act extends the application of Continental
Shelf Act S. 8(1) to pipelines in U.K. territorial waters,
pursuant to S. 45(1).
60. S. 9 concerns the use and supply of natural gas, S. 10 con¬
cerns the modification of national insurance acts, S. 12
refers to the powers of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to
make laws. Ss. 9 and 10 have been substantially modified by
subsequent legislation; S. 12 was repealed in 1973.
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2. Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976^"*"
These Regulations contain the licensing system that is the
primary instrument controlling the exploration and exploitation
of the U.K. continental shelf. They were issued by the Minister
62
of Power under the authority of the Petroleum (Production)
Act of 1934^^ and the Continental Shelf Act 1964.
The Regulations consist of a short body of 12 sections,
plus appended Schedules containing Model Clauses for various
64
types of licences. The paragraphs below set out the general
provisions of the Regulations followed by a brief exposition
of relevant sections of Schedules Five ("Model Clauses for
Production Licences in Seaward Areas") and Seven ("Model Clauses
for Exploration Licences in Seaward Areas or in Landward Areas
65
Below the Low Water Line").
61. (1976 No. 1129), effective 20 August 1976. The 1976 Regulations
(as they shall be designated herein) consolidate the Pet¬
roleum (Production) Regulations 1966 (as amended) and
complete the revocation of the Petroleum (Production)
Regulations 1935 (as amended). Schedule 2 of the 1976
Regulations sets out the Regulations ceasing to have effect.
It should be pointed out that the 1966 Regulations (as
amended) had replaced the Petroleum (Production) (Continen¬
tal Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations (1964 No. 7o8).
62. Now the Secretary of State for Energy.
63. 24 & 25 Geo.5.c. 36, S. 6.
64. Other Schedules containing Model Clauses for licences
include 4 ("Model Clauses for Production Licences in
Landward Areas"), 6 ("Model Clauses for Exploration Licences
in Landward Areas Above the Low Water Line"), and 8 ("Model
Clauses for Methane Drainage Licences") . Schedule 1
is "Lines Dividing Landward Areas from Seaward Areas,"
and Schedule 3 is "Form of Application for a Production
Licence or an Exploration Licence."
65. Regulations 10(2)(b), (d).
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Licences are necessary to either produce or explore for oil in
66
"seaward areas" of the U.K. Any person may apply for either type
of licence and, under the 1976 Regulations, it is not necessary
that the applicant be a U.K. resident citizen or an enterprise
67
incorporated in the U.K. (This was required under the 1966
Regulations, however, and many foreign companies have incorporated
68
U.K. subsidiaries which have become licensees.)
Production licences confer upon the holder exclusive rights to
explore for and produce petroleum^ in the licensed area for four
70
years. Thereafter, one-third of the sections awarded may be retained
71
for an additional 30 years, the remainder reverting to Her Majesty.
72 73
Production licences are awarded following invited bids for blocks
66. These are areas seaward of the low water line or straight
baselines. Schedule 1 lists U.K. straight baselines.
67. Regulations, Section 4.
68. About one-third of the licensees are native British companies.
Department of Energy, op. cit. in footnote 40, at p. 8.
69. Petroleum includes any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbons
and natural gas. Schedule 5, Model Clause 1.
70. Schedule 5, Model Clauses 2 and 3. The original licensed
area may be extended for an additional 3 years. As of mid
1976, approximately 16 per cent, of the U.K. continental
shelf had been licensed pursuant to 33 licences issued to
more than 240 licensees. Department of Energy, op. cit.
in footnote 40, at p. 8.
71. Schedule 5, Model Clauses 4 and 5.
72. Except where the applicant is the BNOC or a subsidiary company,
or does or did hold a production licence in respect of the
area, a production licence may only be issued in response
to invited bids for specific blocks. Regulations, Section 7.
73. Blocks measure 20O-25O square kilometres (80-100 square miles).
Scottish Office, Brief on North Sea Oil, p. 35 (1974).
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within designated areas. The amount of a bid was subordinate to
other factors in early licensing rounds, the most important consid-
74
eration being the promise of rapid development. However, in the
fourth round of licensing in 1971-72 the size of the bonus offered
75
in a bid became a factor to be formally considered.
Exploration licences are not exclusive, but may be for the whole
76
or any part of seaward areas. The right to explore for petroleum
is granted for three years, subject to any existing production licence
• U4- 77rights.
Several provisions of Schedules Five and Seven are directly
74. In 1964, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Power
noted six criteria for licence issuance—none of which was
financial:
1. "The need to encourage the most rapid and thorough explor¬
ation and economical exploitation of petroleum resources
on the Continental Shelf.
2. The requirement that the applicant for a licence shall be
incorporated in the United Kingdom and that the profits
of the operations shall be taxable here.
3. Where the applicant is a foreign-owned concern, how far
British oil companies receive equitable treatment in that
country.
4. The programme of work of the applicant and also the ability
and resources to implement it.
5. The contribution the applicant has already made or is making
towards the development of resources of our Continental
Shelf and the development of our fuel economy generally."
6. The requirements of national security were also considered.
Hansard, H.C. Vol. 692, col. 897, 7 April 1964.
75. Scottish Office, loc. cit. in footnote 73; White, I.L. (efc al.),
op. cit. in footnote 18, at p. 27 and sources cited therein. Awards
from the fifth round of licensing announced 9 February 1977 indi¬
cate that State participation is now a significant factor. Amoco,
which has resisted H.M.G. in this respect was not numbered among
the 24 new licensees. The Times, 10 February 1977, p. 19; The
Scotsman, 10 February 1977, p. 1.
76. Regulations, Section 8(1)(a); Schedule 7, Model Clause 2.
77. Schedule 7, Model Clauses 2, 4. The licence may be extended for
an additional 3 years at Ministerial discretion.
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relevant to the control of marine pollution from offshore operations.
No production or exploration well may be started, abandoned or re-
78
started without the written consent of the Secretary of State.
The Government can therefore control the location of wells even if
79
navigational considerations are not involved. The Secretary of
State is also empowered to order an examination of wells and relevant
records where a condition in the licence relates to the position,
80
depth or direction of the well, or its casing. A similar examin¬
ation may be ordered in respect of an abandoned well which was drilled
under a licence containing a condition pertaining to plugging or
81
sealing. Plugging of wells must be done in accordance with a speci¬
fication approved by the Secretary of State and effected in "an
82
efficient and workmanlike manner." In the event that a production
well is located in an area for which the licensee no longer exercises
rights, if not sealed it shall be left in good order and fit for
83
further working. Such remaining fixtures become the property of
78. Schedule 5, Model Clause 17(1), (2). Model Clause 19 imposes a
similar condition of Ministerial consent on a Licensee wishing
to suspend work on the drilling of a development well. Schedule
7, Model Clause 7(1), (2).
79. Cf. Article 4 of the Continental Shelf Act which extends Part II
of the Coast Protection Act to installations on the Continental
Shelf and which concerns likely obstructions to navigation.
Under the Model Clause, the Secretary of State could take action
to avoid other dangers (such as drilling in unstable geological
formations) or to avoid conflict with other users not primarily
interested in navigation (such as fishermen).
80. Schedule 5, Model Clause 17(4); Schedule 7, Model Clause 7(4).
81. Ibid.
82. Schedule 5, Model Clause 17(5); Schedule 7, Model Clause 7(7).
83. Schedule 5, Model Clause 17(6).
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the Secretary of State. The above provisions regulating oilwell
fixtures empower the Secretary of State to control quite closely the
manner in which drilling and other offshore activities may be con¬
ducted. The express powers contained in Model Clauses are possibly
incomplete, however, in that they do not require the removal of
abandoned or disused installations as required by the Continental
85
Shelf Convention. Despite this omission, there is little doubt
that such removal could be required under the Coast Protection Act
86
as applied by the Continental Shelf Act. But as the Government is
under no legal duty to require installation removal in appropriate
87
cases, and in fact does not do so, in this respect U.K. legislation
84. Ibid., 17(7}.
85. Article 5(5). See Birnie, P., op. cit. in footnote 36, at
p. 29.
86. A recent investigation of obstacles to navigation on the U.K.
continental shelf revealed that there was no central body to
collate and publicise details of structures placed on the con¬
tinental shelf. In consequence, mariners were unaware of many
obstacles to navigation. It was recommended "that existing
statutory requirements should be enforced to ensure the notifi¬
cation of the establishment, movement or abandonment of
structures on the sea bed of the U.K. Continental Shelf. There
should be substantial penalties for non-compliance. We also
recommend that a review should be undertaken of the adequacy of
existing legislation and that the Royal Navy should be given the
responsibility for inspection and enforcement." Report from the
Select Committee on Science and Technology, Offshore Engineering,
Session 1974, H.M.S.O. (1974).
87. Continental Shelf Operations Notice No. 11 (Addendum), November
1975, is instructive: "In view of the great draught of some
modern vessels and the increasing oil exploration and develop¬
ment operations in UK waters, the Department of Trade (Marine
Division) may in the future consider it necessary to restrict
the height above seabed level of suspended wellheads in certain
areas of heavy shipping activity. To prevent obstruction or
danger to navigation, Marine Division when consenting to propos¬
als to drill in water depths of 25 fathoms (45 metres) or less,
may impose a restrictive condition to the effect that in any
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and practice falls short of the obligations imposed by Article 5(5)
of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
In addition to requirements specified more or less precisely in
the Model Clauses, there is a general requirement that the holder of
a production licence must
"use methods and practice customarily used in
good oilfield practice for confining the
petroleum obtained from the licensed area
in tanks, gasholders, pipes, pipelines or gg
other receptacles constructed for that purpose."
"Good oilfield practice" is a standard that was established by
many States as an attempt to control offshore activity for which
there was no precedent in their law. The approach offers the
advantage of flexibility so that initial standards may be predicated
upon experience accumulated from exploration and production on land,
but then can be modified as offshore technology and practice develop.
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the industry sought
89
to be regulated should set its own standards. For this reason
the "good oilfield practice" criterion of performance is generally
being replaced by legislation based upon what experience has shown
is possible or practicable. In the U.K., industry standards are com¬
plemented by law, but they remain important in several areas,
90
such as determining "practicable" operational discharges.
subsequent suspension, the wellhead shall not protrude more
than 2 metres above seabed level."
88. Schedule 5, Model Clause 20.
89. Mr. Warbrick made this observation in connection with the role of
insurance underwriters in influencing vessel safety standards.
See Warbrick, C., op. cit. in footnote 35, at p. 149.
90. See the discussion of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act
1971, below at p. 322.
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The "good oilfield practice" standard is defined by the Code
of Safe Practice for Drilling and Production in Marine Areas, compiled
91
by the Institute of Petroleum. In pertinent part it provides that
"(n)o crude oil, waste oil, oil sludge, oil water
emulsion, or oil-bearing mixtures should be discharged ^
or allowed to flow into any stream, lake, or open sea."
The industry standard purports, therefore, to prohibit the release
of any oil from installations, no matter of what concentration.
As will be seen, this is precisely the approach embodied in the
93
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971.
The obligation to work in accordance with good oilfield practice
is further elaborated by Model Clauses which require the licensee
to take all steps practicable in order
"(a) to control the flow and to prevent the escape or
waste of petroleum discovered in or obtained form
the licensed area;
(b) to conserve the licensed area for productive
operations;
(c) to prevent damage to adjoining petroleum bearing
strata;
(d) to prevent the entrance of water through wells to
petroleum bearing strata except for the purposes
of secondary recovery; and
(e) to prevent the escape of petroleum into any
waters in or in the vicinity of the licensed area."
91. Institute of Petroleum, Code of Safe Practice for Drilling
and Production in Marine Areas, Applied Science Publishers
Ltd., Essex (1972).
92. Ibid., S. 2.12.
93. See below, p. 322. As both the petroleum industry and H.M.G.
are aware that perfect separation of oil from production
waters is presently impossible, it is not surprising that
an exception is made for the discharge of this oily effluent.
94. Schedule 5, Model Clause 21(1); Schedule 7, Model Clause 9(1).
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The Secretary of State may issue instructions regarding any of these
obligations and, should the licensee object that an instruction is
95
unreasonable, he has recourse to arbitration. If an escape or
waste of petroleum does occur, a production licensee must notify the
Secretary of State "forthwith" and if the escape of petroleum is into
96
the sea, the licensee must "forthwith" notify the Chief Inspector
97
of the Coastguard as well. Unlike similar sections in the Preven-
98
tion of Oil Pollution Act, the period within which the Secretary of
State must be notified begins from the occurrence of the event, not
the licensee's discovery of it. It would therefore be possible for
the licensee unknowingly to violate his obligation to give notice of
an escape or waste.
Both production and exploration licences contain Model Clauses
which implement S. 5(1) of the Continental Shelf Convention. In the
case of production licences, it is provided that
"(t)he Licensee shall not carry out any operations
authorised by this licence in or about the licensed
area in such manner as to interfere unjustifiably with
95. Schedule 5, Model Clause 21(2); Schedule 7, Model Clause 9(2).
Arbitration provisions are found in Model Clauses 41 and 22,
respectively.
96. Rather than into adjacent strata.
97. Schedule 5, Model Clause 21(8). The duty to report is clarified
by Continental Shelf Operations Notice No. 7, of June 1972,
which explains that "(a)11 escapes of petroleum should be
reported to HM Coastguard as speedily as possible and in any
event within 24 hours of being detected .... (f)ormal notice to
the Secretary of State within three days does of course
continue to be required." No incidents involving Model Clause
21(8) had occurred as of mid 1976. Conversation with Mr. M.
Davey, Department of Energy, 16 June 1976.
98. Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, Ss. 6 and 7.
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navigation or fishing in the waters of the licensed area gg
or with the conservation of the living resources of the sea."
The provision for exploration licences is similar: both faithfully
follow the wording of the Convention and only prohibit operations
that "unjustifiably" interfere with the other specified uses of the
sea.
Enforcement of licence terms is effected primarily by requiring
reports from the licensee of his activities. Thus, the licensee must
record in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State, any drilling,
100
deepening, plugging or abandonment of wells. The Secretary of
State or his representative may inspect and copy any records which
the licensee is required to keep.''"0''' The licensee is also obligated
to furnish at reasonable times information and reasonable assistance
102
necessary for inspection, and must admit the inspector to the
premises.
In the event that the licensee fails to comply with any of
104
several enumerated Model Clauses, the Secretary of State may,
after reasonable notice, execute any works necessary to satisfy the
99. Schedule 5, Model Clause 23. A substantially similar provision
applies to exploration licences. Schedule 7, Model Clause 10.
100. Schedule 5, Model Clause 29. The Clause contains other report¬
ing requirements as well. Schedule 7, Model Clause 12 is the
identical provision applying to exploration licences.
101. Schedule 5, Model Clause 33(a); Schedule 7, Model Clause 16.
102. Schedule 5, Model Clause 33(b). There is no such duty imposed
on the holder of an exploration licence.
103. Schedule 5, Model Clause 34; Schedule 7, Model Clause 17.
104. Schedule 5, Model Clause 35. Those relevant to pollution
control are Model Clauses 17 (Commencement and abandonment and
plugging of wells), 20 (Provision of storage tanks, pipes,
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obligations imposed by that Model Clause at the licensee's expense.
The Secretary of State may take the further step of licence revoca¬
tion for, inter alia,^°^
"any breach or non-observance by the Licensee of
any of the terms and conditions of this Licence."
The present Government has recently stated that a case of massive
108
pollution would be cause for licence revocation. The brief
experience to date has been good. There have been no incidents of
"significant" pollution"*"0^ and no licences have been revoked.
pipelines or other receptacles), and 21 (Avoidance of harmful
methods of working). Schedule 7, Model Clause 18 provides a
slightly differing version of this power to execute works at
the licensee's expense for holders of exploration licences.
105. There had been no instances of works executed by the Secretary
of State at the expense of the licensee as of mid 1976.
Conversation with Mr. M. Davey, 16 June 1976.
106. Schedule 5, Model Clause 40(2), subsections (a) to (i) specify
events upon which revocation can be based. A slightly differ¬
ing list in respect of exploration licences is found in
Schedule 7, Model Clause 21(2), subsections (a) through (f).
107. Schedule 5, Model Clause 40(2), at subsection (b) for both
types of licence.
108. Statement by Lord Balogh, Minister of State, Department of Energy,
and special oil advisor to Mr. Benn, the Secretary of State for
Energy. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 364, cols. 924-925, 15 October 1975.
Lord Balogh has since resigned as a Minister, but remains a
special advisor and has been appointed to the board of the Brit¬
ish National Oil Corporation created by Part I of the Petroleum
and Submarine Pipelines Act. The Scotsman, 9 December 1975, p. 6.
109. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Fourth Report,
Cmnd. 5780 (1974), para. 125, at p. 44. However, a sprinkling
of solid lumps of oil up to 20 cm. in diameter was found on
the beach near Brora and is thought to have come from drilling
14 miles off the Scottish coast in that area. 8 Marine
Pollution Bulletin 29-30 (February 1977).
110. Conversation with Mr. W. MacLeod, Department of Energy,
16 June 1976.
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Despite the apparently good record to date, it is pertinent
to ask whether existing requirements imposed upon exploration and
production licensees by their licences will be adequate in the future
as the level of offshore activity increases. As concluded in a
recent U.K. environmental report, the primary sources of potential
oil pollution from offshore operations are from well blowouts, stor¬
age tank rupture, pipeline fracture, or from an oil tanker.^"'' To
this list must be added pollution from substances other than oil,
primarily from dumping of wastes associated with offshore operations.
As will be seen from the analysis of the Prevention of Oil Pollution
Act (immediately below), although that Act prohibits the discharge of
any oil into the sea from installations, it does not set standards.
The Mineral Workings(Offshore Installations) Act sets standards, but
they are primarily concerned with safety and only indirectly control
potential pollution from installations. It is therefore evident that
"good oilfield practice" retains considerable importance as a prac¬
tical guide to pollution avoidance procedures. Establishment of such
procedures by the regulated industries may not in itself be undesir¬
able. H.M.G. retains criminal sanctions to coerce compliance with
112
standards which should also be established by Government. Deleg¬
ation of responsibility for marine pollution control in such circum-
111. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, op. cit. in
footnote 109, para. 129, at p. 45.
112. Under the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 and the
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act Her Majesty's
Government can impose penalties in varying degrees, thus
providing flexibility not present when the only sanction is
licence revocation.
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stances should not be confused with abdication of responsibility.
The relevant law is shaped in large part by technology, and what more
qualified organisations to pursue the technology of marine pollution
control are there than the corporate petroleum giants? One possible
scheme would be for Government to set standards (based on empirical
evidence of what protection is necessary, economically feasible,
etc.) and then let contracts for the technology by competitive bid
open to both the public and private sector. Such a system could
offer both price and technology competition.
3. Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act lg?!"1"1^
The preamble of the Mineral Workings Act indicates that it is
114
addressed to three aspects of safety in offshore operations:
1. "(T)he safety, health and welfare of persons on
installations concerned with the underwater
113. 1971 Chapter 61, in force 1 May 1972, except for Ss. 4 and 5
which became effective 31 August 1972. The Mineral Workings
(Offshore Installations) Act 1971 (Commencement) Order (1972
No. 644).
114. Paragraphing added. The impetus for the Mineral Workings Act
was provided by the collapse of the drilling rig "Sea Gem"
with considerable loss of life. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, cols.
741-42, 18 February 1971. An inquiry into the disaster resul¬
ted in a Report which made several recommendations. The Act
incorporates nearly all of these suggestions, "particularly
those about construction and operating techniques, facilities
and codes of construction which vary enormously from one type
to another, discipline and the chain of command." Hansard,
H.C. Vol. 816, col. 651, 28 April 1971. See also, "Report
of the Inquiry into the Causes of the Accident to the Drilling
Rig 'Sea-Gem'; 1966-67," Cmnd. 3409 (October, 1967).
115. "Offshore installation" means an installation used or intended
for underwater exploitation or exploration. S. 1(3)(b). This
definition includes installations capable of being manned, but
regulations can also apply to unmanned devices, for example
(1972 No. 702), (1973 No. 1842). S. 12(2); Hansard, H.C. Vol.
821, col. 674, 14 July 1971. S. 44(3) of the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 amends S. 12(3) of this Act by
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exploitation*"^ and exploration*"*"^ of mineral
resources in the waters in or surrounding the
United Kingdom, and
2. (G)enerally for the safety of such installations,
3. (T)he prevention of accidents on or near them."
Because this Act seeks to control accidents associated with offshore
operations, it is also relevant to control of marine pollution re¬
sulting from such mishaps.
The essence of this Act is the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of State for Energy to make safety regulations governing
U.K. offshore installations, together with the imposition of statu-
118
tory responsibility placed upon "installation managers." The Act
is drafted in general terms; great reliance is placed upon subord¬
inate Regulations to implement the details thought necessary for safe
119
offshore operations. The Act will be generally outlined in the
including a pipeline and associated works within the definition
of "installation," if capable of being manned.
116. "'(U)nderwater exploitation' or 'underwater exploration' means
exploitation or exploration from or by means of any floating
or other installation which is maintained in the water, or on
the foreshore or other land intermittently covered with water,
and is not connected with dry land by a permanent structure
providing access at all times and for all purposes." S. 1(3).
117. (E)xploration' means exploration with a view to exploita¬
tion." S. 1(3)(a).
118. This implements one of the principal recommendations of the
"Sea Gem Report." A most significant finding of the investi¬
gation was that confusion existed among Sea Gem workers as to
who was in charge when the rig was being prepared for towing
and therefore neither drilling nor in transit. See Hansard,
H.C. Vol. 816, cols. 648-49, 24 April 1971.
119. The Act is intended to supplement the safety provisions
inserted into licences which formerly were the sole means of
safety regulation. A statutory scheme of safety regulations
was thought necessary because appropriate penalties for
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paragraphs below, with more emphasis placed upon those provisions
likely to affect the control of marine pollution.
The Act applies to the underwater exploitation and exploration
of mineral resources^0 in U.K. waters'^'*" and covers all types of
122
installations, including those which are also subject to the
different levels of violation (instead of only licence revoc¬
ation) could be imposed, because standards could more easily be
made uniform, and because an overall safety scheme could be
presented more clearly. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, cols. 742-43,
18 February 1971. The form of this instrument reflects the
desire of the Government for flexibility: "(R)egulations should
be made by Order, because with this rapidly changing industry,
and its advancing techniques and technology, it will be neces¬
sary to bring in new regulations and to change them frequently
in response to development." Mr. N. Ridley, Under-Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry, in Hansard, H.C. Vol. 816, col.
648, 28 April 1971. Regulations in preparation include provi¬
sion of life-saving appliances, fire-fighting systems and equip¬
ment and emergency procedures, and the holding of regular drills
and practice musters. Department of Energy, op. cit. in foot¬
note 40, at p. 6.
120. The Act is not limited to oil drilling, but includes any off¬
shore workings, for example gravel, potash. Hansard H.L. Vol.
315, col. 1276, 2 March 1971.
121. Both territorial waters and "designated areas" are subject to
this Act, but, without an Order yet to be made, "inland waters"
are not. S. 1(1)(a), (b); 1(2)(a). "Designated areas" has
the same meaning as that given by S. 1(7) of the Continental
Shelf Act 1964. S. 1(2)(a). "Inland waters" are those "within
the United Kingdom, other than estuaries and tidal rivers."
S. 1(2)(b). Unlike many Acts which apply to U.K. registered
vessels wherever they may be, this Act only applies to rigs on
the U.K. Continental Shelf. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 816, col. 648,
28 April 1971.
122. This includes "production platforms and exploration rigs, fixed
rigs with fixed legs, floating rigs, and .... installations
which as yet have not been designed or made which would explore
for other minerals on the seabed " Hansard, H.C. Vol.
816, col. 648, 28 April 1971. Any "installation or device"
capable of being manned must be registered; for example, cer¬
tain types of buoys. Any such "installation or device" has a
500 metre safety zone; as of mid 1976, 123 installations had
been registered with the Department of Energy. The meaning of
"installation" is still not entirely clear and it is thought
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123Merchant Shipping Acts. Pursuant to S. 2 of the Act, the Secret¬
ary of State has issued Regulations which require that offshore in¬
stallations be registered.This was a preliminary step in the
regulatory scheme, designed simply "to enable the Secretary of State
125
to have a complete and full list of all rigs which are in existence"
in the area to which the Act applies. Registration of installations
confers no "flag" status upon them.
Regulations have also been issued requiring that installations
1.26
in relevant waters have a Certificate of Fitness. Certificates
that Regulations made pursuant to S. 44(4) of the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 (which says, in essence, that
Regulations can define what "things" are capable of being manned)
may help in this regard. One result of such Regulations may be
that Ekofisk booster platforms located on the U.K. continental
shelf be registered. Conversation with Mr. M. Davey, Department
of Energy, 16 June 1976.
123. This "dual personality," has not resulted in any practical prob¬
lems, even during leadership transition from "captain" to
"installation manager." Ibid.
124. The Offshore Installations (Registration) Regulations (1972 No.
702), effective 1 June 1972. A registration list is maintained
by the Department of Trade. The main provisions of the Registra¬
tion Regulations include S. 4 which imposes the registration re¬
quirement, S. 8 which provides that registration automatically
lapses at the end of 25 years for fixed installations and 10 years
for mobile installations, S. 7 under which registration may be
cancelled if ownership changes or if the installation is dis¬
mantled, abandoned, destroyed or combined with another installa¬
tion, and S. 11 which sets out a scheme of penalties and pro¬
vides that it shall be a defence for an accused to prove that
he acted with due diligence to prevent an offence.
125. Mr. Ridley, Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in
Hansard, H.C. Standing Committee G, 1st Sitting, col. 7, 17
June 1971. All "installations" whether fixed or mobile must be
registered, even though since some rigs are classified as ships
they are subject to merchant shipping legislation as well. Mr.
Ridley in Hansard, H.C. Vol. 816, col. 648, 28 April 1971.
126. The Offshore Installations (Construction and Survey) Regulations
(1974 No. 289), effective 1 May 1974, pursuant to S. 3 of the Act.
312
are issued by the Certifying Authority after a survey of the instal¬
lation indicating that design and construction standards have been
127
met. The Regulations also set out practices to be observed in
the siting, alteration and equipping of offshore installations as
128
well as providing for certain exemptions. Violation of the Regul¬
ations made under S. 3 subjects the owner and the installation manager
129
and the concession owner each to criminal penalties.
The Act requires the installation owner to appoint a person
127. Under Ss. 4 and 6(1), the Secretary of State may appoint any
person or body to conduct surveys. He has to date appointed
five classification societies as Authorities. See Tronslin,
P., "Safety Regulations in Use in the North Sea and Elsewhere,"
a paper presented at the Conference on Fatigue Problems in
Offshore Steel Structures, 15-17 September, 1975, Geilo, Norway,
arranged by Norske Sivilingeni^rers Forening. The survey is
intended to determine whether the installation has met the
design and construction requirements appended to the Regula¬
tions in Schedule 2. S. 5(2).
128. Detailed requirements are set out in eight parts of Schedule 2.
Siting is a consideration in that the installation must be able
to withstand any combination of "(a) meteorological and oceano-
logical conditions; and (b) properties and configuration of the
sea bed and subsoil; to which the installation may foreseeably
be subjected at the place at which it is or is intended to be
located " Schedule 2, Part II, "Environmental Consider¬
ations." Regulation S. 11 sets out criteria for termination of
a Certificate and further provides that Certificate validity
(subject to annual surveys of selected parts of the installation
under S. 8) shall be for such periods as the Authority may speci¬
fy, not to exceed five years. S. 12 provides for exemptions of
all or any part of an installation. There are no specific regu¬
lations concerning fatigue in steel construction. See Tronslin,
P., op. cit. in footnote 127, at p. 4.
129. S. 3(4). The fine on summary conviction is not to exceed £400;
on conviction on indictment, the fine is unlimited and a prison
term not to exceed two years may be imposed in lieu of or in
addition to the fine. S. 44(1) of the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Act 1975, in extending the Mineral Workings Act to
those pipelines in U.K.-controlled waters which are capable of
being manned, exempts concession owners from liability because
they may be geographically remote from the site of the offence.
Lord Balogh in Hansard, H.L. Vol. 364, col. 931, 15 October 1975.
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whom he believes competent130 to be "installation manager."131 The
installation manager is responsible for safety, health or welfare,
and the maintenance of order and discipline over all persons in or
132
about the installation, and must be present on any installation
that is manned.133 The manager has wide authority to carry out his
130. The "Sea Gem" Committee of Inquiry had recommended that a
single person be appointed 'master' of the installation.
Hansard, H.C. Vol. 816, cols. 648-49, 28 April 1971. The
master need not be an expert in the technical aspects of
offshore operations; "it would only be necessary for him to
be a mature and responsible person trained to have a whole¬
some respect for the sea and knowing what to look for in
keeping everybody up to scratch." Ibid., at col. 651. To
this end it was planned that masters would "include qualified
master mariners who will act when an installation is floating
and experienced drilling engineers who will act when it is
fixed." Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, col. 745, 18 February 1971.
No provision was made for a certification programme because it
was thought too unrealistic to specify criteria in such a
rapidly changing industry. Ibid., at col. 749.
131. S. 4(1). An alternate installation manager must also be
selected to ensure continuity of supervision. S. 4(l)(b).
The owner is under a duty to remove an incompetent installa¬
tion manager and must notify the Secretary of State of the
initial appointments as well as subsequent changes. S. 4(1),
(4). The Offshore Installations (Managers) Regulations (1972
No. 703) prescribes the notice necessary in this regard (by
its S. 2), and also deals with notice required when a person
is placed under restraint pursuant to S. 5(7) of the Act.
132. S. 5(2). The manager's authority "shall not extend to any
matters for which another person is responsible as master,
captain or person in charge of any vessel, aircraft or hover¬
craft." Ibid.
133. Both the owner (under S. 4(5)) and the manager (pursuant to
S. 5(1)) must ensure that any manned installation is under
the control of the installation manager. Each can be fined
up to £500 for offences. Ss. 4(6), 5(1). Exceptions are
made for cases of sudden sickness, other causes beyond the
manager's control, or for other sufficient reason. S. 5(1).
Even a production rig which is normally unmanned must have a
master if it is visited. Hansard, Standing Committee G, 1st
Sitting, col. 18, 17 June 1971. The Secretary of State may




responsibilities. It is an offence to disobey the lawful command
of an installation manager. ^
The manager must not allow any operation likely to endanger
136
the seaworthiness or stability of the installation, but in an
emergency he may take any necessary measures to deal with the emer-
137
gency, including action contrary to other provisions of the Act.
138
He may cause any person to be put ashore in the U.K. if he reason¬
ably believes it necessary to secure the safety of an installation
or persons nearby, or that such action must be taken to maintain order
139
and discipline. The manager may also restrain or take other reas¬
onable measures against any person whom he reasonably suspects has
or is about to do any act likely to endanger the installation or per-
140
sons in the area, or in order to maintain order and discipline.
134. The scope of the manager's powers was the subject of extensive
Parliamentary debate, the Government contending that extraordin¬
ary powers were necessary because of the geographic isolation in
a hostile environment, but some Members were concerned that
powers granted be strictly limited to safety matters so as to
prevent their abuse. Hansard, Standing Committee G, 2nd Sitting,
cols. 52-68, 22 June 1971.
135. Subject to a maximum fine of £50. S. 5(3).
136. S. 5(4). The owner is responsible for the installation manager's
conduct; an offence under S. 5(4) subjects both the manager and
the owner to possible criminal prosecution. Summary conviction
under this section carries a fine liability of up to £400; on
conviction on indictment the fine is unlimited and a prison term
not to exceed two years may be substituted or added to the fine.
137. S. 5(5).
138. This does not apply in respect of "any matters for which another
person is responsible as master, captain or person in charge of
any vessel, aircraft or hovercraft." S. 5(6).
139. S. 5(6).
140. S. 5(6). The sections of this Act authorising the manager to
take certain actions against persons threatening the safety of
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Restraint is limited to 24 hours unless it is intended that the person
be landed in the U.K. at the earliest opportunity and timely notice
of the restraint and the reasons therefor is sent to the prescribed
141
U.K. authority.
The Secretary has broad powers to make regulations for the
142
safety, health and welfare of persons on offshore installations.
Regulations may set requirements for persons engaged in exploration
or exploitation activities on installations, and for the prevention
143
of accidents in the area nearby. To this end, regulations may be
144
made in respect of, inter alia,
"(2)(a) persons whether or not present in the
course of their employment,
(b) the transport of persons and things to
or from an installation,
(c) vessels, aircraft or hovercraft in the
neighbourhood of an installation, and
the installation is not unlike those vested in the aircraft
commander by the Tokyo Convention. Indeed, aircraft and in- •
stallations share the common characteristics of isolation and
potential for major disaster. See, Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963),
58 American Journal of International Law 566-573 (1964).
141. S. 5(7). The authority is designated by S. 4 of (1972 No. 703) .
as the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
142. S. 6.
143. S. 6(1).
144. S. 6(3) provides that regulations may apply to any of the mat¬
ters set out in the Schedule to the Act. The Schedule, "Subject
Matter of Regulations" includes eight general areas involving
offshore safety. A subsection, "Inspectors and inquiries,"
provides the Secretary of State with express authority to make
regulations in respect of investigations and monitoring. This
includes the power to conduct a public inquiry following an
accident involving loss of life, one of the bases for the Public
Inquiries Regulations discussed above. A second subsection,
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(d) any operation or work whether on or near
an installation, or in the water, or on or be- ^
low the shore or bed of the sea or other waters."
Regulations based in part on this section include those requiring the
maintenance of logbooks and records of persons working on or near the
146
installation, for the inspection of installations by the Secretary
147
of State and for the reporting to him of casualties, for the hold¬
ing of public inquiry into any accident endangering life and occurring
1
on or in connection with an offshore installation in relevant waters,
and relating to diving operations in connection with offshore instal-
149
lations.
"Supplemental," authorises regulations to require records and
reports.
145. S. 6(2). S. 44(3) of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act
1975 further extends the powers to make regulations in S. 12(3)
of this Act. The amendments provide authority for Regulations
authorising inspection of any installation, or vessel used in
connection with an installation, to effect the provisions of
S. 6, and to require the payment of fees. This complements
S. 6(4) which provides for inspectors, but confers no authority
to enter vessels or premises.
146. Offshore Installations (Logbooks and Registration of Death)
Regulations (1972 No. 1542), in operation 30 November 1972.
147. The Offshore Installations (Inspectors and Casualties) Regula¬
tions (1973 No. 1842), effective 1 December 1973.
148. The Offshore Installations (Public Inquiries) Regulations
(1974 No. 338), effective 15 April 1974. The Secretary of State
is empowered to appoint a court of inquiry and the Regulations
provide for payment of witness and court costs. No inquiries
had been undertaken pursuant to these Regulations as of mid 1976.
Conversation with Mr. M. Davey, 16 June 1976.
149. The Offshore Installations (Diving Operations) Regulations
(1974 No. 1229), effective 1 January 1975. The Regulations
apply to operations of exploitation or exploration in relevant
waters, even if from a foreign flag vessel. S. 2. The limita¬
tion to specified activities appears to ensure that the author¬
ity asserted by these Regulations is well within U.K. "sovereign
rights" for the exploitation and exploration of its coastal
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The authority to issue Regulations under S. 6(2) is wide indeed.
The transport of persons to or from an installation, for example,
could well be undertaken by a foreign vessel. To date the potential
issue of U.K. regulation of foreign flag vessels used in connection
with offshore operations, but also frequently located on the high
seas, has not arisen because, according to an official in the Depart¬
ment of Trade, it has been possible to obtain voluntary compliance
150
with U.K. Regulations.
S. 7 contains detailed provisions in respect of the content
and promulgation of Regulations. Before making Regulations, the
Secretary of State is required to consult with organisations in the
U.K. representative of those persons who will be affected.Offen¬
ces under the Act are actually violations of the Regulations issued
pursuant to it. In consequence, S. 7 also sets forth detailed
152
provisions for the creation and punishment of offences.
shelf natural resources, even when diving occurs in connection
with submarine pipelines which, unlike installations, do not
have a safety zone.
150. Archer, J., "Government Responsibilities for Maritime Safety,"
19 Trade and Industry 130-134, at p. 134 (18 April 1975).
151. S. 7(1). This is consistent with the U.K. policy of regulation
by negotiation and compromise. Further subsections provide the
Secretary of State with wide discretion to create exemptions
to regulations. S. 7(4), (5), (6). The Secretary of State is
also expressly allowed to vary provisions in accordance with
different circumstances, such as distinguishing between instal¬
lations which are registered vessels and those which are not,
and between stationary and in transit installations. S. 7(7).
(In this regard, note that S. 8(5) expressly applies S. 3 of
the Continental Shelf Act to installations in transit, thus
making them subject to U.K. jurisdiction as extended by that
section.)
152. Penalties for an offence created by Regulation cannot, on sum¬
mary conviction, exceed a fine of £400 and on conviction on
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The major remaining provisions of the Act deal with jurisdic¬
tion, criminal offences, prosecutions, and civil liability for breach
of statutory duty. They will be summarised, as they are similar to
the terms of the Continental Shelf Act 1964, discussed above.
S. 8 of this Act amends S. 3 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964
by providing that existing law applies not only to installations in
designated areas, but to those within territorial waters as well.
S. 10 of this Act goes further than the Continental Shelf Act, how¬
ever, in that it authorises prosecutions for violations of Regulations
even when the offence was committed—not only on an installation or
within the safety zone—but in a designated area. Regulations could,
therefore, create an offence which would subject foreign vessels on
the high seas to U.K. criminal law.^"^ No Regulations have yet assumed
this power, yet it raises again the issue of whether U.K. interference
with navigation on the high seas, even if in connection with the
exercise of its sovereign rights over its continental shelf, would
be consistent with international law.
It has been suggested that the most likely offence which might
154
raise this issue would be one concerning the use of supply vessels.
The interest sought to be protected here may or may not be of the
same importance to the U.K. as the protection of installations and
indictment, imprisonment for two years and/or an unlimited
fine. S. 7(2), (3). Regulations must be contained in a
statutory instrument subject to annulment by either House of
Parliament. S. 7(8).
153. See the discussion of hot pursuit above at p. 290. S. 12(4)
expressly provides that the Act "applies to any individual
whether or not he is a British subject" and that it applies
to foreign corporations as well.
154. Sibthorp, M. (ed.), op. cit. in footnote 24, at p. 170.
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personnel thereon. A foreign supply boat, carrying only cargo and
crewed by foreign nationals, on a one-time charter which violated a
loading regulation to the harm of no one is not a strong candidate
for punishment under British law. A similar vessel, differing in
155
that it was on a regular run pursuant to contract with the instal¬
lation licensee and that the violation was flagrant (for example,
gross overloading) the result of which caused heavy loss of British
life would present a different case. It was submitted that the U.K.
interest in the welfare of the persons through whom sovereign rights
are being exercised weighs heavily against the classic doctrine of
exclusive flag State jurisdiction. The second example is a case of
absentee ownership not significantly different from the use of flags
of convenience. The interest of H.M.G. in the safety of a vessel
(the flag State of which has no practical interest in any freedom of
navigation save between the Forties Field and Aberdeen) is, in the
second hypothetical case, clearly predominant.
S. 9(1) provides for piercing the corporate veil when an offence
has been committed by a corporation with the consent or connivance of,
156
or results from the neglect of, a corporate officer. As in the
155. H.M.G. could also control substandard vessels indirectly through
the terms of licences with the person granted seabed rights. It
could be a condition of, and a Model Clause contained in, the
licence that the licensee would only employ up-to-standard equip¬
ment, whether directly or indirectly by the use of contracted
services. It should also be noted, that as in the Continental
Shelf Act 1964, H.M.G. controls prosecutions so that only flag¬
rant violations of British criminal law would be likely to come
before the courts. To date, there have been no prosecutions
because H.M.G. has been able to achieve the desired control
through the use of voluntary arrangements. S. 10(3), (4).
156. The provision of personal liability and attendant criminal
penalties is intended to deter criminal acts that otherwise
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Continental Shelf Act, proceedings for an offence may be taken any¬
where in the U.K. and police powers are exercised by the constable
157
of the port from which the installation is serviced.
S. 11 provides for an action to be brought under certain cir¬
cumstances against a person for breach of statutory duty imposed by
the Act. This right is limited to civil actions alleging personal
injury, although it is possible to bring an action for other injury
158
outside the provisions of the Act.
Two general criticisms may be directed at the Mineral Workings
Act from the standpoint of marine pollution control. The first con¬
cerns the U.K. organisational framework: many authorities think that
the network of departmental responsibility is far too complex for
159
efficient regulation of offshore activity. A corollary of this
might be committed by employees knowing that a fine would be
paid by the corporation as a cost of doing business. S. 9 provides
that the prosecution need merely aver that the act complained of
occurred within relevant waters; no further proof is required.
It is then the defendant's burden to rebut the allegation. S.
9(2). A statutory defence for one accused of a criminal act
under section 3 (Construction and survey regulations) and sec¬
tions 4 and 5 (Masters of offshore installations) provides that
he may escape liability by proving "due diligence to enforce the
execution of this Act," and that the violation occurred "with¬
out his consent, connivance or wilful default." S. 9(3)(a),
(b). The defences under S. 9(3) and under the Regulations do
not apply to civil proceedings. S. 11(4).
157. S. 9(4) ,. (5) .
158. S. 11(3). An action may be brought against the Crown as con¬
cession owner, although it is expressly provided that no right
of action exists against Her Majesty in her private capacity
or against persons members of Her Majesty's armed forces.
S. 11(5), (6). No actions have been brought under S. 11. Con¬
versation with Mr. M. Davey, Department of Energy, 16 June 1976.
159. Elizabeth Young has noted that at least 21 Government Depart¬
ments and Offices are involved in maritime affairs. Young, E.,
"Structure of Government," in Young, E. and Fricke, P. (eds.),
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complexity is the difficulty of arriving at common requirements and
enforcement among the various Government Departments.
The second deficiency of the Act is also external rather than
constitutional: the British approach to standard setting is to
entrust this task to classification societies; conversely, the Nor¬
wegian Government develops its own standards, although classification
societies are used to test and inspect. Common standards, especially
in safety matters, should be developed for U.K. and Norwegian off¬
shore installations, especially in common fields. This is particu¬
larly important in the case of mobile installations which may move
from one sector to another. Not only is it more convenient for the
operators of such installations, but uniformity of standards would
make it easier to comply with the law. Uniform standards would be
simpler and facilitate enforcement, not only by the coastal State,
but conceivably under a joint scheme. Inspection of U.K. and Nor¬
wegian installations clustered near the median line could be under¬
taken jointly, with a resulting decrease in cost and a better guar¬
antee that, as is often the case, the regulators and the regulated do
not come to have such an identity of interests that the standard of
enforcement declines.
Sea Use Planning, Fabian Tract 437, London (1975). Both this
Tract and the David Davies Study recommended that U.K.
organisation be restructured to improve intra-Governmental
communication. See Sibthorp, M. (ed.), op. cit.in footnote 24.
It is also of interest to note that the principal recommend¬
ation among the 94 proposals of the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution in their Fifth Report /'H.M.S.O., Cmnd.
6371 (1975)] was for a centralized environmental protection
agency called Her Majesty's Pollution Inspectorate.
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4. Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971^°
The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act came into effect 1 March
1973,161 thereby consolidating the Oil in Navigable Waters Acts 1955
162
to 1971 and S. 5 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. The Act
applies to the introduction of oil into the sea from each of the
four major sources of such pollution cited by the Royal Commission
in their Fourth Report: blowouts from offshore wells, ruptures from
16
oil storage tanks, fractures of pipelines, and shipping casualties.
5. 3 of the Act concerns oil discharges from pipelines and offshore
operations and will be discussed immediately. Those parts of the Act
relevant to vessel-source pollution will be examined in the following
164
section of this thefeis.
S. 3 of the Act provides that the discharge of oil or an oily
mixture into any part of the sea,
"Ca) from a pipeline; or
(b) (otherwise than from a ship) as the result of
any operation for the exploration of the sea-bed
160. 1971 Chapter 60.
161. The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 (Commencement) Order
(.1973 No. 203).
162. Preamble. Since this consolidation enacted no new law, it was
not debated. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 321, col. 1208, 9 July 1971.
However, the legislative history of the earlier Acts thus con¬
solidated is available from the Parliamentary debates and will
be referred to frequently. The Oil in Navigable Waters Acts
were primarily concerned with vessel-source oil pollution.
S. 5 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 dealt with oil pollution
from pipelines and offshore installations; it is therefore of
particular relevance to the discussion in this section.
163. Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, Cmnd. 5780 (1974), para. 129, p. 45.
164. See, the discussion below, at p. 342.
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and subsoil or the exploitation of their natural
resources in a designated area,"
constitutes an offence for which the pipeline owner or the person
carrying on the operations shall be liable.
S. 3 prohibits the discharge of any oil; S. 5 of the Contin¬
ental Shelf Act which is replaced by S. 3 had only prohibited dis¬
charges of oil in concentrations greater than one-hundred parts per
million of the mixture (p.p.m.). There are two reasons for this
change.
The p.p.m. formula was the standard of both the 1954 IMCO Con¬
vention and the 1955 Oil in Navigable Waters Act which implemented
166
it. When, in 1963 provision was being made for the development of
the continental shelf in the terms of the Continental Shelf Bill, it
was decided to include a section on control of oil pollution from
167
pipelines and offshore installations. This was necessary not only
as a matter of domestic concern, but in order to satisfy an impending
treaty obligation imposed by the Continental Shelf Convention to take
163
measures in installation safety zones to protect sea life as well
as the existing duty pursuant to customary law and the High Seas Con-
16c
vention to regulate oil pollution from pipelines and installations.
It was the natural course of action to adopt the existing p.p.m. dis-
165. The prohibition of oil discharges resulting from natural re¬
source development would cover possible instances involving
coal extraction, etc.
166. The 1954 IMCO Convention is discussed above, at p. 151.
167. Hansard, H.C. Standing Committee D, cols. 77-78, 19 November
1970.
168. Continental Shelf Convention, Article 5(7).
169. High Seas Convention, Article 24.
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charge criterion for use in the Continental Shelf Act.
But, as described above in connection with the 1954 IMCO Con¬
vention and the 1969 Amendments thereto, the p.p.m. formula soon
proved difficult to enforce and research by the U.K. Warren Spring
Laboratory indicated that the amount of oil discharged in relation
to the distance travelled by a ship is a critical factor in the
determination of whether lasting pollution will result from the dis¬
charge of oily effluent. These considerations led to the 1969
Amendments which substitute an allowable discharge per mile formula
for the p.p.m. criterion. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971, now
incorporated into the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971, applies
the 1969 Amendments to U.K. vessels, even though the Amendments are
171
not yet in force. When S. 5 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964
was incorporated into the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, the Govern¬
ment was faced with a decision. S. 5 concerned oil pollution from
pipelines and installations, so application of the new discharge per
mile formula was impossible. It was therefore decided to amend this
provision by dropping the p.p.m. criterion and imposing an absolute
prohibition on any oil discharge, thus in effect treating installa¬
tions and pipelines as stationary ships.
So long as activities on the U.K. continental shelf were con¬
fined to exploratory drilling, this was a workable solution. But an
absolute prohibition on the discharge of oil or oil mixtures from
production platforms is at the present state of technology impossible:
170. See abdve, at pp. 156-157.
171. See below, at p. 342.
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172
there will always be some oil in operational discharges. In con¬
sequence, the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, in S. 45(2),
gives the Secretary of State authority to exempt such discharges. The
present level of oil discharge from production installations is thus
not a standard; rather it is set by a policy dictated by the limits
of technology: "it is the intention of the Department of Energy that
operations, to receive exemption, must use the best practicable means
173
available to reduce the oil content of the discharged waters."
The Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority has adopted a similar
, 174
approach.
The scheme of oil pollution prevention from seabed operations
contained in the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act is broad in some
respects and narrow in others.
A remarkably broad application of the Act to pipelines is a
conspicuous feature. The text of S. 3 does not qualify "pipeline"
nor is the term clarified elsewhere in the Act. Thus, an oil dis¬
charge from a foreign-owned pipeline which merely crosses the U.K.
continental shelf would subject the owner to British criminal penal¬
ties. A defendant in a criminal case might well argue that prosecu¬
tion under British law violates his right to lay pipes beneath the
175
high seas. On the other hand, it will be remembered that the High
172. See above, at p. 49.
173. U.K. Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Environmen¬
tal Pollution, The Separation of Oil from Water for North Sea
Oil Operations, Pollution Paper No. 8, H.M.S.O. (1976), at
para. 3, p. 1.
174. See below, at p. 465.
175. High Seas Convention Articles 2(3) and 26(1) declare that all
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Seas Convention declares that every State is under a duty to draw
up rules to prevent marine oil pollution from pipelines. This pot¬
ential conflict of competing interests has been recognised and prov¬
ided for expressly in subsequent legislation. In the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, U.K. regulation of pipelines on its
continental shelf extends to those with origin or termination points
in U.K. territory or in a designated area. Regulations in respect of
pipelines merely crossing the U.K. continental shelf may be made only
to the extent that the Secretary of State deems their provisions
"consistent with the jurisdiction which belongs to the United Kingdom
176
under international law."
The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act is broadly drawn in another
way: "discharge" of oil, with one exception, ^ includes "escape.""''^®
It is therefore irrelevant how oil got into the sea; the fact that
it is there is enough to bring the incident within the Act. But
States enjoy the right to lay submarine pipelines beneath the
high seas. Continental Shelf Convention Article 4 provides that
subject to the coastal State's right to develop natural re¬
sources, it may not impede the laying or maintenance of pipe¬
lines or cables on the continental shelf.
176. Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, S. 31(1), (2).
See below, at p. 332.
177. S. 11 of the Act, "Duty to report discharge of oil into waters
of harbours" distinguishes between discharges and escapes of
oil. Discharges of oil from places on land are not covered.
S. 6(2) and (3) provide a special defence for such discharges.
These provisions are the result of a Parliamentary decision
that economic considerations precluded the inclusion of
refineries within the class of intentional discharges; refin¬
eries must discharge some oily mixture. Hansard, H.L. Vol.
191, cols. 735-37, 3 March 1955.
178. S. 29(3).
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liability does not follow such an incident automatically, for two
major provisions of the Act restrict its application considerably.
"Oil" has two meanings within the Act. Because the oils to
which the 1954 IMCO Convention applies are specified, those provisions
of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act which implement that treaty
179
employ the limited definition of oil. Thus, control of pollution
180
from vessels on the high seas is restricted to certain oils. On
the other hand, those Sections of the Act regulating pollution which
occurs in U.K. waters do not implement the Convention: these provi¬
sions can therefore apply to all oil, and in the case of vessel-source
181
pollution they do.
However, S. 3 of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act applies
the IMCO Convention definition of oil to discharges from pipelines and
installations in designated areas. Although this is sufficiently
broad to include most oil pollution which is probable from pipelines
179. See the discussion of the 1954 IMCO Convention above, at
p. 151.
180. Included are crude, fuel, and lubricating oil, as well as such
heavy diesel and other description of oil as may be defined by
regulations. S. 1(2). The Oil in Navigable Waters (Heavy
Diesel Oil) Regulations (1967 No. 710) promulgated under the
Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1955 and exempted from repeal by
S. 33(2) of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, is the only
exercise of the power to define additional oils. Also regul¬
ated are "oily mixtures" which include oil mixed with "any
other substance." S. 29(2). Drilling muds and oil-contaminated
chemicals discharged from an offshore installation could there¬
fore be oily mixtures as could various types of vessel dis¬
charges.
181. The provisions also apply to installations located in U.K.
waters. S. 2(l)(e). Unless qualified, "oil" in this Act
"means oil of any description and includes spirit produced
from oil of any description, and also includes coal tar."
S. 29.
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and installations today, in the future it may prove necessary to
expand the definition of oil to include the lighter fractions such
as petrol. A supertanker receiving petrol piped from an offshore
refinery adjacent to a cluster of production platforms, or from a
mooring buoy, is certainly a foreseeable situation, and one fraught
with potential for marine pollution. If one takes the view that the
structure is an "installation," S. 3 does not apply because petrol is
not one of the specified hydrocarbon products. If one thinks that
the loading is actually occurring at an offshore terminal, it is still
questionable whether present U.K. law prohibits spills of refined
products. Althouth the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act does apply
to U.K. harbours and would prohibit such a discharge therein, there
is as yet nothing in U.K. law which applies the Act to offshore
. , 182terminals.
The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act is limited to a standard of
fault liability. During Parliamentary Debate it was made clear that
in H.M.G.'s view, the need for energy which could only be acquired
by means of an emerging technology justified a standard of "reasonable
18 3
care" rather than strict or absolute liability. The Act therefore
provides that in respect of a pipeline owner or "the person carrying
182. Conversation with Col. J.A. Sulivan, General Manager, Milford
Haven Conservancy Board, 11 June 1976.
183. The Parliamentary debates indicate that Members were well
aware of a possible conflict between the desired objective
of developing British offshore oil resources quickly and
environmental protection. The reasonable man standard
provided a compromise: an offshore operator who acted
reasonably would not be inhibited in his activities by
considerations of strict or absolute liability; conversely,
an irresponsible operator would be liable. Hansard, H.C.
Vol. 688, col. 224, 17 December 1963.
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on operations" in a designated area,
"it shall be a defence to prove that neither the
escape nor any delay in discovering it was due
to any want of reasonable care and that as soon
as practicable after it was discovered all
reasonable steps were taken for stopping or reducing it."
The Act does not elaborate on what standards of care would be con¬
sidered reasonable. It is likely that the Model Clauses contained
in the licence required for seabed operations would be of great value
in resolving this point. Thus, it would be pertinent to inquire
whether the escape occurred despite "good oilfield practice." More¬
over, Regulations may be made under the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe¬
lines Act (discussed below) which set standards for construction and
186
use of offshore pipelines. When such Regulations come into force
the standard of care a pipeline owner must observe to escape liability
under the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act will become much more clear.
Neither the pipeline owner nor the person carrying on the oper¬
ations shall be liable to prosecution if "the discharge was from a
place in his occupation and he proves that it was due to the act of a
184. "The person carrying on operations" is not defined in the
Act, however a Government spokesman commented that he
"assumed" the person in question would be the licensee
company. Hansard, Standing Committee D, col. 26, 17 November
1970.
185. S. 6(1). As this defence is based on a standard of reasonable
care, it applies only to escapes, not discharges. The
Government declined to provide guidelines or minimum manda¬
tory precautions to assist in determining what steps would be
reasonable. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 688, col. 273, 28 January 1964.
While the lack of guidelines necessarily leaves this defence
more ambiguous than it would otherwise be, the omission allows
flexibility. What is reasonable will vary with the circum¬
stances—and with technological advances upon which new
standards (express or implied) will rest.
186. Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, Part III.
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187
person who was there without his permission (express or implied)."
This limitation of liability for discharges originated in the Oil
in Navigable Waters Act 1955, in which it applied to discharges from
188
places on land. The occupier was only to be liable for discharges
resulting from conduct on his part which fell below the standard of
reasonable care. If he took reasonable precautions to bar unpermit¬
ted entry to his premises there could be no implied permission to
enter and therefore no liability. The provision was included in the
Continental Shelf Act to qualify liability for discharges from pipe¬
lines and installations and was subsequently incorporated into the
189
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act.
There is no statutory provision for enforcement of the Preven¬
tion of Oil Pollution Act in respect of discharges from pipelines or
installations. Those sections of the Act concerned with the control
of vessel-source oil pollution contain provisions for inspections
and a requirement for the maintenance of records; no such provisions
are made in the Act for offshore installations. Although information
concerning discharges must be transmitted to H.M.G. pursuant to the
187. S. 3(1). "Place in his occupation" refers to control over the
premises. Letter from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade,
9 July 1976.
188. The defence to discharges from places on land is included in
the present Act at S. 2(1)(d). It was amended so that it is
now clear that the trespasser is guilty of an offence if the
occupier establishes this defence. Hansard, Standing
Committee D, col. 21, 17 November 1970.
189. U.K. marine pollution control legislation which does not
implement international conventions uses fault rather than
strict liability, and no change from this approach is detect¬




Model Clauses contained in the licence, this requirement pertains
to "any event causing escape or waste of petroleum," language clearly
indicating concern with accidental rather than operational dis¬
charges. Although the Secretary of State may intend to require
some sort of formal reporting system (such as the maintenance of
oil record books reflecting operational discharge data) when he
makes exception Orders, there is no requirement that he do so. The
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act is deficient in not requiring a formal
reporting system for operational discharges, and ought to be amended
or supplemented by provisions in another instrument.
Violation of S. 3 discharge provisions subjects the offender
to a fine of up to £50,000 on summary conviction and to an
191
unlimited fine following conviction on indictment. As in the
Continental Shelf Act, prosecutions are subject to strict Government
control, and can only be brought by or with the consent of the Direc-
192
tor of Public Prosecutions or his equivalent. There are likewise
provisions included for piercing the corporate veil so as to render
corporate officers personally liable in cases of abuse of their
responsibility.
190. Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, Schedule 5, Model
Clause 21 (8); Schedule 7, Model Clause 9(3).
191. No prosecutions for unpermitted discharges of oil from offshore
installations have occurred. Conversation with Dr. J. Cowley,
Department of Trade, 11 June 1976. However, it must be
remembered that production of petroleum in the U.K. sector
only started in mid 1975.
192. S. 19 17}.
193. S. 19C81.
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5. Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 19751^
This Act was intended to establish the British National Oil
195
Corporation, to amend the terms of production licences, to make
provisions in regard to submarine pipelines and refineries, and for
other matters.196 Two parts of the Act are of particular relevance
to the control of marine pollution: Part II, which amended the 1966
Petroleum (Production) Regulations, has since itself been replaced
197
by the 1976 Regulations. Part III, "Submarine Pipelines," will
be examined in this section.
198
S. 20(1) gives the Secretary of State control of construc-
199
tion and use of pipelines in "controlled waters." Upon this
194. 1975 Chapter 74, in force 1 January 1976 pursuant to the
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 (Commencement)
Order (1975 No. 2120).
195. The BNOC will be a vehicle for Government participation in
petroleum development. It will hold the Government's interest
in production licences either in partnership with private
companies or as sole licensee. BNOC can also give the Govern¬
ment advice and perform services (such as management of the
Government's pipeline and storage system which is kept for
defence) as well as engage in oil refining and distribution.
Hansard, H.C. Vol. 891, col. 490, 30 April 1975.
196. "To authorise loans and guarantees in connection with the
development of the petroleum resources of the United Kingdom
and payments in respect of certain guarantees and loans by
the Bank of England; and for purposes connected with the
matters aforesaid." Preamble to the Act. The Act in effect
implements part of the Labour Government's "Manifesto," that
part which relates to offshore operations being reflected in
"United Kingdom Offshore Oil and Gas Policy," Cmnd. 5696
(1974).
197. See above, at p. 297.
198. The Secretary of State for Energy.
199. "Controlled waters" means the territorial sea adjacent to the
United Kingdom and the sea in any designated area within the
meaning of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. S. 20(2). A
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provision rests a scheme intended to rectify a previous U.K. legis
lative deficiency: prior to the entry into force of Part III of tnis
Act, the Government had no statutory authority to control pipelines
200
outside territorial waters or designated areas. The new powers
enable the Secretary of State to control pipeline use and routeing,
thus reducing proliferation as well as minimising interference with
other users of the sea. The Secretary of State may also set safety
and construction standards for pipelines, an important power in respect
of pollution resulting from pipeline defects and various potential
accidents.
"controlled pipeline" is so much of any pipeline as is in,
under or over controlled waters. S. 20(2). Construction com¬
menced prior to 1 January 1976 is exempted, as is use of a
pipeline whose construction commenced before this date.
S. 20(1). As reference is to "territorial sea" rather than
"3 miles," no amendment of this provision need follow British
declaration of a 12 mile coastal belt, should this occur.
200. See, Committee on the Environment, North Sea Oil and the
Environment," a Report to the Oil Development Council for
Scotland, H.M.S.O. (1974), at p. 17. The Pipelines Act 1961
and the Coast Protection Act 1949 provided some control of
pipelines, but the 1961 Act applied only within the territorial
sea and safety zones surrounding installations, and the 1949
Act is primarily concerned with obstructions to navigation.
See, Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, Annual
Report (1972), at p. 6.
201. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 891, cols. 492-93, 30 April 1975; H.L.
Vol. 363, col. 1938, 29 July 1975. Although the Mineral Work¬
ings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 concerns safety, it
does not apply to pipelines, according to a Government spokes¬
man, and Part III therefore fills a gap in U.K. legislation.
Hansard, H.L. Vol. 363, col. 1990, 7 August 1975. As a general
rule, pipelines are regulated by the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Act, whereas manned apparatus and installations on
pipelines or connected with them are the concern of the Mineral
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971. Hansard, H.C. Vol.
899, cols. 517-18, 12 November 1975. S. 44 of the Petroleum
and Submarine Pipelines Act makes it clear that the Mineral
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 applies to pipelines
and related structures if they are capable of being manned.
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The Act requires that a person wishing to use or construct a
202
pipeline must seek an authorisation from the Secretary of State.
The Act expressly empowers the Secretary of State to include as
terms within a works authorisation,
"the route of the pipeline, the boundaries within
which any works may be executed in pursuance of
the authorisation, the design and capacity of the
pipeline or of part of it and the steps to be
taken to avoid or reduce interference by the
pipeline with fishing or with other activities 2Q3
connected with the sea or the seabed or subsoil."
Schedule 4 to the Act details the procedures by which the Secretary
204
of State's powers shall be exercised. Part I of Schedule 4 prov¬
ides that the Secretary of State, either on his own initiative or in
consequence of representations made by any other person, may question
a proposed pipeline routeing for,
"(a) the purpose of avoiding or reducing danger to
navigation, to persons engaged in and vessels
and equipment used for fishing, to some
structure or apparatus (which may be the
pipeline) or to marine flora or fauna;
(b) the purpose of facilitating the use of the
pipeline by persons other than the applicant
where it appears to the Secretary of State
that such persons desire to use the pipeline;
(c) the purpose of avoiding or reducing interference
202. S. 20. By mid 1976 only one use authorisation had been
issued. Conversation with Mr. K. Mayo, Department of Energy,
16 June 1976.
203. S. 21(3) (c). The Secretary of State may also include terms in
an authorisation concerning length of authorisation, construc¬
tion and use, commodities which may be transported, funds re¬
quired against possible liability, and information which must
be supplied to him. S. 21(3). Normally, the duration of an
authorisation is unlimited. S. 21(4).
204. Part I deals with "Works Authorisations;" Part II consists
of a single paragraph concerning "Other Authorisations."
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with fishing or the exploitation of
mineral resources;
(d) any other purpose which the Secretary
of State considers proper."
The power claimed to regulate the routeing of controlled pipe¬
lines under the authorisation system is well based in international
law. Thus, the High Seas Convention requires that freedoms of the
sea be exercised with reasonable regard to other users, and that
20
States draw up regulations to prevent oil pollution from pipelines.
That Convention also obligates States desiring to lay a pipeline
beneath the high seas to "pay due regard to cables or pipelines
207
already in position on the seabed." The Continental Shelf Conven¬
tion prohibits "unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing
2o8
or the conservation of the living resources of the sea." Each of
these obligations will be more easily satisfied because of the new
powers to be exercised by H.M.G.
Both the High Seas and the Continental Shelf Conventions limit
the discretion of the coastal State to regulate pipelines on its con-
205. Schedule 4, Part I, S. 6. It is interesting to note that
both (a) and (c) are designed to protect fishermen. This
reflects the concern for the fishing industry apparent
throughout the debate on competing uses of the sea. See,
for example, Hansard, H.L. Vol. 364, col. 931, 15 October
1975.
206. High Seas Convention, Articles 2 and 24.
207. High Seas Convention, Article 26(3).
208. Continental Shelf Convention, Article 5(1). This obligation
is also included as a Model Clause in production licences
(Schedule 5, Clause 23) and exploration licences (Schedule 7,
Clause 10) of the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976.
The U.K. duty under the Convention can now be enforced by
criminal as well as contractual sanctions.
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209
tinental shelf. In addition to several indirect limitations,
both Conventions restrict regulation to that which is reasonably
necessary to enable development of the natural resources of its
continental shelf. ^ The "Submarine Pipelines" section of the Act
and Schedule 4 which complements it are consistent with this limit¬
ation.
H.M.G. were well aware that U.K. authority over activities on
the continental shelf was limited to "sovereign rights." The applic¬
ation of the "Submarine Pipelines" section was therefore limited to
211
pipelines which begin or end in the U.K. or controlled waters.
The Act may be made applicable to pipelines terminating within U.K.
territory because pursuant to her territorial sovereignty the U.K.
may make acceptance of its terms a condition of entry. Pipelines
ending or beginning on the U.K. continental shelf are likely to do so
because they are associated with the development of the natural re¬
sources of the continental shelf—an activity over which H.M.G. has
sovereign rights. A transverse pipeline may be regulated only to
the extent "consistent with the jurisdiction which belongs to the
212
United Kingdom under international law."
209. The High Seas Convention restricts the activities of users
of the seas by the general requirement that they have reason¬
able regard to others. Article 2. The Continental Shelf
Convention limits the coastal State to "sovereign rights"
in connection with the development of the natural resources
of its continental shelf. Article 2(1).





If the Secretary of State rejects an application to construct a
213
pipeline, reasons must be given for the rejection. If the Secret¬
ary of State questions a proposed pipeline routeing he must notify
any person likely to be affected as well as the applicant, and in¬
clude the reasons for his opinion in the notice unless it would be
214
contrary to the national interest to include such reasons. The
Secretary of State must notify any person affected of his decision
following the hearing, and if he disallows the application, include
the reasons for his decision in the notice to the applicant unless it
215
would be against the national interest to do so.
It is submitted that the procedure outlined above is fundament¬
ally fair and reasonable. The provision which confers the right upon
any person to make representations to the Secretary of State in
respect of a proposed pipeline routeing is of particular interest
both as an exception to the usual drafting of statutes intended to
216
control environmental pollution and because it is unqualified.
The Secretary of State may question a routeing based on a complaint
by a foreign national or even by a plaintiff who would lack the
requisite interest necessary to have the standing required by a court.
The Secretary of State is only obligated to explain his decision to
interested persons, but surely this limitation is "reasonable" within
213. Schedule 4, S. 2.
214. Schedule 4, Ss. 4, 5, 6.
215. Schedule 4, S. 8.
216. None of the instruments reviewed in this thesis give an
individual or organisation a right to bring an action; this
Act is exceptional in that it at least allows such plaintiffs
to make representations to the Secretary of State.
338
the meaning of the High Seas and Continental Shelf Conventions. What
is more troubling is the exception provided whereby the Secretary of
State need not give reasons for refusing an application if it would
be against the national interest to do so, and the absence of any
provision for review by an impartial tribunal.
These defects are closely related. It is not necessary to in¬
stance cases in which "the national interest" has been used to cover
up an abuse of power at the highest levels of Government. That the
British approach to regulation of offshore activities emphasises the
reasonable man approach and that no abuses of power have been thus
far detected begs the question of what is possible. It is recognised
that the point in issue presents a particularly nice problem of line
drawing between the competing interests of national security and
those basic considerations of due process under the law which require
217
that a judge provide reasons for his decisions.
Routeing can only be controlled for the reasons set out above.
The inclusion in that list of the clause, "any other purpose which
the Secretary of State considers proper" gives that official wide
discretion. There is little question that some such provision was
necessary. Draftsmen cannot foresee every eventuality and to omit
the clause in question might inhibit the Secretary of State in the
lawful performance of his duties. Furthermore, it must be remembered
that discretion is not unlimited: what is "proper" must be related
to the purposes of the Act. The Secretary of State would clearly be
217. For example, Article 56(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice requires that Court
to give the reasons which support its judgments.
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acting ultra vires the Act and the clause if he decided that it was
"proper" to order a routeing for personal profit or for the pro¬
fit of a company or individual.
A second major power conferred upon the Secretary of State and
relevant to the control of marine pollution from pipelines is his
authority to make regulations to ensure the safe construction and
operation of pipelines and to protect persons engaged on pipeline
218
works. Such regulations may apply to an exceptionally wide spec¬
trum of offshore activities, including the use of
"any aircraft, vessel, vehicle, structure, plant,
equipment or other thing for the purposes of any
pipeline works and with respect to the movement
of and the precautions to be taken on or in
connection with any of those things which are
used for the purposes of any pipeline works or ^
are in the vicinity of a pipeline or pipeline works."
It will be observed that the provision cited applies not only
to vessels, etc. involved in seabed operations, thus arguably prov¬
iding a jurisdictional nexus, but to such vessels "in the vicinity"
of pipelines as well. Neither the High Seas nor the Continental Shelf
Conventions confer an express right upon a State to control other
users of the sea and superjacent airspace in the vicinity of pipe¬
lines. Indeed, one might argue that as the latter instrument ex¬
pressly provides for safety zones around installations, had a similar
zone been intended to protect pipelines it would have been specific¬




220. Even the RSNT proposed at UNCLOS III does not provide for pipe¬
line safety zones.
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However, some control over vessels to prevent damage to pipe¬
lines may be necessary and not inconsistent with international law
if reasonably applied. It is generally accepted as a fact that fish,
and hence fishermen, are attracted by underwater installations which
221
form a sort of artificial reef. It is possible that pipeline
damage could result from a trawl board or from the force exerted by
a moving fishing vessel if the trawl became snagged on the pipeline.
Fishermen deliberately trawling near submarine pipelines are
not strictly paying "reasonable regard to the interests of others"
as required by the High Seas Convention which applies to them through
their State. On the other hand, to the extent that fishermen are
denied the right to fish on the high seas there is a clear injury to
them.
The approach taken by H.M.G. to resolve this conflict is reason¬
able. In lieu of a safety zone, H.M.G. have elected to give the Sec¬
retary of State certain powers to interfere with vessels and aircraft
in the interest of effecting a reasonable compromise. This is far
more flexible than a safety zone which might be established as a
"prohibited area" in respect of other uses of the sea, and is cert¬
ainly no more susceptible to abuse by mala fides implementation. It
is submitted, therefore, that the provision of the Act in question is
consistent with the international law lex lata.
The Secretary of State is authorised to enforce the part of
the Act concerned with "Submarine Pipelines" by promulgating regula¬
tions. Regulations may provide for inspectors and confer upon them
221. See above, at p. 64.
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222
various powers of entry and examination, they may require the
223
maintenance of records and impose a duty to provide information,
and regulations may set out procedures for inquiries following an
224
accident connected with a pipeline. The Secretary of State has
not yet exercised his powers under this section.
Concessionary, criminal and civil sanctions may follow an
offence under the "Submarine Pipelines" part of the Act. The conces¬
sionary penalty is loss of the authorisation. Revocation can occur
for a number of reasons, including the contravention of a term of the
225
authorisation or an obligation contained in notice duly served.
Ownership of a controlled pipeline for which authorisation has been
226
revoked vests in the Secretary of State. There is no provision
for appeal of the Secretary of State's decision, although an aggrieved
227
authorisation holder may make representations to him. The Secret¬
ary of State is limited to revocation of authorisation only when it
is reasonable that he do so, yet he remains the sole judge of what is
reasonable. As in the case of a refusal by the Secretary of State to
issue a routeing authorisation, revocation of an authorisation without
provision for appeal to a tribunal independent of administrative
interests lacks a vital check against possible abuse.
222. S. 27(1), (2).








It is a criminal offence, punishable by fine to construct or
use a pipeline without an authorisation, to contravene the provisions
of certain notices, or to make false or reckless statements for the
purpose of influencing the Secretary of State in respect of four
229
matters including the issuance of authorisations. As in the Acts
previously discussed, prosecutions are tightly controlled by H.M.G.^0
C. Pollution from Tankers and Support Vessels
1. Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971
Although a small part of this Act concerns the prevention of oil
231
pollution from seabed operations and was discussed above, the
instrument is primarily concerned with the control of oil pollution
from vessels. The present Act in fact is composed to a considerable
extent of the provisions previously contained in the Oil in Navigable
Waters Acts 1955 to 1971, instruments now consolidated in the Preven¬
tion of Oil Pollution Act 1971. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971
is of particular importance because it radically amended earlier
legislation and debates on the Oil in Navigable Waters Bill will be
referred to frequently.
The original purpose of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971 was
to enable the U.K. to bring into force the 1969 Amendments to the 1954
228. Limited to £400 on summary conviction, but unlimited following
conviction on indictment. S. 28(1).
229. S. 28(1) (c) (i) .
230. S. 29(2). This Act is also similar to the Acts already discussed
in that it contains provisions for piercing the corporate veil
(8. 29(4)), prosecution may occur anywhere in the U.K. (S. 29(1)),
and it is a defence for the accused to prove that he used due
diligence to comply with his legal obligations (S. 29(5)).
231. See p. 322.
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232
IMCO Convention in respect of British ships. It will be recalled
that the 1969 Amendments will replace the permissible oil discharge
standards for vessels, substituting an allowable quantity per mile
formula for the present allowable quantity as an element of effluent
233
discharged. The Bill which became the Oil in Navigable Waters
Act 1971 was modified during its passage through Parliament to include
a Shipping Casualties section. The new provisions were intended to
234
implement the 1969 IMCO Intervention Convention. This discussion
of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act will first describe the provi¬
sions contained therein which prohibit oil pollution, whether inten¬
tional or accidental, caused by vessels engaged in activities which
are more or less normal (for example, ballasting, terminal operations,
etc.). The Shipping Casualties section, concerned with preventing
oil pollution on a large scale following an "accident" such as that
which occurred in the case of the Torrey Canyon, will then be analysed.
235
S. 1 prohibits the discharge of certain oils or oily mixtures
from British ships into the sea outside U.K. waters unless that dis¬
charge is exempted by regulation. Regulations enacted pursuant to
S. 1 authorise discharges as permitted by the 1969 Amendments—the
232. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 316, col. 190, 11 March 1971.
233. See discussion above, at p. 156.
234. The Intervention Convention is discussed above, at p. 188.
235. "Oily mixture" includes oil mixed with any other substance.
S. 29(2). The oils to which S. 1 applies include crude, fuel
and lubricating oil, as well as such heavy diesel or other
oil as may be included pursuant to regulation. The Oil in
Navigable Waters (Heavy Diesel Oil) Regulations (1967 No. 710)
define heavy diesel oil for the purposes of S. 1 of the Act.
This implements Article 1(1) of the 1954 IMCO Convention.
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quantity of oil per mile travelled formula. The definition of
terms used in the Act promotes comprehensive regulation: "ship"
includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled
237 2 38
by oars, and "discharge" (with one exception) includes "escape."
On the other hand, there is the usual exception for Government ships
239
which limits the Act's effectiveness and since S. 1 implements the
1969 Amendments, the definition of oil in this Section is limited to
that of the 1954 IMCO Convention.
240
S. 2 is concerned with discharges within U.K. waters. It is
241
an offence to discharge oil of any description into U.K. waters
236. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Exceptions) Regulations (1972 No.
1928), in force 5 January 1973. This implements Article III of
the 1969 Amendments to the 1954 IMCO Convention.
237. S. 29(6); Merchant Shipping Act 1894, S. 742.
238. S. 29(3). The exception is contained in S. 11 which disting¬
uishes between discharges and escapes, exempting the former
from the duty imposed by that section to report the introduc¬
tion of oil into harbours. The 1954 IMCO Convention definition
of "discharge" also includes "escapes." Article 1(1) of the
Convention.
239. S. 24(1). "Government ships" has the same meaning as in S. 80
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1906: "ships not forming part of
His Majesty's Navy which belong to His Majesty, or are held by
any person on behalf of or for the benefit of the Crown and for
that reason cannot be registered under the principal Act." S.
24(3). The exception for naval ships has caused concern that
administrative procedures to prevent oil pollution from R.N.
vessels may be inadequate. A recent oil spill from a Royal
Fleet auxiliary vessel caused widespread pollution in Nigg Bay
and Udale in Scotland, yet authorities could not apply the Act.
The Scotsman, 21 November 1975, p. 6.
240. In the case of Rankin v. De Coster, reported in The Times (14
February 1975, p. 4), it was held that the waters within a dry-
dock can properly be called waters "navigable by sea-going
ships" for the purposes of Section 2 of the Prevention of Oil
Pollution Act.




from a vessel, a place on land, or as a result of seabed opera¬
tions. S. 2 is thus broader than S. 1: it prohibits the discharge
of any kind of oil in any amount by ships of any registration, as
well as oil discharged from land. The wider scope of S. 2 is pos¬
sible because H.M.G. can exercise more extensive jurisdiction within
her territorial sea than is possible on the high seas, although it
remains subject to the right of innocent passage.
The present law of innocent passage is unclear and depends very
243
much on the facts of each claim. One measure of how reasonable
S. 2 is in relation to other users of the sea is to compare it with
the claims of other States. The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act is also legislation intended to protect coastal waters
244
from marine pollution. The Canadian Act, however, asserts juris¬
diction to control navigation within a zone 100 miles from Canadian
land; by comparison, the three-mile claim to apply British law
prohibiting oil pollution seems modest indeed. Nor, to take a less
extreme and less protested example, does S. 2 challenge the right of
innocent passage to the extent of the U.S. Ports and Waterways Safety
Act which provides for the unilateral establishment of safety standards
242. "Place on land" includes anything resting on the bed or shore of
the sea, or of any other waters to which this section applies,
and also includes anything afloat (other than a vessel) if it is
anchored or attached to the bed or shore of the sea or of any
such waters." S. 2(3). This broad definition would appear to
include installations or devices not directly engaged in seabed
activity, such as marine oil storage tanks or offshore tanker
loading and unloading facilities so long as they are located in
U.K. waters.
243. See the discussion of the UNCLOS III RSNT concept of innocent
passage, above at p. 197.
244. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is briefly described
above, at p. 116.
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for all vessels entering U.S. waters. The powers claimed by
S. 2 of this Act appear reasonable by comparison; they have also
been exercised in a reasonable manner.
Ss. 1 and 2 are the key provisions of the Prevention of Oil
Pollution Act in respect of vessel-source oil pollution control.
The success or otherwise of these two Sections in preventing oil pol¬
lution depends, however, on ancillary provisions which enable their
implementation as well as upon their own terms. It is useful, there¬
fore, to consider Sections of the Act which support Ss. 1 and 2.
246
The owner or master of a vessel charged with an offence
245. Pub. L. No. 92-340, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1974 Supp.). The
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 provides that vessel
traffic systems may be established to control all vessels in
U.S. waters, and that regulations shall be made setting mini¬
mum construction standards for tankers entering U.S. waters.
Such regulations have not yet been made to apply to foreign
vessels, but following the Argo Merchant and other flag of
convenience spills near the U.S., support for such regulations
is growing. New York Times editorial, reprinted in the Inter¬
national Herald Tribune, 7 January 1977, p. 4.
246. The case of Federal Steam Navigation Co. v. Department of
Trade and Industry, 1 W.L.R. 505 (H.L.) (1975) held that a
prosecution of "owner or master" under the Act authorised the
prosecution of both. See the Comment on this case by Collins,
L., in 33 Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 181-186 (1974). There
are differing views on holding the master liable. Mr. Dickens
thinks that since a master is not likely to be able to pay a
maximum fine of £50,000 from his own funds, the Act is really
aimed at obtaining this compensation from the company. He
questions the propriety of using criminal penalties against the
master to reach the actual intended defendant. Dickens, B.,
"Law Making and Enforcement - a Case Study," 37 Modern Law
Review 297-307 (1974). Col. Sulivan asserts that the policy at
Milford Haven is to prosecute the owner only. If the master is
fined (with or without the prosecution of the owner) this may
set an unfortunate precedent. Should the occasion arise in
which only the master were subject to U.K. jurisdiction, the
defence could persuasively argue that the amount of the fine
levied upon the master (for example, £1,000) was the limit of
the master's ability to pay and the absence of the owner was
irrelevant. Moreover, the assertion that the shipowner ultim-
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under either S. 1 or S. 2 may escape liability for the high fines
247
possible under those provisions if he can prove that the discharge
was reasonably necessary to secure the safety of any vessel, or to
248
prevent damage to any vessel or cargo, or to save life. The
ately pays is incorrect in most cases; as a general rule, the
cost of a fine is borne by Protection and Indemnity Clubs. Thus,
at Milford Haven, a master would only be prosecuted if the owner
could not be brought within the court's jurisdiction. Convers¬
ation with Col. Sulivan, General Manager, Milford Haven Conserv¬
ancy Board, 11 June 1976. The Department of Trade policy is to
consider each case on its particular merits, weighing, for ex¬
ample, the master's ability to pay and availability of the owner
in making their decision. Letter from Mr. J. Clayton, Depart¬
ment of Trade, 9 July 1976.
247. Article VI(2) of the 1969 Amendments requires each Party to
provide penalties "adequate in severity" to discourage unlawful
discharges, such penalties not to be less on the high seas than
in the territorial sea. Thus, the maximum fine possible on sum¬
mary conviction under both Sections is £50,000; the fine is
unlimited following conviction on indictment. Ss. 1(4), 2(4).
The maximum fine was raised from £1,000 in the Oil in Navigable
Waters Act 1955 to the present limits by the Oil in Navigable
Waters Act 1971. The drastic increase and the vesting in
magistrates courts a power to implement fines of this magnitude
was prompted by several M.P.'s who were concerned that a smaller
maximum fine would be ineffective in deterring discharges by
wealthy corporations. It was necessary to vest the required
power in a court of summary jurisdiction because extended pro¬
ceedings would permit a person accused of an offence under the
Act to sail beyond the court's jurisdiction. As for objections
to the possible maximum penalty, it was pointed out that the
fine imposed could be much less. It was, however, necessary to
provide a high maximum because, pursuant to S. 20(2) of the Act,
a court could order the whole or a part of the fine to be paid
to compensate for pollution damage or removal. Hansard, H.C.
Vol. 805, cols. 579 et seq., 30 October 1970; Vol. 809, cols.
197 et seq., 13 January 1971; H.L. Vol. 315, cols. 50 et seq.,
9 February 1971; H.C. Standing Committee D, cols. 42 et seq.,
17-19 November 1970. Col. Sulivan has commented on the diffic¬
ulty of serving summons upon foreign masters in view of the
S. 18(7) provision that a vessel may not be "unnecessarily de¬
tained." In Milford Haven more than 20% of the cases against
foreign vessels have had to be dropped because the ship departed
before the master could be served. Sulivan, J., op. cit. in
footnote 2, above, at p. 140.
248. S. 5(1); 1969 Amendments, Article IV.
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importance of safety considerations is indicated by the breadth of
language employed in this defence: it is not required that the
vessel or cargo sought to be protected be under the ownership or
control of the defendant. It is also a defence to liability under
Ss. 1 and 2 to prove that an escape resulted from vessel damage, and
that as soon as practicable after the damage occurred all reasonable
steps were taken to prevent (or if this were not possible, to stop or
249
reduce) the escape. Liability for oil discharges from vessels is
thus based on fault rather than being strict or absolute.
The Secretary of State is empowered to make regulations for the
250
purpose of preventing or reducing discharges of oil from vessels.
Pursuant to this power, regulations have been made requiring all
British ships using fuel oil for engines or boilers to be fitted so
251
as to prevent that oil from entering the bilges and requiring cer¬
tain British non-tankers which use their bunker fuel tanks for ballast
249. S. 5(2)(a). Similarly, it is a defence to prove that an
escape resulted from leakage and that neither leakage nor
delay in discovering it resulted from want of reasonable
care and that as soon as practicable after discovery, all
reasonable steps to stop or reduce the escape were taken.
S. 5(2) (b) .
250. S. 4. This Section also contains provisions for testing such
equipment as may be prescribed and provides that the owner or
master of a ship which contravenes any regulation made under
that Section is guilty of an offence. The maximum fine on
summary conviction is £1,000—only one-fiftieth of that per¬
missible for offences involving direct discharges. A spokes¬
man for H.M.G. explained in Parliament that the two cases were
distinguishable because under S. 4 only British ships were af¬
fected. Thus, trial could easily be upon indictment in which
case the possible fine was unlimited. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 809,
col. 199, 13 January 1971. This explanation ignores the pos¬
sibility of applying S. 4 to foreign ships pursuant to the
power vested in the Secretary of State under S. 22.
251. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Ships' Equipment)(No. 1) Regula-
349
252
water to be fitted with an oily water separator. By Order in
Council, such regulations may also be applied to foreign ships,
"when they are in a harbour in the United Kingdom
or are within the seaward limits of the territorial
waters of the United Kingdom while on their
253
way to or from a harbour in the United Kingdom."
This power, similar to that authorised by the U.S. Ports and
254
Waterways Act, has not yet been exercised. Authority to prescribe
construction standards, even if limited to pollution prevention equip¬
ment, can impose far more severe economic penalties upon shipowners
than the fines possible under S. 2. Construction and equipment stan¬
dards affect the vessel regardless of geographic position. In addi¬
tion to purchase, installation and maintenance costs of required
equipment, there may well be a loss of cargo space, and an increase
in the weight of the vessel at the expense of payload and fuel con¬
sumption.
Sections 8 to 11 of the Act regulate vessel-source oil pollu-
255
tion in U.K. harbours. Sections 8 and 9 deal with the disposal
of ballast water and oil residues; they are thus important provisions
in the general scheme of marine pollution prevention. As one author-
tions (1956 No. 1423). This implements the requirement of
Article VII(1) of the Convention as amended in 1969.
252. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Ships' Equipment) Regulations
(1957 No. 1424); Article VII(2) of the amended Convention
provides that "(c)arrying water ballast in oil fuel tanks
shall be avoided if possible."
253. S. 22 (1) of the Act.
254. As a major maritime nation, the U.K. has been cautious in in¬
fringing real or believed freedoms of navigation because of
possible retaliation.
255. A U.K. harbour is a port, estuary, haven, dock, or other
place which contains U.K. internal or territorial waters and
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ity has observed,
"one of the strongest inducements to mariners
to dump oily residues unlawfully into the
sea is known to be their fear of incurring
the displeasure of their owners if they
lose time or involve their ship in
expense by using facilities in port "
Provisions which encourage compliance with standards set by law
are to be encouraged because enforcement of pollution prevention
law is both expensive and fraught with practical difficulties.
257
S. 8 empowers a harbour authority to designate an area within
258
his jurisdiction in which ballast water from vessels which have
259
carried petroleum spirit may be discharged. The cargo last
carried is limited to petroleum spirit because it quickly evaporates
where by enactment vessels may be charged for entry or use of
facilities. S. 8(2). This definition would exclude SBMs and
other offshore terminals outside territorial waters.
256. Counsellor Gunnar Boos, Chairman of the Nordic Union for the
Prevention of Oil Pollution of the Sea, quoted in Hansard,
H.C. Vol. 809, col. 161, 13 January 1971.
257. "Harbour authority" means a person or body empowered by an
enactment to levy charges against vessels entering U.K.
harbours or using facilities therein. S. 8(2). "Enactment"
includes a local enactment, and "charges" means any charges
excepting certain specified levies for navigational aids.
S. 8(2). The legal framework of S. 8 makes it possible for
a local enactment to empower a person with the authority to
levy charges against vessels, thus constituting him as a har¬
bour authority. In the absence of statutory guidelines on
discharges, it is conceivable that the self-interest of a
local resident appointed to be harbour authority might tempt
him to set very relaxed standards for the vessels on which
community welfare may to a greater or lesser extent depend.
258. A harbour authority's "area of jurisdiction" is expressly de¬
limited in the provisions defining his particular authority.
Conversation with Col. J.A. Sulivan, General Manager, Milford
Haven Conservancy Board, 11 June 1976.
259. "Petroleum spirit" has the meaning set out in the Petroleum
(Consolidation) Act 1928: "Petroleum-spirit means such
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from the surface of the water and is therefore unlikely to foul the
260
coastline or floating objects. This reasoning is accurate but
insufficient: clean beaches and unfouled floating objects merit
legal protection, yet cannot the same be said of marine life in
harbours? To reiterate an observation made in Chapter Two, although
refined spirits evaporate more quickly than heavier fractions, they
are far more damaging to marine life. If a spill of refined spirits
occurs in shallow, enclosed, or sheltered waters near shore, the
destruction of marine life is so swift that there is little that can
261
be done to remedy the situation. It is recognised that ballast
must be discharged somewhere, and preferably as near to the place
262
where cargo will be loaded as possible; however, a "least cost"
solution of allowing even limited discharges in harbours would be
computed at considerable expense to the environment. This provision,
thought by one authority not to be used anyway, ought to be removed
263
from the Act.
S. 9 empowers the harbour authority to provide oil reception
facilities for the deposit of oil residues from vessels using the
petroleum as when tested in the manner set forth in Part II
of the Second Schedule to this Act gives off an inflammable
vapour at a temperature of less than 73 degrees Fahrenheit."
260. Hansard, Standing Committee A, col. 33, 29 March 1955.
261. Clark, R., "The Biological Consequences of Oil Pollution of
the Sea," in Water Pollution as a World Problem, Europa
Publications Ltd., London (1970), pp. 53-73, at p. 63;
Sulivan, J., op. cit. in footnote 2 , at p. 141.
262. See the discussion of ballasting in chapter Two.
263. Col. Sulivan has observed that such discharges would not be
permitted at Milford Haven or any other harbour in the U.K.
Conversation with Col. J.A. Sulivan, General Manager, Milford
Haven Conservancy Board, 11 June 1976.
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harbour. Such facilities are open to all vessels except tankers
or ships needing to discharge effluent prior to undergoing repairs.
The Government reasoned that facilities for tanker discharges should
be provided by the receiving oil company and vessel repair firms
264
should likewise include them as part of the repair yard. Vessels
wishing to use oil reception facilities in a U.K. harbour must pay
for the service: an Amendment to the Act which would have provided
such facilities free of charge was not accepted because it was thought
265
that only those vessels which benefitted should be assessed charges.
H.M.G.'s attitude toward the provision of oil reception facilities
appears to have been shaped to a considerable extent by the conflict¬
ing forces of environmental and amenity protection versus short-term
economic considerations.
On the one hand, the Secretary of State is empowered to direct
the harbour authority to arrange for oil reception facilities if the
Secretary of State finds such facilities to be either inadequate or
266
lacking and needed. Failure to comply with the Secretary of State's
264. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 190, col. 867, 1 February 1955; S. 8(6).
265. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 190, col. 867 et seq. 1 February 1955.
266. S. 9(5). The Secretary of State must first consult with the
harbour authority and any organisation appearing to the Secret¬
ary of State to be representative of owners of ships registered
in the U.K. (In practice, this has meant the General Council
of British Shipping. Conversation with Col. J.A. Sulivan,
General Manager, Milford Haven Conservancy Board, 11 June 1976.)
The Department of Trade is currently conducting a study to
determine the need for oil reception facilities in U.K. har¬
bours, who will pay for their construction, and who must prov¬
ide them. Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea,
Annual Report (1975), p. 7. No directions to harbour author¬
ities have been issued pursuant to this Section. Letter to the
writer from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade, 9 July 1976.
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direction is an offence for which the harbour authority may be
267
fined. These provisions are consistent with Parliamentary dis¬
cussion emphasising the importance of oil reception facilities in a
268
scheme of oil pollution control.
On the other hand, the provisions exempting tankers and vessels
preparing to undergo repairs, plus the notion that some vessels
"benefit," certainly do not indicate concern that such facilities be
so convenient that the alternative of ocean discharge is unattract¬
ive. Two questions may be asked: 1) Who really benefits from oil
reception facilities, the vessel operator or the public in whose
interest Government presumably acts? 2) To what extent does the Act
fulfil obligations to provide such facilities imposed upon H.M.G. by
the 1954 IMCO Convention?
Article VIII (1) of the Convention provides that:
"(1) Each Contracting Government shall take all
appropriate steps to promote the provision
of facilities as follows:
(b) oil loading terminals shall be provided
with facilities adequate for the
reception of such residues and oily
mixtures as would similarly [i.e., with
the bulk of water separated from the
mixturej remain for disposal by tankers;
(c) ship repair ports shall be provided
with facilities adequate for the
267. S. 9(8). This unusual coercive measure could subject the
harbour authority to a possible maximum fine of £10 for each
day of default.
268. In 1954 a Government spokesman had described the encouragement
of oil reception facilities in port as the most important pur¬
pose of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1955. Hansard, H.L.
Vol. 190, cols. 333-334, 14 December 1954.
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reception of such residues and oily
mixtures as would similarly remain for
disposal by all ships entering for
repairs."
As emerges from the discussion, the vessels described in (b)
and (c) are not covered by the Act. If H.M.G. has taken appropriate
steps to promote the provision of facilities for tankers and ships
destined for the repair yard it has been by informal arrangement
with oil companies and repair yard operators. In fact, a recent sur¬
vey by the General Council of British Shipping indicated that with
269
some exceptions, oil reception facilities in Great Britain are
generally adequate.
S. 10 prohibits the transfer of oil at night to or from a
vessel in a U.K. harbour unless advance notice is given to the harbour
master or harbour authority. This provision, a common-sense pre¬
caution against spills, remains unchanged from the Oil in Navigable
270
Waters Act 1922. The master of a vessel contravening S. 10 is
liable, but, unlike other Sections dealing with vessel violations,
271
the owner is not.
269. Inadequate or non-existent facilities were recorded for the
port areas of Avonmouth, Ardrossan, Barry, Felixstowe, Fleet¬
wood, Harwich, Sharpness and Swansea. Advisory Committee on
Oil Pollution of the Sea, Annual Report (1974), p. 8.
270. S. 2 of the 1922 Act. This provision, as well as others re¬
lating to control of pollution in harbours may have to be
expanded to cover transfers of petroleum products at offshore
terminals, from single point mooring buoys, and lightering
operations. At present, no U.K. law regulates such transfer
specifically.
271. The Petroleum Consolidation Act requires the Harbour Authority
to enact bylaws. These bylaws deal with the relationship be¬
tween the Harbour Master and the ship's master. This Act
explains why only the master (not the owner) is liable for an
offence under S. 10 involving the transfer of oil at night.
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S. 11 provides for reporting of oil spills into U.K. harbours.
The owner or master of a vessel from which oil is discharged or es¬
capes must forthwith report the occurrence or be guilty of an offence.
This provision in its present form resulted from a fatal accident
272
caused by an unreported spill which subsequently caught fire. As
a result of that incident, all spills of any oil or oily mixture must
273
now be reported.
Those Sections of the Act which regulate discharges or escapes
rely on Oil Record Books as a primary indication of compliance with
their provisions. This is also the method of control employed by the
1954 IMCO Convention.
The Secretary of State is empowered to make regulations re¬
quiring that such Books be carried by U.K.-registered ships, and to
promulgate regulations requiring all vessels to keep records of oil
274
transfers while in U.K. waters. The latter power was exercised
in 1957 and requires the keeping of records for several details of
275
oil transfers in U.K. waters. In 1972 regulations were made
Conversation with Col. J.A. Sulivan, General Manager, Milford
Haven Conservancy Board, 11 June 1976.
272. The accident occurred when a spill spread from a harbour into
the adjacent Manchester Ship Canal. The spill was not reported
and under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1955, the applicable
Act at the time, there was no duty to report such incidents.
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971 included a duty to report
spills in harbours so that warnings could be given and remedial
action taken as quickly as possible. Hansard, Standing Com¬
mittee D, cols. 76-77, 19 November 1971-.
273. A person required to make a report under S. 11 who does not do
so may be fined up to £200 following summary conviction.
274. S. 17.
275. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Transfer Records) Regulations
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replacing an existing instrument in order to impose the oil record
requirements of the 1969 Amendments to the IMCO Convention upon U.K.
276
ships. The new regulations require that records be kept of
several operations involving tankers as well as for certain other
. 277
vessels.
Since enforcement (and therefore to a great extent, the effect¬
iveness) of the Act depends very much upon accurate oil record books,
detailed provisions are included which set out penalties for failure
to comply with this scheme and the Secretary of State is empowered to
appoint inspectors to ensure compliance as well.
If any ship is found not to carry an oil record book, the owner
or master is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£500. "Any person" who does not comply with the requirements of the
oil records Section is similarly liable. And, if any person knowing¬
ly falsifies any oil record book, he is liable on summary conviction
to a £500 maximum fine, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six
months, or both. On conviction on indictment the fine is unlimited,
imprisonment may be up to a term not exceeding two years, and either
or both penalties may be imposed. The falsification penalty has been
(1957 No. 358). The regulations apply to all vessels capable
of carrying more than 25 tons of oil in bulk, whether for cargo
or for bunker purposes.
276. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Records) Regulations (1972 No.
1929).
277. "'Tanker' means a vessel the greater part of the cargo space of
which is constructed or adapted for the carriage of liquid
cargoes in bulk and which is either carrying a cargo of oil in
bulk in that part of its cargo space or has on board oil
residues from a cargo of oil in bulk previously carried."
(1972 No. 1929), S. 2(1). S. 4(1) of those regulations applies
that instrument to other ships of 80 gross tons or more.
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increased drastically from the provision of the Oil in Navigable
Waters Act 1955 which provided only for summary conviction carrying
a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment. The new provision for
indictment was intended to promote compliance with the Act by the
278
use of severe personal sanctions against an offender.
The Secretary of State may appoint inspectors to audit com¬
pliance with the Act, to determine what measures have been taken to
prevent the escape of oil, and whether oil reception facilities
provided in harbours are adequate. The inspectors so appointed are
the Department of Trade's own marine surveyors, although the Secret-
279
ary of State retains the power to appoint other persons. The
powers to inspect specifically provided appear to contemplate such
investigation exclusively while the ship is located in a U.K. harbour
for there is no statutory mention of such powers within territorial
waters or on the high seas. In practice, the Department of Trade
follows up all allegations of offences when the vessel next calls at
a U.K. port. Moreover, U.K. vessels in port are subject to general
278. A master might look to the oil company or the ship owner to pay
a fine for an offence which it was in their interest he commit.
The penalty of imprisonment is not transferable. A suggestion
that £1,000 be awarded to a person who reported an offence was
not accepted. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 805, col. 597, 30 October
1970. The United States has such a qui tam provision in the
Refuse Act [33 USC § 407 (1964), often referred to as the
Rivers and Harbours Act.] This Act, dating from 1899, prohibits
discharging refuse of any kind into navigable waters of the
United States. An informer may receive one-half of the penalty
of $500 to $2,500 upon conviction of the offender. After some
years of neglect, the Refuse Act has been resurrected and
pressed into service as an important legal control of marine
oil pollution. See the comments of Haugh in "Approaches to
Oil Pollution Responsibility: Oral Proceedings," 50 Oregon Law
Review 587 (1971), at p. 591 efc seq.
279. Hansard, H.C. Standing Committee D, col. 89, 19 November 1970.
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inspections at irregular intervals and, although the general inspec¬
tion is concerned primarily with safety, it is thought that the
opportunity thus available to inspect the oil record book and other
documents contributes to the general scheme of marine pollution con-
S. 18(6) provides that the harbour master or the Secretary of
State's appointee may, in respect of any vessel within a U.K. harbour,
1. Board and inspect the vessel,
2. Require the production of an oil record book,
281
3. Copy an oil record book.
Inspection under this provision "shall not unnecessarily detain or
delay the vessel from proceeding on any voyage." Both failure to
produce an oil record book for inspection and wilful obstruction—as
distinguished from merely being unable to produce the oil record
book—which inhibits an inspection subjects the offender to a fine on
. 282
summary conviction.
280. Letter to the writer from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade,
9 July 1976.
281. Under S. 21 an Order in Council may be made to empower U.K.
inspectors to board any Convention ship while that ship is in
a U.K. harbour, and to require production of any oil record
book required by the Convention. The Oil in Navigable Waters
(Enforcement of Convention) Order (1958 No. 1526) is based on
this power. It is designed to check compliance with the 1954
IMCO Convention by Parties thereto in U.K. ports. In essence,
it provides for production and copies of oil records and im¬
poses a maximum penalty of £10 for failure to comply and £100
for wilful obstruction, the same fines which may be imposed
upon U.K. ships. See Article IX of the amended Convention.
282. The fine for failure to produce an oil record book is limited
to £10; the fine for wilful obstruction of enforcement by
refusal to produce an oil record book may not exceed £100.
S. 18(6). These penalties are intended to aid inspection; the
small fine for failure to produce an oil record book covers a
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As in other Acts described above, prosecutions for offences
283
xander this Statute are closely controlled by H.M.G. Also in com¬
mon with the legislation which has been discussed is the omission of
any duty to prosecute. Since oil spills in harbours can, except with
the consent of the Attorney General, only be prosecuted by the harbour
authority, the omission is significant since a harbour authority may
be reluctant to bring proceedings against the owners of ships whose
284
dues provide the port's revenues. Even when proceedings are
commenced against an offender under the Act, problems of proof make
situation in which there is an oil record book, but it cannot
be located or is not on board. Although the higher fines and
possible imprisonment sanctions of S. 17 would also apply if
inspection revealed that an oil record book was not normally
carried or that it had been falsified, a master faced with
penalties under that Section might well elect to be fined ElOO
for wilful obstruction of an inspector and simply refuse to
allow access to any evidence upon which a conviction under S.
17 could be based.
283. In England and Wales, prosecution for all offences may be brought
only by or with the consent of the Attorney General, or by the
harbour authority in certain cases pertaining to harbours, or
by the Secretary of State or his designated representative,
subject to some exceptions. S. 19. The harbour authority may
prosecute:
1. Discharges into a U.K. harbour (an offence under S. 2).
2. Transfer of oil at night or reporting harbour
discharges or escapes (offences under Ss. 10 and 11).
3. Oil Record Book offences (under S. 17).
4. Failure to comply with the harbour master's requirements
or obstruction of the harbour master in the performance
of his duties (under S. 18).
The Secretary of State may not prosecute numbers 2, 3, and 4
in this list. S. 19(6) provides that an appropriately constitu¬
ted and empowered sea fisheries committee (under the Sea Fisher¬
ies Regulation Act 1966) or sea fisheries officer may prosecute
any offence committed within its district. The Sea Fisheries
Regulation Act is only partially relevant to the North Sea as
it does not apply to Scotland.
284. Sulivan, J.A., op. cit. in footnote 2, at p. 138.
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conviction difficult. Unless oil is actually observed being
discharged from a stationary vessel, the oil record book, which may
or may not be inspected when a vessel enters a U.K. harbour, con¬
stitutes the prosecution's only evidence.
The frequency of vessel inspections in U.K. harbours for the
purpose of checking compliance with the oil record requirements of
the Act has been a source of some concern among those individuals and
organisations interested in the prevention of marine oil pollution.
In 1972 the Secretary of State assured the Advisory Committee on Oil
Pollution of the Sea that "proper action was now being taken to
inspect boats arriving in ports and to institute prosecutions where
286
there was firm evidence that a ship had not complied with the law."
H.M.G. does not emphasise detection of vessel-source pollution at sea
because of the practical difficulties involved. The Department of
Trade has issued instructions to masters of all ships flying the Brit¬
ish flag to report discharges or escapes of oil pollution, and the
Department of Energy has requested similar information from offshore
287
operators. There is, however, no provision for staff and equipment
288
to monitor vessel-source pollution at sea as a primary function.
285. This is especially true where an oil spill occurs in a harbour;
the oil must be removed immediately before it reaches the nearby
shore and in consequence, there is little time for police work.
Voluntary cooperation is of particular importance because the
application of sanctions in such situations is just not prac¬
ticable. Ibid, at p. 141.
286. Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, Annual Report
(1972), p. 4.
287. Continental Shelf Operations Notice No. 7, June 1972.
288. In the U.S., the Coast Guard is responsible for such monitoring
and have developed sophisticated equipment to aid them in their
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Finally, it is of interest to note that the level of fine
imposed has been much less than the maximum permitted, a situation
289
which has caused some concern. It may well be that, at least in
the case of vessels calling at U.K. ports, the interests of the par¬
ties are close enough so that the system of "cooperative" enforcement
290
favoured by some is as effective as a more legalistic approach.
Ss. 12 to 16 of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act constitute
a discrete section entitled "Shipping Casualties." The provisions
concerning shipping casualties were not originally part of the Oil in
Navigable Waters Act 1971, nor, for that matter, were any such powers
provided for in any British law. Although the Torrey Canyon ground¬
ing off Cornwall had resulted in the conclusion of the Intervention
291
Convention described above, H.M.G. had not thought it necessary to
292
enact enabling legislation in order to ratify the Convention. Two
accidents which occurred during Parliamentary debate of the Oil in
Navigable Waters Bill caused H.M.G. to reconsider the need for enabling
legislation and to include the shipping casualties provisions in the
Bill which became the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971. Because the
task. One such aid is an electronic airborne sensing system
which can detect oil slicks at night and in bad weather. In
tests the system proved effective, even detecting slicks from
drilling rigs in the Santa Barbara Channel. In 1975, the system
resulted in the conviction of two offenders. U.S. Coast Guard,
Environmental Protection Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 1; Mills, B.,
"Coast Guard Airborne Remote Sensing System," pp. 7-12; Ibid.,
Vol. Ill, No. 1, "AOSS Extends Pollution Patrol Capability—Air¬
borne Remote Sensors Prove Effective in All Weather," p. 16.
289. ACOPS, op. cit. in footnote 286, at pp. 3-5.
290. See Sulivan, J.A., op. cit. in footnote 2.
291. See p. 188.
292. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, col. 50, 9 February 1971.
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problems actually or potentially presented by the two accidents
relate directly to the provisions included in the Act, they will be
described briefly.
On 23 October 1970, the Liberian-registered tankers Allegro and
Pacific Glory collided outside the U.K. territorial sea off the Isle
of Wight. The Pacific Glory caught fire, was abandoned with loss of
life, and ultimately settled, partially submerged, on a shingle bank
four miles off the coast. The British Government and the salvage
company cooperated in freeing the vessel and although oil had escaped
293
from a ruptured cargo tank, the resulting slick was quickly dispersed.
Although the Pacific Glory accident had occurred outside U.K. waters,
H.M.G. still believed that enabling legislation to implement the Con¬
vention was unnecessary as customary law conferred such powers. The
potential problem was, in the view of the Government, a similar ac¬
cident within U.K. waters. Despite U.K. sovereignty over her terri¬
torial sea, it was decided that authority to intervene in cases of
vessel casualties should be extended to that area by Statute. An
amendment to the Oil in Navigable Waters Bill was therefore introduced
which was intended to give the Secretary of State authority to deal
294
with shipping casualties occurring within U.K. jurisdiction.
293. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 25347 B, July 1-8, 1972, Volume
XVIII, 1971-1972, Keesing's Publications Ltd., London; The
Times, 24 October 1970, p. 1; 26 October, p. 1; 27 October,
pp. 1 and 9; 28 October, pp. 1 and 7; 29 October, p. 1; 30
October, p. 5; 31 October, p. 1. TOVALOP paid a U.K. Govern¬
ment claim of $800,000 for costs incurred to clean up the spill.
Shell Briefing Service, "Oil spills offshore - compensation and
remedies," (January, 1976), at p. 3.
294. The Shipping Casualties Section was introduced as an Amendment
to the Oil in Navigable Waters Bill in the House of Lords on
9 February 1971, and after debate, it was accepted and the Bill
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On 30 March 1971, the Panther grounded just outside U.K. terri¬
torial waters. As in the Pacific Glory case, she was quickly attend¬
ed to, but in this instance difficulties were encountered in the
attempts to free the stranded tanker and relations between the
Government and the salvor became strained. The first salvor to
reach the scene refused offers from competitive tugs despite the fact
that his own tugs could not free the Panther. Some oil from the
stricken vessel was transferred to a smaller tanker, but only after
Government pressure was exerted was a second relief tanker brought
alongside and the load sufficiently lightened to allow the Panther to
295
be freed. The difficulties encountered by H.M.G. in attempting to
expedite the freeing of the Panther resulted in an expansion of the
shipping casualties amendment to include powers to intervene with
accidents to vessels not only within U.K. waters, but on the high
296
seas as well.
as amended was sent to the House of Commons. Although the
Pacific Glory accident had occurred outside U.K. waters, H.M.G.
were concerned that should a shipping casualty take place
within the three-mile limit, without this amendment there
would be no clear authority empowering the Government to deal
with the situation. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, col. 58, 9 Feb¬
ruary 1971.
295. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, loc. cit. in footnote 293; The
Times, 31 March 1971, p. 1; 1 April, pp. 1 and 2; 2 April,
p. 2; 3 April, p. 1; 5 April, p. 1; 7 April, p. 2; 15 April,
p. 2.
296. H.M.G. introduced an Amendment in the House of Commons to extend
the Shipping Casualties Section to shipping accidents which
occurred outside U.K. waters. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 815, col. 638,
7 April 1971. The Amendment was accepted and sent to the House
of Lords, where it met a stormy reception. Lord Kennet observed
that the new Amendment indicated that H.M.G.'s previous conten¬
tion that the U.K. had inherent powers to deal with accidents
to vessels on the high seas if a threat of oil pollution damage
to the U.K. resulted now seemed less credible. The Bill was
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The Secretary of State may exercise the powers conferred upon
him under the Shipping Casualties Section when:
297
1. "An accident has occurred to or in a ship;
and
2. In the opinion of the Secretary of State oil
from the ship will or may cause pollution on a
large scale in the United Kingdom or in the waters
in or adjacent to the United Kingdom up to the
seaward limits of territorial waters; and
3. In the opinion of the Secretary of
State the use of the powers conferred ^gg
by this section is urgently needed."
The prerequisites to the exercise of Governmental power are similar
to those specified in Article 1(1) of the Intervention Convention,
but they are not identical.
The Act refers to an "accident," the Convention to a "maritime
299
casualty." "'Accident' includes the loss, stranding, abandonment
of or damage to a ship,"^°° whereas "'Maritime casualty' means a col¬
lision of ships, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other
occurrence on board a ship or external to it resulting in material
damage or imminent threat of material damage to a ship or cargo.
also condemned as "panic legislation" which would abolish free¬
dom of the seas at a stroke. Despite these remarks, the House
of Lords passed the Oil in Navigable Waters Bill as amended.
Hansard, H.L. Vol. 317, cols. 417-18, 8 April 1971.
297. . Although S. 16(4) of the Act exempts naval and Government ships
from the Secretary of State's authority to direct or to take
action, H.M.G. possesses such powers in respect of such U.K.
vessels in any event. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 314, col. 1195, 28
January 1971.
298. S. 12.




Neither definition is unambiguous, but the unexplained narrowing
of "maritime casualty" to "accident" may pose an unnecessary and
important problem: is the Secretary of State authorised to give dir¬
ections or to act if the threatened injury results from an occurrence
on board the vessel—for example, a defective valve which allows oil
to leak into the sea—which is not the result of "damage" and is
clearly not the loss, stranding or abandonment of the ship? The Con¬
vention expressly covers this situation; the Act does not. Were such
a situation to occur and the question of whether a leaking valve was
an accident the only impediment to the exercise of powers under the
Shipping Casualties Section, it is unlikely that the ambiguity would
bar action by the Secretary of State. Prevention of pollution on a
large scale is too important. A possible ex post facto justification
of intervention in this hypothetical case could be an argument that
while the plain meaning of "accident" might exclude discharges from a
faulty valve, the definition of "accident" in the Act was effected by
a list of situations which was illustrative rather than exhaustive.
302. "Accident" appeared in the Lords' amendment which added the
Shipping Casualties Section and was unchallenged in either
House. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, cols. 47 et seq., 9 February
1971.
303. The plain meaning of "accident" is wide enough to encompass
the escape of oil from a faulty valve. Thus, one dictionary
states: "In its most commonly accepted meaning, or in its
ordinary or popular sense, the word may be defined as meaning
a fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event hap¬
pening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the circum¬
stances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it
happens " Black's Law Dictionary, (Fourth Ed.) West
Publishing Co., St. Paul (1966), p. 30. The distinction be¬
tween "accident" and "casualty" has not caused problems.
Letter to the writer from Mr. J. Clayton, 9 July 1976. The
Shipping Casualties section has not yet been applied.
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Although the problem may not occur in practice, the possibility would
304
not even arise had the Act employed the language of the Convention.
The second criterion requires pollution.on a large scale, sim¬
ilar to the language of the Convention which speaks of "a casualty
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful conse¬
quences.""^0^ Both terms are undefined, and though this poses poten¬
tial interpretation problems, some sort of limit to Governmental dis¬
cretion to intervene appears so important that omission of this quali¬
fication would invite far more serious conflict. This reasoning
also accounts for the criterion of "urgent need" in the Act and
"necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger" in the Convention.
A final and important difference between the provisions which
authorise intervention in the Act and similar sections of the Conven¬
tion concerns the interests to be protected. The Convention provides
that action may be taken to "prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and
308
imminent danger to their coastline or related interests." "Related
309
interests" are enumerated in Article II (4). The Act contains no
304. The Marine Environment Protection Committee of IMCO is preparing
a manual of guidelines to follow when considering intervention
under the Convention. MEPC III/WP. 7.
305. Article 1(1).
306^ The Government was influenced to some degree by a fear of re¬
prisals to British shipping authorised by similarly unqualified
conferrals of powers. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 815, col. 636,
7 April 1971.
307. S. 12(l)(c); Intervention Convention, Article 1(1).
308. Intervention Convention, Article 1(1).
309. The "related interests" are described in connection with the
discussion of the Intervention Convention, above at p. 191.
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such indication of what interests it is intended to protect, an
omission which deprives the Secretary of State of guidance in
taking decisions to protect different uses of the sea, such as
recreation or commercial oyster fishing.^0 This omission allows
the Secretary of State great discretion, but is open to possible
abuse.
Satisfaction of the three criteria just discussed activates
a two-tiered Secretarial power: the Secretary of State may give
directions to the master, owner or any person, salvor or salvor's
agent in possession of the ship for the purpose of preventing
oil pollution. But, if in his opinion action is necessary, he
may:
1. Actually do anything which, were he merely
giving directions, he could have directed be
done, for example, the Secretary of State could
engage relief tankers to receive oil from the
stricken vessel;
2. Sink or destroy the ship,
3. Assume control of the ship.
These powers are counterbalanced by a right given to a person
damaged as a result of the Secretary of State's action to recover
compensation if such action was unreasonable or disproportionate to
311
the injury which did, or was likely to, occur. In considering
310. Sibthorp, M. (ed.), 0p. cit. in footnote 24, at p. 38. This
view is shared by Forster, M., "The Prevention of Oil Pollution
Act 1971," 21 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
771-774 (1972), at p. 772.
311. "Disproportionate" injury is required so that the "claimant
has to show that he suffered damage on an altogether different
scale of magnitude from the good which was or might have been,
achieved by the action." Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, col. 1199,
25 February 1971.
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whether this section applies, account must be taken of,
1. The extent and risk of oil pollution if
the action had not been taken,
2. The likelihood of the action being
effective,
3. The extent of the damage which has
been caused by the action. 312
As the Secretary of State has not had occasion to use the powers
authorised under the Shipping Casualties section of the Act, interpret¬
ation of these provisions must be unassisted by practical experience.
S. 14 provides that it is an offence to contravene or fail to
comply with any direction given by the Secretary of State or to wil¬
fully obstruct the implementation of such direction. Two statutory
defences are provided whereby the accused may escape liability if he
proves,
1. that he has used all due diligence to comply
with the direction, or
2. that he reasonably believed that compliance
with the direction would have involved a serious
risk to human life.
The £50,000 maximum fine on summary conviction and unlimited fine on
conviction on indictment is identical to the penalty imposed for dis¬
charges from vessels and seabed operations because "a discharge of oil
as a result of wilful refusal to obey a direction is essentially the
314
same as a deliberate discharge."
The Amendment to the Shipping Casualties Section introduced as
312. S. 13(2).
313. Letter to the writer from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade,
9 July 1976.
314. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, col. 51, 9 February 1971; H.C. Vol.
815, col. 619, 7 April 1971.
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a result of the Pacific Glory and Panther accidents became S. 16 of
the Act. Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary of State may, by
Order, give directions or take action in respect of a ship,
1. which is not a ship registered in the U.K.,
and
2. which is outside U.K. territorial waters.
It was intended to use the flexible Order procedure to permit select¬
ive application of the extraordinary powers authorised to specific
315
problem areas, such as oil tankers in the English Channel, but the
316
Order which has been made under S. 16 of the Act is sweeping. The
Shipping Casualties Section of the Act is applicable to foreign-
registered vessels outside U.K. waters. The power to give directions
and the offence of obstruction is restricted to U.K. citizens or
corporations, but the Secretary of State's authority to take action
is unqualified.
The validity of the Shipping Casualties Section of the Act under
international law may be questioned both in respect of its application
to vessels within U.K. territorial waters and those on the high seas.
The issue in respect of foreign vessels within U.K. territorial waters
is whether or not action under the Shipping Casualties Section would
constitute an illegal interference with the right of innocent passage.
The Intervention Convention does not apply to territorial waters;
315. Hansard,'H.C. Vol. 815, col. 620, 7 April 1971; H.L. Vol 317,
col. 415, 8 April 1971. An Order made pursuant to this provi¬
sion is subject to the annulment procedure, which means that it
will not come into force without there being an opportunity of
further debate in both Houses of Parliament. Hansard, H.C. Vol.
815, col. 621, 7 April 1971; H.L. Vol. 317, col. 415, 8 April 1971.
316. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Shipping Casualties) Order (1971
No. 1736), in force 22 November 1971.
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one must therefore look to international customary law.
Under present international law foreign vessels may not be
prevented from passing through the territorial sea unless such pas¬
sage would be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
317
the coastal State. A foreign vessel threatening oil pollution
damage to a coastal State could be described as posing a threat to
that State's "environmental security," but it is at present uncertain
whether "environmental security" is a protectable interest recognised
by international law. One may cite such evidence as State legislation
to support the argument that the concept of "environmental security"
is becoming increasingly recognised as a legally protectable interest.
For example, the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and
318
the U.S. Ports and Waterways Act noted above both arguably infringe
the traditional doctrine of freedom of the seas, as does the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970 which empowers U.S. authorities to
summarily remove or destroy a polluting vessel located in U.S.
319
waters.
317. Territorial Sea Convention, Article 14(4). Such passage must
conform to other Articles of that Convention and other rules
of international law. Cf. the proposals in the UNCLOS III
RSNT described above at p. 196.
318. See above, at p. 245.
319. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 93-94 (1970). See Cundick, R.,
"High Seas Intervention: Parameters of Unilateral Action,"
10 San Diego Law Review 514-558 (1973). The Milford Haven
Conservancy Act 1975 confers powers similar to the Shipping
Casualties Section of this Act upon local authorities in re¬
spect of vessel-source pollution. S. 14 of the Conservancy Act
confers upon the Conservancy Board the right to give directions
or take action in respect of a vessel in the haven if it is
necessary to prevent pollution. There is no "accident" or
"casualty" requirement, and "pollution" is not limited to that
caused by oil. S. 15 authorises the harbourmaster to "board
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A second factor suggesting acceptance as customary law is
absence of protest by those States especially interested. Although
the caveat of the majority in the Lotus case on the inference of
opinio juris from absence of protest is particularly apposite in the
case of a claimed power which has not been used, it is submitted that
the British claim is reasonable, and so long as it is exercised in a
reasonable manner in good faith, an international tribunal such as
the I.C.J, would not find British action inconsistent with inter¬
national law.
The question of legality vel non under international law in
respect of accidents to foreign vessels outside U.K. waters has
generated considerable comment. There are two main sub-problems:
1) Is the Act consistent with the Intervention Convention? 2) Can
the Act be applied to vessels flying the flag of a State not a party
to the Convention?
The Intervention Convention obligates States to engage in con¬
sultations with other States affected by the maritime casualty,
320
particularly with the flag State or States. The Act omits this
requirement. One writer has observed that this represents "a substan¬
tial deviation from the Convention" as well as being "contrary to the
321
normal tendencies of a property-based system of law." The
any vessel in the haven or in or near the approaches thereto and
inspect the vessel or any part thereof or its cargo or any of
the machinery, boats, equipment, or articles on board the
vessel for the purposes of carrying out the duties of the Board
under any enactment, or for enforcing any enactment or byelaw
which the board may lawfully enforce "
320. Intervention Convention, Article III (a).
321. Forster, M. op. cit. in footnote 310, at p. 773. The omission
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significance of deviation from the Convention should not be over¬
emphasised. Although U.K. enabling legislation must permit the terms
of the international instrument to be enforced domestically in order to
permit ratification of a convention without reservation there is no re¬
quirement that all the terms of a treaty be repeated in the U.K. law, if
it is not necessary to do so in order to apply the convention. In the
case of the obligation to consult with other States likely to be
affected, H.M.G. explained that
"We did not think that /inclusion of a statutory obligation
to consult^ would be appropriate to the Bill especially as
the Convention itself provides for action without prior ^2
consultation or notification in cases of extreme urgency."
As the powers conferred upon the Secretary of State under the Shipping
Casualties Section must be "urgently needed" before they could be exercised
32
in any event, it was not necessary to include a provision for consultation.
Whether the Act may be legally applied to vessels flying the
flags of States notParties to the Intervention Convention depends upon
whether or not such action can be justified under international cus¬
tomary law. As was pointed out in the discussion of the Intervention
in the Act of the obligation to consult contained in the Conven¬
tion is also criticised by Churchill, R. in his paper, "U.K.," in
Churchill, R. (et al.) (eds.), New Directions in the Law of the
Sea, Vol. Ill, The British Institute of International and Compar¬
ative Law, London (1973), pp. 281-301, at pp. 294-95.
322. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 316, col. 188, 11 March 1971; H.C. Vol. 815,
col. 621, 7 April 1971.
323. H.M.G. did, however, assure M.P.'s that even though there was no
statutory duty to consult with interested parties, consultations
in respect of accidents both within and beyond the territorial
sea would occur. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 315, col. 54, 9 February
1971; H.L. Vol. 316, col. 188, 11 March 1971. As H.M.G. has
not yet exercised her powers to intervene with foreign vessels
under the Shipping Casualties Section of the Act, there has been
no opportunity to consult to date.
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Convention above, that instrument is not limited to the vessels
flying the flags of States Parties. The question of intervention
with foreign vessels on the high seas without their consent is there¬
fore relevant to both the Act and the Convention. It has been ob¬
served several times that although freedom of navigation on the high
seas is a rule of customary law, that freedom may be infringed in
certain circumstances, such as the provision of safety zones around
installations on the continental shelf. Each case requires that com¬
peting interests be weighed, yet this is difficult not only because
measurement is necessarily subjective, but also because the relative
weight of protectable interests changes. It appears unlikely that
before the Torrey Canyon accident interference with the freedom of
navigation on the high seas would have been widely supported by coast¬
al States. The Intervention Convention resulting from the Torrey
Canyon is evidence of a change in the relative values which some
States now place on freedom of navigation and prevention of oil
pollution. Freedom of the seas is giving way to order of the seas
325
in respect of these competing interests as well as many others.
It is submitted that emerging norms of customary law now permit
limited proportional interference by the coastal State for the pur¬
pose of self-protection. Freedom of navigation must still be balanced
against the need to provide for coastal State self protection both
in the interests of justice and as a matter of practical politics.
324. See above, at p. 188.
325. See the discussion of emerging norms of international custom¬
ary law, particularly the Principles and Recommendations
resulting from the Stockholm Conference of 1972 and the UNCLOS
III proceedings, above at p. 96.
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However, the technology which has produced supertankers has also in¬
creased the protection which society must provide its members. The
doctrine of necessity is in effect a safety valve which permits ad
hoc solutions to unusual problems within a generally accepted inter-
326
national framework. When, however, technological evolution
results in a permanent alteration in the need to legally protect an
interest, a more permanent solution is desirable. It is submitted
that international customary law provides a ready solution. As a
reflection of the opinio juris generalis, it is but the doctrine of
necessity writ large and made permanent by State practice. Yet, this
"permanence" is only relative, for international customary law is as
flexible as the opinio juris which is its sine qua non. It is sugges¬
ted that the new and proposed national and international laws dis¬
cussed in this thesis have evolved in response to a need and are
strong evidence for the proposition that "reasonable" intervention
with foreign flag vessels on the high seas has likewise now become
permissible under international customary law.
Control of vessels involved in the development of petroleum
from the U.K. and Norwegian North Sea continental shelves may also
be effected indirectly through the jurisdiction exercised by those
States over such development. Thus, although the licensee may deter¬
mine which tankers to employ in the transportation of North Sea
327
oil, H.M.G. is in a position to influence the licensee's choice.
326. See Brown, E.D., The Legal Regime of Hgdrospace, Stevens and
Sons, London (1971), at p. 143.
327. Letter from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade, 9 July 1976.
In fact, the first tankers employed to bring oil ashore in
the U.K. sector were Liberian. Ibid.
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2. Merchant Shipping Act 1974
Part II of this Act is enabling legislation which allowed
U.K. ratification of the 1971 "Tanks" Amendment to the 1954 IMCO
329
Convention. The essence of that Amendment was to regulate the
size and internal arrangement of cargo tanks in certain new and exist¬
ing"^0 oil tankers to limit the possibility, in the event of an acci¬
dent, of serious environmental pollution.When all sections in
332
Part II of the Act have come into force, the "Tanks" Amendment
will apply to U.K. oil tankers and the Secretary of State will be
authorised to take certain action with respect to foreign-registered
328. 1974 Chapter 43.
329. Resolution to amend the International Convention for the Pre¬
vention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, concerning
Tank Arrangements and Limitation of Tank Size, Cmnd. 5071,
(1972). This Amendment is discussed above at p. 159. See
also Hansard, H.C. Vol. 865, cols. 612-14, 29 November 1973.
The Act also contains a number of other provisions concerning
merchant shipping, including those collected in Part I
which enable U.K. ratification of the International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund, 1971, The Fund is discussed
above at p. 246; Part I of the Act is treated below, starting
at p. 409.
330. Oil tanker construction rules may be made retroactive under
S. 11(5). The Department of Trade had made it clear to the
U.K. shipping industry immediately after the 1971 Tanks Amend¬
ment that legislation reflecting the provisions therein would
be forthcoming. Thus, although the Department concede that
retroactive regulations are unusual, they think that few
problems will arise because U.K. shipyards have been applying
the Amendments to vessels started for several years now.
Letter to the writer from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade,
9 July 1976.
331. Amendment, Preamble.
332. Sections 10 (Interpretation of Part II) and 11 (Design and con¬
struction of oil tankers) of Part II and Paragraphs 1 (Surveys,
inspections and certificates), 2 (Duty to notify alterations),
5 (Offences), and 6 (Fees) of Schedule 2 appended thereto came
into force 1 November 1974. The Merchant Shipping Act 1974
(Commencement No. 1) Order (1974 No. 1792).
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tankers as well.^^
The scheme of regulation is based on a power to require that
U.K. oil tankers qualify for a "tanker construction certificate" or
a "tanker exemption certificate" before such vessels may engage in
334
trade. Such certificates will be issued to vessels which have
satisfied the criteria to be specified in "oil tanker construction
335
rules" on the basis of reports by surveyors.
When S. 12 comes into force, it will be an offence for any oil
336
tanker to sail from a United Kingdom port unless:
"(a) it is a certificated oil tanker (within
333. The Amendment has not yet received sufficient ratifications
to become effective. Thus, even those States which have
ratified the Amendment as yet receive no rights and are under
no obligations flowing from it. It is necessary to examine
the amended 1954 Convention in force as well as international
customary law to determine the legality vel non of Part II
under international law.
334. S. 11. The Secretary of State has not yet promulgated rules
requiring U.K. oil tankers to carry such certificates. The Act
is in this respect consistent with the Amendment which, in
Article VI bis (2), requires that "(a) Contracting Government
shall not permit such tanker under its flag to trade unless the
appropriate certificate has been issued." The definitions of
"oil tanker" and "oil" likewise follow the 1954 IMCO Convention,
meaning respectively "a ship which is constructed or adapted
primarily to carry oil in bulk in its cargo spaces (whether or
not it is also so constructed or adapted as to be capable of
carrying other cargoes in those spaces)," and "crude oil, fuel
oil (including diesel oil) and lubricating oil." S. 10(4).
335. S. 11(1) empowers the Secretary of State to make "oil tanker
construction rules;" this power has not yet been exercised.
The provisions of S. 11 and Schedule 2, paragraph 1 authorising
the Secretary of State to delegate authority to conduct surveys
to organisations outside Government partially implements a
recommendation of the Rochdale Report. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 865,
cols. 616 et seg. See also Committee of Inquiry (Viscount
Rochdale, Chairman), Report, Cmnd. 4337, (1970).
336. "Port" includes an offshore terminal. S. 10(4).
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the meaning of Schedule 3 to this Act),"^"^ or
(b) it is not registered in the United Kingdom,
and
(i) if it were a United Kingdom oil tanker,
it would qualify for the issue of a
tanker exemption certificate, or
(ii) its gross tonnage is less than 150 tons,
or
(c) the Secretary of State has
issued it with leave to sail."
The restriction on sailing applied to U.K. tankers is a legitimate
exercise of State sovereignty and fulfills an obligation imposed by
340
the Amendment. Application of S. 12 to foreign-flag vessels, how¬
ever, raises a question of legality under international law. The
Amendment provides only that one Contracting Government may deny sub¬
standard tankers of another Contracting Government access to its ports
341
or offshore terminals. This is distinguishable from authorising
337. Schedule 3, which is not yet in force, details the scheme for
oil tanker certification. A certificated oil tanker may be
registered in the U.K., another Convention Country, or in a non-
Convention Country if the certificate meets criteria set out by
the Secretary of State in a statutory instrument.
338. The 150 tons exemption implements Article 11(1) (a) of the 1954
IMCO Convention which declares such vessels outside the Conven¬
tion.
339. S. 12(1). "Leave to sail" is a procedure which will be applic¬
able only to ships which do not produce certificates recognised
by the 1974 Act. Letter from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade,
9 July 1976. The Secretary of State may issue leave to sail to
a foreign tanker if he is satisfied that it would qualify for a
tanker construction certificate if it were a U.K. tanker. The
very wide scope of his discretion is emphasised by the additional
provision that he may issue leave to sail to either a U.K. or
foreign-registered tanker "where he considers it appropriate to
do so." S. 12(2).
340. 1971 Amendment, Article VI bis, paragraph 2. This Article prov¬
ides in part that "(a) Contracting Government shall not permit
such tankers under its flag to trade unless the appropriate
certificate has been issued."
341. Ibid., paragraph 4.
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Contracting Governments to in effect hold substandard tankers cap¬
tive. It would require an unrealistic stretching of the Amendment to
justify the U.K. assertion of the power to prevent substandard
foreign-flag tankers (or those of non-Parties) from sailing; legal
justification, if any, must therefore be sought in international
customary law.
It was concluded above that powers claimed by the U.K. in
respect of oil discharge prevention in its territorial waters and
ships' equipment regulations, both made applicable to foreign-flag
vessels, were not inconsistent with emerging international customary
342
law. Three criteria upon which that conclusion was based were
comparative State legislation, the absence of protest by other States,
and the "reasonability test."
The assertion of a power to detain substandard vessels or those
which do not comply with procedures required by national legislation
is not unknown. Recent French legislation provides that ships which
do not discharge wastes into oil reception facilities may be prevented
343
from sailing. However, neither the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollu¬
tion Prevention Act nor the U.S. Ports and Waterways Safety Act ex¬
pressly includes this provision. On the other hand, both instruments
do authorise the prohibition of substandard vessels of any nationality
344
from the 100 mile zone and territorial sea, respectively. It may
342. See the discussion of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971,
above at p. 342.
343. See, Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, Annual
Report (1975), at p. 7.
344. The U.S. Ports and Waterways Safety Act authorises the Secret¬
ary of Transportation to promulgate regulations which will
379
be seen therefore, that although the power to detain non-conforming
foreign vessels is not unique, it was not claimed by two proponents
345
of coastal State regulation of navigation. Although absence of
protest by States interested can afford some evidence of acceptance
as law, S. 12 has not yet come into force, thus rendering this
criterion of little evidential value.
Whether S. 12 as applied to foreign ships is reasonable depends
both on the power it confers and how it is applied. The Secretary of
State has discretion to issue a substandard ship leave to sail and is
expressly authorised to impose conditions concerning tanker cargo and
346
the port of destination. These provisions clearly contemplate a
situation in which oil must be transferred from the vessel to prevent
potential marine pollution and/or the services of a repair yard are
needed for the same objective. The general purpose of restrictions
require all tankers in U.S. waters which are carrying oil or
certain other cargoes to meet U.S. construction and operational
standards. The owner or master of a vessel who negligently
violates the American Act may be fined up to $10,000; a wilful
violation may cause the offender to be imprisoned for up to 5
years. Pub. L. No. 92-340, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1974 Supp.).
345. Note that the power to detain vessels is not provided for in
the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 either. Among possible
explanations for the omission of this power from other instru¬
ments is a purely practical one: port authorities are not gaol¬
ers and are simply not prepared to act as such on short notice
from the Secretary of State. See, Sulivan, J.A., op. cit. in
footnote 2, at p. 142.
346. The Secretary of State's discretion is limited only by the re¬
quirement that conditions be imposed "with a view to preventing
or limiting the danger of oil pollution." S. 12(3). It has
been pointed out that harbour authorities are unlikely to want
a substandard ship tied up at a valuable berth. This factor,
as well as remedy of the defect in the substandard vessel, will
be a consideration in granting leave to sail to a specified
destination. It is recognised that once the vessel has left
380
on the departure of foreign-registered tankers is therefore unobjec¬
tionable. However, the absence of any check on possible abuse or
misjudgment by the Secretary of State is somewhat worrying. Suppose,
for example, that a substandard tanker were sent to a U.K. repair
yard even though the owner insisted that the work could as well be
accomplished by a similar facility in his own State. Justifiably or
otherwise, he might allege that the choice of a U.K. repair yard re¬
sulted from political (for example, high unemployment) rather than
maritime considerations. There is no procedure in the Act for appeals
347
from the Secretary of State's decision. As in much U.K. legis¬
lation, it is left to the administrator to decide whether the Act has
been applied fairly in a given case. S. 12 as drafted is of question¬
able legality although it is likely that the Act will be applied
fairly, and cautiously in view of the potential injury to British
shipping interests from retaliation by other States. It is also prob¬
able that S. 12 will gradually be accepted by interested States and
so pass into international customary law.
Uncertificated tankers may also be restricted from entering any
348
or all U.K. ports when S. 13 comes into force. This power is based
on the right of a sovereign State to control entry to its territory.
So long as S. 13 is not applied in a manner which conflicts with a
the jurisdiction there is little enforcement action which can
be taken, although under S. 13, the Secretary of State may
prohibit such a vessel from re-entering a U.K. port. Letter to
the writer from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade, 9 July 1976.
347. However, statutory defences are provided.




duty to which H.M.G. has consented, the question of legality under
international law is not raised.
Violation of the provisions of Part II subjects both the owner
350
and the master of a tanker to a fine. In the case of non-compliance
with the requirement of certification or with a condition in a leave
to sail, the fine on summary conviction may reach £10,000 and is un¬
limited on conviction on indictment. It is a defence to prove
that the tanker put to sea to ensure its safety or to reduce the risk
352
of damage to any other vessel or property. This defence expressly
excludes sailing for the purpose of avoiding damage "caused by con¬
tamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from a
353
tanker." Thus, the master of a substandard tanker cannot use the
result of his vessel's deficiency to avoid this provision of the Act
and remove himself from U.K. territorial jurisdiction in the process.
Both the owner and the master of an oil tanker which enters a
U.K. port in violation of the Secretary of State's direction or in
violation of a condition imposed by him are liable on summary convic¬
tion to a fine not to exceed £15,000 or to an unlimited fine on con-
349. Such as the Geneva Convention of 1923 which requires equality
of treatment in ports.
350. Cf. the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 as interpreted
by the Federal Steam Navigation Co. case which, though using
the language "owner or master" was held to mean that both could
be prosecuted. See above, p. 346.
351. S. 12(4).
352. S. 12(5). This defence is similar to that provided by Article
IV(a) of the 1954 IMCO Convention, as amended, and S. 5 of the




viction on indictment. The larger maximum fine permissible on
summary conviction reflects the greater damage which might be done
to U.K. coastal waters by a tanker arriving laden with cargo as
compared to a vessel in ballast sailing from a U.K. port to the high
355
seas. It is a defence in such proceedings to prove that the
tanker entered the port out of necessity, either because of an
emergency involving a threat to life or the safety of the tanker, or
to circumstances beyond the control of the master. ^
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D. Pollution from Dumping at Sea: The Dumping at Sea Act 1974
The Dumping at Sea Act implements the Royal Commission's urgent
recommendation that " (1)egislation to implement the Oslo Convention
on the Control of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft
in the Northeast Atlantic should be introduced as a matter of prior-
358
ity." The Act was intended to strengthen environmental protection
by replacing a voluntary arrangement which had controlled dumping
354. S. 13(4).
355. Letter to the writer from Mr. J. Clayton, Department of Trade,
9 July 1976. This may need amendment when Britain becomes a
net oil exporter.
356. S. 12(5). This is also a rule of international customary law.
Cf. The Rebecca, 23 American Journal of International Law
860-865 (1929).
357. 1974 Chapter 20, extended by the Dumping at Sea Act 1974 (Isle
of Man) Order (1975 No. 810), and the Dumping at Sea Act 1974
(Guernsey) Order (1975 No. 811) to the Channel Islands.
358. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Third Report,
Cmnd. 5054 (.1972) , paras. 27 and 219, pp. 11 and 70. This
Act also enabled U.K. ratification of the London and Oslo
Dumping Conventions, and may have fulfilled an obligation to
protect the environment which has emerged as international
customary law.
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beyond the U.K. territorial sea with a statutory framework.
Although both the Act and the Conventions which it implements
are primarily directed at the control of hazardous materials, they
also apply to less dangerous items. The scope of the Act is limited,
however, and it is questionable whether the protection afforded to
the marine environment and to other users of the sea from dumping by
support vessels and installations is adequate.
The Act provides that it is an offence for any person to engage
in, or to cause or permit any of the following acts without a lic-
360
ence:
1. Dumping in U.K. waters.
2. Dumping in the sea outside U.K. waters from
a British ship, aircraft, hovercraft, or
marine structure.
3. Loading any ship, aircraft, hovercraft or
marine structure in the U.K. or its waters
for dumping anywhere in the sea.
The Act does not apply to discharges "incidental to or derived
from the normal operation of a ship, aircraft, vehicle, hovercraft
or marine structure" unless it is "constructed or adapted wholly or
mainly for the purpose of the disposal of waste or spoil and the dis-
361
charge takes place as part of its operation for that purpose."
359. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 347, col. 1096, 11 December 1973. The Act
is thought to be more effective than the voluntary scheme
which it replaces because it is a formal system and because
it covers a wider concept of dumping. Letter to the writer
from Mr. M.J. Nelson, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food (MAFF), 2 August 1976.
360. S. 1(1); London Dumping Convention, Article VI(2); Oslo Dump¬
ing Convention, Article 15(1). The Act is intended to apply to
military vessels and aircraft "through administrative means as




This provision was included in the Act to limit its application to
the instruments of professional dumping, namely,
"the operation of vessels which are specifically
designed to dispose of waste at sea as part of their
normal operations; for example dredgers and
incinerator vessels."362
The exemption of incidental discharges from the Dumping at Sea
Act severely limits its application to both vessels and offshore
installations. Although the Conventions were intentionally limited
in this manner in order to prevent conflict with the 1973 IMCO Con¬
vention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships which will control
363
incidental discharges, that instrument is not yet in force. Fur¬
thermore, this limitation of national legislation designed to imple¬
ment the Oslo Convention is at odds with the recent Draft Resolution
by the Oslo Commission which would apply the Convention to discharges
364
of debris resulting from petroleum development. It is regrettable
that at least a de minimis provision requiring offshore operators to
use "all practicable means" to control the dumping of oil-related
365
debris was not included in the Dumping at Sea Act.
The Act employs a definition of "dumping" similar to that in
the Conventions—but one which is open to criticism on at least a
362. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 346, cols. 1263-1264, 22 November 1973.
363. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 351, col. 1289, 20 May 1974.
364. See above, p. 128. The MAFF maintain a list of operational
discharges which they consider "incidental," but consider that
only a court can give an authoritative interpretation of
"incidental discharge." Letter to the writer from Mr. M.J.
Nelson, MAFF, 2 August 1976.
365. Offshore operators have been advised on the Department of
Energy policy concerning the control of debris dumping, pur¬
suant to Continental Shelf Operations Notice No. 8, June 1972.
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charge of substandard draftsmanship. The Act equates "dumping" with
a "permanent deposit:"
"(S)ubstances and articles are dumped in the sea for
the purposes of this Act if they are permanently
deposited in the sea from a vehicle, ship, aircraft,
hovercraft or marine structure, or from a structure
on land constructed or adapted wholly or mainly ^gg
for the purpose of depositing solids in the sea."
It is difficult to see in what way changing the definition employed
367
by both Conventions, "any deliberate disposal," to "permanence"
has effected an improvement in the control of dumping at sea. Parlia¬
mentary debates indicate that the U.K. definition was intended to
exclude from licensing requirements temporary deposits in the sea,
such as fishing gear, and it was emphasised that the Act is concerned
363
"with that which is intended to remain in the sea." Thus, refuse
such as plastic containers which might by impetus of wind or current
come ashore would have been "dumped" within the meaning of the Act if
permanent disposal was intended and the other requirements of the Act
369
were satisfied. In other words, the Act was intended to implement
the Conventions.
The licensing authority is the Minister of Agriculture, Fisher¬
ies and Food for waste loaded in England and Wales or loaded outside
the U.K. into British vessels, the Secretary of State for Scotland
for waste loaded in Scotland, and the Department of the Environment
366. S. 1(2).
367. London Dumping Convention, Article 11(1)(a); Oslo Convention,
Article 19 (1).
368. Hansard, Standing Committee B, cols. 6 et seq., 7 May 1974.
369. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 347, col. 1089, 11 December 1973. The MAFF
reports that the term "permanent" has caused no difficulties.
Letter to the writer from Mr. M.J. Nelson, MAFF, 2 August 1976.
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370
for waste loaded in Northern Ireland. The licensee is typically
371
the vessel owner or the company producing the waste to be dumped.
Upon receiving an application for a licence, the licensing authority
must consult the Annexes appended to the Oslo and London Conventions
372
which classify substances by the hazard they present. If the
substance or material to be dumped is not on the black list, a
licence may be issued which satisfies the Conventions' requirement
that it specify each instance of dumping in some cases or constitute
373
a general approval in others. However, the licensing authority
must always consider
"the need to protect the marine environment and
the living resources which it supports from any
adverse consequences of dumping the substances
or articles to which the licence, if granted,
will relate,"
374
before permitting dumping to occur. To that end, he must "include
such conditions in a licence as appear to the authority to be
370. S. 12.
371. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 346, col. 1264, 22 November 1973.
372. It was decided not to include Annexes to the Act because the
differing provisions of the London Dumping Convention and Oslo
Convention Annexes would have to be reconciled, and because
each revision to a Convention Annex would necessitate a corres¬
ponding amendment to the Annexes appended to the Act. There is
no express duty imposed upon the licensing authority by the Act
to consult the Convention Annexes, but it was clearly intended
that they do so to fulfill the U.K. treaty obligations. See,
Hansard, H.L. Vol. 347, col. 1094, 11 December 1973; London Dump¬
ing Convention, Article IV; Oslo Convention, Articles 5, 6, 7.
373. "Blacklist" is the common term employed to describe the London
Dumping Convention and Oslo Convention Annexes which contain
substances and materials which, subject to narrow exceptions,
may not be dumped at sea.
374. S. 2(1). This was intended to be an overriding consideration.
Hansard, H.L. Vol. 347, col. 1096, 11 December 1973.
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necessary or expedient for the protection of that environment and
375
those resources from any such consequences." Dumping sites are
selected by the licensing authority on the advice of its own experts
on fisheries and marine pollution who in turn consult the provisions
376
of the Conventions.
The licensing authority alone determines licence issuance,
377
conditions, variance, revocation, and fees. An aggrieved licence
holder or applicant has a right of appeal to the licensing authority,
378
who then must constitute a committee to hear the appeal. Consti¬
tution of the appeals committee by the authority whose decision is
379
disputed was sharply criticised in Parliamentary debate, but was
justified on the basis that as the licensing authority knows the
conditions and people involved better than an external body, it was
380
the "right body to set up the committee." H.M.G.'s position in
this matter is another example of the British philosophy that control
375. S. 2(1).
376. Factors which would be considered include the extent to which
the waste is toxic, persistent or bioaccumulative; the amount
to be dumped; water characteristics at the dumping site;
tidal flow; and effect on fish and other marine organisms.
There is no list of dumping sites, but the co-ordinates as
designated in the licence are one of the "notifiable partic¬
ulars" in the public register required to be kept under S. 4.
Letter from Mr. M.J. Nelson, MAFF, 2 August 1976.
377. S. 2(2), (3). The licensing authority can impose fees to
cover the cost of sampling and monitoring the substances to
be dumped. S. 1(5), (6).
378. S. 3(1).
379. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 352, cols. 308 efc seq. 10 June 1974; H.C.
Vol. 871, cols. 1497-1498, 22 March 1974.
380. Hansard, H.C. Vol. 871, cols. 1497-1498, 22 March 1974.
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of pollution is best achieved by negotiation and compromise within a
381
legal framework rather than by purely legal means. The appeals
procedure is more remarkable for its inclusion in any form than for
its actual provisions which could lead to a possible conflict of
interest between the authority's administrative and judicial roles.
Other aspects of licence issuance have been criticised. There
is a potential conflict between the licensing authority who may
authorise dumping in coastal waters below high tide, and local auth¬
orities who may have an interest in the water quality where the
382
dumping is to occur. The Act imposes no duty on the licensing
authority to consult with such local authorities or environmental
bodies prior to issuing a licence to dump. Although in Parliamentary
debate anxious M.P.s were assured that consultation would occur
before licence issuance, in one case this has not happened: the
Secretary of State for Scotland is preparing to issue a licence to
the City of Edinburgh to dump sewage sludge and at the date of writing
381. It is MAFF policy to encourage informal discussion. As of mid
1976, no formal appeals had been received. Letter from Mr. M.
J. Nelson, MAFF, 2 August 1976.
382. Under the Control of Pollution Act 1974, the Water Authority or
the Secretary of State may grant licences or give consent to
dispose of polluting substances in controlled waters. S. 31(2)
(a). The River Purification Authority exercises similar con¬
trol in Scotland. S. 106(2). Local authority control is sub¬
ject to the Dumping at Sea Act, however, pursuant to express
provisions in the Control of Pollution Act which exempts dump¬
ing authorised pursuant to the former Act from the offence of
polluting coastal waters under the latter Act. S. 31(2)(b)(iii),
32(4)(b). "Controlled waters" are defined by S. 56 of the
Control of Pollution Act as waters within three miles of the
low water mark. This definition may have to be changed if the
389
has not consulted with the River Boards which share responsibility
383
tor water quality in the dumping areas.
A second criticism of the licence issuance procedure is that
third parties have no right to make representations to either the
authority when he is considering the merits of an application or
before the committee should the applicant appeal, though their rights
384
may be very much in issue.
Enforcement of the Dumping at Sea Act depends to a great extent
on voluntary cooperation. The Act contains provisions for reciprocal
enforcement, but as a practical matter the extensive geographic area
which would have to be policed, as well as problems of proof, pre-
385
elude a purely legalistic approach.
Any person who dumps without a licence or in violation of its
terms is guilty of an offence^** and is liable to a fine and/or irn-
387
prisonment. As in other U.K. legislation discussed in this thesis,
U.K. declares a 12 mile territorial limit should that breadth
become accepted at UNCLOS III.
383. Conversation with Dr. J.M. Heap, Depute Chief Technical Offi¬
cer—River Inspector, 6 January 1975. This was still the case
at the end of March, 1977.
384. However, there is nothing in the Act to preclude a civil action
for an injunction or damages.
385. Conversations with Mr. D. Stott, Principal, and Mr. A. Templeman,
Senior Executive Officer, Department of Agriculture and Fisher¬
ies for Scotland, 25 April 1975. Although S. 6 provides that an
Order may provide for reciprocal enforcement of the London and
Oslo Conventions, neither Convention has yet established such
machinery and no Order has been made under the Act. Letter from
Mr. M.J. Nelson, MAFF, 2 August 1976.
386. S. 1(6).
387. The maximum penalty on summary conviction is a fine of £400 and/
or imprisonment of six months; following conviction on indict-
390
a standard of liability consistent with the Convention which the Act
implements is employed. Four statutory defences to an offence are
available:
1. Proof that the dumping was done for safety
reasons and that steps were taken to
notify the Minister within a reasonable time.
2. Proof by an employee that he was acting
under instructions given to him by his
employer and that he took reasonable steps
^Qg
to ensure that no offence would be committed.
3. Proof that the actor reasonably relied on
false or misleading information and
that he took reasonable steps to
390
ensure that no offence would be committed.
4. Proof that dumping outside U.K. waters
from a British ship, aircraft or hovercraft
was of waste loaded in and authorised
for disposal by another Convention State.
ment an offender may be sentenced to imprisonment of not more
than five years, to an unlimited fine, or to both. S. 1(6)(a),
(b). As in the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971, a
possible prison sentence may well deter dumping by a person
who might otherwise confidently expect his employer to pay any
fine imposed.
388. S. 7. Both the London Dumping Convention, in Article V(l),
and the Oslo Convention, in Article 8, provide exceptions for
dumping undertaken for safety reasons.
389. S. 8(a).
390. S. 8(b).
391. S. 9. "'Convention State,' in relation to the London Conven¬
tion, the Oslo Convention or a designated Convention, means
a State declared to be a party to that Convention by an
order." S. 12. No Order specifying Convention States has
yet been issued under S. 12(3) of the Act. This provision
avoids the conflict possible under the Act and both Con¬
ventions which would require, for example, the owner of
a British vessel loading material in Oslo for dumping on
the high seas to obtain a permit to dump from both British
and Norwegian authorities.
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Each licensing authority appoints its own enforcement officers.
Inspectors may be either officers of the Ministry's Fisheries Inspec¬
torate or scientists from the Marine Environment Protection Division
of its Fisheries Laboratories. Inspection is made of premises where
wastes intended for dumping are produced or where they are stored, as
well as of the vessel involved. Enforcement depends upon checking
documentation, sample analysis, and actual presence on board the
393
dumping vessel at the site.
In conclusion, it is the writer's view that the Dumping at Sea
Act is a reasonable approach to a problem which, like many of those
raised in this thesis, reflects the limitations imposed by other
disciplines upon law. The logistics of enforcement are such that
unless technology provides some assistance, law must depend to a
dangerous extent upon the bona fides of those whose actions it seeks
to regulate. This is not to gainsay that cooperation between the
regulated and regulators is not a sine qua non for any democratic
legal regime. The point is that as the freedom to dispose of wastes
diminishes, the cost of so doing rises inversely, and enforcement be¬
comes more of a problem. Finally, it is important to reiterate that
392. S. 5(1).
393. Letter from Mr. M.J. Nelson, MAFF, 2 August 1976. The Act prov¬
ides that an enforcement officer may inspect in U.K. land terri¬
tory, all ships in U.K. ports, and "British ships, aircraft,
hovercraft and marine structures wherever they may be," provided
that he reasonably believes "that any substances or articles in¬
tended to be dumped in the sea are or have been present." S. 5.
The enforcement officer is authorised to require anything which
will facilitate boarding a vessel suspected of actual or intended
dumping, including stopping such vessel. S. 5. An unjustifiable
request, such as a needless demand that the master return to
port, would subject the inspector to criminal or civil liability.
Hansard, H.L. Vol. 347, cols. 1111 et seq., 11 December 1973.
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our knowledge of the effects wrought on the marine environment is
imperfect indeed.
E. Conclusion
U.K. legal control of pollution from seabed operations is
largely based on national, rather than international, law. As there
are as yet no conventions regulating such activities, the British
approach has been to construct a national framework which is con¬
sistent with their policy of rapid resource development, yet provides
reasonable protection against injury and is consistent with inter¬
national customary law.
The control of pollution from vessels and dumping is effected
through the framework of international conventions. If U.K. law may
occasionally be challenged as exceeding treaties which it is meant
to implement, in practice there has been no violation of internation¬
al law.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE U.K. LAW OF LIABILITY FOR MARINE POLLUTION
A. Introduction
This chapter is concerned with U.K. law dealing specifically
with compensation for damage caused by marine pollution. Thus, al¬
though reference may be made to the common law theories of recovery,
they will not be discussed separately."'" The discussion of statutory
schemes of recovery immediately below is intended not only to ex¬
plain their operation, but also to suggest questions concerning com¬
pensation for marine pollution damage. These larger questions will
be considered in the final Chapter of this thesis, "A Model Legal
2
Regime for the North Sea." As in the case of marine pollution con¬
trol, the U.K. law of civil liability for marine pollution damage
has been shaped to a large extent by international conventions. See
Table VII-1 on the following page.
3
B. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971
Like the majority of the U.K. legislation discussed above, this
Act implements the terms of an international Convention. This Act is
1. See, Keeton, G., "The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon: English
Law Aspects," 21 Current Legal Problems 94-112 (1968).
2. See below, p. 515.
3. 1971 Chapter 59. S. 21(3) of the Act provides that different
days may be designated for the coming into force of different
parts of the Act. Some parts of the Act were delayed until
the Convention came into force. Thus, the Merchant Shipping
(Oil Pollution) Act 1971 (Commencement) Order (1971 No. 1423)
brought into force certain provisions of the Act. The Merchant
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 (Commencement No. 2) Order
(1975 No. 867) implemented the remaining provisions, coinci¬
dent with the coming into force of the Convention.
394
TABLE VII-1






Signed Acceded Relevant U.K. Law
29-11-69 17-3-75 Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution)
Act 1971
18-12-71 2-4-76 Merchant Shipping Act 1974
17-12-76 In preparation
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the child of the Civil Liability Convention (hereafter, the
4
Convention), just as the Convention issued from the Torrey Canyon.
The Torrey Canyon had raised three main problems related to liability
for such accidents:
1. What type of liability should be imposed?
Liability based on negligence raised doubts
whether some costs, such as those incurred in
cleaning the affected area, would be recoverable.
2. What limits—if any—should be set on liability?
The existing level of shipowner's liability was
thought by many to be far too low.
3. Should there be a specified forum? If so,
should it be the State damaged, the State of ^
vessel registration, or some other interested State?
The Act, in implementing the Convention, attempts to resolve these
questions in the following manner:
1. The shipowner is made strictly liable.
2. Liability limits are retained, but increased.
3. U.K. courts have jurisdiction only over claims for
damage done in the U.K. or its territorial waters.
It is intended that these points provide a framework for discussion
of the Act which follows.^
1. Strict liability
S. 1(1) of the Act is of such importance that it is reproduced
here to facilitate understanding of the discussion:
"Where, as a result of any occurrence taking place
while a ship is carrying a cargo of persistent oil
4. The Convention is discussed above at p. 240.
5. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 314, col. 1080, 28 January 1971.
6. One claim has been made under the Act as of mid-1976. Letter to
the writer from Mr. E.H. Whitaker, Department of Trade, 16 July
1976.
396
in bulk, any persistent oil carried by the ship
(whether as part of the cargo or otherwise) is
discharged or escapes from the ship, the owner
of the ship shall be liable, except as otherwise
provided by this Act,—
(a) for any damage caused in the area of the
United Kingdom by contamination resulting
from the discharge or escape; and
(b) for the cost of any measures reasonably
taken after the discharge or escape for
the purpose of preventing or reducing any
such damage in the area of the United
Kingdom; and
(c) for any damage caused in the area of the
United Kingdom by any measures so taken."
S. 1(1) provides that liability follows "any occurrence" which
causes oil pollution; however, a list of exceptions includes dis-
7
charges or escapes resulting from war, certain natural phenomena,
g
acts or omissions of third parties done with intent to cause damage,
and acts or omissions of an authority charged with the maintenance of
9
navigational aids. Both the Act and the Convention also allow the
7. The exception for "an exceptional inevitable and irresistible
natural phenomenon" is that employed by the Convention. This
definition may be distinguished from the common law concept of
"act of God." Foster, M. "Civil Liability of Shipowners for
Oil Pollution," Journal of Business Law (1973), pp. 23-31, at
p. 25.
8. The exception in favour of an act by a third party is qualified
in the Act by the phrase, "not being a servant or agent of the
owner." In this respect the Act is more narrow than the Con¬
vention: should an employee of the owner (for example, the
master) intend to do damage, it appears that the owner would be
liable under the Convention but not under the Act.
9. As Professor Brown has observed, under the last exception the
victim's only recourse would be against the erring authority.
See Brown, E.D., The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens and
Sons, London (1971), at pp. 171-172. In the other instances
the victim would be without a statutory remedy. The list of
exceptions is contained in S. 2 of the Act and Article 111(2)
of the Convention.
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owner wholly or partially to exonerate himself if he proves that
the victim was contributorily negligent.^"0
In addition to statutory exceptions, liability is also qualified
by the language of the Act which describes to what occurrences it
shall apply. S. 1(1) is limited to occurrences coincident with the
carrying by a ship of persistent oil in bulk. "Carrying" is not
defined by either the Act or Convention, however, an omission which
might well prove significant. Is a loaded tanker "carrying" oil if
it is tied up at a dock in a harbour? In the opinion of an official
at the Department of Trade, this question must be answered in the
affirmative.^ Other and more difficult questions can be imagined:
would the owner of a tanker be liable for oil which merely passes
through the vessel during loading if such discharge were found to be
caused by negligence of the crew? As between the person in charge
of the loading installation and the tanker owner it is clear that
the latter is responsible for the damage. It is less clear that a
claim for such damage may be brought under this Act.
Nor is the term "ship" defined by the Act, although the Conven¬
tion definition is "any seagoing vessel and any seaborne craft, of
12
any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo."
This omission is unfortunate, for the term as employed by the Conven¬
tion could have been more sharply defined. This may be illustrated
by another hypothetical instance of oil pollution: suppose that oil
10. S. 1(5); Convention, Article 111(3).
11. Letter to the writer from Mr. E.H. Whitaker, Department of Trade,
16 July 1976.
12. Convention, Article 1(1).
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was being loaded into a floating oil storage tank (perhaps a surplus
tanker acquired at a bargain price). If this "storage tank" is not
a "sea-going vessel" or a "seaborne craft" it is not covered by the
Convention. This is not a major criticism, and it is conceded that
the problem posed is not insoluble. (A simple and logical test to
distinguish "tankers" from "storage tankers" might be the criterion
of "major modification:" if a "storage tanker" could be used as a
"sea-going vessel" without major modifications as set out in an Annex,
the Act and the Convention should apply, but not otherwise.) However,
such issues however hypothetical need never arise at all in instru¬
ments which carefully define their terms.
The limitation of S. 1(1) to persistent oil is consistent with
the Convention and is some evidence that present systems of civil
liability are primarily intended to compensate property owners. A
spill of refined products could have devastating effects upon the
ecology of a shallow bay, but is not a particularly serious "contam¬
ination" problem that need concern littoral property owners. Thus,
not only does no one have standing to protect areas designated res
communis or res extra commercium, but a source of considerable danger
to the environment remains unregulated.
The Act is consistent with the Convention in holding only the
owner—rather than the owner or master, as in the 1954 IMCO Convention
and the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971—liable for offences, al¬
though the 1971 Fund and the implementing Merchant Shipping Act 1974
13
do shift some of this burden to the cargo owner. "Owner" means the
13. The Fund Convention is discussed above at p. 246; the Merchant
Shipping Act 1974 is analysed below at p. 409.
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registered owner, except in the case of State ships when it refers
14
to the person registered as the operator. The Act, however, con¬
tains a specific exemption not only for warships, but for "any ship
for the time being used by the government of any State for other
than commercial purposes.""^ Thus, a privately-owned tanker chartered
to the Royal Navy would not come within the Act because it was being
used by the Government. The Convention also contains an exception
for State ships, but it requires non-warships used in Government non-
16
commercial service to be either owned or operated by the State.
This discrepancy could have practical results: A chartered tanker,
operated by its private owners for the Royal Navy, would fall within
the Convention but outside the Act.
S. 1(1)(a) limits damage geographically to "the area of the
17
United Kingdom," which includes the territorial sea, and provides
that the Act applies to such damage as is caused by contamination.
"Contamination" is not defined in the Act; the Convention refers to
"pollution damage" which is defined as contamination but does not
18
clarify the meaning of the latter term. Does the term refer merely
14. S. 20(1); Convention, Article 1(3). "Owner" also refers to
the owner at the time of the occurrence or first of the occur¬
rences resulting in the discharge or escape. S. 20(2).
15. S. 14(1).
16. Convention, Article VI.
17. Neither the Act nor the Convention applies to damage on the high
seas or to the continental shelf—even if property interests
(such as interference with offshore petroleum development) are
clearly damaged. S. 20(3); Convention, Article II.
18. Convention, Article 1(6). It will be recalled that the Shipping
Casualties section of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971
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to an alteration of the pre-existing state of the water, beaches,
fishing gear, etc.? Or must there also be some economic loss? The
19
courts have not yet had occasion to consider this question. Cer¬
tainly the Act may be used by the owner of an oil-blackened beach.
His property has been rendered less valuable as a result of contam¬
ination. He may also be successful in claiming compensation for loss
of earnings which would have resulted from tourists who now avoid the
area. It is unlikely, however, that a tourist whose holiday is ruined
by oil on the beach would recover, despite the fact that holiday time
is certainly reckoned in economic terms daily in labour negotiations
and staff recruitment.
S. 1(1)(b) limits the owner's liability to pay for measures taken
to prevent or reduce damage to those that were reasonably taken.
An owner liable for the cost of abatement measures taken by the plain¬
tiff may also be liable for the damage done by those measures, if the
21
victim acted reasonably.
S. 15 provides liability for the cost of preventive measures
where S. 1 does not apply. If, for example, fuel oil is discharged
or escapes from the bunkers of a dry cargo ship, S. 1 is inapplicable
is similarly abridged when compared to the Intervention Conven¬
tion which, unlike the Act, enumerates "related interests"
which may be protected.
19. No court proceedings had been taken concerning the Act as of mid
1976. Letter to the writer from Mr. E.H. Whitaker, Department
of Trade, 16 July 1976.
20. Professor Brown has noted that one result of this provision is
that "the user of detergents would have to satisfy himself in
the light of their known harmful effects whether such measures
would be considered 'reasonable.'" Brown, E.D., op. cit. in




because the vessel was not carrying persistent oil in bulk. S. 15
refers only to "ships;" unlike S. 1 and the Convention there is no
requirement of "carrying a cargo of persistent oil in bulk." H.M.G.
admitted that S. 15 thus went beyond the Convention, but apparently
thought that provision in the Act for recovery in cases not covered
23
by S. 1 more important than consistency with the treaty.
Subsections (2), (3) and (4) of S. 1 further clarify the nature
and scope of shipowner's liability. S. 1(2) provides that a person
incurring liability under subsection (1) is also liable for similar
24
damage caused to another Convention country. Thus, the owner of a
tanker such as the Torrey Canyon which has caused damage in the U.K.
and in France is liable for damage to both Convention countries under
the Act. It is important to note, however, that damage, to confer
25
jurisdiction on British courts, must first occur in the U.K.
S. 1(3) of the Act implements the Convention's provision of joint
26
and several liability. Where oil is discharged from two or more
ships and each owner is liable under S. 1, then each owner is liable
for the entire amount of the damage, unless each share can reasonably
22. The Act would not apply to a combination oil/bulk ore carrier
carrying ore. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 9, above, at
p. 167, and sources cited therein regarding the Convention.
23. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 314, col. 1082> 38 January 1971.
24. S. 19(1). The Act distinguishes a Convention country (for
example, any of the Channel Islands, any colony for whose
external relations the U.K. is responsible) from a Convention
State which is a State Party to the Convention. Ss. 18, 19.
Convention, Article II.
25. S. 13(2); Hansard, H.L. Vol. 314, col. 1084, 28 January 1971.
26. Convention, Article IV.
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be determined.
S. 1(4) is intended to deal with a situation in which multiple
27
discharges result from the same incident. In such a case the succes¬
sive events are treated as one with the first, but any measures taken
after the first of them is deemed to have been taken after the dis¬
charge. The last clause thus allows a victim to claim costs for
measures reasonably taken after the discharge to prevent further
damage, under S. 1(1)(b).
2. Increased liability
The Civil Liability Convention increased the liability limits
previously set by the 1957 Brussels Convention, but still retained a
liability ceiling. The Act follows this formula.
S. 3 restricts the ship owner's liability for oil pollution
damage to actions taken pursuant to S. 1 of the Act, and exempts
servants and agents of the owner as well as any person performing
28
salvage operations from any liability at all. The Act thus becomes
the exclusive means of recovery in U.K. law. Limitation of damage
actions to those taken pursuant to the Act is a typical feature of
27. This implements Article III (1) of the Convention.
28. However, nothing in the Act prejudices the shipowner's right to
recover from a third party. S. 16; Convention, Article 111(5).
In this way although the shipowner may not ultimately bear the
full costs of an award of damages, liability is channeled through
him. Restrictions on actions against the owner's servants or
agents behind whom an owner would normally stand prevents an in¬
direct means of commencing further proceedings against the owner.
Hansard, H.C. Vol. 821, 12 July 1971. The subparagraph excluding
liability for damage caused by salvage operations performed with
the agreement of the owner was included to facilitate salvage
of a damaged vessel. The analogous provision in the Convention
is Article III (4).
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schemata which balance strict liability with limited liability:
unless the latter factor is assured, agreement to the former is un-
29
likely by the State or person who will have to pay.
The owner may limit his liability under the Act to 2,000 gold
francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage not to exceed a maximum of
210 million gold francs."^0 However, this limitation does not apply
if the incident occurred with the shipowner's actual fault or privity.
In a claim against a shipowner, a court must first determine whether
the owner may limit his liability. If the court finds that the incid¬
ent occurred without the shipowner's actual fault or privity, the
owner must then pay into court the appropriate amount as determined
by the francs/tonnage formula. The court then determines the distrib-
29. See, for example, the Warsaw Convention which is based on neg¬
ligence, but with the burden of proof shifted to the defendant
air carrier to show that it was not below the standard of care.
Limited liability was the quid pro quo for the shift in the
burden of proof. Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw, 1929).
The English text of this Convention may be found in the Carriage
by Air (Application of Provisions) Order (1967 No. 480/67).
30. S. 4(1)(b); Convention, Article VI. S. 4(2) contains detailed
provisions concerning the determination of a ship's tonnage.
The 210 million gold franc maximum liability limit (about U.S.
$14 million) is the Convention top limit as well, and was deter¬
mined to a great extent by the capacity of the insurance market
to cover possible claims. It was recognised at Brussels that
this limit "does not afford full protection for victims in all
cases," and in consequence it was resolved to set up an Inter¬
national Fund. See the discussion of the Civil Liability Con¬
vention and the "Resolution on Establishment of an International
Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage," above at p. 240
and p. 246; the Compensation Fund Convention, above at p. 246;
and the Merchant Shipping Act 1974, Part I, which implements
the Fund in U.K. law, below, at p. 409.
31. S. 4(1); Convention, Article V(2). "Privity" connotes "an
element of personal fault as opposed to responsibility for the
acts of others." Hansard, H.C. Vol. 816, col. 1577, 5 May 1971.
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32
ution of that amount.
A person liable under the Act is entitled to offset the cost of
any reasonable measures to prevent pollution, and this cost will be
33
considered by the court in distributing the amount paid in. Once a
fund at least equal to the amount of damage has been paid into court,
the court must order the release of any ship or other property
arrested in connection with the claim, and no judgment shall be en¬
forced in respect of the claim except insofar as it is for court
34
costs. Likewise, no proceedings may be taken against a non-owner
liable under the Act if he is entitled to limit his liability and the
owner has paid into court an amount at least equal to his own liabil-
35
ity. The owner or another person in the U.K. may also limit liab¬
ility in other Convention Countries, provided that the amount paid
into court covers damage which was caused there. As is provided in
the Convention, no action may be brought later than three years after
the claim arose nor later than six years after the occurrence result¬
ing in the discharge.^
32. S. 5(2); Convention, Article V(4). The court may set a time
limit within which an application to limit liability must be
made. S. 5(3).
33. S. 5(5); Convention, Article V(8). If the owner, insurer, or
another person entitled under the Act to limit his liability
has paid any compensation, he acquires by subrogation the rights
of the person compensated to the extent of his payment. S. 5(4);
Convention, Article V(5).
34. S. 6(1); Convention, Article VI.
35. S. 7.
36. S. 8; Convention, Article VI.
37. S. 9; Convention, Article VIII.
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Certainty of compensation to the victims of oil pollution is
sought to be achieved by a system of compulsory insurance. S. 10(2)
38
provides that no ship shall enter or leave a port in the U.K. or a
terminal in her territorial sea unless there is in force a certifi¬
cate of insurance satisfying the requirements of Article VII of the
Convention. This regulation extends to U.K.-registered vessels
entering the ports or offshore terminals of any other country. Cert-
39
ificates are issued by the Secretary of State for U.K. ships and
those of non-Convention countries, and by the Governments of Conven-
40
tion countries in respect of their vessels. The Secretary of State
may also by regulations provide that a certificate issued to a non-
Convention country by a Convention country other than the U.K. will
41
be recognised by H.M.G. Regulations to this effect have been made.
It is an offence for a ship to enter or leave a port or offshore
terminal, or to attempt to do so, in violation of the provisions of
38. Ships required to carry insurance are those carrying in bulk a
cargo of more than 2,000 tons of persistent oil. S. lO(l); Con¬
vention, Article VII. A ship carrying less than 2,000 tons of
oil in bulk is still within that class of ships to which the lia¬
bility sections of the Act apply, but is not required to carry
insurance or other security. "Persistent oil" is described in S.
3 of the Oil Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations (1977
No. 85); the more general description of "oil" in the Convention
is contained in Article 1(5).
39. The Secretary of State for Trade.
40. Ss. 10(3), 11; Convention, Article VII(2). The Compulsory In¬
surance Regulations detail provisions regarding insurance certif¬
icate recognition, application fee, and certificate cancellation.
41. S. 10(4).
42. The Oil Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1977 replace
earlier Regulations. North Sea States include Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway.
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the Act. The owner or the master may be fined up to £35,000 on
summary conviction, and fined without limit following conviction on
43
indictment. Subjecting the master as well as the owner to a fine
is a departure from the statutory provisions for civil liability in
which only the owner is subject to suit to recover damages. Includ¬
ing the master as a defendant is possible because although the
Convention requires States Party to prohibit their ships from trading
without a certificate of insurance, it leaves the means of control
open. The provision that either the owner or master may be fined is
consistent with the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971, and the
comments made in regard to that Act are relevant here as well. The
previous remarks indicated that under a recent case, "owner or master"
has been interpreted as "owner and master;" should that interpretation
apply to this Act, a total fine of £70,000 would be possible on sum¬
mary conviction of the defendants. It was also noted that one author¬
ity has roundly criticised large fines imposed by criminal law
against the master: Such sanctions are unfair, he asserts, because
they are directed at the shipowner--not the master who could not
44
possibly pay the maximum.
Failure to carry or produce a certificate when required is a
45
separate offence for which the master may be fined.
S. 10(8) provides that if a ship attempts to leave a port in the
U.K. without complying with the requirements for compulsory insurance,
that ship may be detained. This provision is a faithful reflection
43. S. lO(6).
44. See above, p. 346.
45. S. 10(7). The fine is limited to £400 on summary conviction.
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of the Conventional requirement that each Contracting State ensure
under national legislation that any ship, wherever registered, enter¬
ing or leaving a port or offshore terminal have insurance or other
46
security in force. Although detention is limited to ships
attempting to leave U.K. ports, the large fines possible should
certainly satisfy the obligation imposed by the Convention in respect
of arrivals at U.K. ports and arrivals and departures at offshore
terminals.
The issue of detention of non-Parties' vessels is contentious.
It was previously discussed in connection with vessel construction
standards which the Merchant Shipping Act 1974 purports to apply to
all vessels, and which also authorises the detention of vessels which
47
are substandard. It was concluded in connection with that Act that
the claimed powers were probably consistent with international law
because freedom of navigation, the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea, and immunity of foreign ships in port—none of
which were ever absolute—are becoming increasingly subject to reason¬
able regulation fairly applied. That aspect of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1974 was judged to be consistent with international law because
it met the criteria of reasonability and fairness, both in relation
to the legislation of other States which authorised more extensive
powers to protect similar interests and non-discriminatory applica¬
tion. Those comments are applicable in regard to the provision of the
instant Act as well.
S. 10(8) of this Act appears to have been applied cautiously and
46. Convention, Article VII(11).
47. See above, p. 376.
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and in a non-discriminatory manner. Professor Brown,
Article VII(11) of the Convention upon which S. 10(8)
based, has little problem in finding that there is no
international law:
"
.... it seems unlikely that this provision
would create any significant difficulties. So
long as the application of the rules is non¬
discriminatory and their existence is published
in advance, they would be quite compatible with
most treaty obligations regarding freedom of
access to ports. For example, the 'liberty of
access to all ports,' etc., and the most-favoured¬
nation and national treatment granted in the
Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation
between the United Kingdom and Japan (1962) do
not affect the right of the parties to make ^
non-discriminatory port byelaws and regulations.V
A victim of oil pollution damage within this Act may proceed
directly against the person who provided the insurance or other
49
security for the vessel causing the injury. This provision offers
the immense advantage from the victim's point of view of speedy,
uncomplicated recovery for his loss. On the other hand, Article
VII (8) of the Convention upon which this provision is based was
opposed by delegations to the Brussels Conference—including the U.K.
delegation—on the grounds that it would encourage frivolous claims.
As a result, insurers were allowed limited defences and a right to
join the owner in the proceedings.^0 The insurer may also limit his
48. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 9, at p. 177, and sources
cited therein.
49. S. 12.
50. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 9, at p. 176. S. 12(2) prov¬
ides that the insurer may avail himself of any defence which the
owner could have used, as well as the defence that the discharge
or escape was due to the wilful misconduct of the owner himself.
This is the extent of insurer defences, however: the insurer
discussing





Contamination damage in the area of the U.K. is a prerequisite
52
to jurisdiction by U.K. courts. This is true even if claims for
damage to other Convention countries are lodged in U.K. courts. On
the other hand, S. 13(3) of the Act implements the obligation imposed
by the Convention to provide for reciprocal enforcement of judg¬
ments.55 The effect of these provisions is to clarify and to limit
the jurisdictions in which a claim under the Convention and the Act
may be brought. Thus, the practice of "forum shopping" in which
those who could afford to do so selected the court likely to maximise
their recovery has yielded to the doctrine that there should be some
connection between the forum and the act complained of.
C. Merchant Shipping Act 1974
Part I of this Act enabled U.K. ratification of the International
Compensation Fund which was established to complement the Civil Liab-
54
ility Convention. Part I is divided into subsections and that ord¬
ering has been adopted in this thesis to facilitate the discussion
which follows. As most of the terms in this Act are defined as they
are in the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, just described,
may not invoke defences normally open to him such as misrepres¬
entation. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 314, col. 1083, 28 January 1971.
51. He may do so even if the owner cannot because of actual fault
or privity. S. 12(3); Convention, Article VII(8).
52. S. 13(2); Convention, Article IX(1).
53. Convention, Article X.
54. The Fund Convention is discussed above, at p. 246.
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only the significant differences will be noted.
1. Contributions to Fund
Contributions must be paid to the Fund in respect of any oil^
56 57
carried by sea to ports or terminal installations in the U.K.
Such contributions are due whether or not the oil is imported and
even if contributions were payable for the same oil on a previous
58
voyage. This provision is therefore applicable to North Sea oil
55. "Oil" has two definitions under the Act and the Fund Convention,
depending upon whether it is used in reference to contributions
to the Fund or otherwise. "Oil" used under the sub-heading
"Contributions to Fund" in the Act (and termed "Contributing
Oil" in the Fund Convention) is restricted to crude and fuel oil.
S. 2(9); Fund Convention, Article 1(3). These terms are defined
technically in the same sections of both instruments. Other
"oil" means "persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil." S. 1(3);
Fund Convention, Article 1(2). The Act does not further define
this term, but the Fund Convention uses the Civil Liability Con¬
vention definition of "oil," which includes heavy diesel,
lubricating, and whale oil. As the Act must follow the Conven¬
tion in all important particulars to satisfy H.M.G.'s treaty
obligations, it is assumed that the Act is similarly restricted.
The effect of this restriction is that the Act (and the Fund)
do not apply to the same range of cargo encompassed by the
Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 (and the Civil Liab¬
ility Convention).
56. A "terminal installation" is a bulk oil storage site which is
capable of receiving oil from waterborne transportation, in¬
cluding offshore facilities linked to such site. S. 2(9);
Fund Convention, Article 1(8).
57. S. 2(1); Fund Convention, Article 10(1).
58. S. 2(2). A "previous voyage" can be determined by reference to
the bill of lading. The voyage of the cargo is the point of
origin and the point of destination, regardless of intermediate
stops. Conversation with Col. J.A. Sulivan, General Manager,
Milford Haven Conservancy Board, 11 June 1976. Contributions
are also payable even if the oil cargo came from a non-Fund
Convention country. S. 2(3). As noted in connection with
mandatory carriage of insurance for oil tankers, so long as
rules imposing requirements upon foreign flag vessels in U.K.
ports are applied in a non-discriminatory manner and are pub¬
lished in advance they raise no serious problems of internation¬
al law.
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which is transported to British shores by tanker: it is subject to
assessment notwithstanding the fact that it is not "imported."
59
The person liable to pay contributions is the importer or,
60
if the oil is not imported, the one receiving the oil. There is
61
no liability to pay contributions if a person has not received more
62
than 150,000 tonnes of oil. The contributions due from a person
who is liable are determined according to the provisions of Articles
63 64
11 and 12 of the Convention. The Secretary of State may make
regulations detailing the procedure to be followed by persons from
whom contributions are due, and providing penalties for offences.^
The Secretary of State may also by notice require any person engaged
in producing, treating, distributing or transporting oil to furnish
59. The importer is "the person by whom or on whose behalf the oil
in question is entered for customs purposes on importation, and
'import' shall be construed accordingly." S. 2(9).
60. S. 2(4); Fund Convention, Article 10(1).
61. All members of a group of companies are treated as a single
person, and any companies amalgamated into a single company
are treated as the same person as the single company. S. 6.
"Company" means a body incorporated under law; "Group" means
a holding company and its subsidiaries as defined by specified
U.K. law. S. 2(9). Lumping the constituent companies of a
group or amalgamation together prevents multiple claims of the
150,000 tonne exemption to which the Act does not apply.
62. S. 2(5); Fund Convention, Article 10.
63. S. 2(7) (a). Contributions shall be payable in such installments
as may be notified to a person liable to pay. S. 2(7)(b).
64. The Secretary of State for Trade.
65. S. 2(8). Regulations may contain such supplemental or incident¬
al provisions as appear to the Secretary of State expedient, and
may impose penalties punishable on summary conviction by a fine
not to exceed £400. No regulations have yet been promulgated
under S. 8.
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specified information.^ The purpose of this power is to provide the
Fund with the names and addresses of persons liable to make contrib-
0
utions to it, and the quantity of oil for which they must contribute.
Penalties are provided not only for failure to comply with a notice,
but for the disclosure of information provided pursuant to notice
68
without the consent of the person from whom it was obtained.
2. Compensation for persons suffering pollution damage
69 70
The Fund is liable for pollution damage in the United Kingdom
if the person who suffered the damage was unable to obtain full com¬
pensation under S. 1 of the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971
t
66. S. 3(1). Such information may include that necessary for a
determination of whether the company shall be treated as a
single person under S. 2(6). S. 3(2). A formal letter has been
sent to persons subject to this provision notifying them of
information required. Letter from Mr. E.H. Whitaker, Department
of Trade, 16 July 1976.
67. S. 3(1); Fund Convention, Article 15(1).
68. S. 3(5). The fine on summary conviction may not exceed £400.
A person who refuses or wilfully neglects to comply with a
notice or in furnishing information makes any statement which
he knows to be false or recklessly makes such a statement is
subject to the same penalty on summary conviction; on convic¬
tion on indictment he may be fined an unlimited amount and/or
imprisoned for a maximum of 12 months. S. 3(6). These pro¬
visions fulfill the Conventional obligation that duties imposed
thereunder be carried out. Article 13(2) of the Fund Convention.
69. "Pollution damage" is defined by the Act as "damage caused
outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from
the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever the es¬
cape or discharge may occur, and includes the cost of prevent¬
ive measures and further damage caused by preventive measures."
S. 1(3).
70. "In the United Kingdom" is not defined in the Act. The Fund
Convention, however, applies to "damage caused on the territory
including the territorial sea" of a Contracting State. Conven¬
tion, Article 3. As the Act (and the Convention) applies to
offshore installations in the territorial sea, and the Merchant
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 (which implements the Civil
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because:71
1. An exception under S. 2 of the 1971 Act barred
recovery (for example, an act of God).
2. The person liable cannot meet his obligations.
3. The damage exceeds the liability limits of the
1971 Act.
The Fund is also liable for pollution damage under the 1971 and 1974
Acts when the Fund is headquartered in the U.K. and proceedings have
been brought in a country which is not a Party to the Fund Convention,
or when both the U.K. and another Fund Convention country have been
injured and proceedings have been brought in the U.K. or in a non-
72
Party country. The definition of "pollution damage" is expressly
stated to include costs reasonably incurred by the owner in attempt¬
ing to prevent or minimise pollution damage, and the owner is
accordingly placed in the same position with respect to claims
73
against the Fund as other plaintiffs.
The obligation of the Fund to pay compensation is limited in
several respects. No compensation is payable if the damage resulted
from force majeure or was caused by oil which escaped from a Govern-
74
ment ship on non-commercial service. A second exception bars
Liability Convention) expressly includes the territorial sea
of a Contracting State, it is reasonable to assume that "in
the U.K." in the present Act includes the territorial sea.
71. S. 4(1); Fund Convention, Article 4. The exceptions which bar
recovery under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971
are discussed above at pp. 396 et seg.
72. S. 4(2).
73. S. 4(6); Fund Convention, Article 4(1).
74. S. 4(7) (a); Fund Convention, Article 4(2) (a).
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recovery if the claimant cannot prove that the damage was caused by
75
a ship which he has identified. The latter exception was included
in the Act to restrict its application to ships, as distinguished
76
from "natural causes." The requirement that the offending ship
be identified has caused considerable concern, however. It is
frequently not possible to identify the origin of an oil slick which
77
nevertheless may cause damage to the coast. The Fund may therefore
offer no relief to bona fide victims of oil pollution damage in many
78
cases.
75. S. 4(7)(b); Convention Fund, Article 4(2)(b).
76. A Government spokesman explained that S. 4(7)(b) was included in
the Act because "the Fund is not designed to pay for pollution
damage arising from what one might call natural causes, from oil
seepage or from fractured oil pipelines, either on the ship or
under the sea." Hansard, H.L. Vol. 351, col. 1277, 20 May 1974.
Although it is correct to assert that the Fund is restricted to
oil pollution damage resulting from vessels, the proffered ex¬
planation does not deal with the question of why identification
of an offender should be a prerequisite to recovery. The reason
S. 4(7)(b) is in the Act is because it is in the Fund Convention
(Article 4(2)(b)), and, as has been emphasised, H.M.G. cannot
deviate in any important particular from a Convention and still
ratify it without reservation. This provision was included in
the Convention because that instrument was not intended to be an
insurance policy available to victims for damage however caused,
but to offer an increased degree of protection from that formerly
available. The Fund itself may proceed against the offender, and
indeed, as discussed below, it acquires by subrogation the
rights of one who has been compensated. A minor error in the
Government's explanation also merits a brief comment: "natural
causes" is a particularly unhappy phrase, for one major feature
of the Fund is that it compensates victims of pollution caused
by "an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible phenomenon"—
surely a "natural cause," and a cause which excludes recovery
under the Civil Liability Convention and the Merchant Shipping
(Oil Pollution) Act 1971.
77. Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea (ACOPS), Annual
Report (1974), p. 8.
78. Technology may reduce the problem of vessel identification some¬
what. In a recent case, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S.
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Fund liability may be limited if it is proved that the pollution
79
damage resulted from an act or omission of the victim. However
this exception is balanced by the exclusion of another: the Fund is
liable even for loss or damage caused by acts of God. In this respect,
the Fund moves toward absolute from strict liability.
The compensation payable from the Fund for any one incident is
limited to that necessary to bring the total of the Fund and the
80
Civil Liability Convention to a maximum of 450 million francs. This
could range from 240 million francs if the maximum allowable recovery
under the Convention were allowed, to the entire 450 million francs
if, for example, the person liable under the Convention could pay
nothing or the Convention did not apply because the damage resulted
Environmental Protection Agency combined to discover the
"chemical fingerprints" of the oil which polluted Florida
beaches. Through the use of spectrofluorometry, thin-layer
chromotography and a technique with iodine, the results of
741 separate tests indicated the identity of the offending
vessel. When the tanker docked at Philadelphia, the captain
was arrested. International Herald Tribune, 10 November 1975,
p. 1. The time and expense involved in such detective work
limit the value of this approach. The limits of technology
describe what is practical, and must therefore be considered
by legal draftsmen.
79. S. 4(8); Fund Convention, Article 4(3). This exception applies
only to the victim; the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act
1971 is narrower in that damage caused by anyone who intended
the consequences of his act may not recover from the owner under
the 1971 Act, but could under the 1974 Act. Both Acts include
contributory negligence provisions, but the 1971 Act is slight¬
ly more restrictive in this respect too, in that the negligence
of certain Government authorities may bar a claim against the
owner. S. 2(c).
80. S. 8(10); Fund Convention, Article 4. The Assembly of the
Fund may raise the maximum to 900 million francs, although it
has not yet done so. Article 4(6) of the Fund Convention. The
30-40 million Special Drawing Right liability limit of the
Seabed Civil Liability Convention may influence the Assembly to
raise Fund Convention limits.
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81
from an act of God. Where the amount of established claims against
the Fund exceeds the maximum allowable compensation each plaintiff
82
shall have his claim diminished pro rata.
3. Indemnification of shipowners
It may be recalled that one purpose for which the Fund was estab¬
lished was to relieve shipowners from the financial burden imposed by
83
the Convention. This section of the Act fulfills that objective.
S. 5(1) provides that where a shipowner is liable under the Act, he
(or his guarantor) may be indemnified for that portion of his aggreg¬
ate liability which is between 1500 and 2000 francs for each ton of
the ship's tonnage or between 125 and 210 million francs, whichever
84
is less. The owner may not claim the benefit provided by this
Article if the pollution damage resulted from his own wilful miscon¬
duct or if the Fund proves that as a result of the actual fault or
privity of the owner, the ship did not comply with certain Conventions
which may be specified by Order and that the damage resulted from
85
such non-compliance. On the other hand, the owner may claim com¬
pensation for costs reasonably incurred in an effort to prevent or
81. S. 4(1) of the 1974 Act; Fund Convention, Article 4. It will
be recalled that under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act
1971 and the Civil Liability Convention, liability may not
exceed 210 million francs.
82. Fund Convention, Article 4(5). No express provision is made for
this situation in the Act.
83. Fund Convention, Article 2(1)(b).
84. S. 5(1); Fund Convention, Article 5(1).
85. S. 5(3), (4), (5); Fund Convention, Article 5(1), (3). The
owner may recover even if the damage was caused by the wilful





S. 6 of the Act concerns jurisdiction and the effect of judg¬
ments. Pursuant to that Section it is provided that Admiralty
jurisdiction shall apply to any claim under Part I of the Act. When
a judgment has become final and enforceable, it is conclusive
evidence of a claim upon the Fund. Detailed provision is also made
for reciprocal enforcement of the Act with other Convention countries.
The Act provides in S. 7 for a statute of limitations within which
a claim against the Fund must be brought: no such action may be
entertained by a U.K. court unless it is commenced or third-party
87
notice given within three years after it arose or six years after
88
it occurred. There is, however, an exception provided for indemnity
actions. In such cases, the owner and guarantor may bring an action
within six months from the date that person first learned of his
possible liability under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the
claim may have been made or the damage occurred outside the time
limits described above. S. 8 provides that the Fund acquires by
subrogation the rights of one reimbursed because of default by the
owner or guarantor. There is a similar provision for a U.K. public
authority to acquire the rights against the Fund of one to whom it
89
has paid compensation for oil pollution damage.
86. S. 5(7); Fund Convention, Article 5(7).
87. "Third-party notice" is that which is given the Fund in respect
of proceedings against an owner or guarantor. S. 7(1).
88. S. 7; Fund Convention, Article 6.
89. S. 8(4).
CHAPTER EIGHT
NORWEGIAN LAW REGULATING POLLUTION FROM SEABED OPERATIONS
A. Introduction
*
In Norway, as in the U.K., the discovery of gas in the Nether¬
lands' Groningen Field at the end of the 1950s aroused speculation
that similar hydrocarbon deposits might be contained in the contin¬
ental shelf beneath the North Sea. In 1962, the first oil company
approached the Norwegian Government requesting permission to begin
exploration off the Norwegian coast; however, permission was refused
as it was intended that a thorough study should precede any action.^
It seems likely that a further and unarticulated reason for delay was
the desire to enact legislation based on findings of the study before
authorising offshore operations. The following year a Royal Decree
and an Act became the first Norwegian law specifically directed to
the subject of offshore natural resource development. These instru¬
ments, like the U.K. Continental Shelf Act which followed in less
than a year, were intended to incorporate into municipal law the
sovereign rights over continental shelf natural resources which inter¬
national law conferred upon coastal States. Such limited sovereignty
would permit the assertion of functional jurisdiction over offshore
petroleum development activities.
Three preliminary comments may assist in the understanding of the
Norwegian regulatory system concerning the control of pollution from
the development of seabed petroleum resources. These concern factors
1. The Ministry of Industry, Report No. 30 to the Norwegian Storting
(1973-74) . Unofficial translation from Norwegian concerning
"Operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf etc.," para. 1.2,
at pp. 5 and 6. (Hereafter, Report No. 30.)
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influencing the development of Norwegian law, the Norwegian "dualistic"
system of law, and the interpretation of Norwegian law.
1. Factors influencing the development of Norwegian law
As observed in Chapter One, Norway is one of the world's richest
nations and can afford to concentrate on deliberate development of
North Sea oil in the context of the total Norwegian society. It might
also be observed that, although Norway is a Party to NATO and the OECD,
she is not a Member of the EEC. Thus, to the extent that the two former
organisations seek to influence the policies of their Members (for
example, in making energy available to States Parties), Norway is in
the same position as the U.K. On the other hand, Norway clearly has
greater freedom in setting economic policy than does Britain. Finally,
it should be observed that although the unresolved continental shelf
delimitation problems which Norway has with the Soviet Union are similar
to those she has with the U.K. (and which the U.K. has with France and
Ireland), the issue of security is uniquely relevant to the north of
Norway and must be considered in any legislation.
2. The Norwegian dualistic system of law
Norway has a "dualistic" municipal law system; it is thus necessary
to ensure that Norwegian law is consistent with treaties to which that
2
State will become Party. Although, as observed above, the majority
2. McNair, A., "The Method Whereby International Law is Made to Pre¬
vail in Municipal Courts on an Issue of International Law," 30
Transactions of the Grotius Society for the Year 1944 11-49 (1945),
especially the comments of Professor Raestad concerning Norway;
Hambro, E., "Some Remarks About the Relations Between Municipal
Law and International Law in Norway," 19 Acta Scandinavica Juris
Gentium 3-27 (1949), at p. 4; Smith, Carsten, "International Law
in Norwegian Courts," 12 Scandinavian Studies in Law 150-201
(1968), pp. 176-177; interview with Byrasjef Karin M. Bruzelius,
Justisdepartementet, 26 November 1976.
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view is that failure of national law to conform to a treaty is not of
itself a breach of international law,~^ the Norwegian constitution
requires that such consistency be effected before a treaty can be
4
ratified. This may at times result in State assertion of claimed
rights before they are actually conferred by the ratified convention.
Support for such claims must then be sought in customary law if they
are to be considered consistent with the international legal system.
It will be noted from Table VIII-1 on the following page that the
Norwegian Government did not accede to the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf until 9 September 1971, some eight years after claim¬
ing sovereign rights over the adjacent continental shelf. Why did the
Norwegian Government hesitate to accept a Convention which appears
supportive of their continental shelf claims? The precise reason may
never be known. It seems clear, however, that concern over the effect
of the 200-metre depth criterion on continental shelf delimitation was
largely responsible. It will be recalled that the Norwegian Trough
exceeds this depth in places, and is located quite close to the Nor¬
wegian coastline. The dual delimitation criteria contained in Article 1
of the Continental Shelf Convention provide that the continental shelf
includes
"the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation
of the said areas "
Were Norway to accept the Continental Shelf Convention, her bargaining
3. See above, at pp. 276, 278.
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position vis a vis the U.K. and Denmark might have been weakened.
Beyond sections of the Norwegian Trough which exceeded 200 metres the
Norwegian claim to additional submarine areas would have rested solely
upon the exploitability criterion. Should Norway have failed to per¬
suade her North Sea neighbours that such resources as might be found
beyond the Norwegian Trough would indeed be exploitable, her shelf
would have been greatly reduced. Information which the Norwegian Gov¬
ernment might have had concerning promising geological structures near
the present U.K.-Norwegian median line could only increase their caution.
Hindsight confirms the wisdom of the Norwegian approach: Figure III-l
on page 125 is sufficient to illustrate that nearly all the great hydro¬
carbon deposits discovered to date in the U.K. and Norwegian areas are
near the present median line—but such major fields as Ekofisk, Frigg
and Statfjord would have been well within the U.K. sector had Norwegian
sovereign rights over the seabed been limited to areas landward of
the Trough.
The question of the legality of the Norwegian claim remains to be
considered: were the sovereign rights claimed consistent with inter¬
national customary law in 1963? The continental shelf doctrine was
discussed above in connection with the evolution of the law between
1951 (The Abu Dhabi Arbitration) and 1969 (The North Sea Continental
£
Shelf Cases). The case for asserting sovereign rights over the adjacent
continental shelf based on custom was strengthened somewhat following
5. Professor E.D. Brown has suggested that exploitability must be
interpreted as meaning "economic exploitability." Brown, E.D.,
The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens and Sons, London (1971)
at pp. 7-8.
6. See above, at p. 95.
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the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention. A coastal State could
cite the Convention as evidence of a generally accepted norm of inter-
7
national customary law.
The case that an embryonic customary law of coastal State contin¬
ental shelf rights had matured sufficiently to support the Norwegian
claims is supported by the fact that the "interested" North Sea States
did not protest. The U.K., certainly the most "interested" of these
States, was well aware of the implications of silence in relation
to unilateral claims, as a result of the decision against her in the
Fisheries Case involving the issue of straight baselines. In 1951,
the I.C.J, had found the Norwegian claim of a territorial sea measured
from straight baselines "not inconsistent with international law" in
Q
part because the U.K. had not registered sufficient protest. Another
inference which may be drawn from British silence regarding delimitation
of the continental shelf is that, even though there might not have been
clear support in international law for the Norwegian claim, neither was
the claim patently a violation of international norms. It is suggested
that this view, complemented by an understandable desire to be a "good
neighbour" to Norway and not get involved in a second Fisheries Case
9
explains the absence of U.K. protest. As customary law requires at
7. This argument would lose much of its force as time passed and it
became evident that few of the world's growing community of
States believed strongly enough in the Convention's provisions
to ratify or accede to it.
8. In the words of the I.C.J., "for a period of more than 60 years
the United Kingdom itself in no way contested" the Norwegian
establishment of a system of straight baselines. Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, I.C.J. Reports (1951) p. 116, at p. 138.
9. A cynic might add that a British "good neighbour policy" of that
period would have been uncomplicated by considerations of central
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the very least an opinio juris, or belief that a proposition is legally
binding, the explanation offered for U.K. failure to protest does not
support a finding of customary law: the U.K. did not so much believe
that the Norwegian claim was legal as suspect that an international
tribunal would find it not illegal; this uncertainty plus the realities
of practical politics tipped the balance towards acquiescence.1-0 In so
believing, the U.K. knowingly accepted the Norwegian claim and knowingly
accepted the consequences. One consequence was that it would there¬
after be futile to assert that an accepted fait accompli was inconsistent
with customary law. Sometime after the U.K. acquired knowledge of the
Norwegian law—whether planned or in force—what may have been a belief
founded on a mixture of politics and obedience to legal norms became
dominated by the latter, and a true opinio juris that Norway had custom¬
ary law sovereign rights over the natural resources of her continental
shelf emerged. When this occurred is impossible to say.
The Norwegian dualistic system and Norway's generally wide accept¬
ance of conventions relevant to the control of marine pollution combine
to ensure that Norwegian law in this respect is very much the child of
the international legal regime—even when the latter is not yet clear.
This conclusion is supported by Tables VIII-1 and IX-1 (on pages 421
and 492), which tabulate accepted conventions and relevant legislation,
and Appendices III and IV which list all Norwegian law pertinent to this
North Sea field ownership and the importance of North Sea oil
to the British economy and its political significance in the
following decades.
10. In the Fisheries Case, Norway had asked the Court to decide that
straight baselines were not inconsistent with international law,
a construction which relieved that State from the burden of
proving that the method of delimitation was valid.
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thesis. It is readily apparent that there is little Norwegian marine
pollution control legislation which is not based on an international
convention. Indeed, the major exceptions to this observation, legis¬
lation concerned with pollution from seabed operations and civil liab¬
ility, will soon be replaced by laws to implement the proposed Conven¬
tion on Safety and Pollution Safeguards in the Development of North¬
west European Offshore Mineral Resources and the 1976 Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration
and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources in order to ensure con¬
formity with international law.
3. The interpretation of Norwegian law
The third point concerns the language employed in Norwegian law.
English translations of Norwegian law are characterised by broad lang¬
uage and vague terms. However, Norwegian authorities do not think
that drafting which might be criticised as "too loose" to provide
guidance for those required to comply or to permit strict enforcement
has inhibited legal protection of the environment. The following
observations are relevant to this question.
1. The English translations faithfully reflect ^
imprecise, or generalised Norwegian drafting.
2. Norwegian law is frequently written more broadly
than a convention which it is to implement. If
there is a question that the national law may
exceed the authority granted by the convention,
the Norwegian law will be interpreted so as ^
to be limited by the international instrument.
11. Conversation with Mr. E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, State Pollution
Control Authority (SPCA), 10 November 1976. Mr. Poulsson thinks
that the advantages of flexibility inherent in wide drafting
exceed possible disadvantages in determining law application.
12. Conversation with Byrasjef Christian Hambro, Ministry of Environ¬
ment, 12 November 1976.
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3. Application of such law has not been^
impeded by drafting characteristics.
In view of the above comments, discussion of textual ambiguities in
Norwegian law will be confined to those having legal significance.
B. Pollution from Seabed Operations
14
1. The Royal Decree of 31st May 1963
This Decree extends Norwegian "sovereignty" to explore for and
exploit natural resources in submarine areas "outside the coast."
This functional sovereignty applies "to such an extent as the depth
of the sea permits the utilisation of natural deposits, but not be¬
yond the median line" of other States. The Decree omits any ref¬
erence to the depth criterion which, as observed above, may be an
exclusion ex abundanti cautela intended to avoid any suggestion that
the Norwegian Trough might impose an outer limit on the Norwegian
shelf where it exceeds 200 metres. The language, "but not beyond
the median line," is relevant to continental shelf delimitation
15
negotiations north of the North Sea and in respect of a possible
13. Conversation with Mr. E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, State Pollution
Control Authority (SPCA), 10 November 1976.
14. Royal Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts, Legislation concern¬
ing the Norwegian Continental Shelf with unofficial English
translation, (January 1973), (hereafter, Norwegian Continental
Shelf Legislation), at p. 9.
15. By Royal Decree of 15 November 1974 a Norwegian delegation was
appointed to begin negotiations with the U.S.S.R. concerning de¬
limitation of the continental shelf between the two States be¬
neath the Barents Sea. The agreement of 10 March 1965 concern¬
ing the continental shelf boundary between Norway and the U.K.
applied only from the Danish/Norwegian/U.K. common boundary
point in the south and up to 61° 44' 12" N. A recent Norwegian
Report has described clarification of the continental shelf
dividing line between 61° 44' 12" N. and 62° N. (the current
northern limit of Norwegian licensing) as a matter of "immediate
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EEZ including seabed resources.
2. Act no. 12 of 21st June 1963 relating to Exploration
for and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources^
Act no. 12 expands and clarifies the Royal Decree, and provides
a statutory basis for the issuance of Regulations. Rights to sub¬
marine resources are vested in the State, exploration or exploitation
rights in respect of such resources may be granted to Norwegian or
foreign persons, and regulations may be issued concerning any rights
urgency" and states that Norwegian authorities will seek negoti¬
ations with the U.K. "at the earliest opportunity." Norwegian
Ministry of Industry, Report No. 81 to the Storting (1974-75)
(unofficial translation), p. 26 (hereafter, Report No. 81). For
a brief description of the Norwegian and Russian positions con¬
cerning Barents Sea continental shelf delimitation (median line
principle v. sector principle) see Leonard, R., "Norway: the
Next Richest Nation," Survey, The Economist, 15-21 November
1975, especially pp. 20-24. Two other factors may affect the
current negotiations concerning Barents Sea continental shelf
delimitation: pursuant to the 1925 Spitsbergen Treaty (Cmd.
2092 (1924)), Norway has almost complete sovereignty over those
islands. Russia is interested in Spitsbergen for strategic
reasons, and although she has not made recent territorial claims,
the Norwegians are worried lest a series of small Soviet en¬
croachments result in a de facto condominium. It has also been
suggested that Russian rights within Norway's newly-declared 200
mile economic zone were agreed upon considering Spitsbergen
and competing claims concerning the Barents Sea continental
shelf, and that the current negotiations concerning the latter
are influenced by the other two interests. Conversation with
Dr. Martin Saeter, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
9 November 1976.
16. The Norwegian "Economic Zone" declared in 1977 is concerned only
with living resources, but the declaration contains a provision
which authorises regulations to be made extending Norwegian juris¬
diction to persons and vessels within the area. This provision
clearly anticipates the emergence of a more comprehensive "eco¬
nomic zone" in international law as proposed in the RSNT. See
the discussion of the Act of 17 December 1976 relating to the
Economic Zone of Norway, below at p. 483. See also the comments
on the emerging law of the sea, particularly with reference to
the RSNT, above, at p. 145.
17. Norwegian Continental Shelf Legislation, p. 11. Pursuant to its
S. 6, the Act entered into force immediately.
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conferred. Although exploration (reconnaissance) licences were
issued immediately, the Norwegian policy of analysis before action
delayed the award of production licences until 1965, following the
promulgation of further rules for seabed operations and coincident with
delimitation agreements setting the outer continental shelf bound-
19
aries. The award of production licences in respect of specific
blocks of the Norwegian continental shelf on 13 April 1965 was followed
by similar licensing rounds on 21 May 1968, 12 July 1973, and 15 Nov-
20
ember 1974. At present, production licences have been granted in
respect of about 25 per cent, of the Norwegian continental shelf south
of 62° N. latitude. No reconnaissance or production licences have yet
been issued in respect of areas north of 62° N., but this will soon
change as drilling is planned off both Troms/Vest-Finnmark and
21
Mjzire/Tr^ndelag in 1978. Drilling in these two areas, the former in
o o
the north of Norway between 69 and 72 N., and the latter farther south
18. Appendix III lists the relevant Decrees and Regulations which are
based on the 1963 Act. Outside the scope of this thesis, but
perhaps of interest to some readers, is the Royal Decree July 9,
1976 Relating to Protection of Workers Etc. in Activities Associ¬
ated with Exploration and Exploitation of Submarine Petroleum
Resources, available in unofficial English translation from the
Norwegian Ministry of Industry.
19. The 1965 production licences were granted pursuant to the provi¬
sions of the Royal Decree of 9th April 1965. The 1965 Decree
was replaced by the Royal Decree of 8th December 1972 relating
to development of seabed resources. Report No. 30, para. 2.1,
p. 6.
20. Ibid., at p. 6; Report No. 81, para. 1, p. 19. Production
licences have also been granted for two blocks without formal
announcement. Report No. 30, para. 2.3, p. 8.
21. Ministry of Industry, Report No. 91 to the Norwegian Storting
(1975-76), "Petroleum Exploration North of 62° N.," (unofficial
translation) (hereafter, Report No. 91), paras. 3 and 4, pp. 6
and 7.
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at between 62° and 66° N., has been delayed pending completion of an
investigation into the "level of risk" which can be expected from such
22
activity. The Ministry of Industry has now published its findings
in a recent Report, concluding that the "level of risk" (comprising
the technical and safety aspects of the projected operations, plus the
23
consequences for the community and environment) is acceptable. The
investigation was particularly concerned with the effects of a blowout
during the winter and spring when large concentrations of fish fry and
larvae pass through the area. It was concluded, however, that "harmful
effects would be of a transitory nature even should they affect an
entire age group" and that not only is there "little likelihood of a
big blowout," but by permitting drilling only in the summer even this
24
risk would be minimised. The Report asserts that
"careful supervision will be exercised by the
authorities from the very beginning to ensure
compliance with the rules in force to prevent
befouling of the seabed.
In view of the recent discoveries of the extent of oil-related debris
on the continental shelf south of 62° N., it seems likely that the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate will be very careful indeed to fulfil
this promise by their Ministry, and that Statoil and the other companies
involved will also conscientiously strive to avoid such pollution, if
26
only to avoid additional bad publicity.
22. The areas are illustrated in Report No. 81, Map Appendices 3 and
4, pp. 60 and 61.
23. Report No. 91, para. 11, pp. 17 and 18.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. See below, at p. 444 and footnote 83.
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a) Royal Decree of 8th December 1972 relating to Exploration
for and Exploitation of Petroleum in the Seabed and
Substrata of the Norwegian Continental Shelf^
This Decree is primarily concerned with licences for exploration
28
and exploitation of seabed petroleum resources on the continental
shelf and in national waters. Three types of licence are available:
reconnaissance, production, and licences for installations other than
production facilities, for example, storage installations, liquefaction
installations, installations for production of electricity, pipelines,
29
shipment installations, and electric cables.
Reconnaissance licences, corresponding to the U.K. exploration
licences, may be granted to Norwegian or foreign companies and entitle
the recipient to prospect for petroleum in stipulated areas for a period
of three years.A reconnaissance licence does not grant exclusive
27. Norwegian Continental Shelf Legislation, pp. 109-159. This Decree
was made under the authority of the Act of 21st June 1963. Pur¬
suant to its S. 60, the Decree entered into force immediately.
28. The comprehensive definition of "petroleum" includes "all liquid
and gaseous hydrocarbons existing in their natural state in the
sub-strata as well as all other substances, including sulphur,
produced as a by-product in extraction of such hydrocarbons."
S. 2(1).
29. S. 3. The terms of licences required for installations, pipelines,
etc. are determined by the Ministry in each case. Report No. 30,
para. 2.1, p. 7. Norwegian authorities had control over offshore
installations and pipelines under the 1965 Decree which the pres¬
ent Decree replaced, although licences were not required.
Sections 36 and 37 of the 1972 Decree complement the licensing
requirement, providing, inter alia, for Ministerial control of
installation siting and pipeline use. Norwegian legislation em¬
powering Government control of pipelines on the continental shelf
thus existed a decade before the U.K. enacted comparable legis¬
lation in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975.
30. Sections 4, 6, 8. A reconnaissance licence does not apply to
areas subject to a production licence, and is in this respect
identical to a U.K. exploration licence which applies to "seaward
areas" except those for which production licences have been granted.
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exploration rights nor does it confer prior rights to exploit any
31
find. The methods by which the licensee may conduct his survey are
32
specified, drilling being expressly prohibited. As of 1974-75, a
33
total of 53 petroleum reconnaissance licences had been granted.
Production licences may be granted to companies which have been
established in conformity with Norwegian law and which have their
34
principal seat of business in Norway. Production licences are issued
on the basis of detailed information submitted in an application which
35
may or may not have been invited by the Ministry. A production
licensee has exclusive rights of petroleum exploration and exploitation
Reconnaissance licences are awarded by the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate, an organisation which reports to the Petroleum and
Mining Department of the Ministry of Industry. Report No. 30,
Appendices 5 and 6, pp. 85 and 86.
31. S. 8.
32. S. 7. Even though drilling is forbidden, the Decree of 25th Aug¬
ust 1967 relating to safe practice, etc. in exploration and
drilling for submarine petroleum resources is expressly made to
apply. S. 9(2). (The 1967 Decree has been replaced by the Decree
of 3rd October 1975, discussed immediately below in the text.)
Reconnaissance licensees are therefore particularly affected by
Chapter II, "Reconnaissance," in the 1975 Decree.
33. Report No. 30, Appendix 2, p. 79; Report No. 81, Appendix 4, p.
50.
34. S. 11(1). Production licences are awarded by the Ministry of
Industry, Petroleum Negotiation Division. Report No. 30, Appen¬
dix 5, p. 85.
35. Sections 12 and 13. S. 14 enumerates the items which must be in¬
cluded in an application for a production licence; this is
primarily information concerning the applicant company. S. 17
provides that no production licence may be granted until the Min¬
istry approves a work programme. It is evident that the Ministry
weighs a large number of other factors as well. For example, in
late 1973 the Norwegians were much concerned to award production
licences in areas which would require the development of deepwater
technology, possible landing of produced petroleum in Norway, and
geological information which would increase knowledge of formations
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in the licensed area for a six-year period. The licence may then
be extended for an additional thirty years, but only in respect of
37
not more than one-half of the original area.
38
Produced petroleum must be landed in Norway unless the King ap-
39
proves another landing point. Because of the depth of the Norwegian
Trough, an exception has been made for petroleum from the Ekofisk and
in the area immediately north of 62° N. A second factor was the
desire to protect Norwegian interests by rapid assessment and
development of the blocks adjacent to those which the British
had started to drill. Report No. 81, para. 1, p. 20.
36. S. 15. The areas for which applications may be made are divided
into blocks measuring 15 minutes latitude by 20 minutes longi¬
tude, S. 12. If a petroleum deposit extends across the boundaries
of two or more concession areas, and if the licensees cannot
agree on an exploitation scheme, the Ministry may stipulate one,
S. 32. Such an agreement has been concluded among the Norwegian
licensees in the Ekofisk Field. Ministry of Industry, Report
No. 90 to the Norwegian Storting (1974-75), "Landing of Petrol¬
eum from the Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell Fields and from Parts
of the Tor Field in the Ekofisk Area," (unofficial translation)
(hereafter, Report No. 90: Landing of Petroleum from Various
Ekofisk Fields) para. 5, pp. 11-13. It should be noted that
S. 32 refers to Norwegian licensees exclusively; unitization
agreements among U.K. and Norwegian licensees in the Frigg
Field have been concluded pursuant to Article 4 of the Boundary
Treaty between the U.K. and Norway. Ministry of Industry, Re¬
port No. 77 to the Norwegian Storting (1973-74), "Landing of
Gas from the Frigg-area," (hereafter, Report No. 77), paras.
3 and 4, pp. 9 and 10. Temporary agreements relating to costs
until start of production (estimated for 1977-78) have been
concluded among U.K. and Norwegian licensees of the Statfjord
Field. Ministry of Industry, Report No. 90 to the Storting (1975-
76), "The development and landing of petroleum from the Stat¬
fjord Field and a gas trunkline," (unofficial translation) (here¬
after, Report No. 90: Statfjord Petroleum Development), para.
5, pp. 14-15. See also above, pp. 123, 138, for a discussion of
the delimitation of the U.K. and Norwegian sectors, and the
Agreement between the U.K. and Norway concerning the Frigg Field.
37. Sections 20, 22.
38. The "King" actually means the Cabinet; thus, approval is required
not only by the Ministry of Industry, but by the entire Government.
39. S. 34.
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Frigg Fields which is piped to the U.K. and Germany pursuant to inter-
40
national Agreement. Ekofisk petroleum is transshipped by dedicated
41
tanker from Teesside to Norway, and it was a condition of the per¬
mission given by the Ministry of Industry to land Frigg gas in Scot-
42
land that a specified quantity of gas be transshipped to Norway.
Advances in deepwater pipeline technology have now made it feasible
to cross the Norwegian Trough with relatively small diameter (16 - 24
40. The Ekofisk and Frigg Agreements are discussed above, at pp. 137
et seg. Detailed accounts of landing of petroleum from Norwegian
fields may be found in (unofficial English translations):
Report No. 51 to the Norwegian Storting (1972-73), "Landing of
petroleum from the Ekofisk area," (hereafter, Report No. 51);
Report No. 77; Report No. 90: Landing of Petroleum from Vari¬
ous Ekofisk Fields; Report No. 90: Statfjord Petroleum Develop¬
ment.
41. A "dedicated" tanker operates in a closed pattern. The tankers
now used to transport petroleum from the Ekofisk terminal at
Teesside, England, to Norway transported oil directly from the
Ekofisk Field to Norway before completion of the pipeline.
These tankers have segregated ballast tanks, a necessity for
loading at Ekofisk because there was no offshore provision for
oily ballast water, and still required because the oil recep¬
tion facilities at Teesside are inadequate. Conversation with
Mr. J. Odland, Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 19 November 1976.
See also, Hendrickson, H., "Onshore Experience - Phillips Pet¬
roleum Company Teesside Operations," a paper presented to the
Heriot-Watt University Institute of Offshore Engineering, 22-23
June 1976, "The Separation of Oil from Water for North Sea
Operations."
42. Report No. 77, p. 3. The Petronord Group (the licensees) will
be required to land in Norway up to 2.5 thousand million normal
cubic metres (hereafter Nm ) of gas per year for a fixed period,
at a price set by the Ministry of Industry, and must also
finance, build and operate a transportation system to trans¬
port this quantity of gas to Norway. The possibility of trans¬
porting gas from the Statfjord Field and other fields on the
Norwegian continental shelf to Britain and the Continent via
a trunk collecting line (which would require international
agreements) is being actively considered. Because of Norway's
abundance of hydroelectric power, there is at present no use of
natural gas in that country, although there are plans for a
large petro-chemical complex in Bamble. Report No. 90: Stat-
fjord Petroleum Development, Part II, "Gas trunk line," pp. 37-
46; Report No. 90: Landing of Petroleum from Various Ekofisk
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inch) pipelines. This course of action is contemplated for the
44
Statfjord field to replace tanker transport direct to Norway.
Pipelines and other offshore installations are subject to regu¬
lations pursuant to the 1972 Decree as well as to control imposed
by licence. The Ministry is given authority to control installation
siting, and it is expressly provided that such pipelines or installa-
45
tions may be made available to other users. These provisions thus
give the Ministry legal means to minimise conflict with other users
of the sea as well as to protect the marine environment.
A substantial part of the Decree concerns the regulation of sea¬
bed operations. It is provided that the Ministry may issue further
rules in respect of a number of subjects, including the prevention of
Fields, para. 6, "Plans for the Use of NGL /'natural gas liquids/
in Norway," pp. 13-15; Note, "Petrochemicals in Scandinavia,"
Noroil (No. 4) (1974), pp. 27-30.
43. Norwegian Deep Water Pipeline Project Committee, English trans¬
lation of the main conclusions of a report (November 1974). (The
official Report, in Norwegian, is "NOU 1974: 40, R^rledninger
p8 dypt vann.") See also, Note, "Spanning Norway's trench only
a matter of time--and money," Offshore Engineer (September,
1975), p. 60. Lack of new technology enabling pipeline repairs
(now done by divers) and facilitating burial limits pipe laying
in deep water. Note, Noroil (No. 6) (1974), pp. 25-28, at p. 25.
44. Report No. 90: Statfjord Petroleum Development; conversation
with Mr. J. Odland, Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 19 November
1976. For a discussion of Storting debates on the landing of
oil in Norway concluding that "it can at present safely be said
that there are now very divided views in the Storting with re¬
gard to the question of landing oil in Norway being the best al¬
ternative on the long term," see Johannessen, K., "Landing of Oil
and Gas from the Norwegian Continental Shelf," Northern Offshore
(No. 9) (1976), pp. 13-18. See also, Note, "Pipelines: Technical
Advances—Political Obstacles," Noroil (No. 12) (1974), pp. 51-55.
45. Sections 36, 37. The provisions which confer authority to control
pipeline routing and use are similar to those found in the U.K.
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, above at p. 334.
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pollution. This authority is similar to that conferred upon the
Ministry by the 1975 Decree relating to safe practices in drilling
for submarine petroleum resources and the 1976 Decree relating to
47
safe practice for the production of submarine petroleum resources.
S. 38 has not yet been used as authority for the issuance of sub¬
ordinate Regulations intended to control marine pollution. At the
time the 1972 Decree came into force, the 1967 Decree relating to
safe drilling practices (now replaced by the 1975 Decree) provided
the necessary authority to issue such regulations. Regulations for
production of petroleum are being developed pursuant to the 1976
Decree on production safety. Prior to 1976, safety controls for
production installations were exercised pursuant to S. 58 of this
(the 1972) Decree (a general authority to regulate as may be neces¬
sary to implement the Decree) and application of appropriate provis-
48
ions from the 1967 Decree relating to safe practices in drilling.
S. 39 implements Continental Shelf Convention Article 5(1) by
requiring that seabed operations be conducted prudently, "and must not
46. Section 38. This authority includes the promulgation of rules
concerned with installation building and siting, drilling, plug¬
ging of wells, preventive measures against pollution, measures
to protect other users and oceanic living resources, and safety
measures of all types.
47. The Royal Decree of 3rd October 1975, Relating to Safe Practices
Etc. in Exploration and Drilling for Submarine Petroleum Re¬
sources, replacing a 1967 Decree of the same name; the Royal
Decree of July 9, 1976, Relating to Safe Practice for the Pro¬
duction Etc. of Submarine Petroleum Resources. Both of these
Decrees are discussed immediately below in the text.
48. Report No. 30, p. 27; Vogt, N., "Safety Regulations for the Pet¬
roleum Activities in the North Sea," a paper presented to Off¬
shore North Sea Technological Conference and Exhibition, Stav-
anger (3-6 September 1974), at p. 4. Production licence terms
should ensure that the licensee's activities do not unreasonably
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unreasonably interfere with other activities." Navigation and fishing
are expressly protected by the requirement that special care be exer¬
cised to ensure that these competing uses of the sea are not unreason¬
ably "obstructed or impeded" by exploration or exploitation activities.
To supervise this and other provisions of the 1972 Decree, the
49
Ministry may appoint inspectors who have access to installations at
any time, and to all relevant materials and data as well.^° The Min¬
istry has delegated powers of inspection to its subordinate body, the
Petroleum Directorate, which maintains a staff of inspectors concerned
primarily with the safety and technological aspects of drilling and
production, but which is also utilised to some extent by the Ministry
of Environment for duties more closely related to pollution control,
such as monitoring the discharge of effluent from production installa¬
tions.^ Inspectors are empowered to halt drilling operations in
cases of serious violations, a provision also found in the 1975 Decree
52
concerning drilling safety as well as Regulations enacted thereto.
interfere with other users of the sea or cause injury to the
marine environment. Report No. 81, Appendix 7, pp. 53-54,
"Petroleum Production licence granted 15th November 1974," S. 8.
49. Section 45.
50. Access is not expressly qualified by "at reasonable times" as it
is in Model Clauses 33 and 34 of Schedule 5 of the U.K. Petrole¬
um (Production) Regulations 1976. See above, p. 305.
51. Conversation with ByrSsjef Christian Hambro, Ministry of Environ¬
ment, 12 November 1976; conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Direc¬
tor of Legal and Economic Department, Norwegian Petroleum Direc¬
torate, 24 November 1976. Mr. Hambro indicated that the Ministry
of Environment was considering the question of how best to moni¬
tor offshore pollution prevention regulations, and may increase
its own capacity to inspect.
52. Section 45. Royal Decree of 3rd October 1975, Relating to Safe
Practices Etc. in Exploration and Drilling for Submarine Petroleum
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S. 47 incorporates Continental Shelf Convention Article 5, para¬
graphs 2 and 3, into the Norwegian legal system. S. 47 provides for
a 500-metre safety zone around any temporary or permanent installation,
including pumps, storage installations and shipment facilities, but
excluding pipelines and cables.As in U.K. legislation, the unauthor-
54
ised entry of vessels and aircraft into the safety zone is prohibited.
The U.K. and Norwegian systems are also similar in that national law
applies to both installations and the safety zones which encompass
them."^ However, application of Norwegian law to safety zones raises
Resources, Section 119; Regulations for Drilling for Petroleum,
issued by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 29th August 1975,
Section 27. The Ministry may also, for adequate reasons, halt
exploration, drilling, and production, Section 41. Section 45(7)
of the 1972 Decree provides that the Ministry may require a ves¬
sel or a drilling platform to put into a Norwegian port "for
inspection and control purposes or for other reasons." This prov¬
ision would appear to conflict with the principle of flag State
jurisdiction, if applied to a foreign flag vessel. The Norwegian
Government would be unlikely to take such action, however, not
only because it would be inconsistent with international customary
law and invite retaliation against the considerable Norwegian
merchant fleet, but because effective control over drilling ves¬
sels can be maintained through the terms of the licence.
53. This is consistent with the Continental Shelf Convention, Article
5(2), (3).
54. Section 47(2). See U.K. legislation above, at p. 285.
55. Section 53(2). Although this Section states, "Unless otherwise
specified, Norwegian law shall apply to such installations as
mentioned in Section 47 [that is, those with safety zonesj, and
to activities carried out at such installations or facilities or
within the established safety zone," it is not clear precisely
which Norwegian laws may be so applied. The Justice Department,
in interpreting S. 53(2), restricts application of Norwegian law
"in cases where special rules have been issued according to the
law's S. 3 [of the 1963 Act./, or where the actual law itself says
that it is not valid or where it according to the content and
purpose of the law is obvious that it shall not be valid on the
shelf." It has been held by the Norwegian Supreme Court that a
criminal law which applied "within the Kingdom" applied to a theft
by a Norwegian national committed on board a foreign drilling
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a problem which differs in degree (though not in kind) from that dis¬
cussed in connection with the U.K.: there is a general demand on the
part of Norwegian offshore operators that safety zones circumscribe
entire complexes, such as Ekofisk and Frigg, rather than individual
56
installations. Should this occur, the area of sea closed to other
users would greatly expand. The Continental Shelf Convention does not
address this issue expressly: it is provided merely that safety zones
of 500 metres (as measured from the outer edges of the installation)
may be established around installations and devices necessary for the
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf.^ It is sub¬
mitted that the legality of such extended zones must be assessed consid¬
ering the circumstances which are relevant to the customary law (and
58
High Seas Convention) criterion of "reasonable use."
Safety zones are a recognised use of the sea which complement the
generally accepted use of continental shelf natural resource develop¬
ment. A safety zone must justify its existence in relation to competing
uses, and the stronger the other claims, the greater justification is
platform located on the Norwegian continental shelf because of
the "close contacts" between the platform and Norway. Bruzelius,
K., "Jurisdiction Competence Concerning Mobile Drilling Platforms,"
a paper read at a seminar at the Scandinavian Institute of Mari¬
time Law, University of Oslo, 19 March 1975. Translation of this
paper from Norwegian was made possible by a grant from the Ford
Foundation. The case mentioned in this footnote is reported in
Norsk Retstidende nr. 57—1974, pp. 897-901 (in Norwegian).
56. Conversation with Mr. Peter Tronslin, Mobil Exploration, Norway,
24 November 1976. Cf. the view of U.K. operators that safety
zones should be extended to 1,000 meters. The Scotsman 2 March
1977, p. 9.
57. Continental Shelf Convention, Article 5(2), (3).
58. See the discussion of "reasonable use" in connection with applic¬
ation of U.K. law to installations, the safety zone, and "the
vicinity" of pipelines, above, at pp. 286, 335.
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necessary. This consideration will assume increased significance as
seabed development commences in the areas off Troms and West Finnmark—
59
oceanic areas intensively used by Soviet submarines.
It may be appropriate at this point to mention briefly the in¬
creased problems of monitoring and enforcement that will result from
opening areas north of 62° N. to drilling and from the 200-mile Econ¬
omic Zone which was established 1 January 1977. The organisation and
resources needed to cope with the problems raised by offshore activi¬
ties of increased intensity and geographic scope was the subject of a
Norwegian Official Report,^0 which found, inter alia:
1. That the police must deal with illegal actions
which do not originate with the military forces
belonging to a foreign power. In the latter case, ^
the assistance of the armed forces must be obtained.
59. See, for example, The Economist, loc. cit. in footnote 15; Report
No. 91. The Frigg Field straddles the U.K.-Norwegian line of
delimitation, the bridge from the quarters platform in the U.K.
sector to a production platform in the Norwegian sector actually
crossing it. The safety zone which is clearly necessary to
protect both the "installations" is thus subject to U.K. and
Norwegian law—each exclusive up to the median line. See the
discussion of the Frigg Agreement, above at p. 138.
60. Ministry of Defence, NOU 1975: 50, "Surveillance of Fisheries
and Petroleum Activities," (Chapter V), (hereafter, NOU 1975:
50). The Stavanger constable is responsible for law enforcement
on the Norwegian continental shelf. The Report noted that, "(t)he
Police today have limited possibilities, in purely practical terms,
for putting any Police measures into effect on the continental
shelf. The Police stations are situated far from the relevant
locations. The Police are not equipped for such tasks, not having,
for example, sea-going vessels or air transport." Ibid., para.
1.5, p. 9.
61. Ibid., para. 1.2, p. 5. Mrs. Elizabeth Young has pointed out the
distinction between the authority of the police and the armed
forces in respect of the problem of policing British waters and
installations: the Royal Navy certainly has the authority to
"keep the Queen's peace" offshore, but "the rights of the armed
forces in relation to the whole panorama of criminal law are no
different from yours or mine." Letter to The Times, 23 February
1976, p. 13.
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2. The official monitoring institutions at present
have only limited opportunities to inspect off¬
shore operations without prior notice.
3. As offshore operations increase, there will be an
increasing risk of oil damage—a risk that the pres¬
ent system of emergency preparedness is inadequate
to cope with.^3
The Special Committee which prepared the Report came to the "princi¬
pal conclusion" that
"the Naval Fisheries Surveillance Service should be
developed as a Coast Guard, as the central executive
agency for an extensive—but limited—part of the
State's functions on the continental shelf and in
fisheries surveillance."^
S. 51 provides that
"If damage or inconvenience is caused, the Norwegian law
of torts shall be applicable. The tort feasor as well
as his employer and the licensee shall be jointly and
severally liable for any claim for compensation."
Although detailed consideration of the Norwegian law of civil liabil¬
ity will be deferred until the next chapter, a comment concerning
this provision may be appropriate at this time. As Professor
Fleischer has pointed out, if there is no specific legislation or
convention applicable, compensation for pollution damage or other
6 5
injury will be governed by the ordinary rules of civil liability.
62. NOU 1975: 50, para. 1.4, p. 7.
63. Ibid., para. 1.9, p. 12.
64. Ibid., para. 2.2, p. 15. As will become evident below, Norway
is in the process of a major reorganisation in respect of pol¬
lution control.
65. Fleischer, C., "Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting
from Offshore Operations," Scandinavian Studies in Law 107-143
(in press), p. 107. Professor Flescher's latest paper expands
and refines previous works: "Pollution from Seaborne Sources,"
in Churchill, R. (et al.) (eds.), New Directions in the Law of
the Sea, Collected Papers--Vol. Ill, British Institute of Inter-
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However, S. 51 is not limited to making this fact express: it also
provides that the tortfeasor, his employer and the licensee shall be
jointly and severally liable. This is thought to extend the Norwegian
law of torts because it disregards the relationship between licensee
and tortfeasor: it is no defence to plead that the tortfeasor was ,
66
acting as an independent contractor. S. 51 of the 1972 Decree has
been complemented by S. 15 of the standard form of petroleum produc¬
tion licence issued from 15 November 1974 which expressly provides
that the licensee assumes strict liability for pollution damages
resulting from his activities, pending the coming into force of civil
67
liability legislation.
The final Sections of the 1972 Decree pertain to arbitration, ven¬
ue, and licence revocation. S. 55 provides that whenever the 1972
Decree or a licence granted pursuant to it provides for arbitration,
68
the proceedings will be according to a specified Norwegian code.
69
Only one Section of the Decree expressly authorises arbitration; no
such provisions appear in the new standard form production licence.
The venue for disputes which can be brought before a court is the
national and Comparative Law, London (1973), pp. 24-78; "Lia¬
bility and Compensation," a paper presented to Offshore North
Sea Technological Conference and Exhibition, Stavanger (3-6
September 1974) .
66. Discussions with research fellows at the Scandinavian Institute
of Maritime Law, Oslo, November 1976; Act on Torts, 13 June
1969, No. 26 (in Norwegian).
67. Report No. 81, p. 54.
68. The Code of 13th August 1915, No. 6, relating to judicial pro¬
cedure in civil cases, Chapter 32.
69. S. 37(3), relating to compensation to the owner of a pipeline
by one who uses it, expressly refers to arbitration.
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Oslo City Court.
Violations of the Decree or Regulations issued pursuant thereto
may be dealt with by licence revocation as well as penal sanctions.
b) Royal Decree of 3rd October 1975 Relating to Safe
Practice Etc. in Exploration and Drilling for
Submarine Petroleum Resources^
This Decree concerns safety during exploration and drilling for
73
petroleum in Norwegian waters and on the Norwegian continental shelf.
It replaces a 1967 Decree which was also directed at safety during the
exploration and drilling phase of petroleum development. The original
Decree was limited to exploration and drilling because production was
74
still some years in the future and it was desired to control the off-
7
shore activities that were presently occurring as quickly as possible.
The 1967 Decree provided not only a framework for regulation of
70. Section 56.
71. Section 57. In the event of proceedings to revoke a licence, the
licensee has the right to be heard. Penal sanctions are set out
in the Penal Code, Section 339, No. 2, (which is available in
English): "Fines may be imposed upon anybody who .... 2) viol¬
ates any regulation issued by the public authorities according
to law and carrying a threat of punishment." Section 59. This
Section also provides that should more severe penal sanctions be
applicable, they will take precedence.
72. As amended by the Royal Decree of July 9 1976 Relating to
Protection of Workers Etc. in Activities Associated with Explor¬
ation and Exploitation of Submarine Petroleum Resources. In
force immediately, Section 121. This Section is also a saving
clause for provisions of the 1967 Decree to the extent that they
are not inconsistent with this Decree. The unofficial trans¬
lation of the Decree of 3rd October 1975 is published by the
Norwegian Ministry of Industry.
73. Section 1.
74. The first petroleum production in the Norwegian sector of the
North Sea was from the Ekofisk Field in July, 1971.
75. Report No. 30, p. 27.
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offshore safety, but in the absence of regulations, the Decree itself
incorporated a great amount of detail. The 1975 Decree omits some of
this detail, a streamlining made possible by the promulgation of Reg-
76
ulations pursuant to the earlier Decree. Nevertheless, even relieved
77
of such technical concerns as regulations for well casings and a
78
chapter on "Perforating," the inclusion of a new chapter, "Contin¬
gencies,"^ results in a Decree that remains long and detailed.^
The following description of the 1975 Decree and Regulations promul¬
gated pursuant thereto will attempt to convey the essence of those
76. Conversation with Mr. Peter Tronslin, Mobile Exploration, Norway,
24 November 1976. Two sets of Regulations of particular rele¬
vance to the control of marine pollution may be mentioned. The
"Drilling regulations for petroleum in Norwegian internal waters,
in Norwegian territorial waters and on the continental shelf
which is under Norwegian sovereignty," (hereafter, Drilling Reg¬
ulations) were issued by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate,
29th August 1975, pursuant to Section 2(1) of the 1967 Decree
and the delegation of authority made by the Ministry of Industry
on 30th March 1973; they are available in an unofficial English
translation from the Petroleum Directorate. The Norwegian Mari¬
time Directorate issued "Regulations for Mobile Drilling Plat¬
forms with Installations and Equipment Used for Drilling for
Petroleum in Norwegian Internal Waters, in Norwegian Territorial
Waters and in that Part of the Continental Shelf which is Under
Norwegian Sovereignty," (hereafter, Regulations for Mobile
Drilling Platforms) on 10 September 1973, pursuant to Section
2(2) of the 1967 Decree and the delegation of authority made by
the Ministry of Industry on 11th July 1969. They were amended
14 February and 1 August 1975, and 15 June 1976 and are available
in unofficial translation, as amended, from the Maritime Direc¬
torate. The Drilling Regulations came into force 1 September
1975, pursuant to the provisions of S. 52; the Regulations for
Mobile Drilling Platforms were effective when issued.
77. Sections 46-49 of the 1967 Decree.
78. Chapter X of the 1967 Decree.
79. Chapter IV of the 1975 Decree.
80. The 1967 Decree contained 128 provisions, the 1975 Decree 119.
It was suggested to the writer by a Norwegian official that this
Decree as well as the 1976 Decree regulating safety in petroleum
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instruments, concentrating on those provisions which are most relevant
to the control of marine pollution,
i) introductory provisions
S. 3, in requiring the licensee to comply with the Decree and
Regulations issued thereto, expressly charges him with responsibility
to ensure that anyone carrying out activities for him, "either person¬
ally or through employees or through independent contractors or sub-
81
contractors" complies with the provisions of this Decree. This
provision, although essentially unchanged from 1967, has still not
been defined in practice. The problem raised is the extent to which
the licensee should be held criminally liable for the acts of persons
(such as independent contractors or even subcontractors) over whom
he has little control. An example of this is provided by the recent
case of two operators who are thought by the Petroleum Directorate
82
to have violated Norwegian law requiring them to keep the seabed
free of debris. A Government inspection team using underwater
television cameras found large quantities of scrap metal, concrete,
83
etc. on the seabed near the sites of two early installations.
production did not go as far in transferring detail to Regulations
as some of the committee drafting them would have liked.
81. Section 2(2) of the Drilling Regulations and Section 2(2) of the
Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms expressly provide that
it is the "obligation" of the licensee and anyone carrying out
activities on the continental shelf to ensure that even indepen¬
dent contractors or subcontractors comply with those Regulations.
82. 1972 Decree, S. 39 (see above, p. 435); 1975 Decree, S. 4;
Drilling Regulations, S. 3; 1976 Decree, Sections 5, 17 (see
below, pp. 462, 465); plus the terms of the production licence
(S. 8 in the standard form production licence granted 15 November
1974, see above, pp. 435, 436, at footnote 48).
83. A comprehensive account of the incident is given in Aftenpoften,
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The operators had produced certificates from diving companies
84
attesting that the seabed was free of debris as required by law.
Would (and should) offshore operators be liable for the actions of
the diving company in such a case?^^
S. 4 implements Article 5(1) of the Continental Shelf Convention
in prohibiting unreasonable interference with navigation or fishing,
86
and requiring "special care" to avoid pollution. These prohibitions
are complemented by an affirmative duty to use "good oilfield prac-
87
tice" and to comply with regulations in force. Relevant regula¬
tions have been made under the authority of this Decree as well as
pursuant to the Seaworthiness Act. The Regulations for Drilling for
Petroleum, issued by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate on 29 August
1975 are of particular importance, mirroring many of the provisions
15 November 1976, p. 5 (in Norwegian). A brief account in
English may be found in The Scotsman, 15 November 1976, p. 3.
The film was shown to the Norwegian public on television and
generated considerable comment.
84. Conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Director of Legal and Economic
Department, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 24 November 1976.
Drilling Regulations S. 25, para. 2.9 requires the licensee to
obtain such a certificate before abandoning a well.
85. Should the Government decide to prosecute the two operators,
the question posed is likely to be answered. The possibility of
criminal prosecution is being considered. Conversation with Mr.
Nils Vogt, 24 November 1976. A similar provision is contained
in the 1976 Decree concerned with production (S. 4).
86. "Pollution" is not defined. The Petroleum Directorate super¬
vises activities on the continental shelf and determines, in
consultation with other Government departments according to the
circumstances, whether "pollution" has occurred.
87. The term "good oilfield practice" has been omitted from the 1975
Decree in a number of Sections in which it appeared in the 1967
instrument. Although the term is not defined in the Decree or
the Drilling Regulations, good evidence of this industry standard
is available in Institute of Petroleum, Code of Safe Practice for
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in the Decree as well as providing detailed drilling requirements.
S. 3 of the Drilling Regulations in fact is essentially the same as
88
S. 4 of the Decree. The Maritime Directorate has also promulgated
Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms pursuant to authority con-
89
ferred by this Decree. These Regulations, which came into force
on 10 September 1973 are primarily concerned with vessel safety
aspects of mobile rigs. Several other sets of regulations have been
made under this Decree and the Seaworthiness Act, but they are of
90
peripheral relevance to control of marine pollution.
Drilling and Production in Marine Areas, Applied Science Pub¬
lishers Ltd., Essex (1972).
88. The Drilling Regulations are slightly narrower, applying to
"drilling" whereas the Decree refers to "exploration and exploi¬
tation." It is questionable whether such duplication promotes
observance of the law: is it preferable to include important
provisions in two instruments to increase "impact?" Or does
such duplication invite a prospective reader to ignore bulky
material which he may think he has read before? The writer
opts for the former view, reasoning that superior instruments
which establish a framework and confer authority, complemented
by detailed regulations, are not only more likely to be read
and easier to understand, but also will facilitate such admin¬
istrative duties as keeping requirements subject to rapid change
up to date.
89. The Drilling Regulations and the Regulations for Mobile Drilling
Platforms are described above, at footnote 76.
90. Regulations for manning of Norwegian mobile drilling platforms
with installations and equipment used for drilling for submarine
petroleum resources, and provisional regulations concerning
qualification requirements for manning of drilling platforms,
issued by the Norwegian Maritime Directorate on 28 February 1975.
Regulations on the construction and operation of mobile drilling
platforms with installations and equipment and which are regis¬
tered or which are to be registered in the Norwegian Register of
Ships, issued by the Maritime Directorate on 5 May 1975. (These
Regulations set out construction standards and operating proced¬
ures for Norwegian-registered drilling platforms, regardless of
where they will be operating. The framework essentially summar¬
ises the far more comprehensive provisions of the Regulations of
10 September 1973 which apply to drilling platforms on the
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Several further provisions complement the general requirements
of S. 4. The operator must submit an organisational plan for drilling
91 92
platform operation to the Ministry, a provision clearly directed
at preventing the organisational confusion which characterised the
93
U.K.'s Sea Gem disaster. The organisational plan must conform to
the detailed requirements set forth in the Manning Regulations issued
94
by the Maritime Directorate. As in the U.K. Mineral Workings (Off-
Norwegian continental shelf, regardless of State of registration.
Possible conflicts with requirements imposed by the continental
shelf State are minimised by Section 2(1) which provides that
the Regulations apply to drilling platform operation "in so far
as this does not cause violation of the coastal State's regula¬
tions relating to the actual drilling for petroleum resources."
In practice, problems have not arisen because the Norwegian Reg¬
ulations are more strict than those of the States with which a
conflict of laws is possible. Conversation with Mr. J. Odland,
Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 19 November 1976.) Further regu¬
lations have been made by other Government departments concern¬
ing subjects not here relevant, for example, Regulations for
Helicopter Decks on Drilling Platforms. All regulations which
apply to mobile drilling platforms have been collected and pub¬
lished by Fabritius Forlag in Flyttbare boreplattformer, Oslo
(1976). This publication is in both Norwegian and English.
91. A drilling platform is any installation, including a vessel,
which is equipped for petroleum drilling. S. 8, emphasis
added. As a vessel need not be engaged in drilling, this defin¬
ition of "installation" is wide indeed. Norwegian jurisdiction
does not conflict with that of the flag State, however, for the
Decree applies to "exploration and drilling" on the Norwegian
continental shelf (S. 1). A drilling vessel sailing over the
continental shelf would remain subject to flag State jurisdiction.
92. "The Ministry" means the Ministry of Industry. S. 2(1). In
fact, a substantial amount of authority has been delegated by the
Ministry to the Petroleum Directorate and the Maritime Director¬
ate. The latter Directorate is empowered to issue regulations
in its own right pursuant to the Seaworthiness Act of 1903.
93. It will be recalled that an impetus for the U.K. Mineral Work¬
ings (Offshore Installations) Act was a Report into causes of
that accident, which recommended, inter alia, that offshore
installations be subject to clearly defined lines of command.
94. See particularly, Manning Regulations, S. 6, "Organisation plan,
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shore Installations) Act, a major provision is that of designating
a platform manager and defining his authority and responsibility.
S. 7 requires Ministerial approval before a platform can be loca¬
ted for drilling. The Ministry therefore has express authority to
determine if a proposed location would unreasonably interfere with
other users of the sea. S. 9 is a new provision requiring that
"All items of cargo carried to or from a drilling
platform shall be marked clearly with the name of
the drilling platform and the well designation."^
This addition is clearly a response to the problem of debris dumping
96
which is far more serious than was originally thought. Identifica-
number and composition etc. of crew for semisubmersible plat¬
forms" and the Provisional Regulations Concerning Qualifica¬
tion Requirements for Manning of Drilling Platforms which are
intended to reduce the "human error" which is so frequently a
cause of or contributor to accidents. S. 4(1) is particularly
pertinent to the control of marine pollution, for it requires
that employment as a drill floor man (roughneck) be preceded
by a theoretical and practical course of at least 6 weeks'
duration including, among other subjects, blowout prevention
control. See the discussion of blowouts, above, at p. 59.
95. This provision is also contained in the Drilling Regulations,
S. 8. Fishermen have also complained of drifting buoys which
interfere with fishing and navigation. In response to this con¬
cern, S. 9 of the Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms has
been amended so as to require that anchor buoys (used to moor
offshore installations) be permanently marked with the name of
the owner and the platform, and to be painted a highly visible
colour. See also NOU 1975: 50, para. 1.7, p. 10.
96. Conversation with ByrSsjef Christian Hambro, Ministry of Envir¬
onment, 12 November 1976. There have been over 1000 reports by
fishermen of damage to gear alleged to have been caused by oil-
related debris. Although it is likely that some of the damage
was caused by other submerged objects, the Petroleum Directorate
has charted the locations where the incidents have been reported
to have occurred and has found that the resultant pattern cor¬
responds closely to installation locations and supply vessel
routes. Conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Director of Legal and
Economic Department, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 24 Novem¬
ber 1976. No similar effort to chart oil related debris in the
U.K. sector has yet been undertaken. Conversation with Mr.
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tion of the licensee coupled with wide vicarious liability is one
answer to the almost impossible problem of detecting an offender in
the act of dumping.
ii) drilling platforms
Chapter III (Ss. 16-36) is concerned with safety regulations for
drilling platforms. S. 16 is a basic requirement that the licensee
obtain consent from the Ministry before commencing drilling opera-
97
tions. The remainxng provisions elaborate minimal requirements for
equipment (for example, S. 19(1) requires "all necessary safety devices
in accordance with good oilfield practice in order to prevent accid-
98
ents"), provide for inspection, and specify procedures which the
G.F. Buxton, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 28
March 1977. Compensation for damaged fishing gear is paid from a
fund which is provided for in the Fisheries Directorate budget.
As a great number of claims by Norwegian fishermen concern incid¬
ents alleged to have occurred in the U.K. sector, talks between
the two Governments concerning increased cooperation have included
this subject. Conversation with Mr. Aslak AasbszS, Attorney, Fish¬
eries Directorate, 25 November 1976. U.K. fishermen benefit from
a similar scheme, although it differs from the Fisheries Director¬
ate fund in that payment is by the U.K. Offshore Operators Associ¬
ation and damage must have occurred in the U.K. sector. See the
discussion of the Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group,
above, at p. 258. Other law relevant to control of oil-related
floating or sunken objects includes S. 9(1), para. 1.1 of the Reg¬
ulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms (as amended) which requires
anchor buoys to be permanently marked with the name of the owner
and platform identification by welding, cutting or a similar man¬
ner; S. 20(1) of the Act on Salt Water Fisheries of 17 June 1955,
which provides that debris disposal which hinders fishing is pro¬
hibited; and S. 24 of the Harbour Act of 1933, which states that
"refuse, etc. must not be discharged in harbours and narrow and
shallow fairways which are used for general traffic." S. 16 of
the 1976 Decree concerned with Safe Practices in Production of
Submarine Petroleum Resources is essentially identical to S. 9 of
this 1975 Decree.
97. This provision is similar to Drilling Regulations, S. 36(1) and
the Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms, S. 3(1).
98. S. 17(2) provides that the Ministry or its authorised represents-
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licensee must follow (for example, S. 23(3) stipulates that towing
shall be done so as to cause the "least possible" inconvenience to
other users, particularly fishing and navigation). Two Sections are
of particular relevance to marine pollution control. S. 27 requires
that drilling platforms be equipped with the necessary technical de¬
vices for drilling, "including shut-off valves, non-return valves and
99
safety valves" in accordance with the applicable regulations. The
following Section provides that blowout preventors shall conform to
tive may inspect the platform and equipment at any time at the
licensee's expense. Safety standards are set by the Petroleum
Directorate and the Maritime Directorate, but some of the inspec¬
tion and/or certification duties have been delegated to Det
Norske Veritas, a vessel classification society. Generally speak¬
ing, Veritas is responsible for inspection and certification of
major structural aspects of drilling platforms, for example the
hull. Other safety requirements (for example, SOLAS requirements)
are the responsibility of the Maritime Directorate, and although
Veritas conducts the inspection, certification is done by the Gov¬
ernment. Conversation with Mr. G. Lund, Attorney, Det Norske
Veritas, 30 November 1976. In addition to the major task of
classification of mobile drilling platforms, Veritas also performs
strength calculation and inspection of fixed offshore structures,
inspection and supervision of pipe laying, and inspection and
supervision of other offshore oil-related equipment. "Det Norske
Veritas," a brochure published by the Society (1974), p. 11. De¬
tails concerning inspection and survey requirements of mobile
drilling platforms are set out in the Drilling Regulations, S. 47;
and the Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms, S. 3. A not¬
able difference between the British and Norwegian approaches to
inspection of offshore installations is that the U.K. has deleg¬
ated a great deal more authority to classification societies than
has Norway, including (within limits) the authority to set stan¬
dards. Standard setting remains with the Norwegian Government.
99. S. 27; Drilling Regulations, Chapter VI, "Drilling Equipment
Etc.;" Mobile Drilling Platform Regulations, S. 25a. The last
cited Section reflects an amendment requiring a no-return valve
on hoses which transfer oil from supply vessels to drilling rigs.
It was discovered that after fuel oil for rig equipment was
pumped up a hose from the vessel to the rig which towered above,
the practice was to disconnect the hose at the supply vessel and
allow the oil still remaining in the hose to drain into the sea.
The no-return valve requirement has effectively eliminated a regu¬
lar source of refined oil input into the sea. Conversation with
Mr. J. Odland, Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 19 November 1976.
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the requirements of regulations and shall be able to withstand any
loo
"foreseeable" pressure that may develop in the well.
iii) contingencies
Chapter IV (Ss. 37-47), "Contingencies," consists almost entirely
101
of provisions not found in the 1967 Decree. The licensee is required
to be prepared to deal with an emergency quickly, and to this end must
prepare an emergency plan for use in the event of accidents or danger-
102
ous situations. Among the three main headings which must be consid¬
ered is "Situations that have involved or may involve pollution.""'"0^
The contingency plan must be approved by the Ministry and must be com-
104
patible with a national contingency system.
100. S. 28; Drilling Regulations Ss. 43 ("Blow-out Prevention Equip¬
ment") and 44 ("Testing of Blow-out Prevention Equipment"). The
Drilling Regulations also address the issue of training for drill¬
ing emergencies and the use of blowout preventers by requiring
daily pit level drills and weekly blowout prevention drills. In¬
spectors from the Petroleum Directorate can require such drills to
be conducted. S. 18(6) of the Drilling Regulations. In regard
to the ambiguous term "foreseeable," it is submitted that in the
context of this decree the standard of "foreseeability" is that
required by good oilfield practice.
101. S. 47, requiring standby vessels, originally appeared as S. 41 in
the 1967 Decree, as part of the Chapter, "Drilling." It has
been rewritten so as to apply to specified instances instead of
the ambiguous "when circumstances so demand."
102. S. 37a, a new provision added pursuant to S. 18 of the Royal De¬
cree of July 9, 1976, Relating to Protection of Workers Etc. in
Activities Associated with Exploration and Exploitation of Sub¬
marine Petroleum Resources; Drilling Regulations, S. 31(1).
North Sea operators have been asked by letter from the SPCA of 17
September 1976 to submit a contingency plan by 1 February 1977.
103. S. 37a, para. b. Other situations are those involving injury,
illness, or death (para, a), and situations which have or may
put a drilling platform partly or completely out of operation
(para, c). The Ministry may decide that the emergency plan shall
include additional situations.
104. S. 38(1), as amended. The Ministry of Justice considers emergency
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The licensee is responsible for implementing the measures de¬
scribed in the contingency plan."*"0^ In the event of an uncontrolled
escape of hydrocarbons, the licensee must not only take immediate
action to control and minimise the possible damage, but must also
restore the environment "as nearly as possible to the same state as
106
before the accident occurred." Although the licensee is responsible
plans concerned with injury, illness, or death, and the Minis¬
try of Environment considers such plans relating to collection
and removal of uncontrolled escapes of hydrocarbons. Ss. 37,
38(1), as amended. S. 39 requires that the contingency plan
contain: 1) an organisation plan, 2) an equipment plan, 3) a
detailed action plan, and 4) plans for personnel training and
drills. It is also required that the contingency plan be kept
current and be based on the best known technology and equipment
available. Ss. 40, 41. See also, Drilling Regulations S. 31
(2)-(5), and Mobile Drilling Platform Regulations, S. 19. The
latter Regulations require the drilling platform to be equipped
with an Emergency Procedure Manual setting out the action to be
taken in the event of a number of situations, including fire,
blowout, and collision.
105. S. 42(1); Drilling Regulations, S. 31(6).
106. S. 42(2); Drilling Regulations 31(9) and 31(9.1). The last
cited Section provides that "Oil spills shall primarily be col¬
lected mechanically. The use of clean-up chemicals shall not
take place except in special cases and in accordance with final
permit issued by the pollution control authorities." There is
no comparable provision in the 1975 Decree, but the 1976 Decree
Relating to Safe Practice in Production does contain a similar
paragraph, S. 18(2). The State Pollution Control Authority de¬
cides whether to authorise the use of dispersants in each case
according to the circumstances. Because of the limited effect¬
iveness of mechanical oil pickup devices at present, in every
case in which oil has threatened a coastline the SPCA has author¬
ised dispersants. Conversation with Dr. 0. Schreiner, SPCA, 17
November 1976. A letter to the North Sea Operators dated 17
September 1976, from the SPCA, required the addressees to order
equipment of sufficient capacity to remove 8,000 tonnes of oil
per day, in 2h foot wave heights (50 per cent, of the time North
Sea waves will be below this height), in a 1.5 knot current, and
to be on the spot in 48 hours. The Norwegian Government is
funding research on mechanical oil clean up devices. This is
quite important because at present, for 50 per cent, of the time,
the devices which are now specified will be unable to function
effectively because of weather and wave conditions. There is
453
for clean up in the first instance, the Ministry^"0^ may assume com¬
mand of all or part of the operation to control and remedy an acci-
108
dent or dangerous situation. Thus, in the case of uncontrolled
blowouts, the Ministry may decide that another drilling platform be
diverted to drill relief wells, and that other necessary equipment
109
also be made available. The licensee on whose account a drilling
little doubt that the present reliance on mechanical clean up
devices is more the expression of a wish than the statement of
a fact. Great faith is being placed in the development of more
efficient and versatile mechanical oil removal devices. The
duty imposed by S. 42(2) of the 1975 Decree to restore the en¬
vironment "as nearly as possible to the same state as before the
accident occurred" contains the seeds of litigation. Following
the grounding of the tanker Drupa near Stavanger, a dispute
arose concerning the duty of the shipowner to restore the beach
to its pre-spill state. How clean did it have to be? An out
of court compromise was reached. Conversation with Mr. E.0.
Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA, 10 November 1976. The U.K. Depart¬
ment of Industry's Warren Spring Laboratory is also engaged
in research into the problems of oil spill clean up. See
above, at p. 172.
107. The SPCA is directly responsible for clean up in national waters,
although the actual work will be done by local communities.
The SPCA and the Petroleum Directorate (subordinate bodies of
the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Industry, respec¬
tively) may assist the operator in the case of a large spill.
New legislation clarifying Governmental authority and responsi¬
bility is in preparation; the SPCA probably will be responsible
for assisting the operator (if necessary) in the case of small
spills; large spills will be the responsibility of several
branches of Government, for example, the Petroleum Directorate,
the SPCA, the Maritime Directorate, the Fisheries Directorate,
etc. Conversations with Mr. E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA,
10 November 1976, and Mr. G. Gjerde, Ministry of Environment,
29 November 1976.
108. S. 42(1) and (3) make it clear that the Ministry and other Gov¬
ernmental authorities may assume command of situations included
in a contingency plan. However, S. 37, in listing "accidents
and dangerous situations" prefaces that enumeration with "e.g.,"
thus clearly evidencing that the list is illustrative rather
than exhaustive. Clearly, any serious situation could be the
subject of Ministerial intervention.
109. S. 44(1), (2). Drilling Regulations, S. 32. These provisions
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platform is employed must indemnify the owner and user of that plat¬
form "for any economic losses in connection with such drilling."^'''0
This provision is not further defined in either the Decree or the
Drilling Regulations, and it has been pointed out that the amount of
compensation would be likely to be disputed.^''" it is the writer's
view that the provision as drafted is necessary but not sufficient.
It is suggested that the complexities of attempting to define costs
actually incurred and potential profits not realised defy codifica¬
tion. A more practical approach would be to refer such disputes to
arbitration pursuant to the Code of 13 August 1915, No. 6 (the arbi-
112
tration provision embodied in the 1972 Decree), or as otherwise
agreed. There are several provisions in the 1975 Decree involving
relationships between offshore operators and between licensees and
113
contractors which might well be the grounds for dispute. Some
dispute settlement procedure would be a useful addition.
also apply in the event of a fire and/or explosion, with the
additional provision that the Ministry may also procure fire
fighting vessels at the licensee's expense. S. 45. Drilling
Regulations, S. 33.
110. S. 44(3). Drilling Regulations, S. 32(3).
111. Conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Director of Legal and Economic
Department, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 24 November 1976.
112. See above, at p. 441.
113. The licensee whose activity has caused the damage is liable
under the Norwegian approach. However, other parties may be
drawn into the situation in a number of ways. S. 43 confers
upon the Ministry the authority to require that "the licensees
in a district cooperate on measures to ensure the necessary
preparedness to combat accidents and dangerous situations" and
"participate to the necessary extent in financing co-operative
contingency plans." S.43; Drilling Regulations, S. 31(8).
Such cooperation is at present required by a term inserted
into licences. It is planned that a uniform provision for
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The licensee is responsible for ensuring that his drilling plat¬
form does not drift from position in areas where this could endanger
114
other fixed or mobile installations. This is an attempt to reduce
the possibility of a collision by a mobile rig with other craft or
installations, a subject of great concern among officials of both
the U.K. and Norwegian Governments.^^
The final section of this chapter requires that a standby vessel
be stationed near the drilling rig. During dangerous operations it
must be in the "immediate vicinity" of the platform.'*"''"^ This is a
common sense requirement, effected to some extent by the U.K. through
117
licensing arrangements upon which little comment is needed.
cooperation will be included in a new comprehensive pollution
control plan to be introduced shortly. Conversation with Mr.
E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA, 10 November 1976. The cost of
such cooperation could well be a subject of dispute.
114. S. 46(1); Drilling Regulations, S. 34(1). In special circum¬
stances, the Ministry may require measures to ensure that the
platform stays on site. S. 46(2); Drilling Regulations, S. 34(21.
115. See, for example, U.K. Department of the Environment, Central
Unit on Environmental Pollution, Accidental Oil Pollution of
the Sea, Pollution Paper No. 8, H.M.S.O. (1976), at para.
6.41, p. 58; NOU 1975: 50, para. 1.4, p. 8.
116. S. 47(1); Drilling Regulations, S. 35(1), (2). During drilling
operations, the vessel must be within one mile of the platform.
During other dangerous activities, such as helicopter operations,
diving, platform raising and lowering, and personnel transfer,
the vessel must be able to render immediate assistance. Ss.
22(1), 47(1); Drilling Regulations, S. 35(1), (2); Regula¬
tions for Mobile Drilling Platforms, Ss. 23(1), 25(1), 26(5).
The standby vessel must also be able to carry the entire plat¬
form crew, should abandonment of the installation become neces¬
sary. Ss. 22(1), 47(2); Drilling Regulations, S. 35(3);
Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms, Ss. 23(1), 25(1).
The requirement that a standby vessel be present when a jack-
up platform is raised or lowered may have been prompted by the
U.K.'s Sea Gem disaster which occurred during such an operation.
117. Conversation with Dr. J. Cowley, Department of Trade, 11 June 1976.
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iv) drilling
"Drilling," the subject of Chapter V, is concerned with that sub¬
ject plus the abandonment of wells, and the reports required of the
licensee. The Sections concerned are therefore somewhat analogous to
the U.K. Petroleum (Production) Regulations and the Model Clauses
which are contained in exploratory and production licences pursuant
118
to those Regulations.
Drilling may not commence without the Ministry's written consent,
and before such consent is given, the applicant must submit to the
119
Ministry a detailed drilling programme. The licensee must have
already submitted and have had approved a work programme, which is
more comprehensive, including exploration activities as well as drill-
120
ing.
Among detailed provisions regulating the placement and operation
of drilling platforms is a requirement that special permission be
obtained if the platform is to be located closer than one nautical
mile from cables, pipelines or other installations and less than two
121
nautical miles from telephone or telegraph amplifiers. Should such
118. See above, p. 297.
119. Ss. 48, 49. The latter Section sets forth a number of other doc¬
uments which must also be submitted before consent will be given.
The Drilling Regulations, in Ss. 12 and 13 detail the require¬
ments for obtaining a drilling permit from the Petroleum Direct¬
orate. S. 50 of the Decree requires that, except in an emergency,
prior consent is required for any major alteration in the drill¬
ing programme. Consent is also required for drilling which in¬
tentionally deviates from the vertical (subject to some excep¬
tions) , and for drilling more than one well from the same loca¬
tion. S. 58; Drilling Regulations, S. 23.
120. 1972 Decree, S. 17.
121. S. 51(6); Drilling Regulations, S. 15(2). The licensee is
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submarine objects be damaged as a result of drilling activity, the
122
licensee is liable regardless of fault. The provision as it
appeared in the 1967 Decree had established that both the licensee
and the contractor whose activity caused the damage would be liable;
the revision reflects an effort to channel liability through the
123
licensee consistent with the provisions of S. 3(1). S. 56, requir¬
ing daily telexes to the Ministry, is also an addition to the 1967
Decree, first appearing in the Drilling Regulations. Telexed infor¬
mation enables the Ministry (actually, the Petroleum Directorate
pursuant to delegated authority) to monitor offshore activity and to
124
respond quickly to trends and events.
During drilling, all necessary steps must be taken to prevent
such accidents as explosions or blowouts which might cause pollution
125
or other damage. The definition of what is "necessary" has changed:
whereas the 1967 Decree specified that drilling safety equipment must
be installed "as drilling operations deem them necessary in accordance
required to examine the seabed to locate the exact position of
pipelines, etc. S. 51(5); Drilling Regulations, S. 15(2).
122. S. 51(7).
123. Although the licensee will be held liable for the actions of
another who is conducting operations on his behalf, it is
expressly provided that his right of indemnity shall not be
prejudiced by this provision. S. 51(7).
124. Conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Director of Legal and Economic
Department, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 24 November 1976.
Drilling Regulations S. 17 sets out in detail the information
which must be contained in telex messages.
125. S. 57; Drilling Regulations, S. 19(1), (6).
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with good oilfield practice," the requirement is now that
"The drilling safety equipment shall be installed
as and when drilling so necessitates and
otherwise in accordance with the regulations
1 97
at any time in force relating thereto."-1-
This new provision suggests that the law of offshore petroleum
development is evolving towards a distinct framework derived from and
128
applicable to the peculiar needs of offshore regulation.
When petroleum has been found, the well shall be secured accord¬
ing to good oilfield practice to facilitate production, protect the
129
well from seawater, and prevent the escape of petroleum. It is
noteworthy that this Section and the relevant Regulations seek not
only to protect the sea, but to prevent air pollution as well.
The final Section of Chapter V is new, clarifying Ministerial
126. 1967 Decree, S. 45(1).
127. S. 57, emphasis added.
128. See, for example, Hardy, M., "Offshore Development and Marine
Pollution," 1 Ocean Development and International Law 239-273
(1973), at p. 251. A similar metamorphosis occurred with S.
51(1) of the 1975 Decree. In the 1967 Decree, the correspond¬
ing provision, S. 36(1), required that prior to jack-up drilling
platform placement, "the seabed shall be checked and other
necessary safety precautions be taken in accordance with good
oilfield practice." S. 51(1) omits any reference to "good oil¬
field practice," but includes in its stead a requirement that
"such examination shall be carried out regardless of whether the
seabed has been examined in connection with other drilling in
the vicinity." It is, in the writer's view, a tenable hypothesis
that there is a relationship between the deletion and the addi¬
tion: "good oilfield practice" may well have condoned the
omission of seabed examination if the area had been inspected
in connection with other drilling. The change was first pub¬
lished in the Drilling Regulations, S. 15(1).
129. S. 64; Drilling Regulations, S. 10(1).
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control of offshore drilling by making express provision for
130
inspection.
v) abandonment of wells
Chapter VI, "Abandonment of Wells," has been shorn of the detail
which characterised it in the 1967 Decree and now consists of a single
Section. S. 66, though the complement of S. 64 (which requires that
when petroleum has been found it shall be secured according to good
oilfield practice), has omitted the industry standard from its provi¬
sions for well abandonment: it is now specified that abandonment shall
occur subject to relevant regulations. S. 25 of the Drilling Regula¬
tions details the requirements for well abandonment, and includes
much of the detail which was part of the 1967 Decree.
vi) other provisions
The remaining provisions of this Decree are concerned with part-
132
icular aspects of safety which are of peripheral relevance to this
thesis, and with enforcement. S. 119 provides that Ss. 45(5), (6) and
57 of the 1972 Decree shall also apply to violations of the provisions
130. S. 65; Drilling Regulations S. 26.
131. Drilling Regulations S. 25 is divided into two major headings:
"Permission, etc." and "Minimum requirements for abandonment."
Of particular interest to "pollution" prevention (as that term
is used herein) is S. 2.9, para. 2 which requires that before
well abandonment, the licensee must inspect the seabed at the
drilling location to determine that it is free of debris, and
that if the inspection is done by a diving company, a certifi¬
cate attesting that the seabed is clear be obtained and for¬
warded to the Petroleum Directorate.
132. Chapter VII, "Geological samples, logging and oil samples;"
Chapter VIII, "Electrical installations etc.;" Chapter IX,
"Fire prevention;" Chapter X, "Transport, storage and use of
explosives;" Chapter XI, "Telecommunications;" Chapter XII,
"Transportation systems;" and Chapter XIII, "Use of radio¬
active equipment."
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of this Decree. S. 45(5) of the 1972 Decree empowers inspectors
temporarily to halt operations in cases of serious violations, and
134
subsection (6) confers similar power upon the Ministry. S. 57
provides that the Ministry may revoke a licence for any serious or
repeated violation of the 1972 Decree. Should the Ministry take this
action, the licensee is expressly given a right to present his view.
If the licence is revoked, the licensee remains obligated to secure
#
the installations and other plant and equipment and to ensure their
continued use. In addition to the temporary or permanent loss of oper¬
ating rights, the licensee may also be subject to criminal penalties
for violation of the 1975 Decree or regulations issued pursuant
. 135thereto.
c) Royal Decree July 9, 1976 Relating to Safe Practice
for the Production etc. of Submarine Petroleum Resources
This Decree, the result of several years consideration, is the
first body of regulations expressly applicable to production installa-
133. See above, pp. 436, 442.
134. The Ministry may order a temporary halt to operations only if
repeated violations have occurred. See also, Drilling Regula¬
tions, S. 48 ("Withdrawal of Consent") and S. 49 ("Stop
of Operations"); Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms
Ss. 28 and 29 with the same titles.
135. S. 120; Drilling Regulations, S. 51; Regulations for Mobile
Drilling Platforms, S. 31. As in the 1972 Decree, S. 339(2) of
the Norwegian Penal Code of May 22, 1902 is applicable, unless
more severe penal sanctions become applicable pursuant to statute.
S. 339(2) of the Penal Code provides that "Fines may be imposed
upon anybody who .... 2) violates any regulation issued by the
public authorities according to law and carrying a threat of
punishment."
136. Unofficial translation from Norwegian published by the Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Handicraft. The Decree was
issued pursuant to S. 3 of the Act No. 12 of June 21, 1963 and,
according to its own S. 131, entered into force immediately.
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137
tions. The 131 sections contained in the Decree cover a wide range
138
of subjects, some in considerable detail, grouped in 12 chapters.
It is proposed to examine only those provisions most relevant to con-
139
trol of pollution from production facilities in the paragraphs below.
i) general provisions
140
The licensee is expressly made responsible for the actions of
any person who performs work for him, whether an employee or independent
137. Initial regulations were confined to exploratory operations be¬
cause that was the immediate need. In this Decree, "production
installation" includes "installations with equipment that are
intended for production drilling and for the production, pro¬
cessing and storage of petroleum," and the Decree applies to
"the designing, building, installation and operation of pro¬
duction installations, pipeline systems and shipment installa¬
tions that are located in a fixed position." Ss. 1(d), 2(1).
The Ministry is empowered to apply this Decree to other exploi¬
tation installations as well, thus providing clear authority
to control such structures as separate "quarters platforms"
which are probably not within the definition of "production
installation." Conversation with ByrSsjef Christian Hambro,
Ministry of Environment, 12 November 1976.
138. Introduction, General Provisions, Emergency Preparedness, Load-
Bearing Structures, Production and Auxiliary Systems, Living
Quarters, Telecommunications, Identification and Marking of
Installations, Transportation Systems, Hoisting Gear, Production
Drilling, Pipeline Systems, Shipment Installations, and Final
Provisions.
139. The only existing regulations for production installations are
"Instrumentation for Fixed Installations," based on the 1972
Decree because they were issued by the Petroleum Directorate
before this Decree came into force. Conversation with Mr.
Peter Tronslin, Mobil Exploration, Norway, 24 November 1976.
Detailed production regulations, now being drafted, will soon
become effective. Conversation with Mr. Nils Vogt, Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate, 24 November 1976.
140. A licensee is not only a company, foundation or group which
holds a petroleum exploration or production licence, but is
also one of the above holding a permit to locate and operate
production installations. Control is thus effected over pro¬
duction installations remote from the licensee, for example,
the erection of an artificial island to handle supertankers
and/or to serve as a petrochemical complex. S. 1(b).
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contractor. This provision thus denies a licensee the defence
that, as an injury complained of was caused by an independent contrac¬
tor, the licensee did not exercise the requisite control over the
contractor's activities to be held vicariously liable. Removal of
this defence increased the Government's chances of proving its case,
and also makes recovery more likely because financial responsibility
is a precondition of licence issuance and the licence itself is held
subject to legal obedience. It is also of importance to note that the
increased leverage thus exerted by the Government over the conduct of
the licensee's vicarious activities is calculated to increase the care
with which such activities are pursued.
S. 4, the provision dealing with vicarious liability, also
provides that orders are to be directed to the licensee in the first
instance, unless safety considerations require that the responsible
person on the installation be the first notified. Lines of communic¬
ation are thus made express, reducing the likelihood that the organis¬
ational structure will suffer from its common affliction, "communica¬
tions breakdown." The licensee is charged with prompt compliance with
orders so received.
S. 5 incorporates into Norwegian law the general provisions of
the Continental Shelf Convention concerning interference with navig-
142
ation and protection of living resources. The licensee is respons-
141. S. 4(1), (2). This provision is essentially identical to S. 3
of the 1975 Decree.
142. Continental Shelf Convention Articles 4 (protection of submarine
cables), 5(6)(interference with recognised sea lanes essential
to international navigation),5 (7) (protection of living re¬
sources of safety zones). High Seas Convention (and possibly,
customary law): Article 2 (reasonable use of the sea), Article
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ible for ensuring that activities on or near production installations
are conducted so as to afford "the greatest possible protection against
143
injury." Furthermore,
"Special care must be taken to avoid damage or risk of
damage to marine animal and plant life and to avoid
pollution of the seabed, its substrata, the sea or the air."
The quoted provision immediately above is anything but precise: neither
"risk" nor "pollution" is defined in this Decree or the superior Act.
It should be pointed out, however, that this sentence is incorporated
verbatim from the 1967 Decree relating to safe practice in drilling,
145
and is also incorporated in the successor to that law.
Sections 6 through 10 deal with the licensee's obligation to
furnish information and to provide notice in respect of production
146
installation planning and construction. Such installations must be
tested as the Ministry considers necessary to ensure compliance with
24 (duty of "every State" to enact certain types of marine
pollution prevention regulations), Article 26 (protection of
submarine cables).
143. S. 5(1). As the High Seas Convention (to which Norway is not a
Party, but which, at least in regard to the reasonable user
criterion, may be regarded as codifying customary law) only re¬
quires "reasonable regard" to other users of the sea, the Nor¬
wegian requirement of "the greatest possible protection against
injury" would seem to allow ample room for Government discretion.
144. S. 5(3).
145. See, Royal Decree of 25th August, 1967 relating to Safe Practice
etc. in Exploration and Drilling for Submarine Petroleum Re¬
sources, S. 4.
146. S. 6 requires the licensee to submit the information necessary
to enable the Ministry to determine whether production activi¬
ties will conform to the provisions of this Decree. S. 7 lists
items which must be included in the plans submitted to the Min¬
istry. S. 8 concerns publication of notice, S. 9 imposes a re¬
quirement of progress reports, and S. 10 states that certain




safety regulations, and written consent to begin operations is also
148
required. After the commencement of operations, periodical inspec¬
tions may be made and reports required to monitor compliance with
149
standards. Safety standards are established by the Norwegian Pet¬
roleum Directorate which also conducts inspections in this regard,
as does Det Norske Veritas, the ship classification society to which
certain authority has been delegated.Removal or movement of pro-
151
duction installations must be authorised by the Ministry.
Ss. 14-20 concern the input of substances and materials into
the sea or air as a result of petroleum production activities. All
waste, including refuse and sewage, must be-handled in accordance
with standards and procedures to be developed by the Ministry of
152
Environment. The licensee is also required to "purify" effluents
in accordance with requirements set by the Ministry of Environment.
Although oil has been produced from the Ekofisk Field since 1971,
147. S. 11.
148. S. 11(3).
149. Ss. 12, 13.
150. As of 1 January 1976, Det Norske Veritas had certificated 60
fixed offshore production platforms and 2 refineries and petro¬
chemical plants. "Facts on Det Norske Veritas," a stencil
printed 1 January 1976 by the Society. Veritas has been exten¬
sively involved in supervision and certification of a great
number of production installations (including pipelines) for
the Norwegian Government, including Ekofisk, Frigg, and Stat-
fjord. Det Norske Veritas, Annual Report, 1975, pp. 14-16.
151. S. 21.
152. S. 14. The Ministry of Environment has not yet promulgated
rules in respect of platform waste disposal. It is intended
to set standards in this regard, but the Ministry has given
priority to control of other forms of pollution thought to
be needed more urgently.
465
discharge standards for oily water have not been set. The SPCA,
charged with the control of operational discharges from installations,
requires that offshore production discharges be subject to the "best
available" technology. "Best available" allows for a consideration
of economic factors; for example, the Ekofisk Field installations
will not be required to meet the same standards which advancing tech¬
nology make the "best available" to control oil in effluent from the
new Statfjord Field.The Norwegian approach to control of oper¬
ational discharges from production installations is similar to that
of the U.K.--with the notable difference that, although both Govern¬
ments use subjective standards, in Norway an environmental department
(the SPCA) decides what is the "best available," while in the U.K.
the Department of Energy (whose primary responsibility is to promote
energy production) is the judge of what is "practicable."
153. Conversation with Dr. 0. Schreiner, SPCA, 17 November 1976. It
is evident that, as in the U.K., Norwegian regulation of opera¬
tional discharges from installations is limited by science and
technology. Thus, although the SPCA plans to issue permits for
operational discharges (just as the Department of Energy in the
U.K. will issue "exceptions" to the effluent discharge prohib¬
itions of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act), they have not
yet done so. A great deal of research is now underway in order
to provide a basis for discharge standards. The Ministry of
Environment has just initiated a long-term study (five or six
years) on the effects of oil in the marine environment, and
licensees have been asked to submit detailed specifications
regarding equipment and procedures for control of operational
discharges. Oil monitoring will be done by equipment being
developed both in Norway and by the U.K.'s Warren Spring Labor¬
atory. It is intended that both the volume of the effluent
stream and the concentration of oil within it be measured.
Since large amounts of effluent, even greatly diluted, may
cause environmental injury (especially when discharged into the
same area in the long term), it is possible that a ceiling on
the total amount of oil discharged within a period may be set,
for example, 10 tonnes per year. Although it is not planned to
set fixed standards, the SPCA is thinking in terms of 40 ppm to
start. Ibid.
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S. 16 requires that all cargo transported to or from production
installations must be clearly marked with the name of the licensee
and the installation designation, a provision no doubt intended to
lessen a plaintiff's burden of proof when complaining of damage
caused by the great amounts of oil-related debris found by the Nor¬
wegian Government to be present on the seabed near installations and
154
supply routes. Closely related to this provision for the protec¬
tion of fishermen is S. 17 which prohibits hindrances left on the
seabed as a result of installation construction or following its
removal, and charging the licensee with conducting inspections neces-
155
sary to ensure compliance.
The licensee is expressly charged with effecting forthwith the
necessary measures to bring a blowout or other event involving an
154. This is essentially identical with S. 9 of the 1975 Decree.
155. S. 17 requires the licensee to ensure that "no hindrance of any
kind is left on the seabed around or along such installations..
..which may endanger marine life, or may cause inconvenience or
prevent fishing, shipping or other activities." It further
provides that the Ministry may require the licensee to give a
similar assurance in respect of supply routes. This require¬
ment, now applied on an ad hoc basis, is likely to be a provi¬
sion of the forthcoming Petroleum Production Regulations. S.
17 thus applies to both seabed installations (which the Conti¬
nental Shelf Convention by Article 5(5) requires be "entirely
removed" when such installations are disused or abandoned) as
well as oil-related debris (which may be covered to some extent
by the Oslo Convention—see above, p. 128). The problem of
oil-related debris has been discussed; in regard to removal of
installations, there have been only a few cases of which the
Ministry of Environment has become aware in which the licensee
had to be reminded of his legal duty. Compliance was without
incident. Conversation with Christian Hambro, Ministry of
Environment, 12 November 1976. The Petroleum Directorate has
the legal authority to require that any offshore installation
be removed if it is disused or abandoned. This includes Condeep
concrete production installations and pipelines. The former are
designed to be moved by pumping air into the oil storage tanks
to float the structure. The issue of pipeline removal has not
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uncontrolled escape of petroleum under control. As is the case
under the 1975 Decree, the licensee is responsible for oil spill clean
up, the Ministry of Environment has oversight authority and responsi¬
bility, mechanical collection is the expressly preferred method of
oil removal, and the use of dispersants must be used only as decided
157
by the Ministry of Environment. Any uncontrolled escape of petro¬
leum, all significant injuries, and every situation which may create
or has created extraordinary danger of significant injury must be
158
immediately reported to the Ministry. In the event of such escape,
injuries or event, production operations must be suspended to the
159
extent necessary to achieve a reasonable degree of safety.
The remainder of Chapter 2 is generally concerned with matters
of health and safety. Sections 22-30 appear to be inspired by the
U.K. Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act, itself a result
of the Sea Gem disaster."^0 To paraphrase its pertinent parts:
been the subject of official comment. Conversation with Mr. J.
Rud and Mr. 0. Mundheim of Statoil, 24 November, 1976.
156. S. 18(1).
157. S. 18. See footnote 106 in connection with the 1975 Decree for
comments on the requirement that oil be removed primarily by
mechanical means.
158. S. 19. The Ministry must be kept informed and a report analysing
the incident is also required.
159. S. 20.
160. See above, p. 308.
161. Sections omitted include S. 25 (welding safety), S. 26 (required
plan for diving), S. 27 (evacuation and safety equipment for
manned installations), S. 28 (duty to inform Ministry of con¬
tractors and to keep a roster of all employees), S. 29 (require¬
ment of restricted access to installations), S. 30 (additional
record keeping requirement of all persons on or travelling to
or from installations).
468
1. The licensee must prepare an organisation plan and
submit it to the Ministry. There must always be a
"responsible person in charge" on the installation
during construction and operation. The organisation
plan must state the qualifications of the responsible
persons and his subordinates. Thus, although the
Ministry has not set out job specifications for the
person responsible, since the organisation plan
must be approved, de facto qualifications result.
2. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that
all personnel on production installations are
qualified to work safely. The Ministry may issue
regulations spelling out such qualifications.
3. The licensee must draw up emergency procedures
and conduct emergency drills.^
Section 37 confers broad authority on the Ministry to appoint
inspectors to ensure compliance with this Decree. Details of this
authority include provisions authorising access to installations and
provisions regarding the temporary suspension of operations in cases
of serious or repeated violations,
ii) emergency preparedness
Chapter 3 deals with Emergency Preparedness. As it is quite
similar to related provisions in the 1975 Decree (as amended), the
reader will be referred to the discussion of the earlier instrument
in a number of instances.
As in the 1975 Decree, the licensee must prepare an emergency
plan^"^^ which, in the case of situations which have caused or threaten
162. S. 22.
163. S. 23.
164. S. 24. Each employee must be given a copy of these guidelines
and drills must be held in accordance with requirements of the
Ministry (to be completed) .-
165. S. 39(1). See above, p. 451.
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to result in oil pollution, must be submitted to the Ministry of
166
Environment. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that meas¬
ures are effected in accordance with the plan, but should intervention
be necessary, the appropriate Ministry may assume control in whole
167
or part. The Ministry is vested with wide discretion to plan for
the mitigation of emergencies, including requirements of cooperation
168
among regional licensees, commandeering drilling equipment in the
169
case of uncontrolled blowouts, retention of special vessels and
equipment to combat fire and explosions at the licensee's expense,
and requiring that standby vessels of certain specifications be
stationed near production installations during construction or
171
operation.
S. 62, under Chapter 5, "Production and auxiliary systems,"
requires that production facilities have an automatic emergency shut¬
down system. Thus, should abnormal operating conditions occur, such
166. Ss. 38, 39, and 40. As in the 1975 Decree (as amended), the
Ministry of Justice is concerned with personal injury and death,
and the Ministry retains authority in matters relating to other
emergency preparedness. Ss. 38, 39.
167. S. 44. Other provisions require that the emergency plans be
suitable for coordination with a national emergency system,
that such plans be kept up to date, and that plans be based on
the "best known technology." Ss. 41, 42, and 43.
168. S. 45. Plans are being made to require cooperation among Nor¬
wegian operators to prevent and mitigate pollution pursuant to
a central legal instrument. At present, requirements inserted
in licences are aimed at ensuring cooperation. Conversation
with Mr. E.0. Poulsson, SPCA, 10 November 1976.
169. S. 46. See discussion in connection with the 1975 Decree, above,
at p. 453.
170. S. 47.
171. S. 48. See above, p. 455.
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as a blowout during well maintenance, shutdown would be automatic,
172
although it is also required that the system be manually operable.
iii) collision prevention
Chapter 8, "Identification and marking of installations" is
pertinent to avoidance of pollution from vessel-installation colli¬
sions. S. 79 requires that installations be marked so as to be clear¬
ly visible to ships and aircraft in daylight and darkness; the fol¬
lowing Section provides that production installations have sound and
light signals, and radio position-finding aids in accordance with Min¬
istry requirements.
iv) production drilling
Several Sections under Chapter 11, "Production drilling," are
relevant to the control of marine pollution. Overall control is prov¬
ided by the requirement that specified plans, drawings and specifi-
173
cations be submitted to the Ministry for approval. The mud system
is required to be adequate to ensure that the well is kept under con-
174
trol at all times, and the blowout preventer arrangement must be
175
able to withstand any foreseeable well pressure. A number of re-
176
quirements are imposed to ensure safety during production drilling,
172. S. 62.
173. S. 92. This includes details of the drilling mud system, blow¬
out preventer system, and use of blowout preventers during
certain operations.
174. S. 94. Mud cleaning and checking equipment must be installed
and arrangements must be made for circulating the fluid in an
emergency.
175. S. 95. BOPs must be pressure tested and function tested in
accordance with the Ministry's requirements.
176. Ss. 96-110 concern information, consent and safety requirements
relating to production drilling. Many of these are technical;
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and when such drilling is in progress, all "necessary" steps must be
177
taken to prevent any form of injury. Abandonment of a borehole or
producing well must take place in accordance with Ministerial re-
_ 178quirements.
v) submarine pipelines
Submarine pipelines are also subject to regulation under this
179
Decree. The planned pipeline must be described in detail to the
those most relevant to prevention of pollution are summarised
in the text. It is submitted that much of this detail might
well be incorporated in regulations; this may become the
case following the expected issuance of Regulations for Pet¬
roleum Production by the Petroleum Directorate in 1977. S. 97
is of some interest, from a political point of view. That
Section states that special consent has to be obtained from
the Ministry (actually, the Petroleum Directorate, pursuant to
delegated authority) prior to drilling and production from the
same platform. This requirement is said by some observers to
have put the Petroleum Directorate in a difficult position:
the Statfjord Field (in which Statoil is a major shareholder)
will be greatly delayed and consequently less profitable if
all drilling most precede production. The decision has been
characterised as a particularly political one, more properly
the province of the Storting as a particular question of petrol¬
eum development policy than the concern of a Directorate sub¬
ordinate to the Ministry of Industry. The reason for caution
in simultaneous drilling and production is the possibility of an
unintended intersection, resulting in leakage or a blowout.
This possibility is characterised as de minimis by an official
of one major oil company, who pointed out that the same skills
that can be used to guide an intersecting well to relieve a
blowout can be used to avoid an unintended intersection. The
geology of the North Sea Continental Shelf is such that adequate
separation between wells can be calculated with more assurance
than would be possible in a highly fissured area, like the Santa
Barbara Channel.
177. S. 101. If injury does occur, it follows that the necessary
steps to prevent such injury have not been taken. This lang¬
uage reflects the Norwegian law of strict liability.
178. S. 109. This provision gives the Government express control
over well plugging as well as removal of seabed protrusions.
179. Chapter 12, "Pipeline Systems."
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180
Ministry and is subject to Ministerial approval. Among the in¬
vestigations which the licensee may be required to conduct is that
concerning the effect of the planned pipeline upon other users in
the area, including fishing, navigation, and development of seabed
181
„■ 1 • .» • • 182 , * . • J 4^resources. Pipelines and marine risers must be designed to
withstand not only normal pressures, but higher stresses which may be
183
occasioned by the addition of external forces. Both pipelines and
marine risers must be provided with a satisfactory corrosion protec¬
tion system, and pipelines must be stabilised by the use of a concrete
184
coating or by other means. Specific provisions are also included
, 185 . fc. . ,. 186 ... 187relating to welding, crossing other pipelines, burial, and
188
emergency shut off systems. It is expressly provided that "the
180. Ss. Ill, 112. The pipeline route is subject to approval by
the Ministry, and the necessary information upon which approval
will be based is specified.
181. S. 112(2)(c).
182. A marine riser is defined as "that part of a pipeline system,
including its connecting arrangements, which extends from the
seabed and up to an installation, booster station or shipment
installation." S. 1(j) .
183. Ss. 113-116.
184. Ss. 117, 118.
185. Ss. 120, 122. S. 120(2) requires that each separate weld be
subjected to a lOO per cent, non-destructive test.
186. S. 121. Agreement with the pipeline owners and the Ministry
is required in each case.
187. S. 123. "To the extent reasonable," pipelines must be buried
or otherwise protected to avoid damage caused by other users.
The freedom of choice suggested by "otherwise protected" is
limited by the second paragraph of this Section, requiring that
pipeline installation must not damage fishing gear.
188. S. 124. The emergency shutoff system must function automatic-
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pipeline shall be installed so as not to damage fishing gear."
vi) other provisions
Chapter 13, "Shipment installations," contains four Sections.
Included are provisions which require information relevant to planned
190
installations, general requirements that the installation design
191
minimise the possibility of accidents, and procedural requirements,
including the provision that "loading shall be carried out so that
192
there is the least possible danger of petroleum escaping."
Violations of this Decree are punishable by both criminal
sanctions and loss of licence. In the case of serious violations
(which include false or withheld application information and interfer¬
ence with a public inspector as well as non-compliance with the tech¬
nical requirements of the Decree), the Ministry may revoke the licence
193
or permit to locate and operate. Even in the case of less serious
ally as well as manually.
189. S. 123(2).
190. S. 125.
191. S. 126. Protection should be such that "as far as possible any
collision between the shipment installation and the ship will
not cause leakages."
192. S. 128(5). Loading shall only occur during weather which will
allow safe operations, continuous communication between the
ship and the loading operator is required, and there must be a
system which allows loading to be stopped rapidly and the vessel
to disconnect at short notice. During the tanker loading oper¬
ations at Ekofisk, loading was occasionally interrupted by bad
weather. Taylor, A., "Ekofisk Development: Movement of Oil
from Platform to Shore," in Cole, H. (ed.) Petroleum and the
Continental Shelf of Northwest Europe, Vol. 2. Applied Science
Publishers Ltd. on behalf of the Institute of Petroleum, Great
Britain (1975), pp. 31-35, at p. 33.
193. S. 129(1) (3) .
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violations, the licence may be revoked if the complaint is not rem-
194
edied within a reasonable time limit set by the Ministry. In any
case involving licence revocation the licensee may appeal, but should
he be unsuccessful, he must secure the disused installation in ac-
195
cordance with relevant regulations. Both wilful and negligent
violations of Decree provisions are punishable by fine pursuant to
the Norwegian Penal Code.^^
3. Conclusion
The Norwegian law which controls pollution from offshore instal¬
lations is remarkably similar to that of the U.K. Each State has
understandably been concerned initially with regulations to control
pollution from drilling accidents. Thus, even though the Ekofisk
Field has been producing petroleum since 1971, production regulations
did not appear until 1976. Subordinate regulations pertaining to
drilling have now been published, thus relieving the 1975 Decree of
some of the detail which characterised its 1967 predecessor, but ana¬
logous regulations have yet to be published in respect of production
operations.
There are no published standards for the discharge of effluents
from production platforms. The Norwegian position in this respect is
again similar to that of the British, for both Governments are con¬
strained by the limits of oily water separator technology. The
194. S. 129(1).
195. S. 129(4)(5).
196. S. 130. Section 339(2) of the Norwegian Penal Code, to which
S. 130 refers, provides merely that fines may be imposed on a
person who "violates any regulation issued by the public auth¬
orities according to law and carrying a threat of punishment."
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Norwegian approach which requires the operator to use the "best
available" technology (considering economic factors) to limit oil in
installation operational discharges is similar to the U.K. "best prac-
197
ticable" standard. The two approaches are further compared below.
C. Pollution from Tankers and Support Vessels
1. Regulations Concerning Prohibition Against Discharges
of Oil into the Sea from Ships Etc.^^
These Regulations incorporate the 1954 IMCO Convention (as amend¬
ed in 1962) into Norwegian law. The national legislation faithfully
reflects the international instrument with few exceptions. As the IMCO
197. See below, p. 530.
198. Issued by the Maritime Directorate, 27 April 1967; in force 18
May 1967, pursuant to its S. 14. Norwegian reference: Meddel-
elser fra Sj^fartsdirektoratet, Nr. 221, 10 Mai 1967, Nr. 4 for
1967. English reference: Gr(Z$ndahl and S^Sns Forlag, in Ex¬
cerpts from Norwegian Shipcontrol Legislation, Oslo (1974), pp.
153-162. These Regulations are issued pursuant to the authority
of the Act Concerning Protective Measures Against Damage from
Oil Pollution of 6 March 1970, as amended (hereafter, the Oil
Defence Act). The Oil Defence Act (which replaced Act No. 17
of 9 December 1955) provides a general framework for oil pollu¬
tion prevention and control. It authorises the issuance of
regulations, the establishment of a Council on Oil Pollution,
and a Fund to cover costs incurred in oil pollution prevention,
mitigation, and clean up. Much of the Act is now "sleeping,"
as one Norwegian official described it, pending new legislation
to be presented to the Storting in 1977. The Council, found to
be an inefficient executive, was effectively stripped of its
power by an amendment which provided that Council duties could
be delegated (Ot. Prp. No. 56, June 1976; in Norwegian), thus
paving the way for the transfer of such duties to the SPCA.
The Fund, though established, did not work, primarily because
of objections to the taxation of imported oil as a means to
finance it. The SPCA budget is now the source of Fund replen¬
ishment. (It should be noted that this Fund is not used to
compensate fishermen for damage caused to their equipment by
oil related debris; that money comes from the budget of the
Fisheries Directorate.) Conversation with Mr. Gunnar Gjerde,
Ministry of Environment, 29 November 1976. See also Bugge, H.,
"Cooperation across the North Sea on Oil Pollution Defence,"
an interview in Northern Offshore, No. 2 (1975), pp. 6-10.
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199
Convention has been discussed above, it is proposed merely to outline
those parts of the Regulations which are unexceptional, reserving
comment for significant aberrations and additional information. In
the latter category is a preliminary remark on the status of Norwegian
acceptance of the various Amendments to the 1954 IMCO Convention, as
well as the 1973 Convention intended to replace the earlier instru¬
ment: as indicated in Table VIII-1 on page 421, Norway has accepted
relevant Amendments to the 1954 Convention, and plans to become a Party
to the 1973 Convention. Regulations to implement the 1969 and 1971
(Tanks) Amendments to the 1954 IMCO Convention were published 2 January
1977, and will come into force 1 September 1977.The Maritime
Directorate is currently preparing a report concerning the disposal of
sewage and garbage from vessels; this information will be used in
drafting legislation to implement the 1973 IMCO Convention. The Direc¬
torate is also engaged in drafting a new Chapter in the Seaworthiness
Act of 1903 which will consolidate all vessel discharges (including
201
ocean dumping) in one instrument.
S. 3 may be termed the basic provision of the Regulations, as it
sets out the prohibition against discharge of oil into the sea. In
addition to implementing the Convention's prohibitions into domestic
199. See above, p. 151.
200. The 9 months between publication and effective date is to
give shipowners a chance to adjust. Conversation with Mr. G.
Stebberud, Maritime Directorate, 19 November 1976. The
Maritime Directorate has already required that new Norwegian
vessels be constructed in accordance with the requirements of
the 1971 IMCO "Tanks" Amendment, which relates to the size and
placement of cargo tanks in tankers. Conversation with Mr. J.
Odland, Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 19 November 1976.
201. Conversation with Mr. Odland, 19 November 1976.
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law, provision is made for forbidding discharges of oil or oily mix-
202
tures into Norwegian territorial waters by ships of any nationality.
This apparently blanket prohibition is in fact more like a wide-meshed
net, for it is restricted by the scope of the Convention which the
Regulations are meant to implement. "Oil" means only certain kinds of
203
liquid hydrocarbons, and an effluent with fewer than 10O ppm of oil
204
to other liquid is not an "oily mixture," and certain vessels are
not subject to regulation:in consequence, most supply vessels^^
and many refined oils (such as paraffin and petrol) used in offshore
207
activity are not subject to regulation in Norwegian waters. These
Regulations are, therefore, unnecessarily narrow, for Norway has
sovereignty over her territorial sea, limited only by the right of
208
innocent passage, and it is clear that under international law Nor-
202. S. 3(1)(a).
203. "Oil" means crude, fuel, heavy diesel and lubricating oils,
S. 1(1).
204. "Oily mixture" means one ten-thousandth part or more of oil
(equivalent to lOO ppm as formulated in the Convention).
205. Neither the Regulations nor the Convention apply to tankers of
less than 150 gross registered tons (GRT), to other ships of
less than 500 GRT, or to ships operated by the Navy.
206. Most Norwegian supply vessels are less than 500 GRT to avoid
Regulations stipulating crew requirements. Noroil (No. 1)
(1974), pp. 23-26, at p. 25.
207. S. 24 of the Harbour Act of 1933 authorises harbour authorities
to "lay down prohibitions against the discharging of oil into
the harbour," a provision which clearly cannot be stretched to
regulate discharges of hydrocarbons into territorial waters
(which, to a substantial degree, begin their 4-mile breadth
from straight baselines). Even if the territorial sea could be
included within the geographical scope of harbour authorities,
a patchwork of standards and enforcement is the likely result
unless there is some formal coordination.
208. See above, p. 197.
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way could have prohibited any discharge of any oil—as has been done
209
by the U.K.
The Regulations incorporate the provisions concerning oil record
books ("oil logs" in the Regulations) contained in the Convention, and
include the spirit as well as the letter of the law: after setting
out the requirements for keeping an oil log, it is expressly provided
that the master of a Norwegian ship is obliged to produce the log upon
the request of the foreign authority in a foreign port.^"*"^ It is
true that the Convention requires such behaviour, but publication of
an express duty so to act can only encourage compliance by Norwegian
ships. This good faith provision is complemented by the penal prov¬
ision of the Regulations which (as required by the Convention) does
211
not distinguish between Norwegian and foreign offenders.
209. S. 2 of the U.K. Prevention of Oil Pollution Act prohibits the
discharge of any oil by any ship into U.K. waters. See above,
p. 344. The Convention exceptions incorporated into the Regu¬
lations may be inconsistent with the Norwegian rule of strict
liability (see below, p. 494). Exceptions include discharges
made for safety or life-saving, unavoidable leakage, fuel or
lubricating oil residues, lubricating oil from bilges, and
discharges from non-tankers en route to a port with inadequate
oil reception facilities. S. 4(1). The first exception is
slightly more restrictive than its Convention counterpart, as
it does not provide that a discharge made for the purpose of
securing the safety of cargo is an exception to the discharge
prohibition provisions of the Regulations. S. 4(1), Conven¬
tion Article IV(a). The last exception is noteworthy because,
in the opinion of an official of the Ministry of Fisheries,
oil reception facilities are presently inadequate, both for
normal operations and in the case of dry docking. Mr. Steb-
berud pointed out that Norway has not had to be overly con¬
cerned about ballast water from tankers because they have been
an oil importer. Refineries and export ports will be required
to have adequate reception facilities to handle Norway's new
oil export traffic. Conversation with Mr. G. Stebberud, Mari¬
time Directorate, 19 November 1976.
210. S. 5(6)(b).
211. S. 13. This provision is drafted in the manner of the penal
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Ss. 6-lO are concerned with "devices for the prevention of oil
pollution," which are mandatory for ships built after these Regula¬
tions came into force, and for certain existing tankers as well.
S. 9(1)(a) is the heart of these provisions, requiring all ships
regulated thereby to have either separation equipment or storage
facilities to deal with engine-room oily effluent. Oily water sepa¬
rators must be approved by the Maritime Directorate and must be
demonstrated to have the capability to reduce the oil in water con¬
tent to 50 ppm in a test performed in the presence of a surveyor
212
appointed by the Maritime Directorate. S. 10 requires that tank¬
ers must be equipped with "cleaning facilities" for treating oily
ballast or tank-washing effluent, if such equipment is necessary in
order to meet the discharge criteria set out in the Regulations.
The Regulations appear to authorise the Maritime Directorate to
require that certain foreign vessels in Norwegian waters comply with
the oil pollution prevention equipment requirements of Ss. 9 and 10,
for unlike the provisions extending Norwegian law to vessels on the
213
high seas, the Regulations are not limited to Norwegian vessels.
clauses in the Decrees concerned with offshore oil development,
providing that S. 339(2) of the General Civil Penal Code of 22
May 1902 will apply unless a more severe penalty is applicable
under any other statutory provision. Unlike the U.K. Preven¬
tion of Oil Pollution Act, no separate penal provisions are
made for non-compliance with oil record book requirements. See
above, p. 355.
212. S. 8(c)(1). This is one-half the permissible oil in effluent
under the Convention. Oily water separation equipment is
checked at the time of installation and during the required
surveys every four years thereafter. There are no arrangements
for inspection at sea. Conversation with Mr. G. Stebberud,
Maritime Directorate, 19 November 1976.
213. S. 3(1)(b), (c).
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Furthermore, the discharge of oil into Norwegian territorial waters
by ships of any nationality is expressly prohibited.^"1"4 The prov¬
ision which would allow the imposition of equipment requirements on
foreign vessels merely passing through the territorial sea is on the
215
frontier of actions permitted under international law. In prac¬
tice, however, the Norwegian Government has exercised restraint in
interference with foreign flag vessels, caution which may have been
as much influenced by fear of retaliation against her extensive
merchant fleet (soon to be exporting oil) as by considerations of
international law.^^
2. Temporary Regulations on Intervention on the High
Seas in Case of Oil Pollution or Danger of Oil 2^7
Pollution as a Consequence of a Marine Casualty
These Regulations incorporate the Intervention Convention into
214. S. 3(1)(a), emphasis added. S. 3(1)(b) and (c) implement the
Convention's provisions and, like the international instrument,
are concerned with prohibited zones that extend 50 or 100 miles
from land. Although these zones include the territorial sea,
it is clear that the primary purpose of the Convention was to
limit discharges by agreement beyond coastal State jurisdiction.
It will be recalled that the 1962 Amendments made the entire
North Sea a prohibited zone. Convention, Annex A, (2) (b) (iii) .
See above, pp. 153, 477.
215. It will be recalled that the U.K. Prevention of Oil Pollution
Act 1971 would permit application of U.K. vessel equipment
standards to foreign vessels, but only when they are in a
U.K. harbour or are in U.K. waters while approaching or leav¬
ing a U.K. harbour. See above, p. 349.
216. It is interesting to note that both the U.K. and Norway, as
coastal States with large merchant fleets, have exercised
great discretion in attempting to balance coastal protection
with freedom of navigation.
217. These Regulations were promulgated under the authority of the
Act on Measures Pursuant to the International Convention of
November 29, 1969 on Intervention on the Free Seas in Case of
Oil Pollution Accidents, 16 June 1972, No. 46. Pursuant to
Chapter II, S. 7 of the Regulations, they came into force 6 May
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Norwegian law. It is, with one exception, an unremarkable set of
rules, conforming closely to the treaty.
These Regulations depart from the Convention in that they apply
when there is "imminent danger of a marine casualty"—not just after
219
such an incident, as in the treaty. "Preventive interference" in
the North Sea may be inconsistent with customary law (and may pose
220
practical problems). As Professor Brown has observed, the right
of "self defence" applies only in certain cases involving unlawful
221
acts or omissions. There may, however, be room within the doctrine
1975. The English translation of the Act and the Regulations
was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation.
218. The Intervention Convention is discussed above, at p. 188.
219. Chapter I, S. 2, para. 1.2. An analogous provision omits the
requirement of imminence, authorising action if there is "dan¬
ger of a marine casualty taking place," although requiring
that the threat of damage must be grave or imminent. Chapter
II, S. 1.
220. It will be recalled that the Convention provides only that
Parties "may take such measures on the high seas as may be
necessary" to prevent pollution damage, without specifying
what such measures might be. The Regulations, like the U.K.
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, authorise the destruction
of the ship and its cargo if required. Chapter II, S. 2;
U.K. Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, S. 12(4) (above, at p.
367); Intervention Convention, Article 1(1). Professor Din-
stein has posed the hypothetical situation of an Israeli
tanker stranded in the Red Sea, bombed by an Egyptian air¬
craft for the reason that, in the Egyptian view, it consti¬
tuted an imminent pollution danger to Egypt, to illustrate
the danger of allowing the coastal State to justify its own
drastic actions. Dinstein, Y., "Oil Pollution by Ships and
Freedom of the High Seas," 3 Journal of Maritime Law 363
(1972), at pp. 371 and 373. Professor Dinstein's warning
applies a fortiori to the case of coastal State interference
with foreign flag vessels on the high seas when a shipping
casualty has not yet occurred.
221. Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 5, at p. 142.
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of necessity to accommodate a change in the normal rule of inter¬
national law that the flag State has exclusive jurisdiction over its
ships while they are on the high seas. It will be recalled that one
authority has observed that "it is the great disparity in the import¬
ance of the interests actually in conflict that alone justifies a
reversal of the legal protection normally accorded to these inter-
222
ests." Assessment of conflicting interests so depends upon the
circumstances, that "a comparison of the conflicting interests appears
223
to be indispensable" in every case. There may arise a combination
of circumstances such that interference with a foreign vessel by the
coastal State in order to avert almost certain injury to its interests
is consistent with the opinio juris generalis, if not international
224
customary law itself. Ordering the transfer of oil from a stricken
tanker to other vessels is a suggested example. Not only might the
circumstances be such that a transfer of cargo thus ordered would be
reasonable, but the doctrine of proportionality, a check on excessive
222. Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunals, Stevens and Sons, London (1953), at p.
745, cited by Brown, E.D., op. cit. in footnote 5, at p. 145,
footnote 35.
223. Ibid.
224. Professor Cheng has suggested that the only element necessary
to the existence of international customary law is opinio juris
generalis, State practice merely being evidence that the neces¬
sary requirement exists. Cheng, B., "United Nations Resolutions
on Outer Space: 'Instant' International Customary Law?"
5 Indian Journal of International Law 23-48 (1965). Professor
Simma has pointed out that this is a distinctly minority view
and is inconsistent with the opinion of the I.C.J, in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, in which the Court stated that the
formation of international customary law required constant and
uniform practice. Lecture at The Hague Academy of International
Law, 29 July 1976. See the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
I.C.J. Reports (1969), at para. 74.
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remedies, is likely to be satisfied as well.
The Regulations include two other provisions which limit Govern¬
ment discretion—and which are not present in the U.K. Prevention of
226
Oil Pollution Act. The "related interests" enumerated by the Con¬
vention as illustrative of the intended scope of protection are in¬
corporated, including the threat of "damage" to activities in coastal
227
areas. As discussed above, this raises a question as to whether
interference with offshore oil development might be included within
the ambit of the Convention. It was then concluded that activities
on the continental shelf, even scores of miles from the coastline,
might be considered "coastal" and so fall within the Convention. Pro¬
tection, however, was meant to be from injury caused by oil pollution:
thus, a tanker drifting toward an installation might be interfered
with on the basis that it would cause oil pollution damage to the in¬
stallation, or to other activities or areas after drifting, but the
measures taken would have to be proportional to the amount of oil
pollution damage which could reasonably be expected. Collision dam¬
age, surely the primary concern, could not be considered as a factor
justifying interference pursuant to the Convention—although it might
well be relevant to international customary law.
The second inclusion found in the Norwegian law but not in the
British Act is the duty to consult with other States which may be
affected by the marine casualty prior to taking action. Together with
225. S. 6; Convention, Article V.
226. See above, pp. 366-367.
227. See above, pp. 191 et seg.
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the ex post facto requirement of notification of measures taken,
these common sense provisions may also reflect emerging customary law.
The Regulations empower the Oil Protection Council to act ac-
228
cording to its provisions. However, as mentioned above, the Coun¬
cil now plays a much-reduced role in the Norwegian scheme of environ-
229
mental protection, and the SPCA has assumed many of its duties.
Present organisation would therefore require the SPCA to decide what
interference with a foreign vessel was necessary and justifiable, but
230
this would be done in consultation with the Maritime Directorate.
3. Act of 17 December 1976 Relating to the
Economic Zone of Norway231
Finally, attention is drawn to an Act Relating to the Economic
Zone of Norway. This Act is primarily concerned with fisheries,
but S. 7 anticipates emerging law of the sea by providing that,
"(s)ubject to the rules of international law," regulations may be
made within the 200-mile zone concerning:
"a. the protection of the environment,
b. scientific research,
c. permanent or temporary artificial islands,
installations, including artificial port
facilities, and other structures,
d. cables and pipelines,
e. the exploration and exploitation of the
economic zone for other economic purposes,
228. Chapter II, Ss. 1, 4, 5.
229. See above, p. 475, at footnote 198.
230. Conversation with Mr. J. Odland, Norwegian Maritime Directorate,
19 November 1976.
231. Reprint from "Fiskets Gang"—No 1-77 (in Norwegian and English).
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including the production of energy."
Subsection (a) is of particular relevance to this investigation. Reg¬
ulations pursuant to subsection (a) could give the Norwegian Govern¬
ment authority to set and enforce standards for foreign flag vessels
in its sector of the North Sea—without regard to any nexus with
development of the natural resources of the continental shelf. As a
major maritime State, Norway is unlikely to enact Regulations pursuant
to this Act without the consent (express or tacit) of at least those
States "most interested," that is, the U.K. plus other North Sea
States. Nevertheless, it is submitted that although Norway would cer¬
tainly prefer to legislate with, rather than in advance of, interna¬
tional law, if a multilateral solution to the problem of vessel pollu¬
tion beyond the territorial sea acceptable to Norway (whether wide¬
spread ratification of the 1973 IMCO Convention or a more comprehen¬
sive framework from UNCLOS III), is not forthcoming within a decade,
the authority latent in this Act will be exercised unilaterally.
D. Pollution from Dumping at Sea: Regulations on dumping
of substances which may have harmful effects on marine
life and human health of 4 February 1975^^
These Regulations were intended to incorporate the Oslo Dumping
Convention into Norwegian law and have also been used to implement the
233.
London Dumping Convention. Although the two Conventions
232. Issued pursuant to S. 18 of the Water Pollution Act of 26 June
1970 and the Royal Decree of 14 July 1972, in force 14 July
1972. Stenciled English translations of the Regulations and
the Act from the Norwegian Ministry of Environment.
233. Telephone conversation with ByrSsjef Christian Hambro, Ministry
of Environment, 9 November 1976. Norway was an advocate of the
Oslo Convention. See the discussion above, at p. 205.
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differ in geographical scope, as well as in other minor respects,
such differences pose no obstacle in Norwegian law to observance of
234
the provisions of both Conventions.
No substances or materials may be dumped from ships or aircraft
into the high seas or the territorial seas of Norway or of other
States Parties to the Oslo Convention without a permit from the State
235
Pollution Control Authority (SPCA).
S. 2 of the Regulations incorporates the Convention's "black
list" by prohibiting the issuance of permits for the dumping of per¬
sistent organic compounds, etc. and also includes the permitted
236
exceptions.
Annex II of the Oslo Convention is incorporated in the Regula¬
tions as well; it is therefore required by Norwegian law that a
specific permit be obtained from the SPCA before such substances as
237
certain heavy metals are dumped. The Regulations are likewise
234. Ibid. One apparently minor difference between the Oslo and
London Dumping Conventions is that the former includes "fixed
or floating platforms" (Article 19(2)), whereas the London Con¬
vention expressly excludes "the disposal of wastes or other
matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration,
exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed min¬
eral resources" (Article III (1) (c)). As discussed above (p. 128),
the Oslo Commission has agreed upon a Draft Resolution which
would classify disposal of pipes, metal shavings and other mat¬
erial which may present a serious obstacle to fishing or navig¬
ation as acts of deliberate disposal within Article 19 of the
Convention. The significance of this difference to municipal law
is that a State Party to the London Convention only would lack
the international consent to regulate such activity by foreign
vessels loading for dumping in its ports and dumping within its
territorial sea which the Draft Resolution unequivocally provides.
235. S. 1. Oslo Convention definitions of "dumping" and "vessel" apply.
236. It will be recalled that the U.K. Dumping at Sea Act does not in¬
clude the Convention Annexes. See above, p. 386.
237. S. 3.
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faithful to the Convention in providing that such substances "should"
be deposited in deep water, and that when issuing permits for dumping
large quantities of acids or alkalis, consideration should be given
to the possibility that other substances listed in Annex II may also
^ 238be present.
When considering whether to issue a permit, the SPCA must con¬
sider the factors listed in Annex II of the Oslo Convention, such as
239
characteristics of the waste and of the dumping site. In practice,
the SPCA gets few requests for permits to dump, and those it does re-
240
ceive it usually denies. In the period 1975-76 only four permits
were issued, all of which involved the dumping of relatively non-
241
toxic materials in internal waters.
The scope of these Regulations is further defined in Ss. 5 and
6. The former section sets out the persons to whom the Regulations
are intended to apply in a single sentence:
"It is forbidden for Norwegian citizens and
enterprises to make arrangements for discharges in
contravention of the provisions mentioned above."2'*2
This provision partially fulfills the obligation to exercise juris-
238. S. 3. The Oslo Convention definition of "deep water" applies.
239. S. 4.
240. Conversation with Dr. 0. Schreiner, SPCA, 17 November 1976. In
consequence, environmentally acceptable disposal sites on land
must be found.
241. Ibid. The dumping actually occurred in deep Norwegian fjords.
As in the U.K., permits to dump which have been granted are
open to public inspection.
242. A Norwegian "enterprise" is a company or "daughter company"
organised in Norway. "Arrangements for discharges" would
probably include loading for dumping. Conversation with Mr.
E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA, 10 November 1976.
488
diction imposed by the Oslo Convention, but it omits any language
which would make illegal the act of dumping by foreign vessels and
aircraft in the Norwegian territorial sea. It is likely that this
omission resulted from the view that such a provision was unnecessary
(Norway already having jurisdiction over foreign vessels in her terri¬
torial sea subject to the right of innocent passage), coupled with a
desire to be as subtle as possible in asserting jurisdiction over
foreign vessels—assertions which might invite retaliation against
243
the Norwegian merchant fleet.
S. 6 includes the Convention (and customary law) exception to
the afore-mentioned prohibitions on ocean dumping in cases of danger
to human life or to the safety of a ship or aircraft, qualified by an
24<
obligation to report such emergency dumping immediately to the SPCA.
No further statutory defences are provided, but in the opinion of the
head of the SPCA legal department, defences such as those set out in
the U.K. Dumping at Sea Act could certainly be employed by a defend-
243. Ibid. Should proposed Article 20 of the Committee III RSNT
became law binding Norway, that State would have the right to
control all dumping in her sector of the North Sea.
244. Dumping which is covered by the Oii Defence Act is also outside
the Regulations. S. 6(3). This is significant because some of
the discharges exempt from the Act may still fall under the Reg¬
ulations, and thus be subject to control. For example, the dis¬
charge of used cleaning solvent by a Norwegian supply vessel
might well not come within the Act because of the vessel's ton¬
nage and the hydrocarbon description. Yet, if it were shown
that the solvent were indeed "dumped" and that such discharge
were not "incidental" to the vessel's operations such discharge
would be prohibited under the Regulations.
245. The Dumping at Sea Act provides that it is a defence for one
accused of violating the Act to prove: 1) That he was acting
pursuant to his employer's instructions, or that he acted in
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Violation of these Regulations is punishable by unlimited fine
246
or by a prison term not to exceed 4 months. The provision for
imprisonment, not found in the Norwegian law pertaining to regulation
of pollution from seabed operations or from vessels, is not likely to
be used. In the opinion of the SPCA, the type of offence likely to
be of sufficient magnitude to be detected is also probably going to
be committed by a Norwegian-based company. It is thought that a fine
could be more readily tailored to fit the offence than imprisonment
which would be likely to involve difficult problems of proof in re-
247
lation to personal culpability.
Enforcement of the Regulations is done in two ways: certain
industries known to produce large quantities of waste material are
required by the Ministry of Environment to account for the method by
248
which such waste is disposed. Vessels suspected of ocean dumping
activities may also be inspected in Norwegian ports, although the SPCA
has no staff of inspectors and is therefore dependent upon whatever
good faith on false or misleading information; or 2) that, in
a case in which he is charged with dumping from a British ship
outside British waters, such dumping was authorised by another
Convention State. (See above, p. 390.) Mr. Poulsson pointed
out that a defendant wishing to employ the first defence may be
faced with difficulties in proving to the court's satisfaction
that he acted in good faith. Conversation with Mr. E.0.
Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA, 10 November 1976.
246. S. 8. Punishment is pursuant to S. 17 of the Water Pollution
Act.
247. This also accounts for the omission of a provision for piercing
the corporate veil, a frequent clause in U.K. pollution control
law. Conversation with Mr. E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA, 10
November 1976.
248. Conversation with ByrSsjef Christian Hambro, Ministry of Environ¬
ment, 12 November 1976.
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reports it might receive from various sources. Despite the obvious
practical problems of enforcing the Regulations, it is not thought
(conceding imperfect information) that any significant illegal ocean
250
dumping is occurring by persons subject to the law.
249. Conversation with Mr. E.0. Poulsson, Counsellor, SPCA, 10 Novem¬
ber 1976. The navy, port authorities, and fishing vessels all
constitute sources of information. Foreign vessels in the Nor¬
wegian territorial sea would not be likely to be inspected
unless there was strong evidence of illegal dumping.
250. Conversation with Dr. 0. Schreiner, SPCA, 17 November 1976.
CHAPTER NINE
THE NORWEGIAN LAW OF LIABILITY FOR MARINE POLLUTION
A. Introduction
The Norwegian law of civil liability for injury caused by pollu¬
tion from offshore petroleum development is a mixture of legislation
intended to implement international conventions and the domestic rules
of civil liability which apply in the absence of such legislation and
conventions.^" (See Table IX-1 on the following page.) As in the
U.K., recovery for oil pollution damage caused by ships is, to a large
extent, governed by the terms of municipal law implementing the 1969
2
Civil Liability Convention. In those cases in which pollution dam¬
age is caused by other agents (for example, refined spirits) or from
other sources (for example, a pipeline rupture) the plaintiff must
3
prove his case under the ordinary rules of Norwegian law. In some
cases the defendant is held to a standard of strict liability, so the
plaintiff's burden of proof is lessened. Under the present system,
however, a victim may still not recover damages if he cannot show to
a court's satisfaction that he has incurred the loss of a property
right protected by law. Thus, even if a Norwegian fisherman could
prove that drilling in the areas north of 62° N. through which cod
migrate had an adverse economic effect upon him by reducing available
1. Fleischer, C.A., "Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting
from Offshore Operations," Scandinavian Studies in Law 107-143
(in press) .
2. See above, p. 240. The Fund Convention will also be implemented
by Norwegian law when it comes into force.
3. The basic provision is the Act on Torts of 13 June 1969, although
application of this Act may be determined by other law (for ex¬
ample, the 1972 Decree), licence provisions, and court decisions.
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TABLE IX-1




Fund 1971 21-12-72 21-3-75
Nordic 1974 19-2-74 7-3-75
Relevant Norwegian Law
Act of 20 July 1893 (as amended)
Chapter 12
Provisional Regulations Concern¬
ing Insurance and Other Finan¬
cial Security Against Liabili¬
ty for Oil Pollution Damage
and Regarding Certificate
Act of 20 July 1893 (as amended)
Chapter 12





fish stocks, a claim for compensation would likely be denied because
the fish not reduced to possession are a common resource rather than
4
his property. The aggrieved fisherman, the disappointed holiday
maker at the seashore, the concerned environmentalist may seek in¬
junctive relief,^ but this may not always be a satisfactory remedy.
For example, if the choice were clearly between the use of ocean space
for a petroleum production complex or as a completely open area in
which trawlermen might ply their trade, an injunction prohibiting one
activity would leave the other party uncompensated in money or oppor¬
tunity. A legal system is deficient as an instrument of public policy
if it omits provision for satisfactory reconciliation of conflicting
interests subject to that policy.
Considerations such as this have caused the Norwegian Government
to commission studies on the question of civil liability for pollution
damage. A committee formed to investigate the question of civil
liability for all forms of pollution damage was scheduled to submit a
comprehensive draft law on civil liability for pollution damage to the
0
Storting in early 1977. The draft law, incomplete at the time of
writing, is to include provisions concerned with compensation for
4. Conversation with Mr. BjgJrn EngstrjzSn, Justisdepartementet, 17
November 1976. Mr. EngstrjzSn is Secretary of a Committee charged
with drafting a comprehensive law concerning compensation for
injury from all forms of pollution.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. The Committee members include representatives from agri¬
culture, fishing, trade unions, the Ministries of Justice and
Environment, and other concerned interests. Conversation with
Mr. Olav Skarpness, Justisdepartementet, 26 November 1976. The
Committee was first concerned with drafting regulations setting
out the legal duty to prevent and mitigate pollution; it then
considered the problem of compensation, including the issues of
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losses which may not be readily measurable in economic terms (for ex¬
ample, destruction of sea birds), or which may not be property rights
(for example, reduction of fish stocks). The Committee is considering
a number of ways to implement these provisions, including the estab¬
lishment of a fund (similar to that already in existence to compensate
fishermen for debris damage), and a provision that the Government may
7
sue on behalf of the thing injured (for example, sea birds).
B. Civil Liability for Pollution Damage from Seabed
Operations
The 1972 Decree expressly provides that the Norwegian law of
torts applies in cases of "damage or inconvenience" caused by seabed
8
operations. Although Norwegian law is based on fault liability unless
9
it can be shown that the activity was "hazardous," in the opinion of
a leading authority on the subject, Norwegian offshore oil development
is governed by a standard of strict liability.'*'0 There is no ceiling
required standard of care and proof of injury.
7. The local Government Council charged with the responsibility for
pollution control would be the plaintiff in a suit on behalf of
the thing injured. Conversation with Mr. Bj^rn Engstr^n, Justis-
departementet, 17 November 1976. Cf. the proposal by U.S. Su¬
preme Court Justice W.O. Douglas that the injured "things" be
granted standing to sue in their own right.
8. 1972 Decree, S. 51. The Decree of 9 April 1965 which was re¬
placed by the 1972 Decree contained an identical S. 51.
9. Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Parliamentary Report No. 25 (1973-
74), "Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society," at p. 38.
10. Fleischer, C.A., loc. cit. in footnote 1. Mr. Engstr^n observed
that an "unwritten law" of strict liability generally applies in
cases concerned with civil liability for pollution damage. Con¬
versation with Mr. Bjfrfrn Engstr^n, Justisdepartementet, 17 Novem¬
ber 1976. See also, Brask, G., "Oil Catastrophes - Liability -
Insurance," Nordisk Forsikrings Tidsskrift (1974), pp. 125-136,
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on liability and the licensee is vicariously liable jointly and
12
severally with the tort feasor and the latter's employer. As noted
above, it is thought by some scholars that S. 51 by its terms expands
the Norwegian law of vicarious liability which does not normally ex¬
tend beyond employees or contractors over whose activities the defend-
13
ant is found to have the required degree of control. The strict
liability standard for the licensee is set out expressly in the pet¬
roleum production licences granted on 15 November 1974, an inclusion
intended as an interim measure until the enactment of appropriate
14
legislation. Such legislation, based on the Report of the Fleischer
at p. 128. Mr. Brask, a Norwegian insurance company executive,
discusses liability in respect of three specific examples: 1)
a supply vessel negligently causes total loss of an oil rig and
herself, 2) a rig negligently causes a blowout, damaging third
parties, and incurring well-control and down-time costs, and 3)
a supertanker hits a storage tank, causing oil pollution from
both ship and tank, damage to the tank, and loss of the ship.
11. The owner of a drilling rig classified as a vessel might enjoy
limited liability under existing legislation. Fleischer, C.A.,
op. cit. in footnote 1, at p. 109. Professor Fleischer observes
that "it does not seem probable, however, that a drilling rig in
operation—still less a platform—could be regarded as a ship.
In any case, the limitation following from such a viewpoint
would only apply to the owner or operator of the rig, not to the
licensee or owner of the oilfield, and here we are mainly con¬
cerned with the licensee or the owner." (Op. cit. in footnote 1,
at p. 116.) Proposed legislation dealing with civil liability
for pollution damage caused by drilling rigs will consider all
such craft (including semi-submersible platforms) vessels if
they are not actually engaged in drilling operations. Conver¬
sation with Byr§sjef Karin Bruzelius, Justisdepartementet, 26
November 1976. In practice, no problems have yet arisen con¬
cerning the classification of a drilling unit as a "vessel" or
"installation."
12. 1972 Decree, S. 51.
13. See above, p. 441.
14. Petroleum Production licence granted 15 November 1974, S. 15;
reproduced in Report No. 81, Appendix 7.
1
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Commission, "Law on Liability, Etc. for Pollution Damages in Connec¬
tion with Exploration for and Production of Natural Resources,""^ is
likely to be enacted in the near future, now that the Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage has been agreed and is open
16
for acceptance. The Report includes a draft law which estab¬
lishes a strict liability standard for all pollution damage caused
by the petroleum development operations, even if the injury was
17
caused by an independent subcontractor. Claims pursued according
to the objective liability standard would be channeled through the
licensee. Although the Commission recommended that liability be
unlimited, inclusion of a liability ceiling in the Convention is
likely to restrict the new law to a similar limitation in cases
18
involving other States Parties.
C. Civil Liability for Pollution Damage from Vessels
Chapter 12 of the Act of 20 July 1893 (as amended) is the Norweg¬
ian legislation providing authority under which the 1969 Civil Liabil¬
ity Convention (hereafter, the Convention) and the 1971 Fund Conven-
19
tion (hereafter, the Fund) are implemented. The provisions of
15. Ministry of Industry, NOU 1973: 8. (Available only in Norwegian.)
16. See above, pp. 223 et seq.
17. Report No. 25, p. 38. The licensee is therefore expressly made
liable for damage occasioned by the acts of a drilling sub¬
contractor.
18. The Norwegian law is expected to follow the new Civil Liability
Convention very closely. Conversation with ByrSsjef Christian
Hambro, Ministry of Environment, 12 November 1976.
19. The unofficial translation of Chapter 12 from Norwegian into
English was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation.
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Chapter 12 contain few deviations from the Convention or the Fund.
Moreover, it is expressly provided that Chapter 12 is to be construed
so as to be consistent with obligations imposed by "convention" upon
20
Norway in respect of States non-Parties. The consideration of
Chapter 12 will therefore be limited to a discussion of those Sec¬
tions which differ from the two Conventions and a brief description
of the remaining provisions.
1. Sections differing from the Convention and/or Fund
a) introduction
The owner of a ship carrying oil in bulk is strictly liable for
oil pollution damage as well as for costs incurred for reasonable
21
measures to prevent and mitigate injury. Chapter 12 taken in its
entirety does not apply to losses incurred outside the territory of
22 23
a Contracting State, to ships not transporting oil in bulk, to
24 25
non-persistent oils, or to Government ships, but certain provi¬
sions of the Chapter do differ from the Convention in respect of
Although Norway has ratified both the Convention and the Fund,
the latter will not become incorporated into Norwegian law until
it comes into force. S. 277.
20. S. 284. It is suggested that this provision was included in
Chapter 12 ex abundanti cautela and merely makes express the
existing rule of international law that a State may not claim
more rights under a treaty than were granted.
21. S. 267(1). The definitions of terms employed by Chapter 12 are
consistent with the Convention and the Fund.
22. S. 282(1).




these four subjects. These deviations are based upon Norwegian sov¬
ereignty rather than the Convention. Table IX-2 on the following
page tabulates these aberrations.
b) preventive measures
S. 282(1) provides, inter alia, that Ss. 267-272 and 276 apply
to preventive measures irrespective of where the measure has been
26
implemented. As observed earlier, this provision only makes ex¬
plicit what is implied in the Convention.
c) loss on the high seas
S. 282(2) states that Ss. 267 and 268 shall apply to cases of
loss or damage on the high seas when Norwegian provisions on compen-
27
sation are applicable. The context of the term "Norwegian pro¬
visions" indicates that the reference is to "other" Norwegian pro¬
visions—not to this Chapter which governs compensation under the two
Conventions. It is clear, therefore, that S. 282(2) does not purport
to extend the Convention or the Fund to damage incurred on the high
seas. The effect of S. 282(2) is merely to provide that when Nor¬
wegian law rather than the Conventions is applicable, the provisions
of Ss. 267 and 268, concerned with owner's liability and owner's
exemptions respectively, shall apply.
d) waiver of "bulk carriage" requirement and "oil" restriction
S. 282(3) presents a case similar to that just discussed. Sub¬
paragraph 3 of S. 282 provides that Ss. 267 and 268 shall apply to
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carried in bulk and even when the "oil" falls outside the definition
28
of that term employed in the Conventions. S. 282(3) represents
the draftsmen's efforts to apply the definition of strict liability
employed in the Conventions to cases which clearly fall outside their
ambit—an instance of terminology standardisation no doubt intended
to impart the virtue of consistency to the overall framework of civil
liability for vessel-source pollution. The limitation of this expan¬
sion in scope to Ss. 267 and 268 indicates that there was no inten¬
tion to extend the schemes set out in the Convention or the Fund,
e) application to Government ships
S. 283, concerned with Government ships, raises an issue of
international customary law. After affirming in its first paragraph
that "the provisions of this chapter do not apply to warships" and
other Government ships employed for non-commercial purposes, S. 283(2)
asserts that Ss. 267-270 will be applied to such ships which cause
29
damage in Norwegian territory. Furthermore, Government ships are
subject to the provisions of Ss. 267-270 no matter what kind of
oil they may be carrying and whether or not they are carrying it
in bulk.
As indicated in Table IX-2 on the preceding page, S. 283(2)
applies the Conventions' provisions concerning owner's liability and
owner's exemptions to Government ships, and makes such vessels
subject to the liability and limitation provisions as well. Although




this is a more difficult question than was the case regarding
S. 282(2) and (3), the same distinction may be made between claiming
unauthorised convention rights on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, incorporating selected Convention provisions into the municipal
legal framework. As the rights claimed in the latter case are based
upon customary law, there is no question of exceeding the scope of
the Convention or Fund.
However, even if this hypothesis is tenable in this case, it
raises a fundamental question: is S. 283(2) consistent with the
international customary law upon which it is hypothetically based?
It is a generally accepted rule of international law that war¬
ships and Government ships in non-commercial service sailing on the
high seas enjoy "complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State
other than the flag State.Furthermore, even in the territorial
sea, the coastal State's customary law rights to interfere with the
ships in question are subject to some limitation.^ In view of these
norms, the question posed in the preceding paragraph can be framed
more precisely: does S. 283(2) represent an exercise of jurisdiction
inconsistent with international customary law? This inquiry may be
answered by considering what is meant by "jurisdiction."
30. High Seas Convention, Articles 8(1), 9.
31. Territorial Seas Convention, Sections B, C, and D. There is
some question concerning the nature and extent of the doctrine
of innocent passage v/hich limits the coastal State's right to
interfere with foreign flag vessels in its territorial sea (see
the discussion of international customary law above, at p. 89,
and the account of the emerging law of the sea, at p. 197).
Moreover, the Territorial Seas Convention does not purport to be
declaratory of international customary law, and has not been
widely ratified. The question of coastal State jurisdiction in
its territorial sea is, therefore, at present one which cannot
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It has been pointed out that "jurisdiction" actually consists
of two components: jurisdiction to prescribe law and jurisdiction
32
to enforce law. Jurisdiction to prescribe law refers to the right
to make municipal legislation apply to individuals. It is concur¬
rent; that is, an individual may be subject to the laws of several
States simultaneously. Conversely, jurisdiction to enforce municipal
law is exclusive: only one State at a time may actually exercise
enforcement jurisdiction. In the case of ships, an individual thereon
may be subject to the simultaneous application of municipal law from
a State in whose territory the ship is located, the flag State, and
the State of which he is a national. The individual in question
would be subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the territorial
State, flag State and State of which he is a national, in that order,
depending upon his location.
When this explanation is applied to the issue of Norwegian
jurisdiction over foreign warships and Government ships, it is evid¬
ent that S. 283(2) is entirely consistent with international customary
law. Norway has the right to apply her law to such vessels; as she
has made no attempt (in legislation or fact) to enforce S. 283(2),
that provision must be held to be valid,
f) liability channelling
S. 269, "Channelling of liability etc.," is remarkable because
it expressly provides that liability for loss or damage cannot be
be defined with precision.
32. Cheng, B., "Crimes on Board Aircraft," 1959 Current Legal
Problems, pp. 177 et seg. Professor Cheng uses the terms
"jurisfaction" and "jurisaction" to refer to jurisdiction to
prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce.
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imposed on a salvor unless he is acting in violation of a prohib-
33
ition imposed by Government, the shipowner, or the cargo owner.
Although this provision is clearly consistent with the Convention's
objective of channelling liability through the shipowner, it does
34
not appear in that instrument. It will be recalled, however, that
a clause expressly exempting the salvor from liability is included
in the U.K. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 which incor-
35
porates the Convention into British law. The explanation for the
inclusion in the British Act undoubtedly accounts for the provision
in S. 269: such protection was thought necessary to enable efficient
salvage operations.^
2. Other provisions
The Convention requirements concerning vessel insurance and
certification are detailed in the Provisional Regulations Concerning
Insurance and other Financial Security against Liability for Oil
37
Pollution Damage and Regarding Certificate. As required by the
Convention, Norwegian ships sailing anywhere and foreign ships
33. In the case of prohibition imposed by the ship or cargo owner,
liability may be imposed on a salvor only if he is not a public
authority. S. 269.
34. The Convention expressly exempts only "the servants or agents of
the owner," a construction which could be construed as too narrow
to protect a salvor employed by the Government pursuant to
powers authorised by the Intervention Convention.
35. S. 3(b) of the U.K. Act. See above, p. 402.
36. See above, p. 402, at footnote 28.
37. These Regulations were issued pursuant to, inter alia, S. 274 of
the Act of 20 July 1893 and entered into force 19 June 1975, pur¬
suant to S. 28 of the Regulations. An unofficial English trans¬
lation was kindly made available to the writer by the Norwegian
Justice Department.
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in Norwegian ports are required to maintain insurance or other
38
security to cover possible liability. Norwegian ships and all
foreign ships entering Norwegian ports must also carry a valid certi¬
ficate attesting that sufficient insurance or other financial secur-
39
ity is in force. The Norwegian Maritime Directorate is empowered
40
to issue certificates for Norwegian ships and non-Convention ships.
Convention ships from other States must carry certificates issued by
41
the appropriate authority of that State. State ships subject to
the Convention (that is, Government ships on commercial service) are
also subject to the insurance requirement, although a certificate
from that State confirming State ownership and an assurance that
liability pursuant to the Convention would be covered may be provided
• 4. ^ 42instead.
Any ship which is found not to carry a valid certificate may be
38. Regulations, S. 2(1), (2); Chapter 12, S. 273(1), (2).
39. Regulations, Ss. 3, 7, 8. This includes non-Convention ships as
well. Although the Convention does not require Contracting
States to require that non-Convention ships entering or leaving
the Contracting State's ports carry a certificate, it is submit¬
ted that certification is a reasonable means of implementing the
obligation that is imposed, viz., that each Contracting State
shall ensure under national legislation that such vessels actually
carry such financial protection. Convention, Article VII(11).
The U.K. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 contains a
similar provision in its S. 10(2).
40. Regulations, Ss. 3, 8. The Maritime Directorate may issue a cert¬
ificate to a non-Convention vessel if cargo onboard is destined
for Norway. Certificates issued by the U.K., Denmark, and Sweden
to non-Convention vessels are also recognised. The actual check¬
ing of certificates in Norwegian ports is done by customs offi¬
cials. Conversation with Mr. J. Odland, Norwegian Maritime
Directorate, 19 November 1976.
41. Regulations, S. 7; Chapter 12, S. 273(2).
42. Regulations, S. 2(3); Chapter 12, S. 273(3).
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denied entry into or be forbidden to leave a Norwegian port, or may
43
be ordered to discharge her cargo or to be moved. The authority
to prevent a vessel from sailing, discussed above in connection with
the Convention and the U.K. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act
1971, is not inconsistent with international law if it is applied in
44
a non-discriminatory manner. The Norwegian Regulations are actually
somewhat more conservative than the British Act in regard to author¬
ising sanctions against vessels which do not comply with certification
requirements: both national laws provide for actions with respect to
the ship, but the British Act authorises the imposition of a fine as
45
well. The U.K. scheme would appear to be slightly better drafted
to achieve the assurance of compliance required by the Convention in
that a master faced with a fine (even if it is to be paid by the ship
owner) in addition to a delay while a certificate is prepared is
arguably less likely to gamble that he will not be caught without the
proper evidence of financial responsibility than were the only con¬
sequence of his behaviour that he missed his sailing date, although
it is recognised that failure to meet delivery commitments can be
43. Regulations, S. 16. "Port" would include a single point mooring
buoy on the Norwegian continental shelf as well as the territor¬
ial sea. Cf. U.K. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971,
S. 10(2) which includes "a terminal in the territorial sea of
the United Kingdom" but omits consideration of loading from
installations on the continental shelf.
44. See above, p. 408.
45. If a ship has not been issued a certificate, the master or owner
may be fined up to £35,000 on summary conviction. If a certif¬
icate has been issued, but it is not on board or the master
fails to produce it, the master is liable to a fine on summary
conviction not to exceed £400. U.K. Merchant Shipping (Oil
Pollution) Act 1971, S. 10(6), (7).
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expensive.
In the event of a decision to take action against an offending
46
ship, written notification of the charges must be provided. In the
case of a foreign vessel, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate must
send written notification to the consul or to the diplomatic repre-
47
sentative of the State involved. A further safeguard against abuse
of authority by the Maritime Directorate is provided by a provision
48
for appeal. There is not, however, in either these Regulations or
the British Act, a clause providing for compensation to the shipowner
49
in the event of unjustifiable interference with his vessel. This
is no doubt a legacy of the Convention which also contains no such
provision; as a practical matter, however, neither Norway nor the
U.K. (as maritime States sensitive to possible retaliation) is likely
to create a situation calling for a compensation clause.
The Sections of Chapter 12 concerned with the liability limita¬
tion provisions of the Convention and the creation of a Fund conform
closely to the international instruments. Pursuant to the Convention
provisions, the shipowner is entitled to limit his liability to 2,000
francs per ton of the ship's tonnage, not to exceed 210 million
46. S. 17 of the Regulations states that both the owner and the
master must be notified immediately. Notification must also
be sent to the police, customs and pilot authorities and, in
the case of Norwegian ships, to the ship's registrar.
47. S. 17.
48. Appeal is from a decision of the Maritime Directorate to the
superior Government organisation, the Ministry of Commerce and
Shipping. S. 18.
49. There is a provision in the Intervention Convention as
well as the U.K. and Norwegian implementing legislation.
507
50
francs. To avail himself of limited liability, the shipowner must
establish a fund at the court where the case is being heard."''1" Dis-
52
tribution of the fund is proportional, one who has paid compensation
has a right of subrogation against the fund,^ and the owner's claims
for reasonable expenses incurred for pollution prevention measures
54
are considered equally with other claims. When the owner has estab¬
lished his right to limit liability in accordance with the Convention,
no claim may be made against his property, nor may his ship be
arrested. In accordance with the Convention, claims may be made
directly against the insurer or other person having provided security
56
for the owner's liability.
i
In addition to the compensation available to a claimant under
those provisions of Chapter 12 which implement the Convention, a right
of compensation will become available to him pursuant to the Fund
57
Convention when that instrument comes into force. S. 277 provides
50. S. 270. Liability limitation is not available if the incident
occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner.





55. S. 272 (1). This protection also applies if the owner has consti¬
tuted a limitation fund in another State Party, provided that the
claimant has access to the court or other authority administering
the fund and this actually is accessible to him. S. 272(2).
56. S. 276(1). The insurer may avail himself of the protection af¬
forded by the owner's limitation fund or constitute a separate
fund. S. 276 (2).
57. S. 277(1). As of January 1977, the Fund Convention had
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that when the Fund becomes effective, it "will be enforced as law
in this state." In consequence, little provision was necessary
in Chapter 12 to set forth rights and duties. S. 278, concerned
58
with the contributions to the Fund and the "contributing oil"
upon which such dues are based, is perhaps the only remarkable
provision. This Section provides that not only is oil transported
by sea to Norway subject to assessment (as provided by Article 10(1)
of the Fund), but oil carried by other means is assessable as well,
if it is first transported by sea to a State not Party to the Fund.
Thus, oil landed in Sweden and transported by road or rail to Norway,
or oil piped from the U.K. to Norway would be "contributing oil"
even if neither State at which it was first landed were a Party to
the Fund. This safeguard against importers attempting to avoid the
imposition of a duty upon their goods would be understandable if it
sought to prevent an evasion likely to occur. Such an evasion is very
unlikely, for the reason that Norwegian oil will come primarily from
her continental shelf and be landed either directly by pipeline or
tanker, or come via the U.K. by tanker. Some imports from the Middle
East will remain necessary in order to supply the necessary "mix" of
petroleum, but this will also be landed directly in Norway by tanker.
Furthermore, most of Norway's neighbours (Denmark, Sweden and the U.K.)
59
have accepted the Fund Convention. Thus, the probability
sufficient ratifications but still required additional "con¬
tributing oil" to enter into force. See above, p. 246.
58. "Contributing Oil" means crude oil and fuel oil as defined by
the Fund Convention in Article 1(3). It is therefore a much
wider definition of oil than that which is the subject of the
Convention.
59. See Table X-4, p. 564. Finland has not accepted the Fund
Convention.
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of oil being transported to Norway other than by tanker from a State
non-Party to the Fund seems remote indeed.
D. The Nordic Convention on the Protection of the
Environment
The Convention on the Protection of the Environment, among
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, was given effect as law in Nor¬
way by the Act of 9 April 1976.^° This regional Convention in essence
provides persons injured in a State Party with a right to seek legal
and equitable relief in another State Party.
1. General provisions
61
Any person in one Contracting State or working on its conti-
62
nental shelf who is or may be injured by nuisance caused by environ-
63
mentally harmful activities in another Contracting State or on its
continental shelf may institute an action before the appropriate
60. The unofficial translation into English of this brief Act was
made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The Conven¬
tion appears at 13 International Legal Materials 591-597 (1974).
61. The broad scope of the term "person" compared to "national" or
even "resident" indicates that even a visitor to Norway would
benefit from the Convention.
62. Article 13 provides that the Convention applies to the contin¬
ental shelves of States Parties.
63. Article 1 provides that "environmentally harmful activities"
means the discharge from the soil, buildings or installations,
of wastes, gases or other substances, into watercourses, lakes
or the sea. The term also includes the use of land, the seabed,
buildings or installations in any other way which might cause a
nuisance by environmental pollution. An illustrative list of
ways in which such nuisance might be manifested is included.
Pursuant to an appended protocol, "discharges" under Article 1
are classified as environmentally harmful activities only if
the discharge entails or may entail a nuisance to the surround¬
ings. This addition increases a plaintiff's task by requiring
him to prove not only that a discharge has (or will) occur(red),
but that such discharge will cause actual or potential nuisance.
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court or administrative authority of the latter State:
1. To challenge the "permissibility" of such
activities.
2. To seek injunctive relief and/or damages.
3. To appeal against a decision of a ^
court or administrative authority.
Fair treatment by the defendant's court is sought to be assured by
provisions according the plaintiff the same rights of compensation
and equitable remedies as those accorded to legal entities of the
State in which the activities creating the nuisance are occurring.^
66
This extends to rights of appeal as well. , Despite this attempt
to ensure equality of treatment, it is possible for differing State
laws to produce dissimilar results. As the Convention contains no
provisions concerning applicable law, this will be determined by
the choice of laws rules of the forum. Should this procedure require
application of the laws of the place of damage, the result could
be less favourable to the plaintiff than were the injury in the forum
State.
2. Implementing machinery
Each State is required to appoint a "supervisory authority" as
6 7
trustee of a nuisance-free environment. The supervisory authority
is granted standing to institute proceedings or be heard by the appro¬
priate court or administrative authority of the nuisance-exporting






standing had the situation been reversed. This requirement of
reciprocity, reminiscent of the "optional clause" of the Statute of
69
the I.C.J., also applies to appeals.
Several Articles deal with communication among interested par¬
ties. Article 5 requires the "examining authority" (the court or ad¬
ministrative authority investigating the complaint) to forward copies
of relevant documents to the supervisory authority of the other State
if publication is required under the law of the forum and if he finds
that the activities complained of do or will entail "significant"
nuisance in "another" Contracting State.' The supervisory authority
in the plaintiff's State shall also be given adequate notice of appro¬
priate meetings and inspections, and he shall be kept informed of
71
relevant developments as well. The supervisory authority in the
defendant's State is required to publish relevant information in the
local newspaper or in some other suitable manner if in his opinion it
68. Article 4(2).
69. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(2):
"The states parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court "
70. The Convention contains no criteria for the evaluation of what
might be significant; in consequence, the examining author¬
ity is vested with very wide discretion to make this deter¬
mination. The use of the term "another" to describe the
Contracting State suggests that significant nuisance found
in such a State would invoke the obligations of this Article
even if it were not the State in which the plaintiff claimed
injury.
71. Article 5. The supervisory authority in the damaged State shall
likewise be provided with an opportunity to make an on-site
inspection "if necessary." The question of who determines the
necessity of such an inspection is left open.
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is necessary on account of public and private interests. In cases
in which the actual or possible nuisance would be "considerable" in
another Contracting State and the permissibility of the activities
is being considered by the appropriate Minister or Ministry of the
State in which they would be located, consultations between the two
73
Governments shall occur at the request of the former.
The Convention provides for arbitration by a seven-man Commission
at the request of either State in cases of such importance as to re-
74
quire consultation. The Commission, perhaps more accurately de¬
scribed as an "arbitral tribunal" in that it is an ad hoc body con¬
stituted for that limited purpose, consists of three members from each
State plus a chairman, who is appointed jointly by the parties and
75
the members. It is interesting, though probably of little practical
significance, that the parties, non-States, are accorded authority to
participate in the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. This unusual
provision certainly does not accord the parties status as subjects of
international law, but it is similar to the recent Conventions on
human rights in that it makes the distinction between individual and
State slightly less distinct than it was before. Perhaps more import¬
ant—and regrettable—is the omission of any provisions to ensure that
72. Article 7. The supervisory authority must also institute such
investigations of the effects in his own State as he thinks
necessary.
73. Article 11. Although there are no criteria provided for deter¬
mining what might be considered "considerable" nuisance, the
requirement that examination be in progress by the Government
or on the Ministerial level is an indication that the situation




the tribunal indeed comes into being even if one State refuses to
appoint its members within a reasonable time, or the members and
76
parties are unable or unwilling to agree upon a chairman. It may
77
well be that such safeguards are self-defeating generally and
unnecessary in this case in regard to the States which enjoy harmon¬
ious relations—but it must be remembered that a party may well wish
to take advantage of an opportunity to delay the proceedings or to
hold out for a chairman thought to be more sympathetic to his view.
3. Relation to civil liability from petroleum development
This Convention will facilitate equitable or legal action to
prevent, control, mitigate, or compensate for damage caused by opera¬
tions on the continental shelves of the States Parties. As a prac¬
tical matter, only Norway is affected by this provision because the
other Parties do not at present have significant oil development oper¬
ations on their continental shelves.
The treaty applies to damage caused on the continental shelf or
in the territory (including the territorial sea) of Contracting
States. Coastal oil pollution and debris dumped on the continental
shelf are clearly the sorts of damage contemplated by the Convention,
but other possible injuries are less clear. Tainting of fish by oil,
for example, would be covered by the Convention if the fish were in
the territorial sea at the time they were injured. On the other hand,
76. Cf. the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case in which the
refusal of one side to appoint members of an arbitral tribunal
prevented that method for the peaceful settlement of disputes
from functioning. I.C.J. Reports (1950), p. 65.
77. See Johnson, D.H.N., "The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal,"
30 British Yearbook of International Law 152-177 (1953).
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a fisherman who caught tainted fish on the high seas could not avail
himself of the Convention. A question yet to be resolved is whether
fish tainted on the high seas but caught in the territorial sea con-
78
stitute damage sustained in a Contracting State.
E. Conclusions
Norway is in the van of States which are changing the law of
compensation for marine pollution damage. The Norwegian view is that
even a careful entrepreneur ought to be responsible for the conse¬
quence of his speculative activity. Norway is restrained in mani¬
festing this philosophy by other States. This is particularly true
of global Conventions (for example, the 1969 Civil Liability Conven¬
tion) , but less true of regional agreements (the 1976 Convention, the
1974 Nordic Agreement). On the other hand, it is likely, in the
writer's view, that both the Norwegian position in Conferences and the
effect of such attitudes are influential indeed upon those States who
must consider similar questions in other fora.
78. Conversation with Byr§sjef Christian Hambro, Ministry of Environ-
Environment, 12 November 1976.
CHAPTER TEN
A MODEL LEGAL REGIME FOR THE NORTH SEA
A. Introduction
This chapter is composed of five main sections. This section
summarises conclusions concerning the present legal regime and
explains the writer's views concerning its deficiencies and possible
remedies. Section B compares the British and Norwegian approaches
to pollution control and compensation for damage and clean-up costs.
Sections C and D contain proposals for regimes to control and com¬
pensate for pollution in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors, and in the
North Sea, respectively. The writer's thoughts on the prospects for
more effective control of marine pollution from offshore petroleum
development both in the North Sea and elsewhere are set forth briefly
in the final section.
1. Conclusions concerning the present legal regime
a) causes and effects of marine pollution
The most likely cause of short-term environmental injury is a
massive tanker oil spill which reaches the coastline. This incident
is also the most obviously expensive in clean-up costs and property
damage. This conclusion suggests that tanker safety ought to be a
priority concern and that ratification of conventions promoting this
objective is indeed important. Moreover, the work of such organisations
as IMCO and the ILO should be offered every encouragement.
Two further conclusions have resulted from the investigation of
causes and effects of marine pollution. First, it is generally agreed
among scientists that we simply do not understand the long term effects
of pollutants in the marine environment. This is a source of partic¬
ular concern in regard to chronic discharges, such as those associated
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with the operations of installations or vessels. The second conclusion
follows from the first: although we are presently unable to predict
long-term effects of substances discharged into the marine environment,
the possibility that permanent damage is being done is a powerful
argument in favour of protective legislation even though the need for
protection cannot conclusively be proved. This is a factor which must
be considered in the determination of national and (to the extent that
it exists) international public policy.
b) the present legal regime of marine pollution control
Two basic conclusions emerge from the analysis of the present legal
regime of marine pollution control in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of
the North Sea. First, it is composed of independently developed com¬
ponents which remain uncoordinated. This is true both in the case of
comparative national legislation (for example, the differing standards
and enforcement provisions of U.K. and Norwegian law concerned with
installation construction and operation) and, more importantly, in
respect of the present legal regime per se. A complex of conventions,
agreements, informal understandings and voluntary arrangements is ad¬
ministered by a variety of inter-governmental, governmental and private
bodies. Distinctions are made according to substance, pathway into the
marine environment, and whether the act was accidental or intentional.
It makes a great deal of difference in compensation for damage suffered
whether the claimant is a Government or a private individual and whether
the claim is for property damage, damage to the environment, or clean-up
or prevention costs.
Two understandable but undesirable effects result from this legal
regime developed by evolution. The first effect is that there are gaps
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among the regulations; for example, it is provided that the coastal
State may interfere with a foreign flag vessel on the high seas to
prevent oil pollution, but there is no analogous provision in the
case of a vessel in imminent danger of collision with an offshore in¬
stallation. Another result of the present uncoordinated legal regime
is that insufficient control is exercised to prevent transfers of pol¬
lution from one source to another. For example, restrictions on ocean
dumping may cause undesirable forms of land disposal, burning oil to
protect beaches may cause air pollution, and the use of dispersants
to break up oil slicks may injure organisms in the water column. An
effective scheme of environmental protection should provide that the
possible transfer of pollution must be considered as part of the
decision making process.
The second conclusion resulting from analysis of the present
legal regime is that environmental protection is determined by a com¬
plex of societal values, not only by scientifically-determined need.
This conclusion was particularly evident in the attitudes of the U.K.
and Norwegian delegations to the Inter-governmental Conference on the
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore
Operations. For reasons discussed in connection with the 1976 Con¬
vention, the U.K. delegation favoured an instrument which would permit
rapid exploitation of her offshore petroleum resources; Norway was
more concerned with the integral reparation for pollution damage.
This illustration is an apt reminder that any proposal for the control
of marine pollution from offshore petroleum development must consider
many factors—technical, economic, social and political as well as
scientific.
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2. Recommendations for an improved legal regime
a) immediate action
Just as it may be necessary to provide legal protection for the
environment before it is clear what form that protection ought to
assume, so the need for immediate action suggests that initial con¬
cern ought to be with regulation which is uncontroversial. Where
protection can be effected by separate agreement, partial agreement
to a more comprehensive instrument, or an informal arrangement, the
opportunity to effect that protection ought to be seized immediately.
This approach does, however, require vigilance to prevent what is
accepted as a minimum first measure from becoming enshrined as the
ultimate standard.
b) North Sea management
The North Sea is an irreplaceable asset which, though "belonging"
to no State, is in effect the mare nostrum of its littoral States who
exercise sovereign rights over its continental shelf and use it most
intensively. Petroleum development is a subordinate "wasting asset"
of the North Sea. A few decades from now the petroleum assets of the
North Sea are likely to be insignificant. Emphasis will be on other
uses of the area; it is suggested that two very important uses will
be fishing and the placement of nuclear power plants for energy pro¬
duction. Fishing may become far more important than it is now if
rising global population increases the demand for (and value of) food.
It is the writer's view that offshore nuclear power plants, such as
those proposed for the U.S.,^" offer such advantages (cooling water,
1. See, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Coastal
Effects of Offshore Energy Systems, an Assessment of Oil and
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isolation from potential radiation victims and from terrorists) that
they may well be adopted by the North Sea States to replace petroleum-
fired generating capacity. It is essential that the North Sea be
managed towards objectives agreed upon by all the littoral States,
c) characteristics of an ideal legal regime for the North Sea
i) the requirement that it be comprehensive
A comprehensive legal regime would include all aspects of sea use
planning. The control of marine pollution would be determined in
accordance with overall objectives and would be coordinated with con¬
trol of land and air pollution. Because pollution control depends
on multiple factors and affects the interdependent parts of the en¬
vironment, it is suggested that a comprehensive legal regime is neces¬
sary for optimum pollution control.
ii) basic tasks: standards, enforcement, compensation for injury
Standards for discharges, vessel construction, etc. should be
set by a central authority and be based on scientifically determined
need and coordinated with North Sea management objectives. Regional
standards for petroleum development should be harmonized to the extent
practicable with international standards and those of other regions.
Regional standards for vessels--especially construction and manning
requirements—should be set in accordance with the international law
lex lata. The North Sea States, perhaps acting through the central
authority, should attempt to gain "special area" status for the North
Sea, should the RSNT provisions in this regard be adopted.
An ideal legal regime would break new ground in providing for
Gas Systems, Deepwater Ports, and Nuclear Powerplants off the
Coast of New Jersey and Delaware, Vols. I and II, Washington,
D.C. (1976).
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reciprocal inspection and enforcement and would include a multi¬
national police force. North Sea States, recognising their common
interest in ensuring conformity to agreed standards and trusting to
mutual bona fides and formal safeguards, should agree to exchange
inspection and enforcement rights in respect of both vessels and
installations. Each State would be empowered to exercise tne same
rights in respect of other North Sea State vessels and installations
as it could exercise in the case of its own vessels and installations.
Moreover, a multi-national police force should be established with
the responsibility of dealing with enforcement of regime standards
at sea, law enforcement on installations and vessels in emergencies
until relieved by the Controlling State, and the prevention of terror¬
ism. It is recognised that, especially with regard to the exercise
2
of national police powers, this concept is revolutionary indeed.
Nonetheless, it is suggested that the economic advantages of combin¬
ation inherent in such a proposal (such as prorated patrolling costs)
would provide an incentive sufficient to permit acceptance of the
scheme.
An ideal legal regime should provide for integral reparation in
the event of pollution damage to persons or the environment. This
2. One writer has listed five of the rare examples of international
sea policing: 1) The Hague Convention of 6 May 1G82 (as amended
in 1955) among Belgium, Denmark, France, the U.K., the Nether¬
lands, and Germany (relating to the policing of fisheries). 2)
The Hague Convention of 16 November 1887 among the same States
(relating to the abolition of liquor trading in the North Sea
among fishermen). 3) The 1884 Paris Convention on submarine
cables. 4) Provisions prohibiting slave trade. 5) The regu¬
lation in the Geneva High Seas Convention concerning piracy.
Breuer, G., "Case Study on Technical Management of the North
Sea," 5 Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute 270-276,
University of Rhode Island (1970).
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objective would require that North Sea investment decisions include
the cost of insurance. Liability for damage and clean-up costs
should be absolute and unlimited. A claimant should not have to
prove property loss in order to obtain compensation; it should be
sufficient that he prove loss of income resulting from the diminution
of natural resources or that funds are necessary for environmental
3
restoration. A Fund constituted from contributions based on hazard¬
ous activities (for example, petroleum transfer) should be available
to compensate victims if the defendant is unable to do so or if there
is no identifiable defendant. Monies from the Fund should also be
used to support research and development in connection with the pres¬
ervation of the environment.
iii) possible legislative and administrative bodies
The creation and administration of a legal regime to protect the
North Sea could be entrusted to one or more of the following: the
coastal State, the flag State, the port State, and/or an authority.
The need to harmonise the law of environmental protection in order to
proceed efficiently towards mutually defined objectives may be best
3. Several Bills being considered by the U.S. Congress contain such
provisions. For example, S. 2666 (Bidden) (94th Congress, 1st
Session, 13 November 1975) provides that a victim may claim for
"any loss of income or impairment of earning capacity due to
damages to real or personal property, including natural resources,
without regard to ownership of such property or resources, that
is damaged or destroyed by a discharge of oil, if the claimant
derives at least 50 per centum of his earnings from activities
which utilize the property or natural resources." S. 3(7)(C).
A Fund constituted from fees levied on oil transfers may be used
for "research into methods for preventing, containing, and re¬
moving discharges of oil" in addition to providing compensation
for injury. S. 7 (b) (D). See also S. 521 (Jackson), S. 1754
(Magnuson), S. 2162 (Magnuson, at the request of the Administra¬
tion) , H.R. 6218 (Murphy), H.R. 9293 (Sulivan, at the request of
the Administration), and H.R. 10756 (Studds).
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fulfilled by the creation of a central authority to set agreed
standards. The most desirable form of enforcement is a more difficult
issue.
The central arguments both for and against coastal State en¬
forcement of agreed standards concern its perceived self-interest in
undertaking that activity. On the one hand, it can be argued that
the coastal State is the most interested in the environmental protec¬
tion of its adjacent waters, and is in the best geographical position
to do so. Conversely, it has been pointed out by critics of coastal
State enforcement that the coastal State may view "work to rule" en¬
forcement as desirable, perhaps to encourage commerce and energy
production.
The case for flag State jurisdiction in the case of vessels
rests almost entirely on the freedom of the seas doctrine of which it
is an integral part. The principal defect of this type of enforce¬
ment, mala fides prosecution by the flag State, would probably not
be a major problem among a small group of North Sea States. However,
even assuming that this responsibility is fulfilled in a conscientious
manner, the flag State may be so remote from the site of the act that
its good intentions are without effect.
Conferring jurisdiction to enforce vessel pollution control
standards on the State in whose port the suspected vessel arrives
offers the substantial advantages of minimal interference with navig¬
ation and early access to evidence (for example, the Oil Record Book
and the residues present in the vessel's tanks). On the debit side,
it has been observed that unless port State responsibility for enforce¬
ment is made mandatory (perhaps shared with another of the possible
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bodies which would also be obligated to prosecute an alleged offender
transferred to it by the port State), the port State may view lax
enforcement as in its best commercial interests.
The final suggested possibility is to vest authority and respons¬
ibility for standard enforcement in a regional authority agreed upon
by the North Sea States. The authority could inspect vessels in the
ports of the North Sea States using its own personnel or delegate the
authority to undertake this task to the coastal State (with checks to
prevent such delegation from becoming de facto coastal State juris¬
diction) or to an independent body (such as a vessel classification
society). However, the most significant possible advantage from
vesting authority and responsibility for enforcement in a central
authority is the opportunity to create a multi-national police force.
It is also the most difficult to realise. The advantages of a multi¬
national police force to enforce agreed standards at sea may be dis¬
tilled into a single word: efficiency. Even under an agreed scheme
of reciprocal enforcement at sea a great deal of duplication is inev¬
itable. Each State must decide, on the basis of its own public policy,
how much to invest in standards enforcement, what equipment to use, the
area to patrol, etc. This is a far less efficient arrangement than a
multi-national police force which could be designed to advance North
Sea management objectives and realise considerable savings from econ¬
omies of scale. It would be possible to combine several duties now
done by various subdivisions of North Sea State Governments, such as
pollution prevention, safety of vessels and installations, fishery
protection, and prevention of terrorism on installations. Unfortunate¬
ly, the creation of such a body would entail a considerable relinquish-
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ment of sovereignty, and it has been pointed out that there are only
five rather unpersuasive precedents for an international oceanic police
force.^
iv) the role of private agreements
It was concluded in Chapter Five that although private agreements
have served a useful function their interest is in furthering corporate
rather than public policy objectives. Nevertheless, the industrial
concerns which dominate the petroleum industry employ sophisticated
management techniques to utilise their considerable resources. A North
Sea authority (or North Sea States individually) could well employ this
expertise to attain its (or their) own managerial objectives. The
crucial issue is how to employ efficient corporate machinery to under¬
take tasks which are likely to be at odds with corporate objectives.
It is suggested that a general answer to this is, "make North Sea
management objectives corporate objectives." This may be accomplished
by ensuring that definition of those objectives is the exclusive prov¬
ince of the North Sea authority (or the several States), but leaving
the means to accomplish those objectives with industry. Two problems
may be encountered in pursuing this strategy.
First, as has been concluded, standard setting is not determined
solely on the basis of scientifically determined need, and industrial
lobbying in various forms is clearly one of several additional influ¬
ences. Moreover, while setting of environmental protection standards
without scientifically indicated need may be necessary, North Sea
planners must consider that the cost of complying with standards will
4. Breuer, G., loc. cit. in footnote 2.
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be carefully considered in corporate boardrooms. It may well be
that this supports the case for national oil companies (which, like
other nationalised industry can be subsidised in the interest of
public policy); however, those companies which must make a profit
to stay in business may be tempted to curtail or abandon operations
if standards are thought to be arbitrary and unwarranted.
The second obstacle is that technology is a critical factor in
determining the law of marine pollution control, and that the pace,
direction and extent of technology are determined in large part by
the petroleum industry. The role of Government and independent re¬
search institutions is crucial, then, if petroleum interests are not
to usurp State authority to set standards by the indirect method of
determining what is and is not "practicable." It is suggested that
a possible solution would be for the North Sea authority (and/or the
several States) to invite bids for the solution of technological prob¬
lems. For example, the authority might invite bids for the design
and construction of oily-water separators capable of a specified per¬
formance from any individual or institution, public or private. It
is submitted that this competition would provide the North Sea author¬
ity with a basis for the establishment of standards as well as stimu¬
late the advancement of pollution control technology,
v) the role of the individual
What role ought the individual to play in an ideal legal regime
of pollution control? The view in the U.K. is that the Government,
the democratically constituted representative of the people, is cap¬
able of assuring that environmental considerations are part of public
policy and that the integrity of the environment is preserved. In
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fact, it is asserted, conferring standing on an individual to be
heard in relation to an action that does not affect his property
5
interests is conducive to vexatious litigation. The Norwegian
practice also tends to discourage individual or class actions by
aggrieved individuals who do not have a direct proprietorial inter¬
est in the protested action. Individuals tend, therefore, to resort
to political rather than judicial remedies.
It is submitted that an ideal legal regime for the North Sea
would include provisions for an individual to make representations
before the central authority, even if his property interests were not
affected. Any individual, whether or not a North Sea State national,
would be entitled to bring a matter to the attention of the authority
ab initio and to be heard during proceedings concerning North Sea
pollution prevention. It is suggested that should a significant num¬
ber of representations without merit (in the opinion of the authority)
burden that body, a bond be required. It is suggested that the indiv¬
idual provides a necessary check on industry and Government. It is
well known that the regulator and the regulated frequently develop an
identity of interests which inhibits the former in the performance of
its responsibilities. In the case of the offshore development of
5. Conversation with Mr. J. Ashley, U.K. Department of the
Environment, lO June 1976.
6. Conversation with Professor Ottar Brox, Member of the Storting,
3 November 1976. Professor Brox, a minority party representa¬
tive, contends that special interest groups, including environ¬
mentalists, can make their views felt more strongly through
minority parties than by using the courts. As the Norwegian
Labour Government needs the cooperation of minority parties, it
is responsive to their views. This view was expressed to the
writer by several other Norwegians in public and private
capacities.
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petroleum, the interchange of personnel between Government and
industry suggests that this is a circumstance which must be partic¬
ularly guarded against.
d) self interest: an obstacle to an ideal legal regime
for the North Sea
It is well known that the closer to a State's perceived "vital
interests" an issue is, the less likely that State is to agree to an
"infringement of its sovereign rights" in order to permit compromise
7
with other States. It is the writer's view that, although this axiom
is widely recognised, it is frequently absent from proposals for
international cooperation. Law, no less than politics (from which
it is frequently indistinguishable), is the art of the possible. The
model legal regime suggested in this chapter is intended to be useful.
This objective is more likely to be fulfilled by a proposal which is
realistic than one which is Utopian, and compromises have been made
accordingly.
el a suggested approach to a model legal regime
for the North Sea
i) build on existing agreements and institutions
The use of existing institutions and agreements has much to
recommend it as a first step. This is particularly the case with con¬
ventions: North Sea pollution control would be greatly strengthened
if all the littoral States could be persuaded to ratify existing
international agreements. Table X-4 on pages 546-547 tabulates North
Sea State acceptance of certain international conventions.
ii) employ successive approximations to an ideal legal regime
While it is recognised that States consider marine pollution
7. See Cheng, B., "Centrifugal Tendencies in Air Law," 10 Current
Legal Problems 200-228 (1957).
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control as only part of a total public policy, it is an objective
of this thesis to point out that it is an important part. It is
suggested that States will find it easier to accept a proposed legal
regime if it can be adopted in steps, rather than as a complex
"package deal" as is being attempted at UNCLOS III. It is recognised
that this approach may be criticised because: 1) it reduces the
opportunities to "trade" positions on various issues and therefore
inhibits compromise, and 2) a piecemeal approach may not only produce
an uncoordinated result, but may create a regime likely to delay or
prevent the establishment of a more comprehensive legal regime if
States consider that no further action is necessary. The writer is
not persuaded by these arguments. In rebuttal, it may be observed
that time is a crucial factor. Establishment of a comprehensive legal
regime is not only desirable—it is necessary, but the design and con¬
struction of an effective scheme is likely to take years, despite the
common interests and mutual goodwill among the North Sea States. During
this period it is desirable that certain minimal interim measures of
protection be implemented. It is not beyond the competence of North
Sea States to agree on such measures pending the completion of a legal
regime designed expressly to implement North Sea management objectives.
It is proposed that the first step concentrate on bilateral agree¬
ments between the U.K. and Norway. There are two reasons for this
approach. First, it is self-evident that bilateral agreement is more
easily achieved than its multilateral counterpart: there are fewer
divergent interests and the machinery of agreement (for example, voting
procedure, ratification, etc.) is far simpler. Moreover, bilateral
agreement may be selected by default and expanded, as it was in the
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case of international carriage by air (in which a network of bilateral
agreements now serves the function intended for amultilateral agree¬
ment which was not concluded).
The second argument for an initial phase involving only the
U.K. and Norway is that insofar as control of pollution from offshore
petroleum development is concerned, nearly all North Sea activity
would be subject to such a regime. Of course, this may change, and
it is recognised that jurisdiction to regulate vessel-source pollution
would be limited to the two flag States plus vessels indirectly con¬
trolled through the offshore licensee. This would also be true, though
to a lesser extent, in the case of a regional agreement.
The second step towards a desired legal regime is to expand the
U.K. - Norway regime in both geographical and material scope. It
is proposed that a regional regime to control North Sea pollution be
created. A regional scheme is the smallest in geographical scope
which could be truly effective. The importance of expanding the
material scope of pollution control as well is amply illustrated by
considering the contribution to North Sea pollution made by the Rhine.
A regional agreement is, in the writer's view, a desirable arrangement
to control North Sea pollution because it is extensive enough geograph¬
ically to control most pollutants affecting the area, yet of a size
permitting comparatively efficient management. Relatively common
interests among the North Sea States would be an advantage in decision
making.
A regional agreement, though suggested as the best approach to
North Sea management, may influence pollution control outside that
area in two ways. First, it is suggested that cooperative links with
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other regional schemes (for example, the Baltic) are a natural
development of the regional approach. Each regional authority would
retain authority and responsibility for its own geographic area, but
inter-regional agreement on standards and enforcement could prove
desirable, and certainly sharing of information of common interest
would further mutual goals. The second way in which regional arrange¬
ments may influence events beyond their geographic sphere is that a
regional approach may become adopted by other regions or by the world
community. It has been pointed out that the general acceptance of a
200 mile EEZ of some sort is the result of the Latin American approach
0
to coastal State control of an extended offshore zone. A North Sea
authority would thus have an opportunity to influence the control of
global marine pollution.
B. Assessment of the Present Legal Regime
This section summarises the U.K. and Norwegian approaches to the
control of marine pollution from installations, vessels, and dumping,
as well as the respective laws governing compensation for pollution
damage and clean-up costs. See Table X-l on the following page.
1. Control of operational discharges from offshore
installations
a) United Kingdom
The United Kingdom requires that offshore operators use the best
practicable means available to reduce the oil content of discharged
effluent. Although the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 prohibits
8. Hardy, M., "Regional Approaches to Law of the Sea Problems: The
European Community," 24 International and Comparative Law Quar¬
terly 336-348 (1975), at p. 327.
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the discharge of effluent with any oil content, production platforms
generate operational oily water. Present oily water separation equip¬
ment cannot completely separate the two liquids; in consequence, the
Department of Energy has decided to permit such discharges subject
to a "best practicable" standard.
Enforcement of these standards is dependent to a large extent
upon the cooperation of the offshore operator. Inspectors from the
Departments of Energy and Trade visit offshore installations at least
twice a year and check oily water separators and other pollution
prevention equipment as part of their duties. The basic approach is
to check the relevant equipment and to ensure that the operator knows
that he will be held responsible for complying with the law.
b) Norway
The Norwegian approach to control of operational discharges from
offshore installations is indistinguishable from that of the U.K.
This is surprising, because the Norwegians are thought by many obser¬
vers to manifest intense concern with environmental protection in
detailed and specific regulations. In fact, there are no published
discharge standards for operational discharges of oil from Norwegian
production installations. As is the case in the U.K., Government
policy is to require the use of the best available technology (consid¬
ering economic and other factors) and to discuss permissible opera¬
tional discharges with the operator. Inspectors from the Petroleum
Directorate and the Ministry of Environment check compliance with this
requirement but, as in the case of the U.K., a great deal of reliance




The problems of consequence associated with control of operation¬
al discharges from offshore petroleum development are scientific,
technological and organisational rather than legal. Both Governments
see the issue of oily water discharges from production platforms as
comparatively minor and so it is, when compared to such possible
sources of marine pollution as blowouts or tanker accidents. Never¬
theless, it is of great importance that the long-term effects of
chronic oil discharges from production platforms in the North Sea be
determined with greater precision in order that a more rational
calculus of risk becomes possible.
The technological limits of oily water separators determine
legal standards. It is therefore important to guard against the
possibility that offshore operators can determine standards because
they effectively control the pace of technological development. Gov¬
ernment and private institutions are needed to engage in competitive
research.
in neither the U.K. nor Norway is there a clearly defined
responsibility for the monitoring and enforcement of operational
discharges from offshore petroleum development. In the U.K., the
Department of Energy has general responsibility for enforcing the
discharge standards from offshore installations. However, the Depart¬
ment of Trade also has responsibilities in this area, and it may be
that the DOT will assume all or part of the responsibility for en¬
forcing oily water separation standards.
Following a major reorganisation in Norway, it appears that the
Ministry of Environment (or its subordinate department, the State
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Pollution Control Authority) will be responsible for operational
discharges from offshore installations—but this is not clear. The
Petroleum Directorate is responsible for most installation standards
and procedures, and has a corps of inspectors to enable fulfilment
of that function. It is possible that the Petroleum Directorate will
be entrusted with the task of checking compliance with oily water
separation requirements in addition to its existing functions which
include inspection of installation pollution prevention equipment.
In the writer's view, placing responsibility for enforcement of
operational discharge standards in a department whose primary respons¬
ibility is to promote the production of energy raises potential con¬
flict of interest problems. In considering such a subjective criter¬
ion as "best practicable/available technology" there is a danger that
compromises which must be made will be unduly weighted in favour of
a department's central concern. The appropriate department with
responsibility for environmental protection ought to enforce standards
the raison d'etre of which is pollution control. The compromises
necessary to resolve conflicting objectives pursued by various depart¬
ments ought not to be entrusted to one of the contestants, but to be
determined according to United Kingdom and Norwegian public policy.
2. Control of accidental discharges from offshore
installations
a) United Kingdom
It is sought to prevent accidental discharges from seabed opera¬
tions by requiring that installations meet certain safety requirements
and that the licensee comply with Model Clauses contained in his lic¬
ence. The Mineral Workings (Offshore Operations) Act 1971 provides
the authority for a number of detailed Regulations concerned with
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installation safety. The basic difference between the U.K. and
Norwegian approaches is in the use of classification societies. The
U.K. has designated a number of classification societies not only to
inspect offshore installation, but to set standards as well. In this
respect, the U.K. approach treats installations like vessels. Norway,
on the other hand, employs Det Norske Veritas primarily for inspec¬
tion, most standards being set by the Petroleum Directorate.
The U.K., unlike Norway, makes extensive use of Model Clauses
in licences to require safety equipment and safe working practices.
Those of particular relevance to this thesis concern drilling opera¬
tions and the abandonment of wells. Enforcement of requirements in¬
tended to prevent accidental pollution from offshore operations is
the responsibility of the Department of Trade and the Department of
Energy, which use their own inspectors as well as receiving reports
from the classification societies,
b) Norway
Norwegian legislation related to control of accidental pollution
from offshore operations is contained in the 1975 and 1976 Decrees,
concerned with exploration and production, respectively. As observed
in the discussion of these instruments earlier, although a great deal
of material formerly contained in the Decree relating to drilling has
been relegated to Regulations, a substantial amount of detail remains.
This is in part because standards are actually set by the Petroleum
Directorate rather than the classification societies, and because
Model Clauses are not used as extensively as they are by the U.K.
Enforcement is by Petroleum Directorate inspectors, as well as by the
classification society, Det Norske Veritas.
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c) conclusion
The writer is not competent to comment on the relative merits
of safety standards contained in U.K. and Norwegian legislation.
However, it may be appropriate briefly to consider their divergent
approaches.
Norway has chosen to develop Governmental capacity to set and
enforce standards relating to the safety of offshore installations.
The Petroleum Directorate therefore has direct control of an activity
for which it is responsible.
However, delegation to classification societies of authority
to set and enforce standards certainly does not imply abdication of
responsibility by the U.K. Department of Trade. The DOT has, very
wisely in the writer's view, merely decided to contract for expert
services rather than develop essentially parallel resources. The U.K.
approach thus places considerable stock in the maritime experience
of classification societies as a foundation upon which to construct
the new framework of norms designed to prevent accidents. The DOT
of course remains responsible, while removal of the task from the
Department reduces the possibility that compromises may be made for
economic or political reasons.
The fund of experience which both the U.K. and Norway are accum¬
ulating will permit more specific requirements when they are found
to be necessary. For example, the "good oilfield practice" standard
may be difficult to improve upon as a means to control activities
subject to rapid change or those which defy compartmentalisation, for
example, creation of a duty to control a blowout as quickly as poss¬
ible. On the other hand, it may be discovered in time that equipment
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must be specified, or that certain organisational structure is
necessary to effectively cope with emergencies.
3. Control of operational discharges from vessels
a) United Kingdom
The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 applies the 1969 IMCO
Amendments to British ships on a voluntary basis. British ships out¬
side U.K. waters in the North Sea must therefore comply with both the
1969 Amendments (the litres per mile formula) and the IMCO Convention
as amended in 1962 (which makes the North Sea a "prohibited area").
Within U.K. waters no oil of any kind may be discharged.
There is at present no U.K. law controlling operational dis¬
charges of light oils, outside U.K. waters or of chemicals anywhere.
Such discharges will be controlled pursuant to the 1973 IMCO Conven¬
tion when that instrument comes into force. Although the U.K. intends




Norwegian vessels are currently regulated by the IMCO Convention
as amended in 1962, and will soon be bound by the 1969 Amendments.
The prohibition on oily discharges into Norwegian waters is limited
to the oils and vessels to which the IMCO Convention applies.
There is no Norwegian law regulating the operational discharge
of refined oils or chemicals from vessels. However, Norway intends
to ratify the 1973 IMCO Convention, and a Draft Act to enable ratifi¬
cation was planned to be complete at the end of 1976.
9. Conversation with Mr. Capel, Department of Trade, 28 March 1977.
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c) conclusion
Operational discharges of persistent oil from tankers engaged in
the transportation of North Sea petroleum does not appear to the
writer to pose a potentially serious problem. Both U.K. and Norweg¬
ian tankers will soon be bound by the 1969 Amendments which are
generally thought to be quite effective in preventing pollution of
the sea by persistent oil. It is planned to continue the use of
dedicated tankers fitted with segregated ballast tanks which charac¬
terised the initial Ekofisk operation so that there should be virtually
no operational discharges of oil from this source. The control of
foreign flag vessels not engaged in North Sea operations and outside
the U.K. and Norwegian territorial seas is likely to remain subject
to exclusive flag State jurisdiction until it is replaced by an EEZ
which includes some form of coastal State authority to control
vessel-source pollution.
It is a cause for serious concern that as yet there is no regul¬
ation of operational discharges of petroleum-related cargoes, such as
refined oils and petro-chemicals. Both the U.K. and Norway have
ambitious plans for the development of coastal petro-chemical com¬
plexes to process North Sea oil. There can be little doubt that much
of this projected production is intended for export, that it will be
transported by tanker, and that this will result in a different kind
of risk for the North Sea. Apart from the issue of accidents (dis¬
cussed below), it should be observed that tankers returning to U.K.
and Norwegian ports (probably from Europe or North America) may well
be "in ballast" and, unless fitted with segregated tanks or retaining
cargo on board, will have to discharge contaminated water somewhere.
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It is not only irresponsible, but probably contrary to international
customary law to permit tank washing in mid-Atlantic. It is sub¬
mitted that plans for the development of petro-chemical complexes
must include adequate reception facilities as part of the projected
cost. As discussed earlier, there are a number of difficult problems
associated with the 1973 IMCO Convention, and it is unlikely to come
into force soon. Nevertheless, both the U.K. and Norway could apply
the Convention to their own ships voluntarily. Reception facilities
would be a sine qua non to such action.
Enforcement of the present and proposed IMCO Conventions is de¬
pendent upon inspecting entries in a vessel's Oil Record Book. In
the U.K., Department of Trade inspectors make periodic inspections of
vessels in port to monitor compliance. The Maritime Directorate per¬
forms a similar function in Norwegian ports. Few authorities think
that the system is foolproof; clearly a system which depends upon
the subject of regulation to record his own behaviour is subject to
abuse. It is submitted that the establishment of adequate reception
facilities would complement the planned use of dedicated tankers
fitted with segregated ballast tanks to help minimise operational
discharges of liquid cargoes in the North Sea.
4. Control of accidental discharges from vessels
Limitations of time and space have precluded consideration in
this thesis of laws intended to reduce vessel accidents. As major
maritime nations, both the U.K. and Norway are parties to a number
of international agreements concerned with vessel safety, for example
the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea convention,''"0 the 1972 IMCO Collision
10. Cmnd. 2812 (1965). See also the Resolutions to amend the 1960
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Regulations^ which will become effective shortly, and several ILO
12
conventions relevant to pollution control. The U.K. and Norwegian
13
merchant fleets enjoy excellent safety records, but of course
accidents may also occur to foreign flag vessels engaged in petrol¬
eum development work in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North
Sea. The writer found British and Norwegian officials somewhat
reluctant to comment on control of such vessels through the licensees
although it was indicated that this is done to some extent.
The 1973 IMCO Convention sets vessel construction requirements
which are designed to minimise the effect of maritime casualties on
the marine environment. Although neither State has legislation which
requires its vessels to comply with the 1973 Convention, both the U.K.
and Norway now apply the 1971 IMCO "Tanks Amendment" to new vessels.
The U.K. and Norway are also both Parties to the Intervention
Convention, the only instrument discussed in this thesis dealing
specifically with the control of marine pollution associated with a
maritime casualty. It is noteworthy that the Norwegian Regulations
depart from the Convention in that they authorise action when there
is "imminent danger of a marine casualty" rather than "following upon
a maritime casualty." Norwegian authorities are thus authorised to
act much more effectively than their British counterparts. Although
SOLAS Convention, Cmnd. 5647, 5648 (1974).
11. Cmnd. 5471 (1976).
12. A recent example (not in force) is the Convention Concerning
Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships. See also International
Labour Organisation, Substandard Vessels, Particularly those
Registered under Flags of Convenience, Reports V(l) and V(2)
(1976).
13. The Economist (12-18 March 1977), p. 81.
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the provision is of questionable legality it is suggested that this
only reflects the global trend to increased coastal State jurisdic-
14
tion over foreign vessels thought to pose pollution danger. It is
the writer's view that British authorities would be likely to act
when there is "imminent danger of a marine casualty" even without
express authority to do so and, consequently, that there is no prac¬
tical difference between the British and Norwegian law concerned with
intervention with foreign vessels on the high seas.
5. Control of debris dumping from installations
and vessels
a) United Kingdom
Dumping of debris, drilling mud, etc. from installations and
vessels is not included within the Dumping at Sea Act 1974 if it is
"incidental" to normal operations. However, the Oslo Commission Draft
Resolution has provided a framework for States Parties to consider
certain offshore petroleum development activities as an integral part
of normal operations and therefore within its scope. The U.K. will
implement this Draft Resolution under the Dumping at Sea Act 1974,
which is of wide enough scope to accommodate this interpretation with¬
out amendment. It will also be recalled that Model Clauses contained
in licences authorising offshore petroleum development contain speci¬
fic requirements relating to the control of activities which could
cause marine pollution, as well as the general provision that the
licensee observe "good oilfield practice" in carrying on operations.
14. The U.K. Voluntary application of the 1969 IMCO Amendments to
its vessels is another example of an act by a North Sea State
likely to hasten the development of the international law of
marine pollution control.
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Control of debris dumping from supply vessels is particularly
difficult. The U.K. approach has been to work through the offshore
operator to make personnel aware of the consequences of such disposal.
The efforts of the Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group to
resolve this problem is an approach which merits watching. It may
well be that negotiation and compromise among the competing users of
the North Sea is a better approach than the imposition of a legal
framework.
b) Norway
The control of debris dumping in the Norwegian sector is
approached in a manner similar to that employed in the British sector.
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate has made it clear to offshore
operators that debris dumping is illegal and that they may be prosec¬
uted for offences. However, despite enacted and proposed laws to
«
facilitate enforcement (for example, it is required that supply vessel
cargo be marked; it is proposed that supply vessels and/or loading
and receiving points be required to maintain a cargo record book), it
is recognised that education of offshore workers may be the best
approach.
c) conclusion
The major difference between the U.K. and Norwegian approaches
to debris dumping control is the existence of the Fisheries and Off¬
shore Oil Consultative Group which is concerned with damage caused in
the U.K. sector. Norway also has a compensation scheme, but it is
administered and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries. It
is suggested that, as the cost of compensation (including administra¬
tion expense) ought to be borne by those responsible for damage, and
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as the competing users of the area ought to be provided a forum for
the resolution of their differences, the U.K. approach offers greater
promise of success.
6. Compensation for damage caused by petroleum development
The compensation schemes set out in Table V-l on pages 252-253
apply, with the exception of the Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consulta¬
tive Group, to both the U.K. and Norway. It will be observed that
there is no provision for compensation for damage caused by petroleum
products and dangerous chemicals. This is a significant deficiency
which ought to be corrected.
7. Assessment of the present legal regime
Both the U.K. and Norway are making bona fide efforts to protect
the North Sea from pollution caused by petroleum development and, in
the writer's view, there are no substantial reasons to prefer one
system over the other. Nevertheless, the present legal regime which
results from the two systems could and should be improved upon. The
major weaknesses of the North Sea regime lex lata are in part the
consequence of the present international law of the sea and in part
caused by unplanned evolution,
a) diversity of installation standards
The independent development of standards for offshore installa¬
tions has resulted in a certain amount of diversity. Lack of uniform
standards in regard to construction of production platforms is not as
important as it is in the case of mobile platforms which may become
subject to various jurisdictions. Nevertheless, from the point of
view of pollution control, it is important that some agreement be
reached on permissible operational discharges, for oil and other
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pollutants may also cross jurisdictional boundaries. The writer has
been assured by Government officials that differing standards have
not caused problems in the Frigg complex which straddles the U.K. -
Norwegian boundary line. It is thought, however, that a gradual
adoption of uniform standards in such fields would make inspection
and detection of safety and pollution problems both cheaper and more
accurate.
b) enforcement problems
The major enforcement problems are,1) control of foreign flag
vessels for the purpose of pollution prevention and, 2) the cost of
offshore patrolling. Both are likely to be resolved in time by the
evolution of international law and technology, but it is questionable
whether North Sea protection can wait.
c) the need for scientific data
Science must answer the question of necessary environmental
protection. Although ICES, NATO, the EEC and other bodies have been
active in investigating the causes and effects of North Sea pollution,
much additional work is needed. It is an unfortunate consequence of
fragmented North Sea continental shelf jurisdiction that no central
organisation is responsible for providing information upon which
management decisions of a superior authority would be based.
d) the need for coordination
Coordination of the many departments within each Government as
well as at the inter-Governmental level remains a formidable task.
Mrs. Elizabeth Young has written a number of papers concerned with
the need for U.K. reorganisation in order to permit efficient use of
British oceanic resources. Certainly this need was made evident to
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the writer during research for this thesis—and not only in the U.K.
As has been mentioned earlier, a substantial reorganisation and re¬
assignment of responsibility and authority for marine pollution
control occurred in the Norwegian Government in 1976. At the very
minimum a standing committee is necessary to consider problems of
North Sea use on both the national and regional levels. The North
Sea is an invaluable asset that should be managed--not squandered by
ad hoc individual decisions.
C. A Model Legal Regime for the United Kingdom and
Norwegian Sectors
The primary recommendation in this section is that existing con¬
ventions be adopted and that the U.K. and Norway cooperate in en¬
forcing the standards thus agreed upon. Particular emphasis is
placed on the prevention of pollution from vessel accidents, the most
likely source of a major oil spill, and the control of chemicals and
other hazardous substances. See Table X-2 on the following pages.
1. Control of operational discharges from installations
It is proposed that, pending a multilateral agreement, the U.K.
and Norway informally agree to cooperate in investigating the stand¬
ards necessary to protect the marine environment from chronic dis¬
charges of oil and other substances from offshore installations, and
to improve the technology available to control such discharges. A
standing committee composed of representatives from both States could
profitably discuss the control of operational discharges from plat¬
forms, exchanging ideas and information, and agree on compatible (and
to the extent practicable, uniform) standards and procedures. An
initial task would be to promote additional research into the problem
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of oily water separation. It is suggested that, as the objectives
of standardisation and reciprocal inspection are compatible with the
Frigg Agreement, the Frigg Field Consultative Commission could be
entrusted with additional responsibility. The Commission could also
be made responsible for the new Statfjord and additional fields which
may be developed jointly, an alternative preferable to the creation
of new Commissions for each new shared field. Increased responsibil¬
ity would make it possible that the present Commission expand from
its current representation of three persons from each Government.
Meetings would still be "from time to time" unless it became apparent
that a definite schedule was required, but a permanent Secretariat
ought to be established in order to facilitate communication.
2. Control of accidental discharges from installations
It is suggested that the Commission proposed above also be given
authority and responsibility to coordinate efforts to prevent and
control pollution caused by accidents to installations. The Commis¬
sion could prove to be of particular value in coordinating activities
of the two States if the forthcoming Conference on Safety and Pollu¬
tion Safeguards should conclude a Convention.
3. Control of operational discharges from vessels
It is proposed that the U.K. and Norway enact enabling legisla¬
tion permitting ratification of the 1973 IMCO Convention. The Con¬
vention ought to be made applicable to U.K. and Norwegian vessels (to
15. Although considerable research into the problems of oily water
separation is already occurring, it is generally admitted by
those concerned that much additional work is needed. See,
Heriot-Watt University, Institute of Offshore Engineering, The
Separation of Oil from Water for North Sea Operations, the Col- .
lected Papers of a seminar held in Edinburgh, 22 and 23 June 1976.
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the extent technologically practicable) as soon as possible, regard¬
less of the likelihood that the Convention will not be in force for
some years. The U.K. or Norwegian law implementing the 1973 IMCO
Convention should be made applicable to foreign flag vessels engaged
in petroleum development activities by requiring that the licensee
only contract with vessel owners who agree to be bound by it. U.K.
and Norwegian shipping interests are likely to protest that such action
would invite retaliation by other States. In the writer's view,
retaliation against British and Norwegian vessels by the imposition
of similar requirements is likely to affect few British or Norwegian
interests, and if done for the same reasons may in fact be welcome.
Retaliation by America or Liberia against the British or Norwegian
merchant fleet is unlikely indeed. The Convention ought also to be
applied to military and other Government vessels of the two States.
It is proposed that the two Governments agree to a scheme of
reciprocal enforcement of the 1973 IMCO Convention. Each State would
be given the same rights of inspection and enforcement that it exer¬
cised in respect of its own vessels. Such an agreement is absolutely
dependent on the mutual bona fides of the two States; it is submitted
that no problem is likely to arise in this regard and that the agree¬
ment could provide for prosecution by either State at the option of
the flag (or controlling) State with little likelihood that the scheme
would be abused.
Finally, it should again be observed that the provision of ade¬
quate reception facilities to receive wastes is absolutely essential
to the operation of the Convention. It is recommended that the two
Governments coordinate their assessment of and planning for this need.
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4. Control of accidental discharges from vessels
a) Intervention Convention
It is suggested that the two Governments agree to permit inter¬
vention with each other's vessels under the Intervention Convention
when a maritime casualty is imminent rather than, as under the Con¬
vention, a fait accompli. This could be applied to foreign flag
vessels working in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors through the licen¬
see. As there would be no attempt to interfere with foreign flag
vessels on the high seas without their consent, this proposal is ent¬
irely consistent with international law.
b) Intervention Protocol
It is proposed that the U.K. and Norwegian Governments enact
legislation to enable acceptance of the Protocol relating to Interven¬
tion on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances
other than Oil, 1973. The Protocol should be accepted inter se even
before it comes into force.
5. Control of vessel/installation collisions
At present the right to interfere with a foreign flag vessel
likely to collide with an installation is unclear. It is suggested
that, pending agreement on an IMCO Convention on Wreck Removal and
Related Issues which sets out the rights and duties of Parties in
such cases, the U.K. and Norwegian Governments agree bilaterally to
permit such intervention with each other's vessels (including foreign
flag vessels working for licensees) . The Agreement could be modelled
on the Intervention Convention as amended inter se. It is thought
that the conclusion of such an agreement would also prove useful in
forcing the two Governments to formalise the issues involved in such
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cases, and to agree on general guidelines for dealing with vessel/rig
collision situations and could well promote the conclusion of an
international convention containing similar provisions.
6. Control of dumping
In the writer's view, the Oslo and London Dumping Conventions to
which both States are Parties are generally satisfactory instruments
for the control of dumping in the North Sea. It is suggested that,
pending agreement of other Oslo Convention members, the U.K. and Nor¬
wegian Governments agree bilaterally to a scheme of reciprocal en¬
forcement. This proposal is particularly directed to control of
dumping from pipelaying barges, supply vessels, etc. The suggested
reciprocal enforcement scheme would be similar to that proposed to
control vessel-source pollution, although it is thought that provision
of separate instruments embodying such agreement would result in a
system more amenable to change.
7. Compensation for damage caused by petroleum development
a) installations: crude oil damage and clean-up costs
It is thought that the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of
Seabed Mineral Resources represents the most effective compensation
scheme on which the U.K. and Norwegian Governments are presently pre¬
pared to agree. Consequently, no suggestions for increased protection
for victims of damage caused by crude oil discharged from installa¬
tions or pipelines will be made other than recommending that it be
adopted inter se pending its coming into force and that the Parties
undertake to review the Convention in the light of experience with it
in order to improve protection where necessary. The 1976 Convention
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is used as a model for suggested bilateral agreements. (See Table
X-3 on the following page.)
b) installations: other petroleum products and chemicals
It is proposed that the U.K. and Norway conclude a formal bi-
t
lateral agreement relating to compensation for damage and clean-up
costs (including preventive measures) caused by the discharge of
petroleum products other than crude oil and chemicals from installa¬
tions and pipelines. At the present time there is no statutory com¬
pensation scheme (and no private agreement) to compensate victims of
such damage. It is conceded that at present the need for the proposed
agreement is not great: as there is no offshore refining or petro¬
chemical industry, discharges of petroleum products and chemicals
are likely to be of comparatively minor significance (for example,
petrol spills and mud dumping). However, as has been pointed out
earlier, ambitious plans for basing a petro-chemical industry on
North Sea oil are underway, and it is not inconceivable that disused
production platforms will complement other artificial islands used
for a variety of purposes which could involve a high risk of hydro¬
carbon or chemical discharge. It is evident that some provision to
compensate persons injured by such activities will be necessary.
The licensee and the operator of the installation or pipeline
would be jointly and severally liable for damage and clean-up costs
(including preventive measures)Strict liability with the usual
exceptions is proposed, it not being thought likely that absolute
16. It is thought that the imposition of joint and several liability
would help ensure that the licensee was careful in the selection
of his operator and that the operator was careful in the manner
in which he conducted operations.
TABLEX-3
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liability would be acceptable to the Parties. Liability limits
would be identical with those of the 1976 Convention.
It is proposed that a fund be established which would be avail¬
able for the purpose of compensating victims and also finance research
and development of pollution control techniques. The fund would be
constituted by the levy of a .05 SDR fee on each barrel of petroleum
product or chemical transferred to or from an offshore installation
or transported by submarine pipeline. The fee collection would con¬
tinue until the maximum liability limit was reached. It is recognised
that the fund is likely to have a zero balance for several years,
until taxable activity occurs. It is the writer's view that this is
of little consequence. It is desirable to have regulatory machinery
available before such activity commences and the absence of funds only
reflects the absence of risk for which the proposed agreement would
17
be constituted.
It is not thought likely that the Parties would consent to an
arrangement whereby persons could claim compensation for damage to
the environment or even for loss of earnings in the total amount est¬
imated to have been lost. However, it is suggested that the U.K. and
Norway may accept an arrangement whereby a person who can prove that
he derives at least 50 per cent, of his earnings from activities which
utilise oceanic resources regardless of whether or not such resources
are his property could claim compensation. This scheme is proposed,
17. Foreknowledge of pollution prevention provisions will enable the
entrepreneur to base pricing decisions on a more realistic pro¬
jection of costs. It is thought that planning for such costs
rather than imposing them ex post facto is a more promising
approach to North Sea management.
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in slightly varying forms, in a number of Bills currently being
considered by the U.S. Congress and is likely (in the turbulent wake
of the Argo Merchant, et al. incidents) to become law in the near
future.
c) tankers: persistent oil damage and clean-up costs
It is proposed that the 1969 Civil Liability Convention be aug¬
mented by the 1971 Fund Convention accepted inter se. This would not
appear to pose significant problems as both Governments have already
ratified the Fund, thus indicating their willingness to be bound by
its provisions. The Fund Convention would thus replace CRISTAL inso¬
far as U.K. and Norwegian cargo receivers are concerned.
d) tankers: other petroleum products and chemicals
It is suggested that a bilateral agreement similar to that pro¬
posed in respect of installations and pipelines be concluded to com¬
pensate the victims of damage caused by petroleum products and chemi¬
cals. This agreement is needed immediately, for vessel transportation
of such substances in the North Sea occurs daily. The conclusion of
a bilateral agreement may exert some pressure on IMCO to hasten adop¬
tion of a multilateral convention on the same subject (which is now
under consideration), and could prove helpful in influencing the in¬
clusion of adequate compensation provisions in such an instrument as
well.
e) dumping from vessels and installations
i) debris damage and clean-up costs
It is proposed that the Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative
18. See footnote 3, at p. 521.
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Group be extended to the Norwegian Sector and that compensation be
available for any person who can prove that he has suffered damage
from oil-related debris. It is recognised that the Governments can
only ask that the operators (who have already extended the OPOL
Agreement to all but one North Sea sector) take the recommended
action. Nevertheless, it is thought to be in the interests of all
concerned that the present arrangement be expanded rather than to
approach the problem through the more formal legal machinery of bi¬
lateral agreement. It is of the utmost importance that the competing
users of the North Sea communicate with one another both in the pre¬
vention and the resolution of conflict. It is submitted that, under
the "polluter pays principle," offshore operators associations ought
to pay for the damage their members cause by unpermitted debris dump¬
ing. If the suggested arrangement does not work in practice, it is
always open to the Governments to assume the burden of providing a
more formal procedure for resolving this North Sea user conflict,
ii) damage and clean-up costs resulting from other substances
It is suggested that consideration be given to charging fees
for dumping permits and placing the proceeds in a fund to be used for
compensation and research into the effects of dumping on the marine
environment. At the present time this suggestion may be unnecessary.
Little licensed dumping occurs in the North Sea, and a fund would be
limited accordingly. Moreover, it is arguable that the imposition
of fees for permitted dumping would only exacerbate the problem of
19
illegal disposal at sea. In consequence, it is proposed only that
19. The present fee for a dumping permit in the U.K. is 45 pence.
Imposition of much higher fees would achieve the desired result
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should future evidence indicate that the cost of ocean dumping to
the environment and to other users of the sea has become significant,
those who benefit from such waste disposal (whether an individual or
society) ought to pay something for an activity that can in no sense
be considered "free."
D. A Model Legal Regime for the North Sea
The second step towards improved control of pollution in the
North Sea is to expand the scope of coverage beyond the U.K. and
Norwegian sectors to include the entire semi-enclosed sea. There is
also a significant change in emphasis: whereas in the model legal
regime for the United Kingdom and Norwegian sectors coordination was
the primary concern, the expanded regime is intended to manage the
North Sea with respect to pollution control (and, perhaps in the
future, with respect to the total use of that natural asset). It is
suggested that an organisation for North Sea management will be neces¬
sary for the proposed model legal regime to succeed.
1. An organisation for North Sea pollution control management
The proposed organisation could be established expressly to
achieve North Sea management objectives or an existing organisation
could be adapted. It is suggested that an additional organisation is
unnecessary; there are a number of existing international organisa¬
tions which could be tailored to coordinate the control of North Sea
pollution. A short list of candidate organisations would include the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), IMCO, the EEC, NATO and
only if enforcement were effective and the penalty for an
offence was severe enough to coerce compliance.
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the Oslo Commission. It is suggested that the Oslo Commission is
the most satisfactory candidate.
a) UNEP
The UNEP, although concerned with the precise problem for which
an organisation is needed and responsible in part for regional schemes
in other areas, is an unsatisfactory choice because: 1) it is so
poorly funded at present that it has been urged to limit its tasks,
2) UNEP headquarters in Nairobi are geographically remote from the
North Sea, and 3) as a U.N. Organisation, the UNEP is subject to
political pressures greater in both kind and degree from those likely
to characterise a purely regional grouping of North Sea or North
Atlantic States.
b) IMCO
IMCO is a strong candidate, for although it is primarily con¬
cerned with vessels, its frame of reference is actually maritime mat¬
ters. It would therefore be quite consistent with IMCO's remit to
vest responsibility for control of pollution from both mobile and
fixed installations in that organisation. On the other hand, the
Council and the Maritime Safety Committee (IMCO's principal operating
organs) are controlled by maritime interests.^ Moreover, the organ¬
isation is large, representing diverse interests on a global scale.
20. The Council consists of 18 members, 6 from States with the larg¬
est shipping interests, 6 from States with the largest maritime
trading interests, and 6 from States with special interests in
maritime transport or navigation. The MSC is composed of 16
members of which 8 are from the 10 largest ship-owning States,
and the remainder from States with an important interest in
maritime safety. As all recommendations of the MSC must be
submitted to the Assembly through the Council, such measures
must negotiate two potentially biased organs. Even MEPC propos¬
als must be submitted to the Assembly through the Council. See
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c) EEC
The EEC appears to be an ideal organisation to manage the North
21
Sea. It has certain supranational powers and all North Sea States
except Norway are bound formally by the Treaty of Rome. The EEC has
considerable experience and resources which could be applied to North
Sea management problems. Nevertheless, the writer considers that the
disadvantages of EEC North Sea management would, at least initially,
outweigh the advantages.
A number of points may be made in this regard. Most importantly,
Norwegian rejection of EEC membership means that one of the two sect¬
ors in which most of the petroleum development is presently occurring
is not subject to Community policies and decisions. Although Norway
and the EEC could agree that the former would be bound by Community
actions in respect of pollution control—but in no other way, such
a limitation would remove any advantage that the EEC enjoyed over
the Oslo Convention Commission. Moreover, the Norwegian attitude
toward implementing EEC policies which are intended to be consistent
with the Community's best interests is likely to be less than
22
sympathetic.
Hallman, R., Towards an Environmentally Sound Law of the Sea, A
Report of the International Institute for Environment and Devel¬
opment, London (1974), at pp. 48-49.
21. "The future of European law of the sea lies with the Common Mar¬
ket which can make an important contribution to European mari¬
time order and provide a model of regional co-operation for other
areas of the globe." Janis, M., "The Development of European
Regional Law of the Sea," 1 Ocean Development and International
Law 275-289 (1973-1974), at p. 275.
22. The tendency of EEC States to oppose a common plan when individ¬
ual interests are thought to be threatened has been illustrated
on many occasions, for example the U.K. and Irish views on fish¬
ing policy and the former State's attitude to EEC effluent dis¬
charge standards.
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The formal structure and economic objectives of the EEC may
inhibit its performance. It is sometimes easier to agree in looser
23
political groupings simply because they are looser in character.
Furthermore, many observers think that the present tendency of EEC
policies to fragment into national self-interest will increase dram¬
atically if such States as Greece, Turkey and Spain are admitted. A
larger EEC would be less relevant to the North Sea, more concerned
with its own internal problems, and more bureaucratic than it is at
present.
Finally, it should be observed that the EEC is first of all an
economic organisation. The primacy of this objective might well
cause any compromise between economic and environmental objectives to
be heavily weighted in favour of the former,
d) NATO
Although all the North Sea States are Parties to NATO, it is sug¬
gested that this Organization would be an unsatisfactory choice be¬
cause of its military objectives. Cooperation with other States or
regional groupings could be difficult and a possible merging of North
Sea and Baltic Sea regimes would be made quite improbable. Moreover,
it is unnecessarily large and geographically dispersed. NATO may
prove to be a useful organisation to assist in the enforcement of
North Sea pollution control standards because it has considerable
resources and expertise in surveillance, but even in this limited cap¬
acity it would be necessary to determine that the price of enforcement
was not cooperation with other States.
23. Hardy, M., op. cit. in footnote 8, at p. 339.
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e) The Bonn Agreement
The establishment of a Commission within the Bonn Agreement
could result in an organisation well suited to North Sea management.
However, the broad scope of this task would require that the new
Commission assume certain authority to control North Sea pollution
from ocean dumping, a task for which the Oslo Commission is presently
responsible. One organisation ought to be clearly responsible for
North Sea management. It is suggested that the Oslo Commission could
easily assume duties which might be assigned to a new Bonn Commission,
whereas the reverse could raise problems in respect of non-North Sea
24
Oslo Convention States,
f) The Oslo Convention
It is suggested that the States Parties to the Oslo Dumping Con¬
vention expand its terms of reference to include coordination of
measures to prevent pollution from operational and accidental dis¬
charges from installations and vessels in the Oslo Convention area.
This proposal would require that the Convention be amended. It is
suggested that, although the Convention can be amended by a two-thirds
25
vote of the Parties, the requirement that the amended Convention be
vigorously implemented by all Members requires unanimity in this case.
The Oslo Convention offers a number of advantages as an organis¬
ation for the coordination of pollution control in the North Sea. It
24. It will be recalled that the Oslo Convention area is somewhat
larger than the North Sea. It is essentially a Northeast Atlan¬
tic area, extending to the seas adjacent to Convention Members
Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Iceland, Spain and Portugal as well
as the North Sea.
25. Oslo Convention, Article 5.
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is an existing regional Convention, including all the North Sea
26
States, plus others in the Northeastern Atlantic area. It has
27
a permanent Commission, thus facilitating Convention management.
Finally, it should be noted that it has been resolved that the Com¬
missions of the Oslo and Paris Conventions should consist of the same
representatives, that their meetings should be combined, and that a
28
common secretariat should be established. The new Commission would
therefore be an organisation already concerned with the coordination
of land-based sources of marine pollution and ocean dumping to which
can be assigned additional responsibilities in respect of a regional
scheme of pollution control.
2. Organisation of the expanded Oslo Commission
The organisation indicated by the suggested areas of concentra¬
tion described below would require the creation of a permanent full-
time secretariat. It may be that the suggested duties require expan¬
sion of the present Commission. Certainly, additional staff would be
necessary to provide Commission Members with the necessary information
upon which to base management decisions.
26. Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany are not yet members,
but have implemented the Convention on a voluntary basis and
are expected to ratify the Agreement in the near future. Con¬
versation with Mr. G.F. Buxton, Secretary to Oslo Commission,
28 March 1977.
27. The Commission's Draft Resolution which would include debris
from offshore petroleum development as "dumping" illustrates
the value of a standing authority competent to adapt a scheme
to changing needs.
28. Oslo Commission, First Annual Report (November 1975), pp. 10-11.
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3. Suggested areas of concentration
a) promotion of scientific inquiry and technological
development
The Commission should assign high priority to the promotion
of scientific inquiry and technological development by the several
States. It is not thought that the North Sea States would accept a
proposal that the Commission solicit bids for research or support
specific projects with monies accumulated in proposed Convention
Funds. In consequence, the Commission's role would be limited to
that of coordinator and advocate. Should the proposed Conventions
be accepted, individual States would retain custody of Fund monies.
b) coordination and expansion of existing pollution
prevention conventions
Another very important task for early consideration is that of
coordination of existing conventions relevant to North Sea pollution
control. It is thought that, although it would be desirable to
replace the present patchwork of pollution control conventions with
a comprehensive "umbrella" convention for the control of all North Sea
pollution, this is not a realistic proposal. It is therefore sugges¬
ted that Oslo Convention States be urged to ratify existing conven¬
tions and that those instruments be strengthened by regional agree¬
ment where necessary. (See Table X-4 on the following page for a
tabulation of North Sea State acceptance of existing conventions,
and Table X-5 on pages 565-566 for a summary of the proposed model
legal regime for pollution control in the North Sea.)
i) installations; operational discharges
It is proposed that the Commission recommend to member States
that the Paris Convention be interpreted to include offshore petroleum
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TABLE X-4
NORTH SEA STATE ACCEPTANCE OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Convention Bel. Den. Fra. Ger. Neth. Nor. U.K.
Continental Shelf x x x x x




Amendments) x x x x x x x
1969 IMCO Amendments* x x x x x x
1971 IMCO Amendments
(Tanks)* x x
Intervention x x x x x x x
Intervention Protocol*
London Dumping x x x
Bonn Agreement x x x x x x x
1976 Civil Liability*
1969 Civil Liability x x x x x x
1971 Fund* x x x x
*Not in force
Note: acceptance as of February 1977.
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development installations within the definition of "man-made
structures." This proposal, if accepted, would allow the Commission
to agree upon standards for operational discharges from platforms.
It is thought that there is little that can realistically be done to
improve on the "best practicable" effluent discharge standard dis¬
cussed above until improvements in technology permit more specific
requirements. Even then, it may be that the peculiar characteristics
of individual installations (for example, placement, age) preclude
specific discharge standards.
It is proposed that provision be made for reciprocal inspection
although, as indicated in connection with the discussion concerning
the United Kingdom-Norway proposed legal regime, it is thought that
this will be of practical importance only in common fields.
ii) vessels: operational discharges
It is recommended that the Commission urge the Governments of
States Parties to enact legislation permitting voluntary application
of the 1973 IMCO Convention to the vessels of member States, and that
29
Members ratify the Convention as soon as possible. Members should
agree to use "the best practicable technology" in cases (such as that
of oily water separators for "white oils") in which compliance with
specific discharge standards is not yet "practicable." It would be a
task of the Commission to determine what was "practicable," considering
29. The Commission should also support the Carter Administration's
recommendation to Congress that the 1973 IMCO Convention be
ratified by the U.S. U.S. ratification would not only provide
another State with a substantial merchant fleet which would
assist progress towards entry into force, but could contribute
toward a general "groundswell" of State acceptance. See Pres¬
ident Carter's Message to Congress, 18 March 1977.
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various factors. It should be required that whenever a "best
practicable" standard is used it be subject to annual review by the
Commission so that it does not become permanent. Consideration should
be given to obtaining observer status at IMCO and to the establishment
of a joint committee with IMCO concerned with the improved control of
vessel-source pollution.
The vexed problem of enforcement could be minimised if the
States Parties to the Oslo Convention so agreed. It is recommended
that an attempt be made to conclude an agreement among the Parties
to submit to reciprocal inspection and enforcement of the 1973 IMCO
Convention, as well as other schemes intended to control pollution
from vessels. Each State should have the rights of inspection and
prosecution in respect of the non-Governmental vessels of other Oslo
Convention States that it has in respect of its own vessels. In
theory, this would mean that vessels could be boarded on the high
seas, and this might indeed happen occasionally. In practice, there
is little enforcement done at sea for the reason that it is too ex¬
pensive. As a practical matter, most inspection would occur in port.
The agreement should provide for prosecution either by the
inspecting State or the flag State, at the option of the flag State.
It is thought that this compromise would be necessary in order to gain
the necessary acceptance for the scheme among Member States. Although
this arrangement is subject to abuse, it is not thought likely that
this will occur. North Sea States have a common interest in preserv¬
ation of a small semi-enclosed sea and in mutual good relations. The
problem of securing agreement is thought to be far greater than that of
ensuring good faith compliance with an agreement that has been accepted.
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It is recognised that agreement among North Sea States to con¬
trol vessel-source pollution omits consideration of foreign flag
vessels from other States. Foreign vessels engaged in work on the
North Sea continental shelf could be regulated through the concession
licensee. The regulation of vessels merely navigating through the
North Sea, whether to North Sea State ports or otherwise, should be
attempted by informal and formal bilateral agreement pending control
by multilateral convention,
iii) vessels: accidental discharges
It is suggested that the Oslo Commission recommend to Member
States (all of which have accepted the Intervention Convention) that
they agree to an amendment of the Intervention Convention inter se
to permit intervention when a maritime casualty is imminent. It is
thought that there should be no objection in principle to this pro¬
posal which would only formalise what, in the writer's view, States
would be likely to do anyway. It is also of importance that North
Sea States accept the Intervention Protocol (permitting intervention
when non-oil substances threaten pollution damage) inter se, as North
Sea petro-chemical complex proliferation is likely to precede Protocol
effectiveness.
iv) vessels and installations: dumping
The Commission should seek to implement reciprocal enforcement
procedures under the Oslo Convention to control ocean dumping from
vessels and installations. In essence, this proposal envisages a
scheme to assist States with the enormously difficult task of con-
*
trolling "convenience disposal," a term meant to describe dumping of
wastes produced in the North Sea area and disposed of at sea not be¬
cause they are particularly toxic or dangerous, but because it is the
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easy way to get rid of them. State vessels on constabulary duty
(for example, fisheries protection) should be authorised to stop
non-Government vessels of member States on the high seas when there
is reason to believe that the vessel has dumped illegally or intends
to do so. Evidence of an actual or intended offence should be turned
over to the flag State (or the State which has issued a petroleum
licence for an area of the continental shelf in which the vessel is
employed, if it is a foreign flag vessel) which should be under a
duty to investigate and prosecute the alleged offender under its
national laws.
v) cooperation in pollution abatement
The Commission should administer the Bonn Agreement for Coopera¬
tion in dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil. This Agree¬
ment should be amended in order to make zones of responsibility con¬
form with sectors of the continental shelf. Furthermore, the Com¬
mission should encourage member States to coordinate and intensify
their research and development of equipment and procedures for pollu¬
tion abatement. For example, while the U.K. favours the immediate
use of dispersants to prevent slicks from threatening coastlines or
other related interests, the Norwegian policy is to resort to this
technique only if mechanical clean-up devices cannot be used. Research
is needed to determine precisely what the short and long term effects
of dispersants are on a variety of marine organisms in conditions
which faithfully reflect those which would be likely to be encountered
in practice. This effort should be supplemented by investigations
into technologically advanced mechanical devices for pollution abate¬
ment. More extensive information is necessary to provide the basis
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for a common policy to combat possible oil spills and other dis¬
charges. The Commission should help members to agree on shared
equipment procurement and employment procedures. For example, it
has been observed by an expert on the subject that available equip¬
ment is inadequate to extinguish a possible production platform fire
which, in consequence, might have to be left to burn for a year or
more while the necessary equipment was constructed. It is conceded
that one cannot insure against every possible risk; however, pooling
of knowledge and resources (perhaps in relation to number of wells
drilled, producing, or some other factor indicating risk-creation) is
a common-sense answer to what must be admitted to be a common problem,
c) proposed pollution prevention conventions
i) installations: accidental discharges
It is recommended that the Oslo Commission urge Member States
to continue the work of the 1973 Conference on Pollution Safeguards,
again with a view towards the early conclusion of a Convention to
control accidental discharges from installations. The new Convention
should embody standards and procedures determined by the States
Parties in consultation with interested organisations (such as the
Oil Companies Exploration and Production Forum, the U.K.0.0.A., and
fishing and environmental groups) and with reference to any existing
internationally-agreed standards. Uniform standards should be adopted
insofar as they facilitate common inspection, enforcement, and com¬
pliance, but the peculiar needs of the North Sea (or a location
30. Comments of Red Adair, expert oil fire fighter on "The Energy
File," a BBC 1 television presentation, 6 April 1977, at 10:45
p.m.
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therein) should not be sacrificed merely to achieve uniformity. Al¬
though it is true that a convention intended to promote installation
safety also indirectly promotes pollution prevention, it is suggested
that the very term "safety" be defined in the proposed Convention to
include "environmental safety." This definition is intended to min¬
imise the possibility that some standards and practices which may
cause marine pollution but are otherwise safe (in the sense of risk
to life or investment) may be accepted,
ii) vessel/installation collisions
It is recommended that pending the coming into force of the pro¬
posed IMCO Convention on Wreck Removal and Related Issues, the States
Parties to the Oslo Convention agree to extend the Intervention Con¬
vention to cases in which one of their vessels threatens to collide
with an offshore installation. While there may be grounds for sug¬
gesting that Parties which do not have significant numbers of off¬
shore installations or are not located near areas of offshore activ¬
ity (for example, Iceland) may be reluctant to agree to such a scheme,
it is thought that the safeguards incorporated in the Intervention
Convention as well as the greater degree of trust possible among a
small group of States with generally similar interests would minimise
this potential obstacle. Even should such States not agree, the es¬
sential purpose of the proposal could be fulfilled among the remain¬
ing States.
d) coordination and expansion of existing compensation schemes
i) installations: crude oil damage and clean-up costs
Member States should be urged to accept the 1976 Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration
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for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources. Although only
four acceptances are required for the Convention to become effective,
it is crucial that the U.K. and Norway be numbered among the four if
that instrument is to afford pollution victims protection from the
most likely sources of injury. (See Table X-6 on following page.)
ii) tankers: persistent oil damage and clean-up costs
All North Sea States are bound by the 1969 Civil Liability Con¬
vention. (See Table X-4 on page 564.) The Commission should actively
encourage acceptance of the Fund Convention, not only among North Sea
States, but elsewhere. Unless the Fund Convention comes into force,
North Sea States would have to continue dependence upon CRISTAL, ac¬
cept the Fund Convention inter se, or draft a new convention. It is
suggested that CRISTAL is inadequate and that without international
acceptance the Fund Convention would be stripped of its primary at¬
traction. It is therefore recommended that, should it appear that
the Fund is not going to receive the requisite ratifications to become
effective (for example, a United States decision to enact its own
scheme instead of accepting the Fund), increased compensation for the
victims of persistent oil carried by tankers be included in a proposed
convention (discussed below) concerned with damage from other petrol¬
eum products and chemicals.
iii) vessels and installations: oil-related debris
The Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group compensation
scheme, now limited to damage to U.K. fishermen in the U.K. sector,
should be expanded to cover damage to any vessel caused by oil-related
debris any place in the North Sea. As in the proposal to extend the
scheme to Norway, the amended scheme would also include damage caused
TABLEX-6
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by oil-related subsea objects (such as abandoned well heads) unless
permitted by the Controlling State. The arguments for preferring
this approach over a more formal treaty arrangement are set out above
in connection with the United Kingdom - Norway proposed legal regime.
Expansion of the Agreement could follow the evolution of OPOL which
also began its existence as a scheme which applied only to the U.K.
sector. It is suggested that consideration be given to combining
the two Agreements into a single instrument setting forth offshore
operator liability for pollution or debris damage. It is thought that
offshore operators would be receptive to this proposal if it were
presented as an alternative to an inter-Governmental arrangement. It
may be pointed out that in those areas of the North Sea where there
is little offshore petroleum development claims are unlikely^1 and
extension of the Agreement is therefore unnecessary. But this ob¬
jection may be answered by the assertion that those who stand to gain
by the creation of risk ought to be prepared to compensate victims of
their activities. Machinery to effect this objective ought to exist
before an injury occurs. Since no investment is required, to the
extent that absence of activity in some areas of the North Sea reduces
the likelihood of injury, the offshore operators likewise are
unaffected.
e) proposed compensation schemes
Two bilateral agreements were proposed for the United Kingdom -
Norway regime to effect new compensation schemes. It is suggested here
31. There have been no complaints to the Oslo Commission concerning
debris dumping in the North Sea south of 55 N. Conversation with
Mr. G.F. Buxton, Secretary to Oslo Commission, 28 March 1977.
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that these bilateral agreements be made multilateral. The essence
of the proposals remains unchanged.
i) vessels and installations: other petroleum products
and chemicals
It is proposed that a regional convention under the auspices of
the Oslo Commission be concluded to provide compensation for damage
caused by substances other than persistent oil discharged from ves¬
sels or installations. The form of the proposed Convention would be
very much affected by IMCO's successes in concluding similar conven¬
tions which become accepted. If, in the view of the Commission, the
1971 Fund Convention is not likely to come into force within a time
which is determined to be acceptable, it is suggested that persistent
oil carried by tankers also be included in this proposal. On the
other hand, should IMCO's work towards a convention concerning civil
liability for substances other than oil carried by vessels prove suc¬
cessful and if, in the opinion of the Commission, the IMCO Convention
provided satisfactory protection for potential victims, this proposal
could be narrowed accordingly. In the proposed United Kingdom - Norway
legal regime separate bilateral agreements were suggested in order to
facilitate such possible future adjustments. In the case of multi¬
lateral agreements, however, it is thought that the duplication
involved might more easily be avoided by using a single instrument,
perhaps in two parts.
The proposed convention would provide compensation for damage
caused by the accidental or intentional discharge of petroleum prod¬
ucts and chemicals in the area in which a State Party exercises
sovereignty or sovereign rights pursuant to international law, and
to preventive measures wherever taken. It is suggested that the
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definitions of non-persistent oils and chemicals used in the 1973 IMCO
Convention be employed. As in the case of the proposed United Kingdom -
Norway bilateral agreements, liability would be strict, and would be
placed on the licensee and operator or the vessel and cargo owners, as
the case may be. The same arrangements for a Fund are proposed.
E. The Future
The late 1960's and early 1970's were heady years for environment¬
alists. The Torrey Canyon incident aroused international concern, the
Santa Barbara disaster confirmed the public's worst fears, and the
1972 Conference on the Human Environment promised a brighter future.
The environmental euphoria is now gone, extinguished by an ailing
global economy. In its place is a new awareness that any decision
taken concerning the environment has an associated cost. As our
resources are clearly finite, it is evident that their efficient
utilisation is necessary if we are to fulfill our objectives. But
what are "our" objectives?
It is not necessary to look beyond events at UNCLOS III to answer
this question. Objectives vary with perceived self-interests that
transcend even political boundaries. States are not likely to pay the
price for environmental protection unless they think it will benefit
them to do so. State determination of self-interest is a cost-benefit
analysis. It is evident, therefore, that perceived self-interests of
States may unnecessarily diverge because cost or benefit data upon
which the analysis is based is inaccurate. Because environmental
protection is particularly difficult to quantify, it is the writer's
view that more complete information concerning associated costs and
benefits would result in a greater harmony of State interests.
578
The description of the causes and effects of marine pollution
and the analysis of international and national law intended to control
it undertaken in this thesis confirm that an interdisciplinary approach
to environmental protection is necessary. It cannot start too soon.
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APPENDIX I
U.K. LAW REGULATING POLLUTION FROM SEABED SOURCES
I. Pollution from Seabed Operations
A. The Continental Shelf Act 1964
1. Relevant Acts extended offshore in whole or part
a) The Submarine Telegraph Act 1885
b) The Petroleum (Production) Act 1934
c) The Coast Protection Act 1949
d) The Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949
e) The Radioactive Substances Act I960
2. Regulations made pursuant to the Act
a) The Continental Shelf (Designation of Areas)
Order (1964 No. 697)
b) The Continental Shelf (Designation of Additional
Areas) Order (1965 No. 1531)
c) The Continental Shelf (Designation of Additional
Areas) Order (1968 No. 891)
d) The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order (1968
No. 892)
e) The Continental Shelf (Designation of Additional
Areas) Order (1971 No. 594)
f) The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction)(Amendment)
Order (1971 No. 721)
g) The Continental Shelf (Designation of Additional
Areas) Order (1974 No. 1489)
h) The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction)(Amendment)
Order (1974 No. 1490)
i) The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction)(Amendment)
Order (1975 No. 1708)
j) The Continental Shelf (Designation of Additional
Areas) Order (1976 No. 1153)
k) The Continental Shelf (Protection of Installations)
Order (1976 No. 332)
1) The Continental Shelf (Protection of Installations)
(No. 2) Order (1976 No. 954)
m) The Continental Shelf (Protection of Installations)
(No. 3) Order (1976 No. 1308)
n) The Continental Shelf (Protection of Installations)
(No. 4) Order (1976 No. 1497)
o) The Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction)(Amendment)
Order (1976 No. 1517)
p) The Continental Shelf (Protection of Installations)
Order (1977 No. 712)
B. The Petroleum (Production) Regulations (1976 No. 1129)
C. The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971
D. The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971
1. The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act
1971 (Commencement) Order (1972 No. 644)
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2. The Offshore Installations (Registration) Regulations
(1972 No. 702)
3. The Offshore Installations (Managers) Regulations
(1972 No. 703)
4. Offshore Installations (Logbooks and Registration
of Death) Regulations (1972 No. 1542)
5. The Offshore Installations (Inspectors and Casualties)
Regulations (1973 No. 1842)
6. The Offshore Installations (Construction and Survey)
Regulations (1974 No. 289)
7. The Offshore Installations (Public Inquiries) Reg¬
ulations (1974 No. 338)
8. The Offshore Installations (Diving Operations)
Regulations (1974 No. 1229)
9. The Offshore Installations (Operational Safety,
Health and Welfare) Regulations (1976 No. 1019)
10. The Offshore Installations (Emergency Procedures)
Regulations (1976 No. 1542)
E. The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975
1. The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975
(Commencement) Order (1975 No. 2120)
2. The Submarine Pipelines (Diving Operations)
Regulations (1976 No. 923)
II. Pollution from Tankers and Support Vessels
A. The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971
1. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Ships' Equipment)
(No. 1) Regulations (1956 No. 1423)
2. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Transfer Records)
Regulations (1957 No. 358)
3. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Ships' Equipment)
Regulations (1957 No. 1424)
4. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Enforcement of
Convention) Order (1958 No. 1526)
5. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Heavy Diesel Oil)
Regulations (1967 No. 710)
6. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Shipping Casualties)
Order (1971 No. 1736)
7. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Exceptions) Regulations
(1972 No. 1928)
8. The Oil in Navigable Waters (Records) Regulations
(1972 No. 1929)
9. The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 (Commence¬
ment) Order (1973 No. 203)
B. The Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (Part II)
1. The Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (Commencement
No. 1) Order (1974 No. 1792)
2. The Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (Commencement
No. 2) Order (1975 No. 866)
III. Pollution from Dumping at Sea: The Dumping at Sea Act 1974
A. The Dumping at Sea Act 1974 (Isle of Man) Order
(1975 No. 810)




U.K. LAW OF LIABILITY FOR MARINE POLLUTION
I. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971
A. The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971
(Commencement) Order (1971 No. 1423)
B. The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971
(Commencement No. 2) Order (1975 No. 867)
C. The Oil Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations
(1977 No. 85)
II. Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (Part I)
A. The Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (Commencement No. 1)
Order (1974 No. 1792)
B. The Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (Commencement No. 2)
Order (1975 No. 866)
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APPENDIX III
NORWEGIAN LAW REGULATING POLLUTION FROM SEABED OPERATIONS
I. Pollution from Seabed Operations
A. Royal Decree of 31st May, 1963
B. Act No. 12 of 21st June, 1963 relating to Exploration
for and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources
1. Royal Decree of 3rd October 1975, Relating to
Safe Practices etc. in Exploration and Drilling
for Submarine Petroleum Resources (as amended)
a) Regulations for drilling for petroleum,
issued by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
29 August 1975
b) Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms
with Installations and Equipment used for
Drilling for Petroleum in Norwegian Internal
Waters, in Norwegian Territorial Waters and
in that Part of the Continental Shelf which
is under Norwegian Sovereignty, issued by the
Maritime Directorate 10 September 1973 (as
amended)
C. Act Relating to Public Control of the Seaworthiness
of Ships of 9 June 1903 (as amended)
1. Regulations for Construction and Operation of
Mobile Drilling Platforms with Installation and
Equipment which are Registered or which are to
be Registered in the Norwegian Register of Ship,
issued by the Maritime Directorate on 5 May 1975
2. Regulations for Manning of Norwegian Mobile
Drilling Platforms with Installations and
Equipment used for Drilling for Submarine Petroleum
Resources issued by the Norwegian Maritime
Directorate 28 February 1975
II. Pollution from Tankers and Support Vessels
A. Act Concerning Protective Measures Against Damage
from Oil Pollution of 6 March 1970
1. Regulations Concerning Prohibition Against Discharge
of Oil into the Sea from Ships etc., issued by the
Maritime Directorate, 27 April 1967
B. Harbour Act, 1933 (Section 24)
C. Act on Measures Pursuant to the International Convention
of November 29, 1969 on Intervention on the Free Seas
in Case of Oil Pollution Accidents, 16 June 1972, No. 46
1. Temporary Regulations on Intervention on the
High Seas in Case of Oil Pollution or Danger of
Oil Pollution as a Consequence of a Marine
Casualty, of 2 May 1975
D. Act of 17 December 1976 Relating to the Economic Zone
of Norway
III. Pollution from Dumping at Sea
A. Water Pollution Act, 26 June 1970
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1. Regulations on dumping of substances which may have
harmful effects on marine life and human health
B. Fishing Act, 17 June 1955 (Section 20)
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APPENDIX IV
NORWEGIAN LAW OF LIABILITY FOR MARINE POLLUTION
I. Act of 20 July 1893, No. 1, Sections 267-284 (The Marine Code)
A. Provisional Regulations Concerning Insurance and
Other Financial Security Against Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage and Regarding Certificate
II. Act of 9 April 1976, No. 21, on enforcement in Norwegian
Law of Environment Protection Convention between Norway,
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, signed on February 19, 1974
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